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Ab§tract 
Since its establishment, the IMF has been subject to constant interest from both 
academic circles and the media. Of the three types of the IMF's functions (regulatory, 
consultative, and financial), the latter- particularly the provision of temporary balance 
of payments support in the upper tranches with high conditionality - appear to have 
gained most of this interest. The fundamental and controversial feature of the IMF' s 
financial assistance is found in the concept of conditionality, which is the subject matter 
of this study. Critics often point out that IMF conditionality is imposed upon borrowing 
countries against their will. However, the IMF and its supporters have responded with 
the notion of ownership of IMF conditionality. This study focuses upon this 
controversy. 
The research investigates the controversial nature of IMF conditionality with a case 
study of Egypt. In particular, it deals with the issue of imposition-ownership. Unlike 
the two opposing schools which see the nature of IMF conditionality as a matter of 
either imposition or ownership, the study argues that IMF conditionality can involve 
both elements. In capturing such a perspective regarding the nature of IMF 
conditionality, the study utilises the notion of the linear spectrum, at the opposing ends 
of which the elements of imposition and ownership are located. Their relative degrees 
can be assessed through the negotiation process rather than focusing on either the initial 
position of the parties or the final outcome. The nature of IMF conditionality can be 
examined with the aid of the concept of power, which distinguishes between resources 
and application. The relative power of the party can, in tum, help determine the degree 
of imposition and ownership on the imposition-ownership spectrum. The study further 
suggests that relative degrees of power, and the consequent location on the imposition-
ownership spectrum, are not static but may vary during the course of negotiations, or 
indeed between negotiations. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
On 15 January 1998, a picture of President Suharto of Indonesia and Michel 
Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMP), was taken at 
the conclusion of Indonesia's financial arrangement with the IMP. In the picture, 
President Suharto was, with a humiliated and hopeless look, seated and signing a Letter 
of Intent in the presence of Camdessus, who was standing with crossed arms and a stem 
face. For the IMP, this depicted a disaster in terms of both public relations and in its 
attempt to defend the long-guarded notion of "ownership" of IMP conditionality -
which implicitly claimed that the borrowing country was willing to embrace terms 
included in IMP conditionality. However, to observers, the picture depicted the notion 
of imposition of IMP conditionality; President Suharto was being forced to hand over 
his country's economic sovereignty to the IMF. 1 
Since its establishment, the IMP has been subject to constant interest from both 
academic circles and the media. J. M. Fleming identified three types of the IMP's 
functions: regulatory; consultative; and financial? Of the three, the financial functions, 
particularly the provision of temporary balance of payments support in the upper 
tranches with high conditionality, appear to have gained most of this interest. The 
fundamental and controversial feature of the IMP's financial assistance is found in the 
concept of conditionality, which is the subject matter of this study. Critics often point 
out that IMP conditionality is imposed upon borrowing countries against their will. 
However, the IMP and its supporters have responded with the notion of ownership of 
IMP conditionality. I will be focusing upon this controversy in my thesis. 
The issue of imposition versus ownership matters for the crucial reason that it has been 
recognised that the successful implementation of IMP conditionality partly depends on 
the willingness of the borrowing country to carry it out. The notion of imposition 
implies that there is a lack of will on the part of the borrowing countries to accept IMP 
conditionality, whereas that of ownership suggests that there exists willingness on the 
part of borrowing countries and an agreement with the IMP regarding IMP 
1 See, for example, Stiglitz, J. E., Globalization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2002), pp. 40-41. 
2 Fleming, J. M., The International Monetary Fund: Its Fomz and Functions (Washington, D. C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1964). 
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conditionality. Given the poor record of the implementation of IMF conditionality, the 
role of imposition or ownership becomes significant. However, despite its importance, 
the issue has been long neglected and it is only in recent years that the IMF, under the 
current Managing Director (Horst Kohler), has publicly turned its attention to the issue 
of ownership of IMF conditionality in the broader initiative of 'streamlining and 
focusing IMF conditionality.' 
Much of the literature concernmg IMF conditionality focuses on the effects of IMF 
conditionality, in particular macroeconomic adjustment policies, upon borrowing 
countries.3 The imposition critique of IMF conditionality and the ownership argument 
with which the IMF has responded have existed for a long time and the debate between 
them has been intense since the second half of the 1970s. Nevertheless, there is a dearth 
of literature concerning the nature of IMF conditionality in relation to the controversial 
question of imposition versus ownership. Few authors have attempted to systematically 
address the issue. Those that have attempted to really unravel the debate have tended to 
limit the scope of their studies. For instance, Kendall Stiles, in his article 'IMF 
Conditionality: Coercion or Compromise?', concludes that IMF conditionality is based 
on compromise rather than being imposed upon the borrowing countries.4 However, 
there are at least two weaknesses in his study. Firstly, his methodology is based on 
interviews with IMF officials which are used to construct his model. This would mean 
3 See, for instance, Agarwal, M. and D. Sengupta, 'Structural Adjustment in Latin America: Polities and 
Performance,' Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 34, no. 44, 30 Oct. 1999, pp. 3129-3136; Auvinen, J. 
Y., 'IMF Intervention and Political Protest in the Third World: A Conventional Wisdom Refined,' Third 
World Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, 1996, pp. 377-400; Biersteker, T. J., 'Reducing the Role of the State in 
the Economy: A Conceptual Exploration of IMF and World Bank Prescriptions,' International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 4, Dec. 1990, pp. 477-492; Conway, P., 'IMF Lending Programs: Participation and 
Impact,' Journal of Development Economics, vol. 45, no. 2, Dec. 1994, pp. 365-391; Crisp, B. F. and M. 
J. Kelly, 'The Socioeconomic Impacts of Structural Adjustment,' International Studies Quarterly, vol. 
43, no. 3, Sept. 1999, pp. 533-552; Donovan, D. J., 'Macroeconomic Performance and Adjustment under 
Fund-Supported Programs: The Experience of the Seventies,' IMF Staff Papers, June 1982, vol. 29, no. 2, 
pp. 171-203; Doroodian, K., 'Macroeconomic Performance and Adjustment under Policies Commonly 
Supported by the International Monetary Fund,' Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 41, 
no. 4, 1993, pp. 849-864; Foxley, A., 'Stabilization Policies and their Effects on Employment and Income 
Distribution: A Latin American Perspective,' in W. R. Cline and S. Weintraub (eds.), Economic 
Stabilization in Developing Countries (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 191-233; 
Khan, M. S., 'The Macroeconomic Effects of the Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs,' IMF Staff 
Paper, vol. 37, no. 2, June 1990, pp. 195-231; Killick, T. (et al.), The Quest for Economic Stabilisation: 
The IMF and the Third World (London: Heinemann Educational, 1984b); Killick, T. and M. Malik, 
'Country Experiences with the IMF Programmes in the 1980s,' World Economy, vol. 15, no. 5, Sept. 
1992, pp. 599-632; Killick, T., M. Malik, and M. Manuel, 'What Can We Know About the Effects of 
IMF Programmes?,' World Economy, vol. 15, no. 5, Sept. 1992, pp. 575-597; and Schadler, S. (et al.), 
'IMF Conditionality: Experience under Stand-By and Extended Arrangements,' part I: Key Issues and 
Findings, IMF Occasional Paper, no. 128 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, Sept. 1995). 
4 Stiles, K. W., 'IMF Conditionality: Coercion or Compromise?,' World Development, vol. 18, no. 7, 
1990, pp. 959-974. 
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that part of the investigation focuses merely on one party, i.e. the IMF. Secondly, the 
issue of imposition-ownership is only tangentially addressed. The model is originally 
constructed with the aim of understanding the decision-making of the IMF and not the 
issue of imposition-ownership, even though the model has its own usefulness in 
explaining the decision-making of the IMF. It is argued in my study that it is necessary 
to deal with the issue of imposition-ownership directly and to pay attention to not only 
the IMF but also the borrowing countries. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to fill the gap in the literature. The study will 
attempt to provide a better understanding of IMF conditionality by examining the role 
and the nature of that conditionality, particularly in relation to the imposition versus 
ownership controversy. The examination will be placed in the context of the 
relationship between the two parties regarding the upper-credit tranche lending. The 
study will use Egypt as a case study and will cover the period between the 1960s, when 
the first upper-credit tranche agreement between Egypt and the IMF was concluded, and 
1998, when the last agreement expired. 
The Argument of the Study 
The study will argue that it is unnecessary and inappropriate to VIew the issue of 
imposition-ownership as a 'black-and-white' issue. The study will suggest an 
alternative perspective of looking at this particular controversy over the nature of IMF 
conditionality by locating the two opposing elements on a linear spectrum, instead of 
viewing them as entirely separate entities. By holding such a perspective, the study will 
move on to create a framework which will be utilised in analysing the imposition-
ownership nature of IMF conditionality. An appropriate way of addressing the 
imposition-ownership nature of IMF conditionality is, as the study will suggest, to 
examine how IMF conditionality is derived in practice, i.e. the negotiations concerning 
IMF conditionality. In this study, the concept of power will be employed in the context 
of the negotiations between the IMF and a borrowing country. The use of the 
negotiation process in the analytical framework would allow one to consider the 
relationship between the IMF and a borrowing country in a dynamic rather than a static 
sense. Both parties will be considered as active. This means that they will not be 
assumed to be passive to the other's action nor to changes in the environment. In 
contrast with a widespread assumption that economic difficulties make the IMF 
Introduction 4 
condition coercive/imposed m nature, this study will argue that in fact there are a 
number of variables which can shape the nature of IMF conditionality through the 
bargaining power of the negotiating parties. 
Among these variables is the role of third parties. A predominant assumption about the 
role of third parties is that the external actors, like creditors and donors, side only with 
the IMF and always leave the borrowing developing countries' relationships with the 
IMF unbalanced, in favour of the IMF. This study will show that some developing 
countries, such as those with geopolitical importance, could also gain support from 
those external actors. That is, these external actors could play a double-edged role in 
dealing with the relationship between the developing countries and the IMF, as both 
supporters and pressurisers on the two parties. Besides the third parties, other factors 
include, for example, the international environment, domestic economic circumstances, 
internal pressures, technocratic alliances, and negotiating skills of individual 
negotiators. 
Methodology and Outline of the Study 
This study will analyse the nature of IMF conditionality through a case study of Egypt. 
One of the major disadvantages of employing a country case study approach is that it 
does not automatically facilitate generalisation across countries. Although this problem 
could partially be solved by undertaking a number of country case studies, such an 
approach requires a vast amount of resources which proved beyond the scope and limit 
of the study. Despite such weaknesses, the case study approach has its own advantages. 
As some scholars have noted: 'In practice, the case study approach can ... go much 
further in explaining the reasons behind the results obtained. ' 5 Furthermore, using a 
single country case study allows one to cover a long period and to see whether any trend 
can be established in relation to a particular case. 
So why is Egypt chosen as a case study? The author has chosen Egypt as a case study 
since there are several factors which make it a particularly interesting case. First of all, 
Egypt has had a long relationship with the IMF since the inception of the latter (see 
Introduction of Part II for more details). Secondly, the case of Egypt is rich in 
analytical factors which many other countries may lack, although it cannot be claimed 
5 Killick, Malik, and Manuel, op. cit., p. 579. 
Introduction 5 
that Egypt is representative of every case. With its geopolitical significance, Egypt 
represents an important case and thus deserved to be studied. Thirdly, although the case 
of Egypt is often quoted in the literature, the official documentation regarding the 
relationship between the IMF and Egypt concerning IMF conditionality has rarely been 
consulted. This is largely due to the limited availability of such documentation in the 
past. The negotiations were conducted behind closed doors and the official documents 
regarding IMF conditionality and its negotiations in the case of Egypt were not made 
available to the public, except in the rare event of document leakage. As part of its 
policy to be open and transparent regarding its operations and activities, the IMF has 
made many borrowing countries' Letters of Intent and Memoranda for Understanding 
available on the IMF's website upon their consent. Nonetheless, this is still not the case 
for Egypt. Therefore, the above reasons make it worth studying the case of Egypt. 
The study is organised into two major parts and six chapters. Part One (Chapters One 
and Two) deals with the historical development of the IMF and of IMF conditionality. 
Chapter One will begin by examining the evolution of the IMF since its inception, its 
shifting focus towards developing countries, and its increasing influence over the 
latter's economic policies. In Chapter Two, I will examine the historical development 
of IMF conditionality and its critiques. An analytical framework will be developed here 
to assist the analysis of the nature of IMF conditionality in the case of Egypt. 
Part Two of the study, which contains Chapters Three to Six, will apply the analytical 
framework constructed in Chapter Two to the case study of Egypt from the 1960s to 
1998. A focus will be placed upon the 1970s onwards since it was in the 1970s that the 
increasing involvement of the IMF had brought with it the growing controversy over 
several aspects of the IMF and its lending policies. Chapter Three will cover the period 
of the 1960s under Nasser's socialist regime. Chapter Four will examine IMF 
conditionality during the period 1974-1979 under a new political leader, President 
Sadat, and his Open Door policy. Chapters Five and Six will consider the period under 
Mubarak's leadership in 1985-1988 and 1989-1998 respectively. In the concluding 
chapter, the study will remark on three important issues. The first issue will deal with 
the Egypt-IMF relationship and the nature of their negotiating power. The second issue 
will touch upon the imposition-ownership nature of IMF conditionality in the case of 
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Egypt and other borrowing developing countries. The final issue will reflect upon a 
number of lessons drawn from this study. 
Sources of Information 
There are various sources which have been utilised in the study. They include both 
primary and secondary sources. For the primary sources, the study has made intensive 
use of official documents held at the IMF archives supplemented by qualitative 
evidence gained through detailed interviews in Cairo and Washington, D. C. The 
secondary sources include books, journals, and newspapers. 
The interviews and document searches were carried out in two stages: the first in Cairo 
during the period January-March 2001; and the second in Washington, D. C. in October 
2001. However, during the Cairo field trip, the hope to gain access to official 
documents in Cairo was virtually diminished since all the interviewees either denied 
that they had the documents or refused to grant the author access, even if they admitted 
having them. However, some interviewees made the helpful suggestion that the author 
should obtain documentation from the IMF itself. To order to emphasise the degree of 
confidentiality of the Egyptian official documents (such as the Letters of Intent signed 
with the IMF) and how difficult it is to obtain them in Cairo, the author would like to 
quote the remarks made by a journalist of Al-Ahram Weekly (a semi-official English 
newspaper): 'We do not know much else for the simple reason that nobody, not the 
press, not the public at large, were told. Parts of the World Bank 'Aide-Memoire' were 
leaked ... , but the IMF' s Letter of Intent is secret. ' 6 It should be noted that these 
remarks were made nearly ten years prior to the author's Cairo field trip and prior to the 
IMF's openness policy (see the following discussion). However, the observation that 
the author would like to make here is that up till the point of conducting the research, 
the situation has not changed in gaining access to official documents in Cairo. 
Furthermore, despite the liberalised policy of the IMF, Egypt's Letters of Intent and 
other documents have remained unavailable on the IMF' s website, unlike those of many 
other borrowing countries. This, therefore, made it necessary for the author to visit the 
IMF archives. 
6 Al-Aizram Weekly, 23 May 1991. 
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As a result of their unavailability in Cairo, virtually all of the official documents used in 
this study were obtained from the IMP archives in Washington, D. C. As part of its 
policy to promote greater openness in relation to its operations and activities, access to 
documentary materials more than thirty years old held at the IMP archives became 
available to those outside the IMP upon request in January 1996. Again, in March 
1999, the IMF decided to further expand public access to documentary materials held at 
the IMP archives, which took effect on 8 September 1999. As a result, more official 
documents have been made available to the public. Less restricted access to official 
documents allowed the author to obtain valuable information about Egypt's financial 
agreements with the IMP and, for certain periods, correspondence between the two 
sides, and to gain better understanding regarding IMP conditionality. The author has 
tried her best to obtain relevant confidential documents concerning the relationship 
between Egypt and the IMP in the context of the upper-credit tranche lending, i.e. the 
Stand-by Arrangements (SBAs) and Extended Fund Facilities (EFFs). However, the 
reader may find that during certain periods, i.e. in the 1980s and 1990s, the reliance of 
the study on the confidential documents is less than in the earlier periods. This is due to 
the fact that at the time of conducting the research, most of the documents in these 
periods remained classified due to the 20-year rule and thus were not made available to 
the author (nor, either, to other members of the public). Nevertheless, the author tried 
to compensate for this weakness by relying on other sources such as personal 
interviews, journals, and newspapers. 
With regard to the interviews, the author conducted 33 interviews m total. The 
'snowball effect' strategy was used as a way to gain more interviewees. The 
interviewees were drawn from various careers and positions. They included former and 
existing Egyptian and IMP officials, academics, think-tank analysts, critics, and 
journalists. The author was reliant upon semi-structured interviews, each of which 
lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours. Some interviews were completed by repeated 
visits. The interviews took place in several different locations in Cairo and 
Washington, D. C., in both formal and informal settings. 
In addition to the two field trips during 2001, the author also made efforts to trace the 
whereabouts and correspond with former IMF officials and negotiators throughout the 
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process of research. Although her efforts were not fully achieved, they were 
worthwhile. 
It remains to be pointed out that the study does not claim to represent the whole picture 
of the relationship between the IMF and Egypt. Instead, it seeks to demonstrate the 
major argument of the study which has been mentioned earlier through the available 
evidence that could be gathered by the author. 
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PART I 
Chapter One 
The IMF: Its Changing Role and Unbalanced Influence 
This chapter serves two major purposes. First of all, it aims to provide an introduction to 
the origins, role, structure, and functions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Although the focus of the study is the IMF, the discussion on the IMF could not leave out 
the World Bank and the IMF-World Bank relationship due to their historical background 
and increasing collaboration. The second main purpose of this chapter is to determine the 
part the IMF has played in international economic relations between the developed and 
the developing countries. 1 In particular, it provides a discussion on the development of 
the relationships between the IMF and the developing countries. Using a chronological 
analysis, the chapter primarily aims at illustrating how the IMF has slowly shifted its 
focus towards the developing countries and has, since then, played an increasingly 
significant role in the latter. It also seeks to show: 
1) how the role and policies of the two International Financial Institutions (IFis ), the IMF 
and the World Bank, have altered since their inception; 
2) how the policy instruments of the IMF have developed; 
3) how the relationships between the IFis have evolved; and 
4) the principal critiques of the IFis, particularly of the IMF and the IMF's responses. 
The chapter is divided into four major sections: first, the origins of the IFis; second, the 
gradual shift of the IMF's focus towards the developing countries; third, the critiques of 
the relationship between the IFis and the developing countries, and, last but not least, a 
discussion on technical issues in relation to the IMF such as the quota system and the 
sources of its finance, its structure, and voting power. 
1 It is not considered useful for the author of this thesis to provide a definition of "developed" and 
"developing" at this point. The definitions that matter are those that evolved within the thinking of the IMF 
during the period covered. This will be clarified during the course of this chapter. 
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1.1 The Origins of the International Financial Institutions 
1.1.1 The Reason for Their Creation 
The International Financial Institutions (IFis)- the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank2 - have emerged as an outcome of the International Monetary and 
Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire on 1 st_zznd July 1944. The 
establishment of the IFis reflected the desire of the founders to avoid a recurrence of a 
similar international economic crisis to the 'Great Depression' of the 1930s which was 
characterised by the breakdown of international trade and investment, and high 
unemployment. A series of competitive currency devaluations and protectionist 
measures (including the use of import quotas and an increase in import tariffs) were 
widely practised during the interwar period following the breakdown of the gold standard 
(a fixed exchange rate regime prevailed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, coming to an end at the outset of the First World War) in 1931. Although such 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies could, on a temporary basis, improve a country's balance 
of payments and domestic employment, they were pursued only at the expense of the 
exports and employment of other countries and, thus, provoked others' retaliations. The 
culmination in the 1930s' Great Depression of such self-defeating policies led to efforts, 
mainly dominated by the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) during the 
early Second World War, to seek a solution to the international monetary and trade 
problems. The desire to avoid another Great Depression is manifest in the purposes 
contained in Article 1 of the IMF' s Articles of Agreement which read as follows: 
1) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent 
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration 
on international monetary problems. 
2) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of 
employment and real income and to the development of the productive 
resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy. 
2 Its original institution was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Now the 
institution, technically called the 'World Bank Group,' consists of five components: the IBRD; the 
International Development Association (IDA, created in 1960); the International Finance Corporation (IFC, 
established in 1956); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, founded in 1988); and the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID, established in 1966). Gilbert, C. L. and 
D. Vines, 'The World Bank: An Overview of Some Major Issues,' in C. L. Gilbert and D. Vines (eds.), The 
World Bank: Structure and Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 2000), ch. 1, pp. 12, 13 and 34; and 
World Bank, World Bank Annual Report, various issues since 1995. 
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3) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
among members, and to avoid comparative exchange depreciation. 
4) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect 
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign 
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. 
5) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments 
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international 
prosperity. 
6) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.3 
Although the IMF and the World Bank are seen as 'twin' Bretton Woods institutions, the 
corning into being of the World Bank was, in fact, overshadowed by that of the IMF. 
During the planning period, the World Bank's establishment was uncertain until the last 
moment. In his invitation letter to 44 governments to a conference at Bretton Woods, the 
US Secretary of State described the conference as being 'for the purpose of formulating 
definite proposals for an International Monetary Fund, and possibly [sic] a Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (emphasis added).' 4 · Even at the Bretton Woods 
Conference, the first week's attention and discussion were devoted to the IMF to the 
extent that fears began to be expressed that the Conference would never cover the World 
Bank.5 One commentator describes the World Bank as 'something of a neglected sibling 
of the IMF. ' 6 The reason behind their creation and the marginalised idea of creating the 
World Bank, one of whose purposes was development, seem to indicate that there was 
hardly any special attention devoted to the developing countries and their problems in the 
initial thinking for the formation of both IFis. 
3 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund [online], Article 
1: Purposes, 2003. Available from: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlaa/aaOl.htm [accessed 6th Oct. 
2003] 
4 Mason, E. S. and R. E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods (Washington, D. C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1973), p. 12. 
5 Ibid., p. 21; and Keynes, J. K., The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 26: Activities 
1941-1946, Shaping the Post-War World Bretton Woods and Reparations, ed. by Moggridge, D. (London: 
MacMillan, 1980), p. 83. 
6 Payer, C., The World Bank: A Critical Analysis (New York: Monthly Review P., 1982), p. 22. 
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L1.2 Tille Traditional Rone of tllle IlFis 
Although the IMF was created in 1944, it did not begin its operations until 1st March 
1947.7 In order.to fulfil its purposes outlined above, the IMF carried out its functions of 
providing consultation, regulation and credit. 8 The IMF had its major role in assisting the 
member countries which faced severe balance of payments problems with its short-term 
loans through the traditional Stand-By Anangements (SBAs). 
As for the World Bank, when its operations began on 251h June 1946, the World Bank9 
was to serve two major purposes which were reflected in the original name of the 
institution, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ffiRD). First, it 
was set up to assist the reconstruction of the European and Japanese economies which 
were devastated by the Second World War. Second, it had another purpose in assisting 
the development of the developing countries. 10 According to the founders, the major role 
of the World Bank would be to 'guarantee loans in order that investors may have a 
reasonable assurance of safety in placing their funds abroad. In this way it is expected 
that the international flow of capital in adequate volumes will be encouraged.' 11 The 
World Bank could provide direct lending only in exceptional circumstances. Thus, 
originally the guaranteeing of private investments was the primary role of the World Bank 
while lending was intended to be a less important one. However, the original role of the 
World Bank was not adhered to when later the World Bank became heavily involved in 
lending to the developing countries. 
The World Bank also provided technical assistance to help the developing countries 
implement development projects. In its early years, the World Bank-supported project 
lending concentrated on such fields as infrastructure and energy. Since the 1960s, the 
Bank has moved away from the traditional fields of its project lending towards ones 
7 International Monetary Fund, 'IMF Chronology,' IMF Survey Supplement, vo!. 27, Sept. 1998. 
8 Machetta, M., 'The International Monetary Fund Today: Problems and Prospects,' Journal of Regional 
Policy, vol. 12, Jan.-Mar. 1992, p. 150. 
9 The World Bank and the IMF are linked through the former's Articles of Agreement, saying that to be a 
member of the World Bank, a country has to be a member of the IMF. 
10 Ayres, R. L., Banking on the Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty (Cambridge, M. A.: MIT P., 
1983), p. 1; and Keynes, op. cit., Opening Remarks of Lord Keynes at the First Meeting of the Second 
Commission on the Bank for Reconstruction and Development, p. 72. 
11 U.S. Treasury Department, Questions and Answers, 10 June 1944. This was a set of questions and 
answers concerning the World Bank provided by the US treasury to the allied and associated countries. 
Cited in Mason and Asher, op. cit., p. 18. 
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which 'can directly affect the well-being of the masses of poor people of developing 
countries' such as agriculture, rural development, education, family planning, water and 
nutrition. 12 
1.1.3 The Dominance of a Few Industrial Countries during the Formation Years 
At the Bretton Woods Conference and other previous meetings, the discussions and 
negotiations concerning the two institutions were dominated by only a handful of 
Western industrial countries, particularly the US and the UK. The creation of the IFis was 
largely the result of the Anglo-American initiatives. For two years prior to the Bretton 
Woods Conference, the UK and the US had exchanged drafts concerning the two IFis, 
which were initially proposed by Lord Keynes and Harry Dexter White, respectively. On 
the whole, the two institutions were 'the product of English and American brains, with 
valuable assistance from the Canadians.' 13 This left other countries, including the 
developing countries, to play a minimum role in the early stage of the formation of the 
two IFis. As Lord Keynes commented prior to the commencement of the Bretton Woods 
Conference: 
They [42 countries which had been invited for the Bretton Woods Conference] 
are to have no power of commitment or final decision and everything is to be ad 
referendum. Nevertheless it now appears that they are not even to have the 
semblance of doing any work, since that is to be done before they meet. 14 
He further added by pointing out a long list of specific countries, almost all of which were 
the developing countries, which, according to him, would have no role at all at the 
Conference: 
Twenty-one countries have been invited which clearly have nothing to 
contribute and will merely encumber the ground, namely, Columbia, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Ecuador, Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Iceland, 
Iran, Iraq, Luxemburg. The most monstrous monkey-house assembled for years. 
To these might perhaps be added: Egypt, Chile and (in present circumstances) 
Yugo-Slavia. 15 
Nevertheless, among the two countries, it was the US which had avoided the devastating 
effects of the Second World War. It had, thereafter, emerged as the creditor country and 
12 World Bank, World Bank Annual Report, Introduction, various issues. 
13 Harrod, R. F., The Life of John Maynard Keynes (London: MacMillan, 1952), p. 579. 
14 Keynes, op. cit., Note for Sir David Waley, 30 May 1944, p. 41. 
15 Ibid., p. 42. 
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dominant player in the international economy, and thus gained its ability to shape the 
outcome of the discussions concerning the two institutions according to its own interests 
and economic foreign policy. In particular, this is obvious when one considers the 
coming-into-being of the World Bank. The World Bank was largely the initiative of the 
US, although there was a contribution from the British and other countries' 
representatives. As Mason and Asher point out: 
Almost all the preliminary work on the proposed Bank had been done within the 
U.S. government, and until the meeting in Atlantic City of the committee that 
was to shape the agenda for Bretton Woods, the participation of other countries 
had been perfunctory. 16 
In addition, the dominance of the US over the other participating countries during this 
period was manifest in several issues, some of which were controversial, regarding the 
IMF and the World Bank. They included the site of their headquarters, the questions of 
the decision-making body and the management of the two institutions, and the formula 
for the quota calculation. With regard to the site for the headquarters of the two new 
institutions, it was the American view that the location should be in Washington, D. C., 
the US political centre, which prevailed. Lord Keynes and a majority of the delegations at 
the Savannah Conference17 of March 1946 assumed that the location would be in New 
York, which was a centre of international finance and 'sufficiently removed from the 
politics of Congress and the nationalist whispering gallery of the embassies and legations 
of Washington.' 18 However, the US was not prepared to discuss the matter and took its 
decision as the final say. 19 
The US dominance was also evident in the questions of the decision-making body and the 
management of the two institutions. The Executive Directors and Alternates of the two 
institutions were to work on a full-time basis as suggested by the US, despite Lord 
Keynes's argument for their part-time role. 2° Furthermore, the US influence was 
16 Mason and Asher, op. cit., p. 12. 
17 This was a conference in which the first meeting of the Board of Governors was held and in which several 
controversial issues were discussed, including the location of the headquarters of the IMF and the World 
Bank, the duties of their Executive Directors and Alternates, and the question of salaries. 
18 Harrod, op. cit., pp. 629-630; and Keynes, op. cit., pp. 211 and 221. 
19 Harrod, op. cit., p. 630; and Keynes, op. cit., pp. 221-222. 
20 Harrod, op. cit., pp. 632-633; Horsefield, J. K., The International Monetary Fund, 1945-65: Twenty 
Years of International Monetary Cooperation, vol. 1: Chronicle (Washington, D. C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 1969), p. 123; and Mason and Asher, op. cit., p. 38. 
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manifest in the initial appointments made by the new Boards of the first Managing 
Director of the IMF and the first President of the World Bank. The obvious candidate for 
the first appointed Managing Director of the IMF was an American founder, Harry Dexter 
White. However, because of rumour about his political contacts, he was not selected21 
and instead Camille Gutt (Belgium) became the first Managing Director of the IMF. As a 
result, the President of the World Bank could only be an American (Euhene Meyer). 
Since then, it has become a tradition to have a European as the IMF' s Managing Director 
and an American as the World Bank's President.22 
Another crucial area over which the US had gained large control was the determination of 
each member's quota which had a great impact on the IMF's (and also the World Bank's) 
policy direction. At Bretton Woods, an ad hoc Committee on Quotas chaired by Fred M. 
Vinson, Vice-Chairman of the US delegation, was set up to decide the quotas for the 
member countries. The formula for the calculation of members' quotas, which was 
mainly based on a member country's exchange reserves, international trade figures such 
as average annual exports and imports, and national income, was initially worked out by 
the US. However, the quotas seemed not to have been purely determined according to the 
formula due partly to the difficulty in accommodating all of the considerations and 
unavailability or inaccuracy of the data. Identifying precisely what other factors entered 
into the quota decisions would not be easy due to the insufficient records of the basis of 
the Committee's work. At least, it was suggested by some that it was the US which took 
the final decision. As Professor Masse, a member of the French delegation to Bretton 
Woods, remarked, quotas were created 'more or less arbitrarily by the United States in a 
series of deals.' 23 For each member, their quotas determine their subscription to the IMF 
and the credit they could draw as well as their voting power within the institution (see 
later discussions for more details). When the quotas were first established at the Bretton 
21 However, it should be pointed out that a different account was put forward by the IMF's historian. 
According to J. K. Horsefield, the reason White was not proposed as Managing Director of the IMF was that 
'the Bank would have to be headed by aU. S. citizen in order to win the confidence of the banking 
community, and that it would be impracticable to appoint U.S. citizens to head both the Bank and the Fund.' 
Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 135. 
22 James, H., International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (Washington, D. C.: International 
Monetary Fund; New York: Oxford U. P., 1996), p. 72. 
23 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 94-98. 
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Woods Conference, the US was allocated the largest quota, approximately 36.2 per cent 
of the total,24 and thereby the largest vote in the IMF, with an effective power of veto. 
Last, but not least, at Bretton Woods the US dollar became the dominant currency in the 
international economic system, in place of the British Pound Stirling. The latter had, 
prior to the Second World War, enjoyed its powerful role in the international payments of 
foreign countries due largely to the pre-war position of the UK as the largest international 
trader. 25 However, under the Bretton Woods system the US dollar was pegged to gold 
and all other currencies were set relative to the dollar; thus the dollar effectively became 
the base currency. It was used as one of the two units in expressing the par values of the 
member states' currencies. As Article IV, Section ii (a) of the IMP's original Articles of 
Agreement stipulates: 'The par value of the currency of each member shall be expressed 
in terms of gold as a common denominator or in terms of the United States dollar of the 
weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944.'26 
As for the developing countries, despite their participation drawn from Latin America, 
Asia and Africa at the Bretton Woods Conference, their power was trivial in affecting the 
course and outcome of the discussions. Out of the 45 countries, 26 (including Egypt) 
were designated as the developing countries. 27 Attempts had been made by some 
developing countries to play an active role in drafting the Articles of Agreement28 of the 
IMF. For instance, at Bretton Woods India proposed the inclusion of the clause which 
would refer to the developing countries, calling on the IMF 'to assist in the fuller 
utilisation of the resources of the economically underdeveloped countries.' Following 
objections from the UK and South Africa, both of which believed that development fell 
under the remit of the World Bank, India opted to revise its proposal, calling for 'the 
development of the resources and productive power of all member countries, with due 
regard to the needs of economically backward countries.' However, the proposal still 
24 Horsefield, J. K. (ed.), The International Monetary Fund, 1945-65: Twenty Years of International 
Monetary Cooperation, vol. 2: Analysis (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), Table 14, 
p. 380. 
25 Ashworth, W., A Short History of the International Economy since 1850, 41h ed. (London: Longman, 
1987), p. 265. 
26 International Monetary Fund, 'Agreement of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,' 22 July 
1944, in J. K. Horsefield (ed.), The International Monetary Fund, 1945-65: Twenty Years of International 
Monetary Cooperation, vol. 3: Documents (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), p. 189. 
27 Bernstein, E. M., 'The International Monetary Fund,' International Organization, vol. 22, 1968, p. 133. 
28 The Articles of Agreement is a constitutional document of the IMF. 
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faced opposition from some powerful developed countries, notably the UK and the US, 
both of which disliked an inclusion of the developing countries in the Articles of 
u 
Agreement. As a consequence, in the final version of the Articles of Agreement there was 
no distinction made between the developed and the developing countries. Only a 
reference to development was included in the Articles. It referred to 'the development of 
the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy 
[emphasis added].' 29 Another example occurred when India and Egypt expressed their 
demand for the reference to the settlement of indebtedness as a result of war to be 
included in the Articles of Agreement. As with the first two proposals, their call was 
ignored. 30 Therefore, it was not because of the lack of their participation that the 
developing countries' influence in the discussions was insignificant. Due to the 
opposition from powerful developed countries, no distinction was drawn between the 
developed and the developing countries, in spite of the latter's demands. Consequently, 
the developing countries found themselves with little special consideration paid to them 
and their problems during the founding period of the IMP. 
1.2 A Gradual Shift in the Focus of the IMF towards Developing 
Countries 
1.2.1 The Years of US Dominance and of Little Attention to Developing Countries' 
Problems: Late 1940s-Late 1950s 
From the late 1940s to the late 1950s, the dominance of the US in the IMP continued its 
strength. In February 1949, the US influence in the IMP was enhanced through the 
establishment of the position of Deputy Managing Director. The appointment of the first 
Deputy Managing Director was given to the US Treasury official, Andrew Overby?1 
This period also saw US dominance in the IMP to such a degree that until1956 there was 
a tendency for the Executive Director of the IMP representing the member country in 
question to approach the US Executive Director for the latter's approval before the 
country submitted a formal proposal or request to the IMP. 32 By US law, the US 
29 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 93-94. 
30 Ibid., p. 94. 
31 James, op. cit., 1996, p. 72. 
32 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 11. 
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Executive Director is bound to be under the instructions of the Secretary of Treasury. 33 It 
was in this sense that some observers commented that the IMF' s policies, at least during 
the first twelve years of its existence, reflected the US economic foreign policy?4 Some 
went further to suggest that until 1956 the US had absolute domination over the IMF since 
'decisions were made effectively by the US Secretary of the Treasury, to the point that the 
IMF' s staff had no authority to negotiate conditions for drawings. ' 35 
During its early years, it remained the case that the problems of the developing economies 
gained no particular attention from the IMF. Neither did the IMF make a differentiation 
between their problems and those of the developed countries. Instead, the IMF was 
preoccupied with its primary purpose of promoting trade liberalisation and monetary 
stability in the international economy with an assumption that this would be beneficial to 
all member countries. As Graham Bird has noted: 
Annual Reports of the IMF during the early and middle 1950s ... confirm that 
the Fund had little specific interest in the particular problems of LDCs [less 
developed countries] as such. LDCs were treated as if their problems were no 
different from those of developed countries. Fund policy continued to rest on the 
notion that the encouragement of monetary stabilisation and free trade was the 
main purpose of the IMF and that such policies were in the interests of all 
members.36 
Moreover, in its early years the IMF's vtew regarding its lending role was rather 
conservative. The IMF saw its lending as being for dealing with temporary balance of 
payments deficits only, and not for reconstruction. Its Annual Report for 1947 stated: 
The Fund is intended as part of the permanent machinery of international 
monetary relations rather than as an emergency device to meet the special needs 
of the post-war years .... Now more than a year after the establishment of the 
Fund, the World is confronted with seriously unbalanced trade, with an urgent 
problem of financing international payments, and with severe shortages of goods 
33 Stange, S., 'IMF: Monetary Managers,' in R. W. Cox and H. K. Jacobson (eds.), The Anatomy of 
Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1974), p. 284. 
34 Bird, G., The International Monetary System and the Less Developed Countries (London: MacMillan, 
1978), p. 17. 
35 Tew, B., 'The International Monetary Fund,' mimeographed, 1969, p. 86. Cited in Payer, C., The Debt 
Trap: The IMF and the Third World (New York: Monthly Review P., 1974), p. 217. 
36 Bird, op. cit., 1978, pp. 16-17. 
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for reconstruction and even for maintaining minimal consumption standards in 
many countries. The Fund cannot solve these problems .... 37 
Such a narrow view also had an impact upon the developing countries whose problems of 
economic development required long-term financial assistance. Thus, the IMF during the 
early years after it came into being played only a restricted role in providing its lending to 
the developing countries. Although the problems of post war reconstruction in Europe 
were met by Marshall Aid and the conditions of the IMP precluded the use of the IMF' s 
resources in anything other than 'exceptional and unforeseen circumstances,' the majority 
of total drawings from the IMF were carried out by Western European countries. During 
1947-1957, out of the total drawings of SDR 2,886.1 million from the IMF, nearly 
two-thirds of drawings (SDR 1,838.4 million) were made by Western European countries 
whereas only one-third (SDR 994.2 million) by the developing countries.38 
Despite its limited role in the developing countries, during this period there emerged a 
number of IMP's policy changes and developments, which provided and facilitated its 
assistance to the developing countries among other member countries, even though they 
were not created especially for the developing countries. Missions were sent to the 
member countries at their request to provide technical assistance and advice concerning 
such issues as banking, monetary, exchange rate and balance of payments problems. 
Since its first mission in 1946 to Ecuador, there had been an expansion of the IMF's 
technical assistance throughout the period as its membership increased, including that 
from the developing countries. 39 Also in 1950 a formal Training Programme was 
introduced by the IMF following the proposals by the Managing Director, Camille Gutt, 
largely to enable member countries to be become acquainted with its work while criticism 
on the US's involvement in the IMF's activities (mainly in Latin American countries) 
existed. A limited range of training courses was given to member countries' officials, 
primarily in balance of payments techniques.40 Moreover, in the first half of the 1950s, 
decisions were, as part of the IMF's efforts to revive its lending operations, adopted to 
37 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 
30, 1947 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 2. Cited in Krasner, S.D., 'International 
Monetary Fund and the Third World,' International Organization, vol. 2, 1968, p. 672. 
38 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1984), p. 14. 
39 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 185-187, 391-394,428 and 444. 
40 Ibid., p. 264. 
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make drawings in the gold tranche virtually automatic (as part of the 1952 'Rooth Plan'-
see below) and drawings in the first credit tranche more easily accessible (see Chapter 
Two). 
Some of the policies developed during the IMP's earlier years deserve more consideration 
since they would have considerable implications on the relationships between the IMP 
and the developing countries in the later years. Among them was the adoption of 
conditionality into the IMP's lending policy which was due largely to the US's pressing 
for the adoption of restrictions on IMP lending. After a long debate over the issue of 
conditionality, the Executive Board adopted the 'Rooth Plan' in 1952. The Rooth Plan 
granted the IMP the authority to supervise the members' economic and financial policies. 
Before a decision over granting financial assistance to a member could be made, the IMP 
would consider 'whether the problem to be met is of a temporary nature and whether the 
policies the members will pursue will be adequate to overcome the problem within such a 
period ... [whether] use of the Fund's resources [was] in accordance with the purposes of 
the Fund.' 41 The Rooth Plan was never intended specifically to help the developing 
countries but instead to solve the standstill in the IMP's operation largely instigated by the 
US's challenges over requests for IMP lending by some member countries such as the 
Netherlands, Nicaragua and South Africa (for further discussions on IMP conditionality, 
see Chapter Two). 
In association with the developments of conditionality, the SBA was introduced in 1952, 
allowing the IMP's members to draw from its resources in higher tranches. Under this 
type of facility, performance criteria (which are quantitative targets written in the Letter 
of Intent- a letter appending to the SBA and containing a description of the member's 
proposal for measures aiming at correcting the balance of payments problem) were 
required and had to be met by the borrowing country in question. Drawings under the 
SBA were disbursed on a quarterly basis, provided that borrowing countries satisfied the 
agreed conditions. 42 The conditions generally included limitations on public sector 
borrowing, bank credit, foreign borrowing and international reserve levels. In effect, 
41 IMF Executive Board Decision no. 102-(52111), 13 Feb. 1952, in Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 228. 
42 The ideas of phasing, performance criteria, and Letter of Intent were not introduced until the second half 
of the 1950s. See Chapter Two. 
The IMF: Its Changing Role and Unbalanced Influence 21 
these developments mean that access to the IMP's credit was subject to the performance 
of the borrowing country in trying to meet the set targets. 
In sum, the period from the late 1940s to the late 1950s witnessed several developments 
of IMF policies which directed the IMF' s assistance and benefits to its member countries. 
Yet, they did not arise with an aim to assist the developing countries in particular due 
partly to the IMF' s perception of its primary domain of responsibility being monetary and 
trade issues, rather than development. Often these developments were, to a great extent, 
designed to overcome its own institutional problems and/or facilitate its own operations. 
Some of these devices, such as conditionality and SBAs, generated the means by which 
the IMF's influence in borrowing countries' economic policies could subsequently be 
enhanced. However, this limited view of the IMF's function did not carry on in the 
following period to which we now tum. 
1.2.2 The Years of the Decline in U§ Dominance and Greater Attention to 
Developing Countries' Problems 
1.2.2.1 The Turning-Point Period: lLate 1950s and 1960s 
During the 1960s, the issue of development gained more of the IMF's attention and 
consequently its role in the developing countries was substantially enlarged. Several 
factors which contributed to such changes can be identified. After the success of the 
reconstruction of the European and Japanese economies, it would be expected that the 
IFis were able to direct more of their interests towards the developing countries. In 
addition, on the side of member countries, the emergence of the newly independent 
countries in Africa and Asia following the end of the colonial regimes resulted in the 
growing representation of the developing countries in international organisations, 
including the IFis. From 1960 to 1963, the membership of the IMF increased by 
approximately 49 per cent from 68 to 101.43 With anti-colonialist sentiment, it was not 
surprising that these countries initially found multilateral institutions, including the IMF 
and the World Bank, very appealing in providing both financial and technical assistance 
for their development programmes. In their eyes, joining these institutions would, in 
effect, help to get rid off their dependence on ex-colonial powers. 
43 James, op. cit., 1996, p. 120. 
The IMF: Its Changing Role and Unbalanced Influence 22 
Also this period was marked by increasing concern over the deterioration in the terms of 
trade of the developing countries' primary products and the fluctuation of their export 
earnings. Following the report provided in 1953 to the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) of the United Nations (UN) on 'The Adequacy of Monetary Reserves' and a 
subsequent study by the IMF staff of international liquidity, the IMF in 1957 began to 
recognise that quotas were too small in relation to the financial need of its member 
countries and therefore should be increased. In particular, the IMF considered that at the 
time of the US recession and the decline in primary product prices, it might possibly face 
the difficulty arising from the greater use of its resources by the primary product 
. . 44 
exportmg countnes. 
This period also saw a shift of US policy in its overseas economic aid. With the 
emergence of the European countries and Japan as powerful economies, the US began to 
experience a decline in its relative economic strength and hence its domination in 
international monetary and financial affairs, as reflected in the size of its quota at the IMF. 
Since the Bretton Woods Conference, the relative size of the US quota had been on a 
decline. As shown in Table 1.1, by the end of 1965, the US quota stood at approximately 
26 per cent of the total, compared with about 36 per cent decided at Bretton Woods. 
Table 1.1 The Quotas of the US at Selected Dates, 1944-1965 
July 1944 End of 1950 End of 1955 End of 1960 End of 1965 
Quotas in Total 7,600 8,036.5 8,750.5 14,740.7 15,976.6 
US quota 2,750 2,750 2,750 4,125 4,125 
Percentage of the total 36.18 34.22 31.43 27.98 25.82 
Source: Horsefield, J. K. (ed.), The lntemational Monetary Fund, /945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, 
vol. 2: Analysis (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), Table 14, p. 380. 
The US, in the late 1950s, pursued several strategies which marked a major change in US 
aid policy.45 This was due to the desire to correct its own balance of payments deficits 
while at the same time facing the criticism that much of its spending on foreign aid to 
Latin American countries was being wasted.46 Among these strategies was a growing use 
44 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 446-448, and vol. 2, pp. 357-358. 
45 Payer, op. cit., 1974, pp. 27-28. 
46 James, op. cit., 1996, pp. 134-135. 
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of 'tied aid,' whereby the aid recipient was required to purchase the donor country's 
products. In addition, the US was keen to enhance the role of the IFis, including the IMF, 
by increasing the latter's lending. It recognised that more credit would enable the 
developing countries which experienced a decline in their export earnings to purchase its 
own exports of consumer and capital goods. 47 Also the IMF was, according to C. 
Douglas Dillion, Deputy Secretary of State for Economic Affairs during the Eisenhower 
administration, 'better able to advise sovereign governments on sensitive matters of 
financial policy, or to insist on appropriate corrective measures in return for credits, than 
are sovereign governments.' 48 As a result, in 1958-1959 the US successfully pressed for 
a general increase in IMF quotas by 50 per cent,49 which substantially enlarged IMF 
lending capacity. Other important elements marking the change in the US aid policy 
included the development of the 'consortium' technique, the shift in emphasis from 
'project' to 'programme' aid and the reliance on the SBA of the IMF in determining the 
granting of its aid programme; all of these enhanced the role and power of the IMF. 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily imply that the US gave up its power and stayed 
aloof from the institution. In fact, the US was still able to influence all important 
decisions of the IMF via its dominant, though declining, quota and voting power in the 
institution and through informal influence.50 
In addition, the developing countries, as well as other international organisations, also 
played a part in directing the IMF's attention towards the developing countries' problems. 
Due partly to the instability of their export receipts, several developing countries, such as 
Egypt, Syria, and El Salvador, in the early 1960s pushed their case in the IMF for an 
increase in their quotas. 51 At the same time, the UN Commission on International 
Commodity Trade (CICT) asked the IMF to consider a greater role in providing 
compensatory financing for export fluctuations. 52 In response to these demands and 
partly to solve the problems of international liquidity, the IMF adopted a second general 
47 Payer, op. cit., 1974, p. 30. 
48 A statement by C. Douglas Dillion before the House Banking and Currency Committee on 4 March 1959. 
Cited in ibid., p. 31. 
49 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 448, and vol. 2, pp. 358-359. 
50 Payer, op. cit., 1974, p. 31. 
51 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 359. 
52 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 532, and vol. 2, pp. 360 and 418. 
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increase in quotas in 1965,53 which further raised the entitled amount of drawings and 
enhanced the IMP's lending role in the developing countries. 
With the changes that had occurred in the international economy and the increasing 
demands placed upon it by various parties, the IMP began to change its perspective 
towards the problems of the developing countries. However, such a shift in the IMP's 
attitude was at the same time subject to restrictions imposed upon it by its own limited 
domain of responsibilities. In 1960, Per Jacobsson, Managing Director of the IMP, 
publicly recognised the positive role of the IMP in promoting development, not by 
providing development finance, but rather by protecting development plans via the 
provision of short-term lending to countries facing temporary balance of payments 
deficits. Monetary stability remained the IMP's prime objective, but the change that this 
perspective brought in was that it then became specifically linked to development.54 
Besides the two general increases in quotas mentioned previously, the shift in the IMP's 
attitude and focus was highlighted by the introduction of several other devices designed to 
help the developing countries lessen their balance of payments problems. These included 
the creation of the IMP's new special facilities. Among them was the Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CFF), which was established in February 1963 for financing 
short-term shortfalls in export earnings arising from adverse circumstances beyond the 
members' control. To start with, the CFF was unattractive to the developing countries 
owing to its relatively restrictive terms of borrowing. First of all, there was a lack of 
sufficient automaticity, despite the call for automatic access by both Organisation of 
American States (OAS) and UN proposals. 55 In resisting to such a demand, the Executive 
Directors asserted that an overall assessment of a country's payments situation was 
necessary to avoid generating an excessive short-term debt burden on the borrower; that 
automatic drawing rights might be harmful to the borrower if they forestalled needed 
reforms; and that differences between present and past prices might indicate a long-term 
trend rather than a short-term cyclical movement in which case the IMP's assistance 
would not be appropriate.56 Secondly, drawings made under the CFF were included in 
53 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 361-363. 
54 Bird, op. cit., 1978, p. 18. 
55 Horsetield, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 419-420. 
56 Krasner, op. cit., p. 677. 
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assessing further requests for drawings. A current borrowing member under the CFF 
might, in effect, find it difficult to gain access to subsequent regular drawings from the 
IMF. As a result, during the period between 1963 and 1966, only three countries (Brazil, 
Egypt and the Sudan) requested financing under the CFF for a total of US$ 87.25 million, 
although the small number of requests was in part reflected by the general rises in world 
prices of primary commodities. 57 However, following lobbying by the developing 
countries via the OAS and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and in the IMF at the 1965 Annual Meeting in 1965, and subsequent 
amendments to the borrowing terms, the CFF was, in September 1966, made more 
attractive to the developing countries, but still not automatically available. The amount 
allocated to the CFF was enlarged from a maximum of 25 per cent to a maximum of 50 
per cent of quota by allowing the holdings of a member's currency to reach 250 per cent 
of the quota in place of 225 per cent under the previous term. Drawings made under the 
CFF were excluded from the consideration of future drawings. Also greater weight was 
given to qualitative estimation of export shortfalls in determining the amount that a 
member could draw.58 Since the CFF was amended in 1966, 31 member countries had, 
by April1975, purchased a total of SDR 913 million under the facility, bringing total use 
of the facility to more than SDR 1 billion since its creation. 59 
In June 1969, the Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF),60 which would be of benefit to 
the developing countries, was created as a consequence of the developing countries' 
efforts during 1967-68 in pressing their concerns over the problem of stabilisation of 
fluctuating primary product prices in the IMF via their Governors of the IMF at the 
Annual Meetings as well as in other forums such as the UNCTAD.61 The BSFF was 
intended to help the member countries which had balance of payments difficulties due to 
57 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 422-423; and de Vries, M. G., The International Monetary Fund, 
1966-1971: The System Under Stress, vol. 1: Narrative (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 
1976), p. 263. 
58 Krasner, op. cit., pp. 676-678; Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 423-427; and de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1976, 
pp. 261-262. 
59 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 
30, 1975 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 52, and Table 1.9, p. 80. 
60 It should be noted that under the BSFF, no drawings have been made since January 1984. International 
Monetary Fund, 'Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF,' IMF Pamphlet Series, no. 45, 5th ed. 
(Washington, D. C.: Treasurer's Department, International Monetary Fund, 1998), p. 72. In February 2000, 
as part of streamlining and simplifying IMF facilities, the BSFF was eliminated. 
61 de Vries, op. cit., val. 1, 1976, pp. 270-272, and 278. 
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their participation in international buffer-stock schemes.62 Under the BSFF, a member 
country was allowed to raise the IMP's holdings of its currency to reach a maximum of 
250 per cent and thereby to draw up to 50 per cent of its quota being used to finance an 
international buffer stock. However, drawings under the CFF and the BSFF taken 
together could not exceed 75 per cent of quota. Similar to the CFF, the amount drawn 
under the BSFF was separated from the amount that the member was normally able to 
draw under the IMP's usual tranche policies. Therefore, the developing countries would 
benefit from the enlarged access to the IMP's financial resources through both the 
establishment of the CFF and the BSFF. 
In addition to the creation of the two special facilities, this period saw the expansion of 
the range of the IMP's advisory and training activities. Following several years of debates 
within the IMP concerning its authority in the field of restrictions, in 1960 the IMP 
enlarged its jurisdiction of consultations, which was previously limited to only exchange 
restrictions, to cover trade policies, with a view that various forms of restrictions were 
interrelated and thereby could not be considered separately.63 By the mid-1960s, the 
scope of consultations was broadened further to include a wide range of financial and 
economic matters. In the case of the developed countries, consultations were, after 1967, 
extended to cover issues such as the causes of recurrent exchange crises and inflation.64 
On the other hand, the extended scope of consultations with the developing countries was 
far greater, partly reflecting the larger scale of economic problems that these countries 
had to encounter. As Margaret de Vries writes: 
Consultations with developing members ... began to cover more fully the 
consequences of economic development efforts, both in the short run and in the 
somewhat longer run, for prices, production, monetary and fiscal policies, and 
the balance of payments problems of joblessness and the measures to increase 
employment opportunities; the size and servicing of external indebtedness; and 
members' relationships with regional organizations ... 65 
62 1t was a mechanism to avoid erratic short-term fluctuations in price. Generally, this involved the creation 
of a stock of commodity (such as copper, wheat, and sugar) with funds held by an international trade body to 
regulate the price of that commodity through the management of the stock. If the market price decreased 
below the range of established prices, the trade body would buy the surplus generated by the decline in price 
and add it to the buffer stock in an attempt to bring the price back up. By contrast, if the market price rose 
above the range of established prices, then the trade body would sell part of their buffer stock in order to 
bring the price down. 
63 de Vries, M.G., 'The Consultations Process,' in Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, ch. 11, pp. 237-238. 
64 de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1976, pp. 575-576. 
65 Ibid., p. 576. 
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The larger the scope of consultations, the more information the IMF obtained from 
member countries. The increased information in tum provided the essential basis for 
deriving the conditions for its loans to member countries. 
The issue of indebtedness provides a good example. As de Vries points out, during this 
period the IMF' s consultations with its member countries were extended to deal with the 
issue of indebtedness. For the first time, the issue of external indebtedness was included 
in the Annual Report for 1964 (and also for 1965).66 With great concern having been 
raised by several debtor and creditor countries at the IMF over the problem of servicing of 
external debt by the developing countries, by the mid-1960s the IMF's activities in 
dealing with the issue of external indebtedness had gone beyond consultations. The 
IMF's staff began to participate as observers and advisors in multilateral debt negotiation 
meetings between creditor and debtor countries; for example, by analysing debtor 
countries' economic situations and prospects, assessing the economic impacts of various 
renegotiation proposals, and preparing reports on the progress of the debtors' debt 
position to the creditors. More importantly, the IMF's action concerning external 
indebtedness also included the working out of conditions in the developing countries' 
stabilisation programmes in regard to the issue. As a result, limitations on external 
indebtedness were often incorporated in many financial stabilisation programmes.67 
The increase in the IMF's membership also led to a rapid growth in requests, particularly 
from the developing countries, for its technical assistance. The IMF, in the second half of 
the 1960s, began to provide technical assistance to the developing countries in the fields 
of central bank matters, fiscal affairs and statistics.68 It established the IMF Institute in 
1964 in Washington, D.C. for training finance and central bank officials of member 
countries. 69 Also, the IMF expanded its publications in the forms of periodicals, 
monograph series, and pamphlet series, and began to make available some of its 
publications in other languages than English (such as French, Spanish and German).70 To 
some extent, the IMF's publications (as well as its training and technical assistance) were 
helpful to the developing countries, such as in the provision of essential statistics for 
66 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 553; and de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1976, p. 593. 
67 de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1976, pp. 593-596. 
68 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 552-553; and ibid., pp. 579-586. 
69 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 554. 
70 Ibid., pp. 555-557. 
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members' use. Yet, the dramatic growth of these areas of the IMF's activities, 
particularly publications, was, to a larger extent, motivated by the growing realisations on 
the part of the IMF that there was a need to technically justify its role and policies at the 
time when the IMF encountered persistent criticism that the US was closely involved in 
many IMF (and World Bank) programmes,71 and that it was crucial to make as many 
people as possible familiar with its work, so increasing their confidence in, and the 
credibility of, the institution. 
It can be summarised that as a result of changes that occurred in the international 
economic and political system as well as pressure from various parties, between the late 
1950s and 1960s the IMF began to turn its attention toward the developing countries and 
their problems; namely, the fluctuation of their primary commodity prices and the adverse 
impact upon their balance of payments. During this period, the IMF augmented its 
lending resources through general increases in quota and the establishment of special 
lending facilities, which enlarged the developing countries' access to its financial 
resources. It also sharply expanded other areas of its activities. However, such 
expansions produced an increasing scope of its authority in several monetary and 
economic fields, on which IMF conditionality could soon be based, and thereby added to 
its leverage over the developing countries' economies. 
1.2.2.2 The Proliferation of IMF Facilities: 1970s-Early 1980s 
The 1970s were marked by two important events in the international economy. First was 
the collapse of the so-called 'Bretton Woods system' 72 and the second was the rapid 
increases in oil prices. Both developments had a profound impact upon the role and 
lending activities of the IMF with regard to the developing countries. 
The period of the early 1970s witnessed a substantial imbalance in international payments 
(on the one side, a large US balance of payments deficit, and, on the other side, sizable 
surpluses built up by many Western European countries and Japan), and the massive 
capital movements. The increasing deterioration of the US balance of payments deficit in 
71 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 199-200 and 555; and James, op. cit., 1996, p. 134. 
72 The Bretton Woods system was a par-value (fixed but could vary) international monetary system where 
the US dollar was pegged to gold and used as a base currency for all other currencies, i.e. the latter were set 
in rates relative to the dollar. 
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1971 and subsequent speculation against the dollar led to the devaluation of the dollar 
(both in December 1971 and February 1973). When the US, in August 1971, declared the 
suspension of official convertibility of dollars into gold, the system of agreed par values 
and convertibility into gold (the two important pillars of the Bretton Woods system) 
virtually no longer functioned as it had done in the past. Although substantial efforts were 
made during late 1971 and 1972 to retain the par value system, culminating in the 
currency realignment of the so-called Smithsonian agreement in December 1971, the 
agreement was short-lived. By the early months of the 1973, the Bretton Woods system 
had collapsed entirely following the adoption of a regime of widespread floating 
exchange rates, instigated by persistent speculative capital movements. 
The effective breakdown of the Bretton Woods system paved the way to the creation of 
the Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues (the 
so-called 'Committee of Twenty').73 Although the idea of setting up a committee of the 
Board of Governors of the IMF had been around since 1966,74 it was in the course of the 
discussions concerning a reform of the international monetary system during the crisis of 
the Bretton Woods system that such a committee was successfully set up. Following the 
US's and, to a lesser extent, the developing countries' demands, the Committee of 
Twenty was created in July 1972. In the light of the growing influence of the Group of 
Ten,75 which worked exclusively in the interest of the large industrial countries, by the 
early 1970s there were persistent demands from the developing countries calling for their 
participation in the negotiations on any reform of the international monetary system, and 
for the creation of a forum by which they could express their views on the issue.76 More 
importantly, at the same time the US felt that the Group of Ten had become excessively 
73 This was a committee of the IMF's Board of Governors which was established in July 1972 and ceased to 
exist in October 1974. It was then succeeded by two new Committees: the Interim Committee of the Board 
of Governors on the International Monetary Systems (know as the Interim Committee); and the Joint 
Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real 
Resources to Developing Countries (known as the Development Committee). International Monetary Fund, 
Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended Apri/30, 1975 (Washington, D. C.: 
International Monetary Fund), p. 41. 
74 For more details on earlier attempts prior to the creation of the Committee of Twenty during 1966-1970, 
see de Vries, M.G., The International Monetary Fund, 1972-1978: Cooperation on Trial, vol. 1: Narrative 
and Analysis (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1985), pp. 145-148. 
75 The Group of Ten consisted of financial ministers and central banks ministers from ten industrial 
countries: Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK and the US. It was created in 1961 during the course of discussions on the establishment of 
the General Arrangements to Borrow. However, it was not a body of the IMF. 
76 de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1976, pp. 552-553; and de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1985, p. 144. 
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weighted in favour of the five EC countries (Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) which often took a common line opposed to the 
US's views. The US thus pressed for the creation of a new body to include more 
countries largely in a hope that those outside the Group of Ten might lend support to 
strengthen US positions vis-a-vis those of the five EC countries.77 The Committee of 
Twenty had an advisory role and made reports on international monetary reform. In June 
1974, its final Report, together with an 'Outline of Reform,' was published. In its 
recommendations on the management of future international monetary arrangements, the 
'Outline' explicitly referred to economic development in the developing countries. The 
introduction of the 'Outline' stated that future international monetary arrangements 
would be carried out in a manner that would 'encourage the growth of world trade and 
employment, promote economic development, and help to avoid inflation and deflation.' 
One of the features of the reformed international monetary system listed in the 'Outline' 
was the promotion of the net flow of real resources to the developing countries, which had 
never previously been regarded as one of the IMP's primary responsibilities. In order to 
attain the purposes of the reform, the 'Outline' emphasised the importance of satisfactory 
and consistent arrangements for international trade, capital, investment, and development 
assistance, including the access for the developing countries to both financial and goods 
markets in the developed countries.78 Therefore, the Committee of Twenty, its Report, 
and the 'Outline of Reform' marked another significant development in the relationship 
between the IMF and the developing countries at least in the sense that they recognised 
the idea that the development problems of the developing countries should be 
incorporated into proposed actions on the international monetary reform. 
Following a recommendation of the Committee of Twenty, a joint Ministerial Committee 
of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the IMF on the Transfer of Real Resources to 
Developing Countries (commonly known as the 'Development Committee') 79 was 
established in October 1974. The Development Committee dealt with the issue of real 
resource transfer to the developing countries, in particular to those developing countries 
facing severe balance of payments problems. In effect, with the coming-into-being of the 
Development Committee, the issues of international monetary reform and of the 
77 de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1985, pp. 148-149, and 152. 
18 Jbid., pp. 256-259. 
79 For more detail on the Development Committee, see the following section on the structure of the IMF. 
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development problems of the developing countries became linked at an institutional level 
within the IMP. 
In addition to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the oil price rises of the 1970s 
further enhanced international concerns, including the IMP's, over the problems of oil 
importing countries, including oil importing developing countries. The 1970s' oil price 
crisis had important implications for the latter: external inflationary pressures resulted 
from the dramatic rise in the cost of imports; and low demand for their exports developed 
due largely to the recession in the developed industrialised countries. Therefore, the oil 
price increases were expected to aggravate the balance of payments situation in many 
developing countries. 
In these circumstances, IMP lending and resources were expanded, in particular through 
the establishment of a number of new credit facilities. Among the numerous facilities 
created by the IMP during this period included the Oil Facility (OF). The OF, which was 
an ad hoc financing facility available until March 1976, was set up in June 1974, as the 
IMP's response to the oil price crisis under the personal initiative of Managing Director 
Johannes Witteveen and having been endorsed by the Committee of Twenty.80 It was 
designed to provide financial assistance to the IMP's member countries which faced 
balance of payments problems caused by increases in the costs of imports of petroleum 
and petroleum products. Drawings under the OF were supplementary to IMP resources 
under other policies, but were subject to a limit of 75 per cent of quota (under the OF for 
1974) and of 125 per cent (under the OF for 1975) with a maximum repayment period of 
7 years. 81 The financing of drawings under the OF through borrowings from 17 countries 
mainly came from 7 oil-exporting countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Venezuela, 
Nigeria, Abu Dhabi, and Oman), representing 72 per cent of the total fund. 82 Out of the 
total drawing under the OF of SDR 6,902.4 million made by 55 member between 1974 
and 1976, ten industrial developed countries drew 63 per cent. Only 37 per cent went to 
45 developing countries, six of which (Chile, India, Israel, Korea, Pakistan, and 
80 de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1985, pp. 305-306. 
81 Gold, J., Financial Assistance by the International Monetary Fund: Law and Practice, 2"d ed. 
(Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1980), pp. 31-32; and International Monetary Fund, 
Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 30, 1975 (Washington, D. C.: 
International Monetary Fund), pp. 53-54. 
82 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 
30, 1976 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 54, and Table 1.16, p. 91. 
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Philippines) took 56 per cent.83 This suggests that the OF benefited the developed rather 
than the developing countries, and that the majority of the developing countries gained 
relatively little from the OF, despite the majority of the financing having come from the 
oil-producing developing countries. Effectively, the IMF through the OF helped to 
transfer a vast amount of financial resources from the developing to the developed 
countries. This is in contrast to what had been recommended by the Committee of 
Twenty. 
In connection with the OF, a Subsidy Account (SA) was created in August 1975 to reduce 
the interest burden arising from drawings under the OF for the most seriously affected 
members. In other words, the SA was to help subsidise the interest payments incurred 
since the interest rates charged under the OF (7.7 per cent) were higher than the IMF's 
traditional charges, reflecting the cost of borrowing. The SA was funded by contributions 
from 24 members (including oil-exporting and industrial countries) and Switzerland. The 
cumulative amount of payments under the SA in April 1980 totalled SDR 113.15 million, 
54 per cent of which went to the three largest beneficiaries, India, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines. The remainder of the payments was allocated among 21 developing 
countries with differing amounts between SDR 0.03 million and less than SDR 9 
million. 84 
In September 1974, members' access to IMF resources was further enlarged through the 
establishment of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), as a response by the IMF to the lack 
of agreement and the failure of negotiations on a reformed international monetary system. 
In particular, the establishment of a connection between allocations of SDRs and the 
provision of development finance, which had strongly been pressed for by the developing 
countries, had not materialised due to the lack of support from many developed 
countries.85 The EFF was designed to help a member which was described as either 
'suffering serious payments imbalance relating to structural maladjustments in 
production and trade and where prices and cost distortions have been widespread,' or as 
'characterized by slow growth and an inherently weak balance of payments position 
83 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 
30, 1976 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 54, and Table 1.12, p. 87. 
84 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 
30, 1980 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), Table 26, p. 89. 
85 de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1985, pp. 203-209, and 361. 
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which prevents pursuit of an active development policy. ' 86 Therefore, it was largely 
intended to benefit the developing countries which were typically characterised by such a 
situation, particularly those that depended on one or two export commodities, or lacked 
the financial and monetary instruments for mobilising and allocating domestic savings. 
The EFF was normally limited to a period of three years with a maximum of drawings of 
140 per cent of quota and a repayment period within four to eight years after drawings.87 
Thus, under the EFF, the IMF provided financial assistance to its members for longer 
periods and in larger amounts available than those available under the SBA. 
However, the large amount and longer period features of the EFF come with a high price. 
The EFF is, similar to the SBA, attached to a number of conditions under the IMF' s 
supervision. A member applying for financial assistance under the EFF is required to 
present a programme setting forth the objectives and policies for the whole period of the 
EFF, as well as a detailed statement of policies and measures for the first year, plus the 
understanding that for each subsequent years, the member would submit a detailed 
statement of the programme progress and of the policies and measures which would be 
followed. 88 
Not surprisingly, very little use was made of IMF resources under the EFF in its earlier 
years. Within three years and eight months of its operation, only three countries (Kenya, 
the Philippines, and Mexico) had entered into the EFF with the IMF.89 The small number 
of the EFFs requested and concluded largely reflected the fact that members were able to 
avoid such a high-conditionality facility by preferably opting to meet their needs for 
balance of payments financing from the IMF' s other facilities, particularly the 
low-conditionality facilities such as the OF and the CFF, or from other sources whose 
financing carrying very limited or no conditionality, such as the Organisation for 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and private commercial banks. 
86 Executive Board Decision no. 4377-(74/114), 13 Sept. 1974, in International Monetary Fund, Annual 
Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 30, 1975 (Washington, D. C.: 
International Monetary Fund), app. II, p. 88. 
87 In December 1979, the maximum repayment period under the EFF was extended from eight to ten years 
from the date of drawing. 
88 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 
30, 1975 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 54. 
89 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 
30, 1977 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 53, 1978, p. 66. 
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In May 1976, the Trust Fund (TF) was created to provide highly concessional finance 
with 0.5 per cent interest, available in two periods until the end of 1980, on a 
medium-term basis to help the lower-income developing countries (those with a per 
capita gross national product (GNP) in 1973 of less than US$ 300) to meet their balance 
of payments requirement. It was financed with a portion of the profits from the sale of the 
IMF' s gold and resources lent or contributed by members. The credits were to be repaid 
in equal instalments between five and a half and ten years after disbursement. 
Conditionality for drawings under the TF was similar to that for drawings in the first 
credit tranche, i.e. a member must have a need for balance of payments assistance and 
also must be making a reasonable effort to correct its balance of payments position. 
However, if the member had, within a relevant period, adopted a programme in 
connection with the upper credit tranches such as a SBA or an EFF, conditionality became 
stricter, i.e. the member was deemed to satisfy the second requirement.90 
In August 1977, the Executive Board of the IMF set up another facility, the Supplement 
Financing Facility (SFF, also know as the 'Wittveen facility'). It was designed to 
supplement credits drawn under the SBA or the EFF reaching into the upper credit 
tranches and thus being subject to similar conditions. Drawings under the SFF were 
normally limited to a maximum of 140 per cent of quota with a repayment period of 
between three and a half and seven years after the purchase.91 
Moreover, in December 1975, the IMF expanded its lending role by further liberalising its 
existing facility, the CFF, to help primary producing countries meet the intensified 
payments problems, especially when there was weakness in international demand and 
prices for their primary products arising from the widespread recession, particularly in the 
industrial countries. The principal changes made to this facility covered both the 
maximum entitled amount under the CFF in terms of quota and the formula for 
calculating export shortfalls: a) the limit on drawings was raised from 50 to 75 per cent of 
quota, and the joint limit of 75 per cent of quota, which previously applied to drawings 
under both the CFF and the BSFF, was abolished; and b) the method of calculating the 
90 Gold, op. cit., 1980, p. 36; and International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors 
for the Fiscal Year Ended April30, 1976 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 60. 
91 Gold, op. cit., 1980, pp. 34-35; and International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive 
Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April30, 1978 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 
67. 
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export shortfalls under the CFF was improved by giving greater weight to the trend of past 
growth rates of export earnings.92 As a consequence, the use of the CFF substantially 
expanded following the 1975 amendment to the CFF. In 1975176, drawings under the 
CFF amounted to a record SDR 828 million, bringing the amount outstanding under the 
CFF in April 1976 to SDR 1,208 million. Most of the drawings were made after its 1975 
liberalisation, with 25 members drew a total of SDR 956 million under the CFF in the first 
six months of 1976.93 
Nevertheless, as G. C. Abbott points out, there were a number of shortcomings of the CFF 
which indicated why the developing countries were unable to benefit fully from the 
facility and also why the amount provided was insufficient to meet their deficit needs. 
First of all, calculations of shortfalls were based entirely on the behaviour of exports in 
nominal terms, and did not take into account changes in import prices, nor earnings from 
services. Secondly, CFF drawings were limited by quota, and not linked to the needs of 
individual deficit countries. The developing countries with small quotas might have 
greater shortfalls, and thus greater needs, than those with relatively larger quotas. Thirdly, 
the repayment schedule was fixed at three to five years, and not related to the recovery of 
export earnings. Fourthly, no allowance was made for increases in the volume of imports 
arising out of factors beyond the control of the deficit country. Finally, drawings under 
the CFF must be made within six months of the occurrence of the shortfalls, while for 
many countries statistics were available after a considerably longer time-lag.94 More 
importantly, there was conditionality attached to the CFF, although it was less severe than 
that of the EFF or the SBA. The conditionality consisted of a requirement that the 
member would 'cooperate with the Fund in an effort to find, where required, appropriate 
solutions for its balance of payments difficulties. ' 95 If drawings under the CFF exceeded 
50 per cent, the IMF must be satisfied that the member had been cooperating in this way.96 
Thus, although the CFF contributed to the alleviation of the developing countries' 
payments problems caused by fluctuating export earnings, it simultaneously strengthened 
92 Abbott, G. C., International Indebtedness and the Developing Countries (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 
171; and International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended 
Apri/30, I976 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 52. 
93 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 
30, I976 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 52. 
94 Abbott, op. cit., p. 172. 
95 Executive Board Decision, no. 1477-(63/8), 'Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctuations,' 27 Feb. 
1963, in Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 239. 
96 Gold, op. cit., 1980, p. 30. 
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the IMF influence in the developing economies. In particular, this occurred after changes 
in borrowing terms in 1982 which turned it to become a high-conditionality facility, and 
in general there appeared to be an imbalance of power between the IMF as a lender and 
the developing countries as borrowers. 
During this period, the relationships between the IMF and the developing countries were 
seen as paradoxical. Even though the IMF had expanded its lending resources so as to 
help meet the payments needs of the developing countries, the use of IMF lending by the 
developing countries was not as high as it might have been. This was largely due to two 
factors. First, the developing countries found IMF lending less attractive than that of 
private commercial banks. Lending provided by the IMF was often attached to 
conditionality which would take time to work out and, more significantly, could have 
adverse implications for the developing countries, particularly political ones. Second, the 
IMF also faced competition from other sources, particularly from private commercial 
banks, in providing lending to the developing countries. One of the major consequences 
of the oil price crisis was the accumulation of liquidity in several private commercial 
banks, mostly Western commercial banks, following the steadily rising deposits from 
oil-producing countries. This in tum increased the willingness of the banks to lend to the 
developing countries as a way to recycle their excessive 'petrodollars' (which were dollar 
revenues of the oil-exporting countries earned from exporting their oil),97 especially at 
the time when the 1974-1975 recession reduced credit demand in the developed industrial 
countries. Underlying the increased willingness of the banks to lend was a popular belief 
that 'countries do not go bankrupt.' 98 Furthermore, the real cost of borrowing in the 
commercial markets was remarkably low since real interest rates were zero or negative as 
a result of high inflation. Thus, to finance their balance of payments deficits or 
development projects, the oil-importing developing countries often opted for private 
commercial banks' lending as an alternative and/or a supplement to IMF lending. As a 
consequence, during 1977-82, short-term lending of private commercial banks to the 
97 It should be noted that in contrast to a conventional belief, the role of the Euromarkets in recycling 
petrodollars was modest. See for example, Spiro, D. E., The Hidden Hand of America Hegemony (Ithaca, N. 
Y.: Cornell U. P., 1999). 
98 This belief was expounded by Walter Wriston, Citicorp Chairman, who usually said, 'countries don't go 
out of business.' James, op. cit., 1996, p. 352. 
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developing countries was at an average of US$ 19.5 billion annually while net purchases 
from the IMF were merely US$ 2.5 billion.99 
In sum, the international developments as well as the discord between the US and other 
industrial countries which occurred during the 1970s helped provide the developing 
countries with forums within the IMF and also with limited opportunities to press the case 
for the IMF' s dealing with their economic problems. Although the consequent 
enlargement of access to IMF resources through both the proliferation of IMF facilities 
and the liberalisation of the CFF would, to some extent, be of benefit to the developing 
countries, at the same time it provided additional instruments through which the IMF's 
influence in their economic policies could be reinforced, especially through the new 
facilities with high conditionality like the EFF. Nonetheless, in practice such an influence 
in the developing countries as a whole was, during this period, not substantial due to less 
reliance of the developing countries on the IMF' s financial assistance than other 
alternative financial sources, namely private commercial lenders. Yet, the legacy of this 
period was to change the course of the relationship between the IMF and the developing 
countries in the following periods, to which we now tum. 
1.2.2.3 The IMF-World Bank Convergence: 1980s Onwards 
The period of the 1980s onward saw the emergence of several crises. Among them was 
the debt crisis which was characterised by the inability of a number of the developing 
countries, which had borrowed heavily from Western private commercial banks, to meet 
their debt repayments. This had a significant impact upon the IMF's influence, especially 
in the field of debt renegotiations between the creditors (both official and private) and the 
debtor countries. 
To understand the changes that occurred during this period, it would be helpful to look 
briefly at the origins of the debt crisis. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the 
industrial countries faced stagflation, a low level of output combined with inflation, 
which had followed the oil price rises of 1973 and 1979. Controlling inflation became the 
priority of virtually all industrial countries, especially the US, in a belief that it would 
stimulate growth and employment. Anti-inflationary measures principally based on 
99 Bird, G., IMF Lending to Developing Countries: Issues and Evidence (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 4. 
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restrictive monetary policies were pursued after late 1979, even though this would 
exacerbate the already-high level of unemployment. This included the sharp increase in 
interest rates. The inflation rate did eventually fall but this brought about a substantial 
rise in real interest rates since nominal interest rates now exceeded the reduced inflation 
rate. 
Due to the rise in real interest rates, the prevailing situation of inflation eroding debt prior 
to 1979 was no longer the case. Higher interest rates obviously had an immediate impact 
in raising the interest payments since most of loans were contracted at floating interest 
rates, and reflected US rates. 100 Interest payments incurred by the developing countries 
more than tripled during 1978-1982 from US$ 21 billion to US$ 72 billion. 101 Also the 
majority of loans from private commercial banks to the developing countries' 
governments had been made on a short-term basis and, as time went on, the maturity of 
the loans fell. While in 1974, two thirds of the loans in the Euromarkets still had a 
maturity of between seven and ten years and one tenth had a maturity of more than ten 
years, in the following years two thirds were dated between one and six years, and only 1 
per cent had a maturity of more than ten years. 102 Moreover, the weak demand arising 
from the recession and an intensification of protectionist measures in the industrial 
economies made it difficult for the non-oil developing countries to export and thus further 
worsened their export performance which had also been weakened by the fall in primary 
commodities prices and their declining terms of trade. 103 As the economic prospects of 
the world and particularly of many developing countries grew bleaker, in 1978 private 
commercial banks sought to minimise risk by increasing short-term lending and by 
reducing loans with longer maturities. Simultaneously, the level of capital outflows from 
some developing countries, particularly, Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, began to 
increase on a large scale, which was often compensated through increased short-term 
borrowings. 104 Therefore, many developing countries, which had borrowed heavily, 
especially from private commercial banks, after 1973, found themselves caught in 
massive and increasing debt burdens. By mid-1982, the aggregate external debt of many 
100 James, op. cit., 1996, p. 355. 
101 Loxley, J., Debt and Disorder: External Financing for Development (Boulder: Westview, 1986), Table 
3.3, p. 60. 
102 James, op. cit., 1996, pp. 319-320. 
103 de Vries, M.G., The IMF in a Changing World, 1945-85 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary 
Fund, 1986),pp. 183-184. 
104 Loxley, op. cit., p. 64; and James, op. cit., 1996, p. 358. 
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oil-importing developing countries was over US$ 600 billion, over half of which was on a 
commercial terms. 105 
Yet, the important issue in relation to the debt crisis is not the total amount of debt but 
rather the ability of a borrowing country to service its debt which can be measured by a 
debt-service ratio (debt-service payments (principal plus interest payments) as a 
percentage of export earnings). With the persistent weakness in the export markets of 
many developing countries combined with the considerable rise in the interest payments 
and an increase in maturing loans, the combined debt-service ratios for the developing 
countries rose sharply from 15.1 per cent in 1977, to 19 per cent in 1979, and to 24.4 per 
cent in 1982. For non-oil developing countries it rose from 16.1 per cent, to 19.7 per cent 
and to 25 per cent in the same years. 106 As noted in the earlier section, the problems of 
debt servicing were not new to the developing countries. However, the fear of default on 
debts was triggered, especially when the major debtor country of Mexico, which was 
itself an oil exporting country and regarded by officials and bankers as the least likely to 
default on its loans, announced in August 1982 that it could no longer meet its 
debt-servicing payments. The Mexican crisis was shortly followed by the outbreak of 
similar crises in major debtor countries such as Argentina and Brazil. 
However, the debt crisis was not confined to only large debtor countries in Latin America; 
a large number of middle-income and minor debtor countries in other regions were also 
affected. This was due largely to a sharp cut back in bank lending to non-oil developing 
countries after the Mexican crisis, and also to oil-exporting countries by 1983 as oil prices 
fell dramatically. As a consequence, net flows of finance to the developing countries in 
1983 and 1984 were negative to the estimates of US$ 24 billion and US$ 31 billion, 
respectively. 107 The negative net financing flows meant that net lending (new lending 
minus principal payments of old loans) to the developing countries was insufficient even 
to cover their interest payments on past debt. 
With the onset of the debt cns1s m late 1982, there had been a greater degree of 
cooperation between creditor countries (developed industrial countries), private 
105 de Vries, op. cit., 1986, p. 183. 
106 /bid., Table 1, p. 185. 
107 Loxley, op. cit., p. 62. 
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commercial banks, international organisations (namely the IMF and the World Bank), 
and debtor countries. Their attention turned to the IMF as 'the lender of the last resort,' in 
the search for a solution to the developing countries' debt problems which were also the 
creditors' problems. Since the IMF recognised that its financial assistance was 
insufficient to cover the debtors' financial requirements, it then had to bring in additional 
financing from the private commercial banks and also the creditor countries in managing 
the debt problems. On the other hand, the creditor countries, especially the US, had 
adopted a new strategy towards their foreign aid policy as previously pointed out, in 
particular the increasing reliance on the IMF as 'a seal of approval.' Also the private 
commercial banks, having tried unsuccessfully in the past to bring about changes in 
economic policies in debtor countries, as in the case of Peru in 1976, had become aware 
that they lacked the technical expertise, data, and monitoring capabilities to do so.108 As a 
result, after August 1982 a new relationship between private commercial banks and the 
IMF emerged. The IMF, which had previously in the 1970s been in competition with the 
private commercial banks as institutional channels for petrodollar recycling, now closely 
coordinated with them. In particular, debtor countries' negotiations with the private 
commercial banks and creditor countries, both for additional net lending and for debt 
restructuring, became linked with the elaboration of IMF programmes. 
As previously noted, the re-negotiation of debts was not a new field to the IMF. It had 
occurred between 1959 and 1971 in eight countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Turkey, 
Ghana, Indonesia, India, and Peru. 109 Since the second half of the 1970s, the IMF has 
increasingly been involved in debt negotiations through the provision of new resources or 
rescheduling in cases such as Zaire, Peru, Turkey, Jamaica and Sudan during 1976-78.ll0 
However, the significance of the debt crisis is that it led to an emergence of more debtor 
countries and to the IMP's involvement in a larger number of the developing countries. 
Between 1979 and 1983, no fewer than 68 developing countries and 12 of the 20 major 
developing country debtors turned to the IMF for financial assistance. 111 Thus, through 
the process of managing the debt crisis, the IMF was able to expand its lending activities 
in the developing countries and thereby to enhance its opportunity in influencing 
108 Loxley, op. cit., p. 74. 
109 de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1976, p. 595. 
110 James, op. cit., 1996, pp. 330-331 and 359-360. 
111 Loxley, op. cit., p. 88. 
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economic policies of a large number of the developing countries through the application 
of its conditionality. 
Not only had the debt cnsts activated the relationship between the IMF and the 
developing countries but it also had an impact on the IMF-World Bank relationship. In 
fact the division of labour between the IMF and the World Bank had already begun to 
change in the 1970s but it was in the 1980s that major changes took place. The division of 
labour between the World Bank and the IMF was clear prior to the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system. The IMF was designated to deal with short-term balance of payments 
problems, the demand side, and the monetary sector of the economy, through its 
supported programme lending. The World Bank, on the other hand, was oriented towards 
long-term economic development, the supply side and the real sector of the economy 
through its supported project lending. The 1966 memoranda assigned each institution 
'primary responsibilities,' following the increasing overlap between activities of the two 
institutions during the first half of the 1960s. This was notably in the case of India in 
1965-1966, which the World Bank's large-scale project lending in practice amounted to a 
balance of payment programme. 112 The memoranda stipulated that the World Bank was 
mainly responsible 'for the composition and appropriateness of development 
programmes and project evaluation, including development priorities.' The IMF's 
primary responsibility was 'for exchange and restrictive systems, for adjustment of 
temporary balance of payments disequilibrium and for evaluating and assisting members 
to work out stabilisation programmes as a sound basis for economic advance.' 113 
Yet, the introduction of the EFF by the IMF in 1974 can be seen as a first step towards 
intruding into the World Bank's field. The IMF under the EFF recognised that the 
balance of payments difficulties in the developing countries could be structural. The 
EFF was, thus, largely aimed at structural adjustment in the developing countries with 
longer-term finance. In addition, after the approval of the UK's and Italy's SBAs in 
1977, no major industrial countries concluded a policy programme with the IMF. As 
previously discussed, the IMF had gradually shifted its focus towards the developing 
112 James, op. cit., 1996, p. 143. 
113 Mason and Asher, op. cit., p. 551. 
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countries. This shift had become manifest since the mid-1970s with the growing range 
of its facilities. 
However, Table 1.2 shows that during the 1970s, the industrial countries continued to 
draw a substantial amount from the IMF. 114 It was not until the late 1970s that most of 
drawings from the IMF were made by the developing countries. Since the mid-1980s, 
the overall picture has changed; the industrial countries have ceased to draw from the 
IMF whereas all drawings have been made by the developing countries. Consequently, 
the IMF has become involved in mainly the developing countries, and has, in effective, 
moved closer to the World Bank's domain of responsibilities. 
Following the emergence of the 1970s balance of payments crisis in many developing 
countries, the World Bank had meanwhile diversified its own activities to provide 
programme lending. This was not specific project lending, but rather lending to support 
the balance of payments of recipient countries through structural adjustment programmes. 
The move of the bank was based on the belief that in addition to the implementation of 
development projects, changes in domestic policy were crucial in avoiding the future 
balance of payments crises which could in tum seriously jeopardise the World Bank's 
development projects and impede economic development in the developing countries. 
114 All member countries of the IMF have the right to seek the IMP's financial assistance. Unlike the IMF, 
the World Bank lends only to creditworthy governments of developing countries. The IBRD lends to 
developing countries whose per capita gross national product (GNP) in 1997 exceeded US$ 925. On the 
other hand, only the poor developing countries whose per capita GNP in 1997 was US$ 925 or less are 
entitled to borrow from the IDA. World Bank, World Bank Annual Report, 1998. 
Table 1.2 All Purchases from 1961-2000, excluding reserve tranche purchases (in millions of SDRs, otherwise stated) 
Years 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
ICs 1,080 138 0 516 1,431 142 156 1,404 !,355 635 0 0 0 !,513 !,974 2,628 2,416 
DCs 646 257 324 139 509 603 405 528 367 314 380 650 342 1,575 1,962 3,391 929 
World !,726 395 324 655 1,939 745 560 1,932 1,721 949 380 650 342 3,088 3,936 6,019 3,345 
ICs/World 63 35 0 79 74 19 28 73 79 67 0 0 0 49 50 44 72 (%) 
DCs/World 37 65 100 21 26 81 72 27 21 33 100 100 100 51 50 56 28 (%) 
Years 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
ICs 0 54 355 217 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DCs 6,771 7,394 12,264 7,074 4,014 3,820 3,299 2,669 3,478 4,270 7,387 4,791 5,042 4,980 16,968 5,271 16,113 
World 6,771 7,448 12,619 7,291 4,014 3,820 3,299 2,669 3,478 4,270 7,387 4,791 5,042 4,980 16,968 5,271 16,113 
!Cs/World 0 I 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (%) 
DCs/World 
(%) 100 99 97 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1991 ), pp. 24-25, 1988, pp. 26-27, and 200 I, p. 29. 
Note: !Cs and DCs denote industrial countries and developing countries. 
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As a result, the idea of the Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) was initiated during the 
September-1979 Annual Meeting of the IMP's and the World Bank's Boards of 
Governors and was approved in 1980 by the Executive Directors of the World Bank. 
The World Bank recognised that 'the recent changes in the international economy, 
including the increase in the price of petroleum, continued high levels of inflation, and a 
prolonged period of slow growth in the industrialized countries, were posing acute 
problems for many of the developing countries.' 115 The SAL was intended to provide 
long-term finance to supplement the short-term finance from private commercial banks 
and the IMF. 116 As a type of programme loan, the SAL was conditional. Ernest Stern 
identified four areas of conditions attached to the SAL: 1) the restructuring of 
incentives, including pricing policies, tariff reforms, taxation, subsidies, and interest 
rates; 2) the revision of public investment priorities; 3) reform on budget and debt 
management; and 4) institutional reform, particularly strengthening public 
. 117 
enterpnses. With the introduction of the World Bank's programme loans (including 
both the SALs to support programmes relating to the economy in general and the 
Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SECALs) which provided loans supporting programmes 
linked to particular sectors), the World Bank had in effect entered into the areas 
originally designated for the IMF. 
On the other hand, the IMF had made further moves and became closer to the fields of the 
World Bank. This move was manifest in the establishment of the Structural Adjustment 
Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The SAF was 
set up in 1986 to provide loans at a highly concessional interest rate to low-income 
countries which faced protracted balance of payment difficulties. It supported 
medium-term adjustment programmes of three years with a repayment period of five and 
a half to ten years. Its establishment was followed by that of the ESAF in 1987. Similar to 
the SAF, the ESAF was to provide highly concessional loans to low-income developing 
countries with the stronger conditionality attached than that under the SAF. 
115 World Bank, World Bank Annual Report, 1980, p. 67 
116 Ibid. 
117 Stern, E., 'World Bank Financing of Structural Adjustment,' in J. Williamson (ed.), JMF Conditionality 
(Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983), pp. 93-98. 
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Therefore, since the mid-1970s, the difference between the World Bank as an 
international institution providing long-term project lending to promote development and 
the IMF as one which provides short-term balance of payments lending to alleviate 
temporary payment problems has become blurred. The increasingly overlapping nature of 
their activities and responsibilities brought about greater cooperation and collaboration 
between the two institutions as a way to deal with the overlap itself. Their collaboration 
was both formal, through a policy framework paper (PFP), 118 and informal, through 
personal contact of their staff members. 119 Nonetheless, the IMP-World Bank 
collaboration did not always go smoothly. They might agree on broad issues like the need 
for policy adjustment and conditionality. However, at times, they failed to agree on 
detailed policies which borrowing countries were required to pursue. Thus, a difference 
in their approaches to the same problem could arise. The classical example was that of 
Kenya in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, in which the World Bank's conditions 
'differed from those of the IMF both in taking the form of agreed policy actions (rather 
than numerical outcomes) and in relating to longer-term variables.' 120 A worse case 
happened in Argentina. Tensions between the two institutions arose following the 
announcement of the World Bank in 1988 that it was to grant a US$ 1.25 billion loan to 
Argentina who had failed to meet the performance criteria of its latest SBA with the IMF. 
In the case of Argentina, the World Bank took the view that the IMF approach 
concentrated unduly on aggregate macroeconomic targets to be achieved in a short time 
and questioned whether these targets were attainable without radical structural changes. 
It was also concerned about 'the realism of the fiscal targets' and the lack of adequate 
regard for their effect on the efficiency of the economy. A similar scenario took place in 
Turkey in the same year when the World Bank agreed to release the second tranche under 
a SECAL to Turkey, despite the dissatisfaction of the IMF over its macroeconomic 
118 A policy framework paper is the joint-prepared document between the borrowing country, the World 
Bank, and the IMF in connection with the SAF and ESAF arrangements. It was introduced in 1986, the same 
year when the SAF was created. It contains a medium-term policy framework, including information on 
economic policies and economic estimates for the borrowing countries. It has more importance to the IMP's 
operations than to the World Bank's because its approval by the IMP's Executive Board is required for an 
SAF or an ESAF arrangement. Goreux, L. M., 'The Fund and the Low-Income Countries,' in C. Gwin and 
R. E. Feinberg (eds.), The International Monetary Fund in a Multipolar World: Pulling Together (New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 1989), p. 157. 
119 Bird, op. cit., 1995, pp. 49-50. 
12
° Killick, T., 'Kenya, the IMF, and the Unsuccessful Quest for Stabilisation,' in Williamson, op. cit., 1983, 
p. 409. 
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performance. However, in early 1989, the release was delayed until October 1990 in the 
context of the Gulf War. 121 
The early 1990s saw the emergence of a new group of borrowing countries, the Central 
and Eastern European economies, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and 
the Eastern Bloc. This presented a new challenge to the IMF, which responded by 
introducing a new temporary facility to help the 'countries in transition.' The creation of 
the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) was approved by the Executive Board in 
April 1993. It was designed to assist member countries which experienced balance of 
payments problems arising from transformation from a planned to a market economy. 
Repayments under the STF are made over four and a half to ten years. The Kyrgyz 
Republic was the first member to use the STF. 122 However, during this period loans to 
the developing countries continued to dominate the lending pattern of the IMF. 123 
In the 1990s, the IFis' focus towards the developing countries was further been enhanced 
by several developments in international politics and economy, principally the second 
Gulf War of 1990-91 and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. With regard to the 
1990-91 Gulf War, the IMF-World Bank joint support was provided to the Gulf Crisis 
Financial Coordination Group. 124 In mid-April1991, the Group had agreed to grant about 
US$ 15.7 billion to mainly Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, and about US$ 8.3 billion was 
disbursed. In addition, the IMF responded to the crisis by adapting the existing credit 
instruments rather than introducing new ones with more flexibility, quick access and 
disbursement of financing. This reflected the belief of the IMF that the impact of the 
crisis was 'relatively limited and manageable.' 125 
During the East Asian financial crisis, the IMF set up the Supplemental Reserve Facility 
(SRF) in December 1997. It was designed to assist member countries which faced 
121 Polak, J. J., The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund: A Changing Relationship 
(Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 30-37. 
122 International Monetary Fund, IMF Survey Supplement, Sept. 1998. 
123 Bird, G., 'The International Monetary Fund and Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and 
Policy Options,' International Organization, vol. 50, no. 3, summer 1996, p. 477; and Killick, T., IMF 
Programmes in Developing Countries: Design and Impact (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 6. 
124 This was a group of 12 major donors and creditors and chaired by the United Stated. It was set up to 
mobilise and coordinate assistance to countries seriously suffered from the Middle East crisis. 
125 Cheney, D. M., Dealing With the Unexpected: The IMF's Response to the Middle East Crisis 
(Washington, D. C.: External Relations Department, International Monetary Fund, 1991). 
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balance of payments problems arising from 'a sudden and disruptive loss of market 
confidence reflected in pressure on the capital account and the member's reserves.' 126 
Drawings under the SRF run up to one year with a repayment period of one to one and a 
half years from each purchasing date (an extension up to one year of repayment may be 
granted). The SRF also carried conditions: its availability was subject to the 
implementation of adjustment policies. 
The persistent debt problem of many developing countries had provided another 
opportunity for the IMF (and the World Bank) to direct more attention towards the 
developing countries. In September 1996, the Interim and Development Committees of 
the IMF and the Bank adopted a joint initiative for heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs). The so-called HIPC Initiative provided 'exceptional assistance' to countries to 
reduce the burden of their external debt 'to levels that they can service through export 
earnings, aid, and capital inflows.' Both the World Bank and the IMF recognised that the 
external debt had become a heavy burden in some HIPCs to the degree that it jeopardises 
their adjustment and growth. The Initiative is available to all HIPCs who are entitled to 
finance under the IMF's ESAF and the IDA-supported programmes. 127 
In sum, this period witnessed major changes in both relationships between the IMF and 
the developing countries, on the one hand, and between the IMF and other parties, namely 
creditor countries, private commercial banks and the World Bank, on the other. In the 
course of the debt crisis, there had been a rise in the number of indebted developing 
countries with debt-servicing difficulties and the increasing IMF-World Bank 
collaboration. This, together with a shift in the creditor countries' and the banks' 
approach towards reliance upon the IMF's approval, has highlighted the lending role and 
enriched potential sources of leverage of the IMF in relation to the developing countries, 
as its borrowing countries. 
126 International Monetary Fund, IMF Survey Supplement, Sept. 1998, p. 17. 
127 International Monetary Fund, IMF Survey Supplement, Sept. 1998. 
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1.3 Clritiqii.Res of the Relationships between the HMJF and Developing 
Countries 
As the IMF has become increasingly involved in the developing countries and their 
economies, it has also become the focus of controversy, especially since the 1970s. A 
number of criticisms of the IMF have been raised over time and the institution has been 
called upon to defend its role and policies. This section looks at both the issues frequently 
raised by critics of the IMF, some of which may also apply to the World Bank, and the 
arguments in defending the IMF. The criticisms of the IMF can be classified into three 
major lines: first, the power of the IMF over the question of the international payments 
adjustment; second, the issue of IMF conditionality; and, third, the issue of the 
organisation and structure. 
1.3.1 The Power of the IMF in International Payments Adjustment 
Critics rightly argue that there exists asymmetry in the IMF' s power in dealing with the 
question of who should take responsibility in adjusting to international payments 
imbalances between countries in balance of payments deficit and those in surplus. 128 The 
IMF has been criticised for having little influence in making the countries in surplus bear 
their share of adjustment, while being able to exert such an influence through IMF 
conditionality on the countries in deficit. It is the countries in deficit (with very few 
exceptions of those with alternative sources of financial support or in a privileged 
position whose currency acts as an international reserve currency, namely the US), which 
are in need of IMF financial assistance, and which are, thus, subject to the policy changes 
required by the IMF. On the other hand, the countries in surplus, which have no need to 
resort to IMF financial assistance, are able to treat such policy changes as optional or even 
to avoid them altogether. Thus, it has always been the deficit countries (mainly the 
low-income developing countries) which have to adjust to imbalances in international 
payments and to bear the burden of the adjustment. The defenders admit that due to its 
limited power, there is little that the IMF can do regarding the issue, apart from exercising 
'firm surveillance' over the exchange rate policies of surplus countries and that the 
effectiveness of such an exercise depends upon their cooperation. 129 
128 Dell, S., 'Stabilization: The Political Economy of Overkill,' World Economy, vol. 10, no. 8, 1982, p. 600. 
129 Nowzad, B., 'The IMF and its Critics,' Essays in International Finance, no. 146 (Princeton, N.J.: 
International Finance Sec., Dept. of Economics, Princeton U., Dec. 1981), pp. 6-7. 
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1.3.2 The Issue of IMF Comlitionality 
The second line of criticisms of the IMF is concerned with the nature and appropriateness 
(both theoretical and political) of IMF conditionality. There are a number of criticisms in 
relation to this issue, which will be discussed in the following section. 
First of all, it is argued that the IMF has failed to distinguish between exogenous and 
endogenous factors contributing to the balance of payments deficits. 13° Critics point out 
that many developing countries, particularly the poorest ones, are often faced with 
balance of payments deficits caused by external factors outside their governments' 
control (such as natural disasters like floods and droughts, and low international prices of 
primary products) rather than by internal factors (such as economic mismanagement). 
They thus suggest that IMF conditionality should be less severe where the causes of 
balance of payments problems are beyond the government's control. In response to this 
critique, both the IMF and its defenders take the view that what is important in 
determining the need for adjustment policies is not the issue of their causes, but whether 
the balance of payments problem is transitory and self-reversing. If it is transitory, then 
adjustment is not necessary. However, if not, adjustment policies are required, regardless 
of the causes of the payments deficit; otherwise the problem will re-emerge. 131 
Furthermore, they argue that exogenous factors are not totally absent from the IMP's 
consideration. They refer to the special facilities made available by the IMF such as the 
CFF132 and the OF, which take into account exogenous causes of balance of payments 
problems. 
Secondly, IMF conditionality is claimed to be inflexible. The monetarist framework 
adopted by the IMF in its policy analysis is, according to the critics, rigid: one simplistic 
solution applies to all countries, regardless of different circumstances they have 
encountered. Thus, the IMF' s policy programmes are often seen by the critics as a 
'standard package' for all countries in all circumstances. The assertion is rebutted by the 
defenders who claim that it is incorrect to say that IMF policy programmes are rigid. They 
point out that in practice the similarity of IMF programmes arises partly because the 
130 Dell, op. cit., 1982, pp. 599-600. 
131 Nowzad, op. cit., p. 16. 
132 In 1988, the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) was established, superseding the 
CFF. However, in February 2000, the contingency element of the CCFF was eliminated in order to 
streamline and simplify IMF facilities. 
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balance of payments problems in the developing countries share common elements, such 
as large budget deficits, monetary expansion and the lack of exchange and price 
adjustment, and partly because the IMF tends to focus on a limited number of broad 
macroeconomic variables. 133 
Thirdly, relating to the above argument, a question has persistently been raised over the 
appropriateness of the IMF' s approach to the problems being faced by the developing 
countries. The critics assert that the IMF focuses on short-term balance of payments 
problems, and ignores long-term economic development. Its programmes have an 
adverse impact on development of the developing countries, and thus, the IMF has been 
labelled as an anti-developmental institution. According to the critics, IMF conditionality 
is said to be 'harsh' and the IMF has little interest in the negative socio-economic costs of 
its adjustment programmes, in particular on the poor and on income inequalities, and in 
their political consequences. This argument is often used to explain why countries have 
tried to avoid seeking financial assistance from the IMF. 
However, the defenders of the IMF argue that the ability and policies of the IMF are 
constrained by such factors as available limited resources and the role laid down in its 
Articles of Agreement of providing short-term financing. Moreover, it is not the role of 
the IMF to act like a development agency. In fact, the issue of development problems in 
the developing countries is the responsibility of the World Bank, its twin Bretton Woods 
sister. The defenders point out that the IMF does not, nevertheless, completely ignore 
such an issue. Its special facilities, operations and promotion of international trade 
growth are said to have benefits to the developing countries. Such facilities as the EFF, 
the SAF and the ESAF are often quoted as beneficial to the developing countries due to 
the longer time over which resources are provided, and the longer repayment period than 
under the traditional SBA. In response to the criticism of harshness of IMF measures, the 
defenders argue that often countries approach the IMF at the very late stage of its 
economic difficulties. In such situations, tough measures are then necessary in dealing 
with the severe problems. 134 Along the same line, Managing Director Michel Camdessus 
states that: 
133 Nowzad, op. cit., p. 12. 
134 Ibid., p. 21. 
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It is not Fund conditionality that is unduly harsh. It is the difficult underlying 
economic problems that demand rigorous economic discipline in the countries 
seeking Fund help. Quite simply, countties cannot live beyond their means. 
With or without the Fund, they have to adjust sooner or later. And delay does not 
help . . . most members requesting an arrangement have not only needed 
resources urgently, they have also approached the Fund only after some delay, 
when their difficulties have become such that they could be solved only by a 
more rigorous adjustment program than would have been necessary at an earlier 
date. 135 
With regard to the issue of social predicaments, the IMF's view is that it is not the 
responsibility of the IMF, but rather the domestic government to introduce measures to 
relieve the adverse social effects arising from the implementation of the IFis' adjustment 
programmes. However, recently there has been a joint IMF-World Bank effort to 
alleviate such adverse effects in countries which adopt their programmes. 
Furthermore, in linking their criticism of IMF conditionality to its lending, critics add that 
the amount of IMF financial assistance is small and even insufficient for the balance of 
payments needs of borrowing countries, in comparison to harsh conditions that they have 
to endure. Also the critics argue that the proportion of low and high conditionality 
lending provided by the IMF is inappropriate. By placing an increasing emphasis on high 
conditionality lending since the early 1980s, the IMF in effect pushes the borrowing 
countries into high-conditionality drawings. 136 
More importantly, the critics further argue that IMF conditionality is ineffective in 
helping indebted poor countries to reduce their debts, but rather increases them. Poor 
developing countries end up repaying more than the amount they have received from the 
IMF. Thus, the critics claim that IMF facilities cause the perverse transfer of resources 
from the poor developing countries to the IMF and thus contribute to the drain on the 
developing countries' scarce financial resources. 137 
135 Camdessus, M., 'The IMF: Facing New Challenges: An Interview with Michel Camdessus, Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund,' Finance and Development, June 1988, pp. 3-4. 
136 Dell, S., 'On Being Grandmotherly: The Evolution of IMF Conditionality,' Essays in International 
Finance, no. 144 (Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Sec., Dept. of Economics, Princeton U., Oct. 1981), 
pp. 29-30. 
137 Oxfam Policy Department, A Case for Refomz: Fifty Years of the IMF and World Bank (Oxford: Oxfam, 
1995), pp. 38-40. 
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Table 1.3 shows the net credit and loans from the IMF to the developing countries from 
1984 to 2001. Since 1986, IMF net credit and loans to all developing countries has tended 
to be negative with some exceptions such as in 1991, 1995 and 1997-1999. As critics 
point out, this suggests that the amount which the developing countries paid back to the 
IMF was in fact more than the amount of which they had received from the IMF in terms 
of credit and loans. The positive net credit and loans from the IMF in 1991, 1995 and 
1997-1999 can be explained by particular major crises to which the IMF had responded: 
the Gulf crisis in the early 1990s; the Mexican economic crisis in 1995; and the Asian 
economic crisis commencing in 1997. For instance, in 1995 a vast amount of the IMF's 
credit and loans went to the Western hemisphere as illustrated by a net credit of US$ 12.9 
billion. In 1997, Asia received a positive net credit of US$ 5 billion which was the 
highest amount compared with other regions in the same year and also the highest amount 
compared with the amount received in previous years since 1984. Particularly, newly 
industrialised Asian economies in the same year received net credit of US$ 11.3 billion 
from the IMF. 138 In these periods, negative net credit and loans incurred by other 
economies elsewhere are offset by such large positive net credits, and, thus, the positive 
net credit to the developing countries as a whole, particularly since the late 1990s does not 
show the negative trend of net credit to Africa and sub-Sahara Africa, in which the 
majority of low-income developing countries are. 
Furthermore, as a commentator has pointed out, the trend of negative net credit and loans 
from the IMF has raised the question of the consistence between its lending performance 
and its role which is stated in its Articles of Agreement. 139 Article 1 describes the IMF' s 
role as 'to give confidence to members by making the general resources of the IMF 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with 
opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to 
138 The term 'newly industrialised Asian economies' includes Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
Province of China. The figure is quoted from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
(Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, Oct. 1998), Table 37, p. 229. 
139 Bird, op. cit., 1996, pp. 502-503. 
Table 1.3 Net Credit and Loans from IMF of the Developing Countriesa (in billions ofUS dollars) 
YEARS 1984 1885 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Developing Countries 4.2 0.3 -2.2 -4.7 -4.1 -1.5 -1.9 1.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.8 12.6 -2.9 0.8 8.5 1.3 -6.7 23.3 
Africa 0.6 0.1 -1 -1.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 
Sub-Sahara Africa 0.5 0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 0 0 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0 -0.2 
Asia 0.3 -1 -0.9 -2.4 -2.4 -1.1 -2.4 1.9 1.3 0.6 -0.8 -1.5 -1.7 5 6.6 1.7 0.9 -2.2 
Middle East & Europe -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.6 3.3 10.3 
West Hemisphere 3.4 1.5 0.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.2 1.2 -1 -1.6 -0.9 -1.3 12.9 -2 -4 2.5 -0.9 -10.7 15.6 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, Oct. 1992), Table A44, p. 153, Oct. 1998, Table 37, p. 229, and Apr. 2002, Table 37, p. 210. 
Note: • includes net disbursements from programmes under the General Resources Account, Trust Fund, Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (formerly ESAF). 
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measures destructiv~ of national or international prosperity.' 140 In 1994 (the year of the 
fiftieth anniversaries of the IMF and the World Bank), the so-called 'Fifty Years is 
Enough' organisation was created by a group of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
which were sceptical about the neo-liberal trend of the IMF and the World Bank and were, 
thus, identified with the Left of the political spectrum. The group asserted that the IMF' s 
role as a development agency was inadequate. Structural adjustment programmes of the 
IMF and the World Bank brought more disadvantages than advantages to the developing 
countries, in particular the poorest ones. They caused deflationary pressure, high 
unemployment, the worsening of the social welfare for the poor, and an increase in 
poverty in borrowing countries. Therefore, according to the NGOs, if the IMF ceased its 
policy programmes, these countries would be better off. 141 
At the other end of the political spectrum, rightwing critics asserted that the IMF had lost 
its monetary functions since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods in the early 1970s and 
has changed its role to become a development institution. They saw such a change as 
inappropriate. For them, the solution for the IMF is either to abolish the institution 142 or 
to return to its traditional monetary role and programmes. 143 
In addition to the above criticisms concerning IMF conditionality, the IMF has often been 
accused of imposing such harsh policy conditions upon borrowing countries. Since the 
question of imposition is the core of the study, it deserves to be examined extensively (see 
Chapter Two). 
1.3.3 The Issue of the Organisation and Structure 
The third line of criticisms deals with the issue of the IFis' organisation and structure. It is 
argued that both the IMF and the World Bank (specifically, the ffiRD) are dominated by 
the industrial countries and their interests through their voting power. 144 Their dominant 
position in the two financial institutions provides them an opportunity to exploit the 
140 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund [online], Article 
1: Purposes, 2003. Available from: http://www.imf.org/externaUpubs/ft/aa/aaOl.htm [accessed 6th Oct. 
2003] 
141 See, for example, Oxfam Policy Department, op. cit., 1995. 
142 See, for example, Walters, A., 'Do We Need the IMF and the World Bank?,' Current Controversies, no. 
10 (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, Sept. 1994). 
143 Killick, op. cit., 1995, p. 157; and Bird, op. cit., 1996, pp. 477-478. 
144 See Payer, op. cit., 1974, app. II, pp. 217-219. 
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developing countries. The issue of industrial country domination in the IMF is defended 
on the grounds that it reflects the economic and financial significance of countries, and 
that reducing the industrial countries' influence in the IMF would bring more 
disadvantages to the developing countries due to the possible risk of the industrial 
countries bypassing the IMF. The defenders also assert that the developing countries have 
gained a certain degree of influence in the IMF, pointing to the CFF and the EFF 
established as a result of the pressure of the developing countries. 145 However, as 
previously noted, the EFF, which is attached with high conditionality, was in fact not the 
preferred choice called for by the developing countries, but rather the SDR-aid link. In 
order to gain a better understanding on the debate on the issue, it is necessary to describe 
how the IMF is now structured and organised, to which we tum. 
1.4 The Structure and Organisation of the IMF Today 
1.4.1 The Quota System of the IMF 
Before one can understand the IMF' s structure and voting power, the issue of quotas 
should be discussed since it plays a crucial role in defining a member's financial and 
organisational relationships with the IMF. Each member country, when joining the IMF, 
is assigned a quota, which is expressed in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). A member's 
quota is equal to the maximum amount of its obligatory financial resources made to the 
IMF, or its capital subscription. 146 At present, each member of the IMF pays 25 per cent 
of its own subscription in SDRs or in other member countries' currencies indicated by the 
IMF, and the remaining 75 per cent in its domestic currency. 147 The subscription itself 
constitutes a primary source of IMF financial resources from which IMF lending to its 
members is drawn. Another source of IMF financing is borrowing from official and 
private sources with the purpose to balance the demand for and the supply of IMF 
resources when the IMF faces the inadequacy of its own resources. Although the IMF can 
borrow from both official and private sources, it has so far borrowed only from the official 
sources. At present, there are two arrangements in which borrowing can be undertaken: 
145 N d . 2 3 owza , op. elf., pp. - . 
146 The total amount of quotas, as of the end of August 2003, paid by the 184 members of the IMF stood at 
SDR 213 billion (approximately US$ 296 billion). International Monetary Fund, IMF Quotas: A Factsheet 
[online], Sept. 2003. Available from: http://www.imf.org/externaVnp/exr/facts/quotas.htm [accessed 6th 
Oct. 2003] 
147 Until the second amendment of the IMF's Articles of Agreement came into force in 1978, 25 per cent of 
a member's subscription was payable in gold and the remaining 75 per cent in its domestic currency. 
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the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB); and the New Arrangements to Borrow 
(NAB). Under the GAB, which was set up in 1962, 11 industrial countries or their central 
banks 148 have agreed to lend SDR 17 billion (plus SDR 1.5 billion through an associated 
agreement with Saudi Arabia) to the IMF at market interest rates under special 
circumstances such as when the international monetary system or its stability are under 
threats. With the growing concern over the adequacy of IMF resources, 149 the NAB were 
established in 1998. Under the NAB, the IMF can, under similar circumstances to those 
under the GAB, borrow from 25 member countries and institutions as a supplement to its 
quota resources. However, borrowing under the GAB and the NAB together cannot 
exceed SDR 34 billion. In addition to the subscription payments and borrowing, IMF 
resources can be raised in several other ways. These include the sale of gold, bilateral 
contributions, interest repayments from its borrowing countries, and the use of SDRs. 
Besides determining the subscription payment to the IMF, a member's quota serves 
several other functions. It is used as the basis for determining the amount to which the 
member is entitled to borrow from the IMF. 150 Also it defines the member's voting power 
in the IMF (see later discussions). In addition, a member's quota determines the 
allocations of SDRs to the member. The share of the member's SDRs is allocated in 
proportion to its quota; the greater the quota, the larger the SDR allocations to which the 
member is entitled. 
As required by the IMF's Articles of Agreement, at intervals of not more than five years, 
quotas paid by the member countries are reviewed by the Board of Governors. 151 The 
modification of members' quotas could be made either to all member countries or to 
selective member countries whose economic importance in the international economy has 
increased. The size of the quotas depends on partly the economic factors such as the size 
of the economies and on how important the economies are in the international trade. It 
also partly reflects political considerations. As was discussed earlier, the initial process of 
148 The GAB participants are Belgium, Canada, the Deutsche Bundesbank, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, the Seriges Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank, the UK, and the US. 
149 Following Mexico's economic crisis in the early 1995, in June of the same year, the Group of Seven 
industrial countries proposed a plan to deal with financial emergencies by doubling the credit amount 
available under the GAB. 
150 This rule does not apply to the IMF's finance under the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF). All 
member countries are in general entitled to borrow with limits determined by their quotas. However, the 
SRF is an exception, not subject to limits relating to quotas. 
151 Since the first review in 1950, 4 out of 12 general reviews of quotas resulted in no increase in quotas. 
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determining quotas was seen as dubious and unsatisfactory due to the political 
involvement. It seems that since then, this trend has continued in the process of reviewing 
and increasing quotas. As one scholar has concluded, the outcome of quota reviews is 
heavily influenced by political factors and depends on bargaining power within the IMF' s 
Executive Board since the empirical evidence suggests that 'variations in the size of the 
quota increases cannot be explained simply in terms of key international economic 
variables.' 152 
1.4.21I'he §tructu.nl!'e of the llMJF 
At the top of the hierarchy, the Board of Governors resides as the highest authority of the 
IMF (see Figure 1.1). It is the decision-making body of the IMF. Nevertheless, it only 
decides on major policy issues such as the admission of new member countries and any 
change in quotas, and delegates most of its powers to the Executive Board. Its members 
are a Governor and an Alternate Governor appointed by each member country (normally, 
ministers of finance and central bank governors), therefore speaking on the behalf of their 
countries. The Board of Governors usually meets once a year at the Annual Meetings of 
the IMF and the World Bank, which are normally held at the end of September or the 
beginning of October. However, between annual meetings, Governors may take votes by 
mail or other means. As previously noted, there are also two advisory bodies within the 
Board of Governors: the International Monetary and Financial Committee, or IMFC (until 
September 1999 known as the Interim Committee); and the joint IMF-World Bank 
Development Committee. The IMFC currently consists of twenty-four Governors of the 
IMF (usually ministers of finance and central banks governors). Each member country 
that appoints, and each group of member countries that elects, an Executive Director 
appoints a member of the IMFC. It has an advisory role, making reports to the Board of 
Governors involving such broad issues as changes in the international monetary and 
financial system including disturbances that might threaten the system, and the 
amendment of the Articles of Agreement. The Development Committee at present 
comprises twenty-five members (usually ministers of finance or development), each of 
whom is appointed for a two-year term by one of the member countries or a group of 
152 Bird, op. cit., 1995, p. 86. 
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member countries that appoints an Executive Director of the IMF or of the World Bank. 
Its role is to advise and report to the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank 
on development issues (which have, over the years, been extended to include trade and 
global environmental issues) and on financial resources required to promote economic 
development in the developing countries, and to make recommendations on their 
implementation. 
Beneath the Board of Governors is the Executive Board, 153 responsible for day-to-day 
decision-making of the IMF. Unlike the Board of Governors which meets annually, the 
Executive Board holds meetings regularly (normally three times a week) at the IMF' s 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. It is the Executive Board which has the power to take 
decisions on the request for credits and loans from members. Members of the Executive 
Board are made up of twenty-four Executive Directors chaired by an appointed Managing 
Director who serves for a five-year term. The five large industrial countries with the 
largest IMF quotas (at present, the US, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK), along with 
Saudi Arabia, China and Russia, directly appoint their own Executive Directors. The 
other sixteen Executive Directors are elected every two years by groups of member 
countries (or known as constituencies) with smaller quotas. 
Since the inception of the IMF, the Managing Directors of the IMF have always been 
Europeans. This gives no opportunity for the developing countries' representatives to take 
the post, despite the IMF's substantial involvement in the developing countries and its 
trivial role in the developed countries. As J. E. Stiglitz comments: 
While almost all of the activities of the IMF ... today are in the developing world 
(certainly, all of their lending), [it is] led by representatives from the industrialized 
nations .... [The head of the IMF is] chosen behind closed doors, and it has never 
even been viewed as a prerequisite that the head should have any experience in the 
developing world. The institution [is] not representative of the nations [it] 
serve[s]. 154 
The Managing Director is also the head of IMF staff members, most of whom are located 
in a number of departments and offices based in the Washington headquarters. Apart 
153 Since the mid-1970s, ministerial guidance has been provided to the Executive Board from the two groups 
of committee: the Interim Committee and the Development Committee. 
154 Stiglitz, J. E., Globalization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2002), p. 19. 
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from the headquarters, there are small offices situated elsewhere such as in Paris, Tokyo, 
Geneva, at the UN in New York, plus the resident representatives in some of the larger 
borrowing countries. 
It should be noted that there also exist a number of interest groups, 155 which have some 
say in the decision-making process in the IMF. Among them are the Group of 10 and the 
Group of 24. The Group of 10 was created in 1962 in association with the GAB. It 
consists of representatives of the major industrial countries. On the other hand, the Group 
of 24156 was set up in 1972 at the Lima meeting of the Group of 77. It is aimed to 
represent the interests of developing countries in negotiating on international monetary 
issues. Although the Group of 24 is not part of the IMF's structure, its meetings are 
normally held in association with those of the Interim or Development Committees. 
1.4.3 Voting Power 
Concerning the voting system of the IMF, it IS not based on the principle of 
one-country-one vote as operating in the UN organisations. Rather, it is based on 
weighted votes due to the quota system used by the IMF. Each member country has 250 
basic votes plus one additional vote for each SDR 100,000 of its quota. 157 In both Boards 
of Governors and of Executive Directors, relatively unimportant decisions require a 
simple majority, more important ones require a 70 per cent majority, while an 85 per cent 
majority is required on such crucial matters as the structure of the IMF, allocations of 
SDRs, and quota changes. Nevertheless, the Executive Board rarely conducts formal 
voting in making decisions, although each Executive Director has a certain number of 
votes in proportion to the quota(s) of a member country/countries being represented. In 
practice, the Executive Board relies on the 'sense of the meeting' or consensus among its 
members. 
155 For information on the other groups, see International Monetary Fund, A Guide to Committees, Groups, 
and Clubs: A Factsheet [online], Apr. 2003. Available from: 
http://www.imf.org/externaUnp/exr/facts/groups.htm [accessed 6th Oct. 2003] 
156 Group of24 is officially known as the Intergovernmental Group of24 on International Monetary Affairs. 
Its 24 members are drawn from 8 African, 8 Asian, and 8 Latin American countries: Algeria, Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Cote d'lvoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Iran, Lebanon, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Venezuela. 
157 Prior to the second amendment of the IMP's Articles of Agreement, each additional vote was given to a 
member for each US$ 100,000 of fixed gold value held as its quota. 
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As a member's quota determines its voting power; the larger the quota held by a member, 
the greater its voting power is. Table 1.4 shows quotas and votes of the five largest 
contributors of the IMF: the US, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK. Together their 
votes are under 40 per cent of the total votes. Out of the five member countries, it is the 
US which has, since the inception of the IMF, continued to hold the largest vote in the 
IMF' s decision-making. Despite the constant decline in its voting power to over 17 per 
cent of the total votes in 2003 from about 36 per cent since the IMP's inception, the US 
has managed to retain its influence in the IMP's decision making through the changes in 
the size of the majority required for certain decisions. As one scholar explains: 'This is 
because the decrease in the US's percentage holding of the total quotas has been matched 
by an increase in the percentage of total quotas needed for key decisions.' 158 Therefore, 
its voting power of over 17 per cent has continued to provide the US with the power to 
exercise vetoes unilaterally on the issues that require at least 85 per cent of the total votes. 
Table 1.4 Quotas and Voting Rights of Five Largest Contributors of the IMF (in millions 
of SDRs), as of September 2003 
Country Quota Quota(%) Votes Votes(%) 
us 37,149.3 17.46 371,743 17.14 
Japan 13,312.8 6.26 133,378 6.15 
Germany 13,008.2 6.11 130,332 6.01 
France 10,738.5 5.05 107,635 4.96 
UK 10,738.5 5.05 107,635 4.96 
Total 84,947.3 39.93 85,072.3 39.22 
Source: International Monetary Fund, IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board ofGovemors [online], 5th Sept. 
2003. Available from: http://www.imf.org/extemaVnp/sec/memdir/members.htm [accessed 6th Oct. 2003] 
Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the development of the IMF, and its gradual move towards 
the developing countries. The creation of the IMF at the end the Second World War is 
based on the recognition, mainly among the developed industrial countries, that as the 
158 Thomas, C., In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Heme! Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987}, p. 48. 
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monetary and financial system has become increasingly internationalised, there is a need 
to prevent the pursuit of national interests by individual countries, which may not 
coincide, from impeding international trade, growth, and stability. Due largely to the 
dominance of a few industrial countries in discussions for its creation, the IMP was not 
specifically designed to deal with the problems of the developing countries. As a result, 
they received less attention during the earlier years of the IMP. Nonetheless, since the late 
1950s, a number of changes have taken place in the international system. These changes 
have contributed to the shaping of the IMP's role and led to an orientation towards the 
developing countries and at the same time away from the industrial developed world. 
Various factors have led to such a shift in the IMP's focus. These include: the changes in 
international political and economic conditions; the changes in the foreign aid policy of 
the US, the largest contributor of the IMP; at-times tensions between the US and Western 
European countries; and, as well- although to a lesser extent- the developing countries' 
demands. The emergence of several major international crises and the shift in other 
creditors' (both private and official) strategy in dealing with debtor countries have further 
deepened the growing involvement of the IMP in the developing countries, which are 
more vulnerable to such crises than the industrial countries. 
Despite the IMP's shift of focus and its increasing role in the developing countries, 
especially the fact that most of the IMP's lending goes to the developing countries, the 
developing countries still have less say in the institution itself due to the use of the quota 
system where the large industrial countries as major subscribers of the IMP hold a 
substantial part of voting power. As a result, there exists a disproportion in the influence 
exercised within the IMP by the industrial and the developing countries. Often the 
developing countries have been unable to push for their preferred options. This is 
manifest in the increasing reliance of the IMP on conditional lending, which might be 
seen as largely reflecting the interest of the industrial countries, as the large creditors of 
the IMP, rather than that of the developing countries, as the major borrowers of the IMP. 
Moreover, as the tacit custom practiced since its creation, the institution is still led by the 
representatives of the industrial developed countries. 
In the course of the process, the ability of the IMF (and also the World Bank) to influence 
economic policies in the borrowing countries, mainly the developing countries, has 
increasingly expanded through its conditionality and recently through its shared 
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neo-liberal conditionality with the World Bank. Such an expansion has prompted several 
key critiques of the IMF while, at the same time, both the IMF and its defenders have 
offered counter-arguments to such critiques. From the above discussions, the issue of 
IMF conditionality has attracted numerous severe criticisms. Chapter Two of the study 
will look at the issue of IMF conditionality in more detail. 
In conclusion, there is an imbalance of power within the IMF between the major creditors 
of the IMF, mostly the industrial developed countries, and borrowing countries, mostly 
the developing countries. This largely mirrors the continuation of the dominant role of 
the industrial countries, particularly the US, since the founding years of the IMF. With 
the increasing use of conditional lending, there appears to be another type of imbalance: 
one between the IMF and the borrowing countries. However, as will be argued in Chapter 
Two, this may not always be the case. 
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Chapter Two 
The Concept of IMF Conditionality and Its Development 
Chapter Two is concerned with IMF conditionality. The purposes of Chapter Two are 
threefold. First of all, it aims to critically examine the concept of IMF conditionality as it 
has evolved in IMF lending policy. The second purpose is to determine critiques of IMF 
conditionality, to examine the two opposing views of imposition and "ownership," and to 
establish the relationship between the two views. The third and final purpose is related to 
the question how the relationship between the IMF and borrowing countries can be 
examined and assessed in order to determine the role and character of IMF conditionality 
and to decide whether it is imposition or whether the borrower can "take ownership" or 
else. 
In order to pursue the three main purposes, the term 'IMF conditionality' will be first 
defined. The chapter then moves on to look at its origins in a historical context to provide 
a better understanding of IMF conditionality. This will be followed by the second section 
of the chapter, focusing on the critiques of IMF conditionality, especially over the 
question of imposition and the IMF's response. Last, but not least, an analytical 
framework will be developed which will be utilised as a guideline for the subsequent 
chapters in examining the case of Egypt. 
Section I 
2.1 The Definition and Its Origins 
2.1.1 Definition 
The term 'conditionality' refers to the conditions attached to loans extended. In the 
context of the IMF, it means a set of economic reform programmes applied by the IMF on 
its 'upper-tranche' (or 'higher-tranche') loans. It should be clarified that despite its 
loaded appearance, the term 'IMF conditionality' used in this study does not suggest the 
presumption that IMF conditionality is forced upon a borrowing country. It is simply 
taken to mean the conditions attached to IMF credit. 
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From a revolving pool of funds consisting of its member countries' subscriptions, the 
IMF makes available hard currency and Special Drawing Rights (SDRs; an 'international 
currency' administered by the IMF) to its member countries. The amount is subject to 
limits in relation to their quotas or subscriptions to the IMF, except that for the 
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) and the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) there are no 
limits specified. In an exchange for hard currency, a borrowing country provides the IMF 
with its own domestic currency. This is why such a transfer is officially called a 
'purchase.' However, very often this transfer is, in the literature, termed as a 'loan' or 
'lending.' At the end of the borrowing period, the borrowing country has to buy back the 
excessive amount of its own domestic currency held by the IMF and, thus, such an 
exchange is referred to as a 'repurchase.' The IMF' s financial resources are made 
available to its member countries in tranches (segments). The first tranche (known as the 
'reserve tranche') drawing is automatically made available by the IMF without any 
application of conditionality to the loan. Under this tranche loan, a member country can 
request up to the amount which would not make the IMF' s holding of its currency to 
exceed 100 per cent of its quota. However, a reserve tranche purchase does not constitute 
a use of IMF credit since a member country's reserve tranche is part of its own reserves. 
It is the following tranches that are counted as IMF credit (made available in four 
tranches). Thus, the next tranche is called the 'first credit tranche' where the member 
country can borrow up to 25 per cent of its quota in addition to the reserve tranche loan. 
The loan under this tranche comes with small conditions that the money is used in a 
policy programme that deals with its balance of payments problem and it will undertake 
measures to correct such a problem. Once the borrowing country requests more than the 
amount available under the first two tranches (i.e. the reserve and the first credit tranches), 
it has to deal with an 'upper-credit tranche' loan with an application of conditionality. 
Normally, such drawings are associated with Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs) or 
Extended Fund Facilities (EFFs). Under the upper-credit tranche loans, the IMF will 
require more economic policy reforms such as a reduction of government budget deficits 
and trade liberalisation as conditions of providing its loans. Such economic reform 
conditions are collectively known as 'IMF conditionality.' 
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2.L2 Origlins 
2.1.2.1 'Automaticity' versus 'Conditionality' 
When one reads through the original Articles of Agreement, no reference is made to 
conditionality. However, this does not mean that the concept of conditionality was not 
raised prior to the original Articles of Agreement being drawn up at the Bretton Woods 
Conference in July 1944. In fact, the origins of IMF conditionality can be traced back to 
the controversial discussions before the Bretton Woods Conference. From the outset of 
the plans for the establishment of what later became the Bretton Woods institutions, there 
existed two different views over the issue of the use of the IMF' s financial resources: the 
British and the American views. 1 On the one hand, the British were in favour of the right 
that could be enjoyed by every member country to draw financial resources from the IMF 
without being subject to any conditions, i.e. such resources would be automatically 
available when requested. This view initially found support among many representatives 
of other countries, which were in the position of being potential deficit countries. On the 
other hand, the US, which was in the position of being a potential net lender in the early 
post-Second World War period and thus feared an abused use of balance of payments 
support merely from its own resources, insisted that the resources should not be available 
freely. Instead they should be subject to the IMF's close scrutiny in order to ensure that 
there would be no misuse of the IMF's resources such as the use of drawings as a source 
of long-term capital. 
It should be noticed that both sides agreed that there should be a quantitative limit on 
drawings as manifest in the plans for the Clearing Union (the so-called 'Keynes Plan') 
and for the Stabilisation Fund (the so-called 'White Plan'). The type of conditions both 
sides were in dispute was, thus, qualitative limits on the use of drawings rather than 
quantitative limits on the amount of drawings. More importantly, at the beginning the 
objective of the concept of conditionality pressed by the US was rather narrow. It largely 
aimed to avoid the abuse of the use of the IMF's resources. As reflected by White's 
suggestion in a meeting between the US and the UK in Washington in August 1943: 
1 This is reflected in the different opinions held by Keynes (on the British side) and White (on the US side) 
on the IMP's policies towards the use of its resources. For a detailed examination, see Horsefield, J. K., The 
International Monetary Fund, I945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, vol. 1: 
Chronicle (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), pp. 67-77. 
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The Fund's facilities should not be used to finance either a flight of capital or the 
issue of foreign loans by a country which could not afford to undertake foreign 
lending. Again, the Fund would be justified in intervening where a country was 
using its quota for rearmament. On the other hand, it would not be justified in 
the case of an unbalanced budget. In general, the Fund would intervene only in 
extreme cases of violation of qualitative rules, and would bear the burden of 
proof.2 
Thus, the concept of IMF conditionality at that time simply focused on the criteria which 
the IMF could apply in judging whether a member's request to draw should be accepted 
in order to ensure its 'appropriate' use. 
Surprisingly, at the Bretton Woods Conference the issue of 'automaticity' versus 
'conditionality' was not discussed. Without declassified documents to explain such an 
absence, the following is a conjectural reason put forward by Sidney Dell: 
One possible version might run as follows. The U.S. delegation, having 
encountered strong opposition in Atlantic City, was anxious that the conflict on 
conditionality should not surface at Bretton Woods. The fact that other countries 
interpreted the draft Agreement as authorizing unconditional drawings within 
certain quantitative limits, would, it might well have been felt, be bound to 
endanger the prospects of ratification by Congress. Congress was well aware 
that the United States would, for some time to come, be the only possible source 
of substantial net credit to the system. Prospects for ratification were already 
uncertain because of strong opposition to the idea of a Fund by the American 
Bankers' Association. 
On the other hand, the delegations opposed to Fund conditionality had 
every reason to believe, after Atlantic City, that they had won their point and that, 
as long as the key words of the Joint Statement [which later became Article V, 
Section 3 (a) of the original Articles of Agreement] were maintained, there was 
no need to engage in another confrontation with the Americans on the matter. 
Moreover, Keynes had decided that he would raise as few issues as possible that 
might be embarrassing to the United States, because he was aware of the 
Administration's difficulties with Congress and was unwilling to add to them.3 
As a consequence, the issue remained unresolved; a fact reflected in the original Articles 
of Agreement, which contained a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies. Among 
them were two ambiguous words found in Article V, Section 3 of the original Article of 
Agreement for conditions governing use of the Fund's resources. Article V, Section 3 (a) 
stipulates: 
2 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 69. 
3 Dell, S., 'On Being Grandmotherly: The Evolution of IMF Conditionality,' Essays in International 
Finance, no. 144 (Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Sec., Dept. of Economics, Princeton U., Oct. 
1981), p. 5. 
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A member shall be entitled [emphasis added] to buy the currency of another 
member from the Fund in exchange for its own currency subject to the following 
conditions: 
(i) The member desiring to purchase the currency represents [emphasis 
added] that it is presently needed for making in that currency payments which 
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
The two words allowed two different interpretations of the access to the IMF's financial 
resources. The word 'entitled' seems to lend support to the concept of automaticity, i.e. a 
member country of the IMF possessed the automatic right to draw. On the other hand, the 
ambiguous word 'represents' was viewed by the US as that the IMF had the power to 
challenge the presentation, if it believed that the presentation was incorrect. However, 
the decisions, which were adopted by the Executive Directors in May 1947 and which 
were later reaffirmed by the decision of 10 March 1948, favoured the second view. In 
addition to the permission of the power to challenge, the decisions added that the IMF 
could also 'postpone or reject, or accept it subject to conditions,' if the IMF concluded 
that a representation was incorrect.4 
2.1.2.2 Movements towards the Concept of Conditionality 
When the IMF began its operations, the ambiguous and inconsistent terms in the original 
Articles of Agreement, including those concerning the use of the IMF's resources, had to 
be discussed and interpreted. It was during this process that a move away from the idea of 
automaticity and towards that of conditionality began. 
For several years the dichotomy had repeatedly created a serious problem for the IMF. In 
implementing the IMF's policy on the use of its resources, the issue of 'automaticity' 
versus 'conditionality' had, over the years, caused an increasingly sharp division within 
the Executive Board between those who supported the concept of automaticity and the 
US who pressed for conditionality. The attempts of the latter were, for example, 
highlighted during several discussions at the Executive Board in which Andrew N. 
Overby, the US Executive Director, questioned the requests for drawings proposed by 
4 Horsefield, J. K. (ed.), The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International 
Monetary Cooperation, vol. 2: Analysis (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), pp. 
385-386; and IMF Executive Board Decision, no. 284-4, 10 Mar. 1948, in J. K. Horsefield (ed.), The 
International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, vol. 3: 
Documents (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), p. 227. 
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countries such as the Netherlands and South Africa in October 1948, and Nicaragua in the 
same year with regard to their temporary character or the prospects for repurchase. 5 
The discussions within the Executive Board and subsequent decisions adopted until May 
1949 resulted in further moves away from the concept of automaticity. Nevertheless, the 
development of the concept of conditionality remained restricted. The focal point was 
still on whether the IMF had power to do something in dealing with a member country's 
request for drawings in order to prevent their misuse. This can be illustrated by the 
decision adopted by the Executive Board on 15 March 1948,6 in addition to the decision 
of 10 March 1948 (as discussed above). The decision of 15 March 1948 stated that under 
Article V, Section 5 for ineligibility to use the Fund's resources, the IMF had power to 
delay a transaction if at the time when a request for a purchase was received the IMF was 
considering sending the member a report under that Section, or if it found when the 
request was before it that action under that Section should be considered. 
In May 1949, Frank A. Southard Jr.'s (the US Executive Director) memorandum 
provided another major step of the development of the concept of conditionality. It was a 
report on an outcome of a review by the US government of the IMF' s policy on the use of 
its resources which insisted on the temporary character of drawings and the IMP's power 
to challenge them. Thus, in his memorandum he proposed four criteria which would help 
the IMF judge whether a proposed drawing was temporary. They were: 1) that the 
member's par value was appropriate; 2) that its balance of payments disequilibrium was 
temporary; 3) that drawing was not used for rehabilitation or development; and 4) that the 
member was undertaking all steps essential to assume as soon as possible its full 
obligations under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, particularly maintenance of 
convertibility, avoidance of restrictions on currency payments and of discriminatory 
current arrangements and multiple currency practices. These criteria were applied to 
Mexico's request a few days after. In this case, part of the Executive decision was that 
Mexico might draw the IMP's resources, on condition that Mexico put forward a proposal 
for a new exchange rate to which the IMF could agree, and followed appropriate fiscal, 
5 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 398-399; and Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 242-244. 
6 Here the question under the discussions was whether the IMF could, when it received a request for a 
drawing, postpone transaction in order to prepare a report and then limit the use of its resources by the 
member under Article V, Section 5 which permitted the IMF to declare the member ineligible to use of its 
resources if the IMF believed that the resources were being misused. 
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credit, and trade policies.7 It was the decision by the Executive Board in this case which 
established a SBA in the following years (see the following section). 
During 1948-49 the IMF experienced a decline in drawings made to its member countries 
which culminated in a complete standstill of the IMF in 1950, in which there were no 
drawings at a11.8 This was partly due to the 'ERP Decision' (whereby European countries 
receiving assistance under the European Recovery Programme (ERP) were only to 
request the purchase of US dollars from the IMF in 'exceptional or unforeseen' 
circumstances), and due partly to the improvement of developing countries' balance of 
payments because of the demand for primary products caused by the Korean conflict. 
Another important factor was the discouragement created by the US's insistence on the 
IMF' s power to challenge requests which led to an atmosphere of uncertainty about 
circumstances in which drawings would be made available. 
Due to the IMF' s attempts to search for a solution to the problem of repurchase raised by 
the US and also to revive the IMF's operations following the decline, the concept of 
conditionality was further developed through a series of proposals, discussions and 
decisions among IMF staff and the Executive Board during 1949-1951.9 These proposals 
and discussions culminated in an incorporation of the concept of conditionality in the 
IMF's lending policies when the Executive Board approved a decision to adopt the Rooth 
Plan on 13 February 1952. It should be clarified that in practice IMF conditionality was 
applied prior to the Rooth Plan as early as 1949 in the case of Mexico (as discussed 
above). However, it was the Rooth Plan which institutionalised the concept of 
conditionality. The plan which was proposed by Ivar Rooth, Managing Director of the 
IMF, was regarded as one of the most significant moves towards the idea of 
conditionality. In the words of Sir Joseph Gold, former General Counsel of the IMF, on 
comparing the decisions made on March 10, 1948 and on February 13, 1952: 'If the 
decision of March 10, 1948 on the power to challenge representations is a landmark, the 
decision of February 13, 1952 is the Mount Everest that towers over all other decisions on 
the use of the Fund's resources.' 10 
7 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 245. 
8 Ibid., p. 276. 
9 For detailed discussions, see Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 278-282 and 321-324. 
10 Gold, J., 'Use of the Fund's Resources,' in Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, ch. 23, pp. 523-524. 
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The Rooth Plan 11 contained several major features. First, it stated that the IMF' s attitude 
towards a member country's request for its financial resources would be guided primarily 
by its judgement on whether the member's policies would be adequate to overcome the 
balance of payments problem. Second, it referred to what subsequently became known as 
the SBAs. They were intended to ensure a member who had no immediate need for a 
drawing that a drawing would be available if, within a period of six to twelve months, the 
need presented itself. Third, it clarified the IMF' s view on the temporary use of its 
resources. It stated that in order to ensure the revolving character of the IMF' s resources, 
'exchange purchased from the IMF should not remain outstanding beyond the period 
reasonably related to the payments problem for which it was purchased from the Fund. 
The period should fall within an outside range of three to five years.' 12 Last, but not least, 
it introduced the concept of the gold tranche (which is a drawing that increased the IMF's 
holdings of a member's currency to no more than 100 per cent of its quota)13 by declaring 
that each member could receive 'the overwhelming benefit of any doubt,' when they 
applied for a drawing within the gold tranche. 
2.1.2.3 Further Developments: Instrument and Characters 
Although the Rooth Plan distinguished only between drawings in the gold tranche and all 
other drawings, in the following years its creation gradually paved the way for the 
development of several tranche policies which were among crucial aspects of the concept 
of conditionality. In 1955, a drawing policy beyond the gold tranche was adopted, 
differentiating drawings in the gold tranche from those in the first credit tranche (which 
are drawings raising the IMF' s holdings of a member's currency above 100 per cent but 
within 125 per cent of its quota). Requests for drawings in the first credit tranche would 
be considered by the IMF with a 'liberal' attitude. 14 This was followed by the policy 
towards drawings beyond the first credit tranche which was established three years later. 
Requests for such drawings would require 'substantial justification' with 'a sound 
program aimed at establishing or maintaining the enduring stability of the member's 
11 IMF Executive Board Decision no. 102-(52/11), 13 Feb. 1952, in Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 228-230. 
12 Ibid., p. 229. 
13 The second amendment of the Articles of the Agreement, which entered into force on 1 April 1978, 
replaced the term 'gold tranche' with 'reserve tranche.' This can be found in, for example, in Article V, 
Section 3 (c). Gold, J., 'Conditionality,' IMF Pamphlet Series, no. 31 (Washington, D. C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 1979), p. 12. 
14 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 
30, 1955 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), pp. 84-85, cited in Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, 
p. 404. 
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currency at a realistic rate of exchange.' 15 Therefore, the distinction between drawings in 
the successive tranches was primarily based on the progressiveness of the concept of 
conditionality: the higher the tranches and the larger the size of drawings reached, the 
stronger the conditionality would be. 
Not long after the creation of the Rooth Plan, the SBA was established in October of the 
same year. Since then, this has become one of the key instruments in applying the 
concept of conditionality to drawings beyond the first credit tranche by linking IMF 
conditions to its financial resources provided to its member countries. 
Besides the above tranche policies, other key elements of IMF conditionality were also 
developed in the second half of the 1950s. These included the introduction of phasing in 
March 1956 (in which drawings were disbursed in instalments over a period of time, each 
of which were approved if the performance by the drawing member was satisfactory), and 
that of the Letter of Intent in February 1958. 16 
2.2 The Expansion of IMF Conditionality 
2.2.1 The Expansion in the Early Years 
In addition to the above, another important development took place in July 1957 when 
performance criteria (which are quantitative targets written in the Letter of Intent) were 
first introduced in the Paraguay's SBA in which a drawing was made dependent on 
Paraguay's commitments to the credit ceiling and to the maximum levels for budget 
expenditures and for the public works programme. 17 In 1958, a SBA with Haiti included 
a wider range of specific policy commitments, and since then performance criteria had 
gradually evolved and proliferated further. As Emil G. Spitzer puts it: 
The specific policies referred to in stand-by arrangements have varied widely in 
numbers and range of coverage. In addition to a ceiling (or a number of ceilings) 
on the domestic assets of the central bank, they have frequently included fiscal, 
exchange rate, and balance of payments policies. There has been a tendency 
toward the proliferation of specific limitations and targets ... 18 
15 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 
30, 1959 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 22, cited in Horsetield, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 
404. 
16 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 430-433. 
17 Spitzer, E. G., 'Stand-By Arrangements: Purposes and Form,' in Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 484. 
18 Ibid., p. 486. 
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In other words, the scope and extent of IMF conditionality has gradually expanded over 
the years since the 1950s. However, its evolution during the 1950s and 1960s focused 
primarily on macroeconomic policies and so programme monitoring was typically 
confined to key macroeconomic indicators. An analytical framework known as 'financial 
programming' (FP) was used by the IMF in the design of its economic adjustment 
programmes. FP was developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s by a group of 
economists in the Research Department of the IMF led by J. J. Polak, and has changed 
very little since it was created. 19 The IMF' s analytical framework was largely based on 
the Polak model published in the IMF Staff Papers in 1957. The Polak model was 
associated with a set of equations that link the behaviour of the financial and monetary 
sectors to the balance of payments. The model focused on controlling such variables as 
domestic credit and money supply as an attempt to arrive at balance of payments 
equilibrium.20 
According to FP, the major cause of balance of payments problems was the existence of 
excess demand pressures. As a result, FP usually consisted of policy measures aiming at 
controlling the level or the rate of growth of nominal aggregate demand. The IMF 
claimed that excessive levels of demands often resulted from undue expansion of 
domestic credit by the banking system. At times, this was accompanied by heavy reliance 
on foreign borrowing. The root of these disequilibriums was said to be fiscal and public 
sector imbalances. Therefore, FP involved policies in the fiscal, domestic credit, and 
foreign borrowing field. Furthermore, these imbalances were often worsened by 
distortions in cost-price relations which could have an adverse impact upon the 
international competitiveness of the economy. Supplementary policies were designed to 
improve resource allocation and reinforce the external sectors. The classical examples 
were policies in exchange rates, prices, wages, and interest rates. 21 
19 Edwards, S., The International Monetary Fund and the Developing Countries: A Critical Evaluation 
(Cambridge, M.A.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989), pp. 10-11; and Polak, J. J., 'The 
Changing Nature ofiMF Conditionality,' Essays in International Finance, no. 184 (Princeton, N.J.: 
International Finance Sec., Dept. of Economics, Princeton U., Sept. 1991), p. 33. 
20 Polak, J. J., 'Monetary Analysis of Income Formulation and Payments Problems,' IMF Staff Papers, vol. 
6, 1957-58, pp. 1-41. 
21 Guitian, M., 'Fund Conditionality and the International Adjustment Process: The Early Period, 1950-70,' 
Finance and Development, vol. 17, no. 4, Dec. 1980, p. 26. 
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2.2.2 'lfhe Guidelines on .n:MJF Com:llitionality 
In the light of the proliferation of IMF conditionality and its practices developed since the 
1950s, considerable concerns were raised by developing countries and, in the early years, 
also by some developed countries over the increasingly stringent IMF conditions.22 In 
particular, this became evident in the case of the SBA approved for the UK in November 
1967 with a relatively large amount but minimum conditions.23 Although the SBA was in 
the highest credit tranches and thus should have been attached to stringent performance 
criteria, there were no clauses for phasing (which meant the full amount of the drawing 
could be made in one transaction), no performance clauses, and relatively monetary or 
credit ceilings in the SBA. Instead, it contained unusual provisions for frequent 
consultations. The developing countries, during the discussion of the UK's SBA, had 
expressed their desire for the SBAs approved to them to be modelled on the same lines, 
and subsequently raised the question about the need for uniform treatment for all 
members. 
These developments prompted the first review of the IMF's policies on conditionality. 
The review concluded with the Executive Board Decision of 20 September 1968 which 
provided certain guidelines for IMF policy on the use of its resources.Z4 The preamble to 
the decision emphasised the significance of providing adequate safeguards to preserve the 
revolving character of the IMF's resources, and also the need for a flexible but uniform 
treatment of all members. The decision clarified the use of consultations, phasing and 
performance criteria. This was reflected in the following elements: 
1) Clauses requiring the member to remain in consultation with the IMF were to be 
included in all SBAs. Periodic consultations were to be required in all drawings 
beyond the first credit tranche, whether or not under a SBA. 
2) No provisions for phasing of the amount drawn and for the achievement of 
performance criteria would be required in SBAs which did not go beyond the first 
credit tranche. However, such provisions would normally be included in all other 
SBAs but applicable only to drawings beyond the first credit tranche. 
22 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 484-485. 
23 For a detailed discussion on the UK's case, see de Vries, M. G., The International Monetary Fund, 
1966-1971, vol. 1: Narrative (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1976), pp. 338-346. 
24 IMF Executive Board Decision, no. 2603-(681132), 20 Sept. 1968, in de Vries, M.G. (ed.), The 
International Monetary Fund, 1966-1971: The System Under Stress, vol. 2: Documents (Washington, D. C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1976), p. 197. 
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In addition, the decision provided a limit on performance criteria to those considered 
necessary for evaluating the implementation of the member's financial stabilisation 
programme with a view to ensuring the achievement of its objectives. Also, language 
having a contractual connotation would be avoided in SBAs.25 This decision was later 
revised by the decision of 2 March 1979. 
Despite all this development and practices of IMF conditionality, the concept of IMF 
conditionality was not incorporated into the Articles of Agreement until the latter was 
amended in 1969. As made explicit in Article V, Section 3 (c) and (d): 
(c) A member's use of the resources of the Fund shall be in accordance with the 
purposes of the Fund. The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its resources 
that will assist members to solve their balance of payments problems in a manner 
consistent with the purposes of the Fund and that will establish adequate 
safeguards for the temporary use of its resources. 
(d) A representation by a member under (a) above shall be examined by the Fund 
to determine whether the proposed purchase would be consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement and with the policies under them, with the 
exception that proposed gold tranche purchases shall not be subject to 
challenge. 26 
By 1978, there was a widespread concern among the developing countries over the 
severity of IMF conditionality and its negative impact on the level of drawings from the 
IMF.27 The developing countries felt that the amount of IMF financial support available 
was too little to justify the considerable changes in economic policies which had to be 
made for the drawings to be allowed. This seems to account for the concentration of the 
use of the IMP's resources on the facilities with relatively low conditions during the mid-
and late 1970s. There were only ten cases of drawings beyond the first credit tranche in 
1974-76 among the entire IMF membership.28 
At a ministerial meeting held by the Group of 24 (which consists of the ministers of 
developing members of the IMF) in September 1978, the Group expressed its concern 
about the multiplicity of performance criteria and some other forms of conditionality that 
25 de Vries, op. cit., vol. 1, 1976, p. 347. 
26 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund as amended entered into force on 28 July 1969, 
Article V for Transactions with the Fund, Section 3 (c) and (d), in de Vries, op. cit., vol. 2, 1976, p. 102. 
27 For the statements made by several Governors for the developing countries during the IMP-World Bank 
Annual Meetings in September 1978, see International Monetary Fund, 'Discussions on the Fund ... Future 
of New Surveillance Role Sparks Brisk Exchange of Views,' IMF Survey, 16 Oct. 1978, p. 329. 
28 Dell, op. cit., 1981, p. 24. 
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were inhibiting access to the IMF's resources by member countries. The Group also 
urged the Executive Board of the IMF to set appropriate guidelines designed so as to 
restrict the performance criteria only to relevant macroeconomic variables, paying due 
regard to the growth considerations of member countries as well as their economic and 
social situations.29 
At its ministerial meeting m April 1978, Interim Committee members from the 
developing countries urged the Executive Board to review IMF conditionality on the use 
of the IMF's resources in the credit tranches.30 In response to the concern made regarding 
IMF conditionality and the request of the Interim Committee, the Executive Board began 
in June 1978 to conduct its second review of conditionality. 31 On 2 March 1979, the 
review concluded with the adoption of a decision containing a set of guidelines for 'Use 
of Fund's General Resources and Stand-By Arrangements.' The new set of guidelines 
was largely a revised and extended version of the decision reached in 1968. It included 
several conclusions which had been reached in 1968 while there were certain new or 
clarified elements added to it. 32 The main elements of the March 1979 decision 
included:33 
1) It clarified that the IMF would 'pay due regard to the domestic social and political 
objectives, the economic priorities, and the circumstances of members, including the 
causes of their balance of payments problems.' 
2) Performance criteria would be limited to those that were necessary to evaluate 
implementation of the stabilisation programme, and would normally be confined to 
macroeconomic variables and those necessary to implement specific provisions of the 
Articles or policies adopted under them. 
29 Group of 24, 'Communique Urges Faster Growth in Industrial Nations,' issued on 22 Sept. 1978, IMF 
Survey, 2 Oct. 1978, p. 307, paragraph 12. 
30 
'Press Communique of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary 
System,' Tenth meeting, Mexico City, 30 Apr. 1978, in International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the 
Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April30, 1978 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary 
Fund), p. 140. 
31 Mookerjee, S., 'New Guidelines for Use of Fund Resources Follow Review of Practice of 
Conditionality,' IMF Survey, 19 Mar. 1979, p. 82. 
32 Ibid., pp. 82-83; and Gold, op. cit., 1979, p. 15. 
33 IMF Executive Board Decision no. 6056-(79/38), 2 Mar. 1979, in International Monetary Fund, 
Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs- Policy Issues [online], prepared by the Policy Development 
and Review Department, in consultation with other departments, approved by Jack Boorman, 16 Feb. 2001, 
pp. 5-6. Available from: http://www.imf.org/externaUnp/pdr/cond/2001/eng/policy/021601.pdf [accessed 
7u. Oct. 2003] 
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Furthermore, the 1979 guidelines required IMF staff to prepare, for review by the 
Executive Board, periodic studies of programmes supported by SBAs. Such reviews of 
IMF conditionality would enable the Executive Board to determine when it may be 
appropriate to have the next comprehensive review. Since then several reviews had been 
carried out but there was no decision to adopt a new set of guidelines to replace the 1979 
guidelines, even though consideration was given to a change to the 1979 guideline to 
provide for more routine inclusion in IMF arrangements of performance criteria on 
microeconomic policies. 34 The Executive Board repeatedly concluded that the 1979 
guidelines remained satisfactory and sufficiently flexible for IMF policies on the use of 
its resources and were consistent with the increased emphasis the IMF had placed on 
structural adjustment, in particular since the mid-1980s (see a later discussion). 35 
Nevertheless, some commentators pointed out shortcomings of the 1979 guidelines, in 
particular its failure to explicitly tackle the issue of conditionality in relation to structural 
problems. As Sidney Dell writes: 'the guideline did not deal with the question of the 
applicability of the Fund's standard performance criteria to the particular types of 
structural balance-of-payments problem experienced in recent years.' 36 
2.2.3 The Substantial Expansion of Conditionality: Structural Adjustment 
2.2.3.1 Expanding Scope 
By the mid 1970s, the IMF had begun to recognise that in some cases, imbalances in the 
balance of payments with which the developing countries faced could be structural and 
not, therefore, be corrected over a short period of time. The IMF had initially attempted 
to address them through the introduction of medium-term loans such as the EFF in which 
financial support provided for a longer period and in a larger amount than in the SBAs. 
Nonetheless, such recognition did not have a great impact on IMF conditionality until the 
early 1980s. The balance of payments experienced by several countries in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s led the Fund to conclude that the creation of special facilities to provide 
financial resources attached to low conditionality (such as the oil facility of 1974 and 
1975) would not be appropriate, and that a more comprehensive approach was, thus, 
34 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 
30, 1986 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 45. 
35 See, for example, International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial 
Year Ended April30, 1986 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 45, 1988, p. 49, 1989, p. 
31, and 1992, p. 50 
36 Dell, op. cit., 1981, p. 26. 
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needed. As Managing Director J. de Larosiere remarks in his speech in Bonn on 29 
October 1980 before the Annual Assembly of the Federal Association of German Banks: 
... our response to the new rise in oil prices has not been to establish a facility, 
like the oil facility, offering assistance with a low degree of conditionality. Our 
new borrowings next year are intended for relending on what we call upper 
credit tranche conditionality. This reflects our belief that members must respond 
with appropriate ~olicies to the present situation; financing and adjustment must 
go hand-in-hand. 7 
In a subsequent interview, he elaborates further: 
In the wake of the first oil shock ... [u]nconditional facilities, or facilities with 
light conditionality, were resorted to or designed in the expectation that the 
balance of payments problems might be reversible. It became very clear by 1978 
that such an unconditional or "recycling-oriented" approach was not warranted 
by the realities of the situation as we saw it evolve at that time. Balance of 
payments must be adjusted and the Fund must link its high credit tranche 
resources to the adoption of meaningful adjustment policies by member 
countries. 38 
While the IMF increasingly relied on the upper credit tranche lending which was attached 
to high conditionality, at the same time it sought to renew emphasis on structural 
adjustment policies to increase productivity and to improve resource allocation. J. de 
Larosiere states in his address before the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations in Geneva on 13 July 1982: 
... we have sought to broaden the base of our programs so as to help member 
countries handle the more deep-rooted structural problems that have been 
characteristic of the payments difficulties for many of them in recent years. The 
Fund has been placing emphasis, therefore, not only on demand management but 
also on measures to strengthen the economy. In doing this, the Fund has not 
moved into the field of development policies itself but has been taking the steps 
needed to ensure that its programs are in consonance with sound investment and 
production strategies and, hence, with the longer-term structural adjustment .... 
To this end, close collaboration with the World Bank has been an important 
aspect of our work .... 39 
37 de Larosiere, J., 'Recycling Needs and the Capital Markets,' excerpts of a speech delivered in Bonn on 29 
October 1980 before the Annual Assembly of the Federal Association of German Banks, in Finance and 
Development, vol. 18, no. 1, Mar. 1981, p. 12. 
3s 'A Conversation with Mr. de Larosiere,' Finance and Development, vol. 19, no. 2, June 1982, p. 5. 
39 de Larosiere, J., An address delivered on 13 July 1982 before the Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations in Geneva, in International Monetary Fund, IMF Survey, 19 July 1982, p. 213. 
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In the light of these developments, since the early 1980s IMP conditionality has 
substantially evolved and extended to cover structural adjustment (or 'supply-oriented') 
policies, which were the original domain of the World Bank (see Section 2.2.4 
Conditionality Convergence). 
When the Executive Board discussed the potential role of structural adjustment policies 
in IMP-supported programmes in 1981, most Executive Directors from the developing 
countries expressed strong disagreement with IMF staff's analysis and were against 
greater IMP involvement. Until the mid-1980s IMP conditionality in relation to 
structural measures, thus, remained relatively limited, although the staff encouraged 
structural reforms in its discussions with member countries. 40 By the mid-1980s, 
according to the 1986 Annual Report of the IMP which discussed the Executive Board's 
review of the IMP's policy on conditionality, there was a consensus within the Executive 
Board that a higher priority should be given to the supply side, or structural aspects of 
IMP-supported programmes, including pricing policy, tax reform, financial sector reform, 
and trade liberalisation.41 
2.2.3.2 Enlarging Objectives 
While the scope of IMP conditionality has expanded to include structural adjustment 
policies, the number of its objectives has at the same time seemingly enlarged. By the 
mid-1980s, economic growth had gained importance in IMP conditionality along with the 
balance of payments correction. According to the 1986 Annual Report of the IMP, in a 
review of IMP conditionality, the Executive Directors emphasised the need for a 
growth-oriented approach aimed at enhancing economic efficiency and competitiveness 
and increasing supply responses.42 The enlargement to include economic growth as one 
of the main objectives of IMP conditionality was evident in Michel Camdessus's 
(Managing Director) speech: 
Our prime objective is growth. In my view, there is no longer any ambiguity 
about this. It is toward growth that our programs and their conditionality are 
aimed. It is with a view toward growth that we carry out our special 
40 Boughton, J. M., Silent Revolution: The International Monetaty Fund, 1979-1989 (Washington, D. C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 2001), ch. 13, pp. 32-33. 
41 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 
30, 1986 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 45. 
42 /bid., pp. 44-45. 
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responsibility of helping to correct balance of payments disequilibria and, more 
generally, to eliminate obstructive macroeconomic imbalances.43 
The establishment of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in March 1986 and in December 1987 
respectively provided additional means for the IMF to expand the scope and the 
objectives of IMF conditionality. 
Besides economic growth, since the late 1980s, there has been a wide range of other 
issues related to IMF conditionality what Jacques Polak called 'secondary objectives of 
IMF conditionality. ' 44 Such issues have emerged partly as responses to public concern 
on the adverse impact of IMF conditionality on issues such as those of poverty and the 
environment, or the effect of the latter on IMF conditionality such as the issue of 'good 
governance.' More importantly, the rise of these issues is due largely to the influence of 
developed countries' neo-liberal perception within the IMF (see Section 2.2.4 
Conditionality Convergence). 
The IMF' s stance towards the issues of income distribution and the environment was that 
they are merely areas of concern. Thus, it denied the adoption of environmental and 
income-distribution conditionality. Concerning the issue of poverty-reduction, the 
Executive Board reiterated that 'the questions of income distribution should not form part 
of IMF conditionality.' 45 As for the environmental issue, the same line was stressed: 
'there would be no environmental conditionality.'46 Therefore, according to the IMF, 
they are the issues that the IMF would like to promote and take into account when dealing 
with its policy analysis and programme design to achieve its primary objectives of 
correcting the balance of payments and encouraging economic growth. 
Changes in the political environment, in particular the collapse of the centrally planned 
economies and the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, gave rise to the new 
concern over issues of governance. The IMF (and also the World Bank) have, since the 
43 Camdessus, M., Excerpts of Remarks before the United Nations Economic and Social Council in Geneva 
on 11 July 1990, IMP Survey, 30 July 1990, pp. 235. 
44 Polak, op. cit., 1991, p. 24. 
45 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 
30, 1989 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 31, and 1990, p. 41. 
46 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 
30, 1991 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund), p. 54. 
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early 1990s, placed increasing emphasis on issues of good governance in areas such as 
military expenditures, eradication of corruption and transparency of government 
operations. The declaration 'Partnership for Sustainable Growth' adopted by the IMP's 
Interim Committee 47 at its meeting in September 1996 identified 'promoting good 
governance in all its aspects, including ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency 
0 
and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption' as an essential element of 
a framework within which economies could prosper. The subsequent discussions at the 
Executive Board led to the adoption of guidelines regarding the issues of governance 
promulgated in August 1997. 48 Under the section 'Use of IMF Resource' of the 
governance Guidance Note, paragraph 15, it states: 
Conditionality, in the form of prior actions, performance criteria, benchmarks, 
and conditions for completion of a review, should be attached to policy measures, 
including those relating to economic aspects of governance that are required to 
meet the objectives of the program. 
Such policy measures would include ones that 'may have important implications for 
improving governance but are covered by IMF conditionality primarily because of their 
direct macroeconomic impact' such as the elimination of tax exemptions and recovery of 
non-performing loans. 
2.2.4 Conditionality Convergence 
As has been pointed out earlier, the expansion of the scope and objectives of IMF 
conditionality since the 1980s has led to increasing convergence of its conditionality with 
those of programme lending provided by the World Bank. Commentators of the Bank 
and the IMF have often described the ideology underpinning conditionality convergence 
as being neo-liberal-driven. The prime objective of the neo-liberal school (or a 
'market-friendly' school) of economic policy analysis is economic growth which could 
efficiently be achieved through free markets with the elimination of government 
intervention in the economy. The way to achieve this objective is internally, through 
capital accumulation in terms of savings and investment, and externally, through an 
increase in exports. 
47 The Interim Committee is official known as the Interim Committee of the Boards of Governors on the 
International Monetary System. It was established in October 1974 as an advisory body to the Board of 
Governors of the IMF on issues such as the supervision of the management and adaptation of the 
international monetary system. 
48 For the full text of the governance Guidance Note, see IMF Survey, 5 Aug. 1997, pp. 234-238. 
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Concerning the World Bank, the Bank has, since its inception, undergone two main 
alterations in its approach. In its early years prior to 1973, the Bank's primary objective 
was to promote economic growth. However, since 1973, the Bank underwent two major 
changes while under the presidency of Robert M. McNamara (1968-81). First, a vast 
increase in the Bank's financial resources flowed towards developing countries. Second, 
the types of project lending were reoriented. Following the 1973 Nairobi speech by 
McNamara, the Bank had diversified its project lending toward those projects concerned 
with the alleviation of poverty in the developing countries.49 Although McNamara's 
speech marked a major change in the World Bank's approach towards development, the 
idea of poverty alleviation was not initiated with this speech. Concern that economic 
growth in many developing countries failed to produce a trickle-down effect on living 
conditions of the poor had also been raised among academics, international forums and 
organisations, and developing countries. However, it was the Bank which had the 
resources to put this new developmental approach into practice.50 
In effect, the Bank's approach became a combination of both growth-driven and 
poverty-oriented schools. Growth was the important goal of such a strategy as a way to 
reduce poverty in developing countries. This would mean that although the Bank had 
re-oriented its emphasis towards poverty alleviation since 1973, its concern over growth 
remained. As R. L. Ayres puts it: 
While there was a heightened concern for the social aspects of rural 
development, this did not mean any less attention to the requirements for 
increasing agricultural production. While there was a heightened concern for the 
consumption needs of the poorest, this did not mean that national savings and 
investment rates should fall. While a heightened concern for poverty and 
income distribution presumably entailed more concern for the political and 
social aspects of economic development, Bank loan decisions were still held to 
be governed by purely economic considerations. While poverty-oriented 
development projects were by their very nature riskier and more innovative than 
traditional projects, they still had to meet traditional canons of economic and 
financial analysis. 51 
In the early 1980s, the Bank underwent another shift in its approach. A new strategy was 
adopted by the Bank in striving against poverty problems in many developing countties 
49 Ayres, R. L., Banking on the Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT P., 
1984), p. 1. 
50 Ibid., pp. 7-10. 
51 Ibid., p. 75. 
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through the free-market ideology. This is reflected in the policy measures of the 
Bank-supported programmes including the elimination of state intervention in 
determining domestic pnces (such as agricultural and urban food subsidies, and 
minimum wages), the liberalisation of financial markets and foreign trade, and the 
unification of exchange rates. 52 In effect, its main objective has again moved to improve 
the efficiency of the price system and of resources allocation.53 
During the 1950s, there had been an increasing number of developing countries pursuing 
the Import Substitution Industrialisation (lSI) strategy. This trend was influenced by the 
recommendation of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) under 
Raul Prebisch.54 By following lSI, these developing countries tried to industrialise their 
economy but only aimed for domestic consumption. To achieve this goal, several 
protectionist measures were carried out (such as the imposition of quotas and tariffs on 
imports, and exchange rate manipulation) as a way to create barriers to entry for imports 
and to protect domestic industry. In fact, the lSI strategy recommended by the ECLA was 
not in line with the thinking of the IFis. The pursuit of the lSI strategy in developing 
countries received negative responses from the IFis. The classical example was India 
during the 1950s. Following the 1952 visit of the Bank's President in India, the President 
first responded to India's pursue of the lSI strategy by writing a letter to the Indian 
Minister of Finance, stating: 
Once again, I wish to emphasise my conviction that India's interest lies in giving 
private enterprise, both Indian and foreign, every encouragement to make its 
maximum contribution to the development of the economy ... 1 have the distinct 
impression that the potentialities of private enterprise are commonly 
underestimated in India and that its operations are subjected to unnecessary 
restrictions. Above all, in a country which is short of capital, and with limited 
resources of managerial talent, it is important that the respective roles of public 
and private enterprise should be fixed entirely ... 55 
52 Hunt, D., 'Development Economics, the Washington Consensus and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Initiative,' Journal of North African Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, summer 1998, p. 20. 
53 Ibid., p. 22; and Taylor, L., 'Editorial: The Revival of the Liberal Creed-The IMF and the World Bank in 
a Globalised Economy,' World Development, vol. 25, no. 2, 1997, pp. 148-149. 
54 For a detailed explanation on the logic behind the favoured- lSI -strategy recommendation of the ECLA, 
see Roxborough, I., Theories of Underdevelopment (Basingstoke: MacMillan P., 1986), ch. 3, pp. 27-41. 
55 IBRD, 'Some Observations of the IBRD Mission on Economic Programmes and Policies in India,' June 
30, 1956, processed. Cited in Mason, E. S. and R. E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods 
(Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 372. 
The Concept of IMF Conditionality and Its Development 84 
Nevertheless, the lSI strategy pursued from the 1950s to the 1970s in many developing 
countries failed to achieve economic development targets and the growing indebtedness 
of many developing countries became serious issues in the 1980s. It was not until then 
that the IFis' stance against the lSI countries became manifest. 
In addition to the failure of lSI, Diana Hunt pointed out that, the liberal ideology of the 
IFis was linked to the 1980s policy formation dominated in the US and the UK under the 
Reagan and Thatcher administrations. The writings of Friedrick Hayek, which emphasise 
two principles of free market liberalism in the economic domain and 'true individualism' 
in the social domain, 56 became influential in the Thatcher and Reagan governments in the 
US and the US from the late 1970s. With the US in a position to influence the IFis via its 
voting power, a similar shift in economic view was found among the Bank's senior 
economists.57 In the case of the IMF, Kendall Stiles also confirmed this point by pointing 
out that in the context of Executive Directors' conflicts, 'during the 1980s, the United 
States Executive Director was generally loyal to the Reagan administration's ideology 
and pressed for greater liberalization measures in IMF conditionality.' 58 
John Williamson used the term 'Washington consensus' to represent the notion of 
conditionality convergence between not only the IFis but between them and the US. 59 In 
mid-1989, he provided a list of 'the conventional wisdom of the day among economically 
influential bits of Washington, meaning the US government and the international 
financial institutions' as follows: 
1) fiscal discipline: budget deficits should be kept small and able to be financed; 
2) public expenditure priorities: the redirection of spending from the areas with low 
economic returns (such as defence, administration and subsidies) toward ones with 
higher economic returns (such as health care, education and infrastructure); 
56 As, for instance, reflected in Hayek, F., The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1943); and 
Individualism and Economic Order (London: Routledge, 1949). For a brief discussion on his philosophy, 
see Hunt, op. cit., pp. 22-25. 
57 Hunt, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
58 Stiles, K. W., Negotiating Debt: The IMF Lending Process (Boulder: Westview P., 1991), p. 38. 
59 The term was challenged by Richard Feinberg who argued that it was not universally endorsed in 
Washington, and was thus not a consensus. He suggested that the term 'universal convergence' would be 
more appropriate. Williamson, J., 'Democracy and the "Washington Consensus",' World Development, 
vol. 21, no. 8, 1993, p. 1329; and Williamson, J., 'What Washington Means by Policy Reform,' inS. 
Haggard (ed.), The International Political Economy and the Developing Countries, vol. 1 (Hants: Edward 
Elgar, 1995), pp. 514-528. 
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3) tax reform: the tax base should be broadened and marginal tax rate should be 
decreased; 
4) financialliberalisation: interest rates should be ultimately determined by the market; 
5) unified exchange rates; 
6) trade liberalisation: the replacement of quantitative trade restrictions with tariffs which 
should in a later stage be progressively reduced; 
7) foreign direct investment: it should be encouraged through the abolition of barriers to 
entry and competition on equal terms; 
8) privatisation of state-owned enterprises; 
9) deregulation: regulations which create barriers to entry and limit competition should 
be abolished, unless the regulations are justified on safety and environmental grounds; 
10) provision of secure property rights in the legal system. 
There are main three basic models underlying the above ten policy measures of the 
'Washington consensus.' 60 Of the three, two models are associated with the 
macroeconomics. The first model focuses on the demand side of the economy and also 
the growth of money supply, and is used by the IMF in dealing with the balance of 
payments problems and domestic inflation. On the other hand, the second model adopted 
by the Bank emphasises the importance of the supply side of the economy as a way of 
coping with real resource constraints and so promoting economic growth. 
The demand-side model of the IMF assumes that the balance of payments and price 
instability faced by its member countries are primarily caused by the excessive growth of 
domestic money supply as a way to finance government budget deficits. The excess 
growth of money supply over the money-demand and output growths generates a 
problem of inflation via the increase in domestic prices and imports. In the 
IMP-supported programmes, measures to overcome these problems usually include the 
reduction of budget deficits, the rise in the interest rates to increase savings and 
devaluation of the local currency to promote exports and so to improve balance of 
payments deficits. 
In the supply-side model of the Bank, the constraints on the supply side of the economy 
were identified: there were the two gaps between the investment rate and the savings rate, 
60 Hunt, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 
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on the one hand, and between imports and exports, on the other hand. Either of these 
constraints could impede the targeted growth rate. Thus, according to the Bank, measures 
have to be undertaken to reduce these gaps in order to promote the growth rate. 
The third model which is based on the role of free markets in enhancing allocative 
efficiency is adopted by both the Bank and the IMF. Both institutions are in favour of the 
allocative role of markets and hence market liberalisation at both international and 
domestic levels. At the international level, import restrictions should be abolished and 
tariffs should be reduced and rationalised. At the domestic level, prices should be 
determined by markets rather than the governments. To help enhance efficiency, the 
Bank has also included the privatisation of public sector enterprises in its structural 
adjustment programmes. 
It should be noted that in addition to the above economic policy instruments, there were a 
number of other matters which had caused concerns in the IFis and the US government in 
their relationships with client countries. They included such issues as 'the promotion of 
democracy and human rights, suppression of the drug trade, preservation of the 
environment, and control of population growth.' Nonetheless, these concerns have 
played a minor role in influencing the view of 'the Washington' over their client's 
economic policies.61 
In sum, the concept of conditionality in practice emerged in the late 1940s following the 
insistence of the largest creditor country, the US, despite the objections of the Western 
European countries, the main debtors at the time. It was primarily prompted by the need 
to ensure the temporary feature of the members' drawings and, thereby, the revolving 
character of the IMF' s use of resources. It was rooted in the view of preventing 
unjustified drawings, and of ensuring effective repurchase. That is, resources of the Fund 
should be treated as being for a short-term purpose and had to be paid back within a 
certain period. One way to ensure this prompt repurchase is to attach policies and 
measures to resources provided to borrowing countries so as to restore the balance of 
payments equilibrium. 
61 Williamson, op. cit., 1995, p. 515. 
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IMP conditionality has steadily evolved throughout its existence. It has been shaped by 
events at both domestic (the failure of the lSI strategy pursued by many developing 
countries in generating economic growth) and international levels (the debt crisis, the 
collapse of the centrally planned economies, and the Asian crisis). Also the rise in the 
popularity of neo-liberalism in both the academic and the official circles in major 
industrial countries, particularly the US and the UK, to a large extent, contributed to 
major changes in the IMP's (and the World Bank's) perception. These factors in tum led 
to the growing collaboration between the two institutions, their increasing involvement in 
the developing countries' problems and hence their conditionality convergence or, in 
Williamson's words, the 'Washington consensus.' 
Therefore, over the years IMP conditionality has expanded its scope and extent not only 
from macroeconomic variables to structural adjustment measures, but its objectives have 
also increased in number to include economic growth, poverty alleviation and good 
governance in addition to its traditional objective of balance of payments correction. 
However, the increasing involvement of IMF conditionality in social and political issues 
and the growing number of IMP conditions would in tum have implications for the 
relationship between the IMF and its borrowing member countries in practice, which we 
now examme. 
Section II 
2.3 Concern over the Expansion of IMF Conditionality 
The proliferation of objectives of IMP conditionality and the expansion of its scope and 
extent have given rise to several concerns over time. As has already discussed in Chapter 
One, several criticisms have emerged, including the harshness of IMP conditionality, the 
lack of socio-economic considerations, and the 'one-solution-fits-all' approach. Such 
criticisms often boil down to another crucial criticism that IMP conditionality is imposed 
upon borrowing countries, especially the developing countries. The latter criticism has 
also received the IMP's response. It is the issue of imposition and the IMF's response 
which will be discussed in the following section. However, before discussing the 
controversy over the issue of imposition, one needs to look at another controversial 
question regarding IMP decision-making on its lending and conditionality. Without an 
understanding of how decisions are made at the IMP and the nature of IMP 
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decision-making on its lending and conditionality, one would miss part of the jigsaw to 
form a better picture of the nature of IMF conditionality. 
2.3.1 Controversy over the Issue of the Underlining Motivation of IMF 
Conditionality 
There exist two maJOr opposing views concerning IMF decision-making: the 
economically-driven and the politically-driven views. They are propounded as attempts 
to provide an explanation for what determines IMF conditionality towards the borrowing 
countries. 
2.3.1.1 The Economically-Driven Argument 
The principle proposition of the economically-driven argument is that IMF conditionality 
is solely based on a technocratic, economic doctrine of rationality and neutrality. 
Political factors are, thus, deemed not to have any influence upon the decision-making of 
IMF lending. 
The doctrine of economic neutrality in IMF operations proposed by the economic-driven 
view has been emphasised, dating back to the preparation years of its establishment. At 
the Atlantic City Conference held in 1944, the British delegation expressed the British 
functionalist/technical view towards the role of IMF staff. They stated that: 
We want to aim at a governing structure doing a technical job and developing a 
sense of corporate responsibility to all the members, and not the need to guard 
the interests of particular countries.62 
At the Inaugural Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank at 
Savannah, Georgia, on 9 March 1946, Lord Keynes expressed the notion of economic 
neutrality which would determine the lending decision-making of the Bretton Woods' 
twin institutions. He remarked that: 
If these institutions ... are to win the full confidence of the suspicious world, it 
must not only be, but appear, that their approach to every problems is absolutely 
objective and oecumenical, without prejudice or favour .... If, however ... the 
62 Strange, S., 'IMF: Monetary Managers,' in R. W. Cox and H. K. Jacobson (eds.), The Anatomy of 
Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (London: Yale U. P., 1974), p. 267. 
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devotee of ballet, the malice of the bad fairy Carabosse were to prevail, you two 
brats shall grow up politicians.63 
The neutrality doctrine of the economic-driven view has been embraced in the IMP's 
Articles of Agreement. Provisions in its Articles of Agreement have prohibited the IMF 
from intervening in the domestic social or political policies of member countries by 
objecting to them. The IMF has also been forbidden by the provisions from making 
decisions based on political considerations. This is reflected in the last sentence of 
Article 1 in the Articles of Agreement which requires the IMF to be guided 'in all its 
policies and decisions' by the purposes set forth in Article 1. In addition, Article XII, 
Section 4 (C) in the Articles of Agreement dealing with the impartiality of IMF staff 
stipulates that: 
The Managing Director and the staff of the Fund, in the discharge of their 
functions, shall owe their duty entirely to the Fund and to no other authority. 
Each member of the Fund shall respect the international character of this duty 
and shall refrain from all attempts to influence any of the staff in the discharge of 
these functions. 64 
The economic-driven view has mainly been held by a number of IMF officials. Also it is 
often found in the early literature concerning the Bretton Woods institutions. It can be 
seen in the works written by Sidney Dell (1981), Joseph Gold (1983), Mason and Asher 
(1973), Frank A. Southard (1979), and Susan Strange (1974).65 
The economic-driven view assumes that IMF staff are neutral. Joseph Gold confirmed 
this assumption by stating that: 
The Managing Director and the staff, of which he is the chief, owe their duty 
entirely to the Fund and to no other authority, nationality or international, in the 
exercise of their official functions. In conducting negotiations with members 
and in making recommendations to the Executive Board, the Managing Director 
abides by the law of the Fund. His role is a major bulwark in defense of the rule 
of law and the rights of all members.66 
63 Gold, J., 'Political Considerations are Prohibited by Articles of Agreement when the Fund Considers 
Requests for Use of Resources,' IMF Survey, 23 May 1983, p. 146. 
64 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund [online], Article 
12: Organization and Management, 2003. Available from: 
http://www.imf.org/externaVpubs/ft/aa/aa12.htm#4 [accessed 711' Oct. 2003] 
65 Dell, op. cit., 1981; Gold, op. cit., 1983; Mason and Asher, op. cit.; Southard, F. A., Jr., 'The Evolution of 
the International Monetary Fund,' Essays in International Finance, no. 135 (Princeton, N.J.: International 
Finance Sec., Dept. of Economics, Princeton U., Dec. 1979); and Strange, op. cit .. 
66 Gold, op. cit., 1983, p. 148. 
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Similarly, Susan Strange suggested that 'As civil servants with a concrete job to do, the 
[senior] staff shows a high standard of responsibility, integrity, and impartiality. ' 67 
The Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director (hereafter refers to as 'the 
Management') and staff in relation to the Executive Board are, according to this view, 
relatively autonomous and do not fall under the latter's domination. Frank Southard 
supported this claim by concluding that 'the Managing Director and staff gradually ... 
emerged as an effective organ, highly professional, able to operate with a satisfactory 
degree of independence from heavy supervision by the Executive Board ... '68 
The economic-driven view also assumes that IMF conditionality for particular types of 
loans is derived from the arithmetic calculation of the economic data which are collected 
by IMF staff and applied in the IMP's financial-programme formula. Moreover, the 
economic-driven argument claims that the IMF applies its conditionality in accordance 
with the doctrine of uniformity in which each member country receives uniform 
treatment from the IMF. Joseph Gold asserts that the doctrine of uniform treatment had 
been drawn from the IMF' s Articles of Agreement to guarantee that 'the Fund may not 
discriminate among members in establishing policies under the Articles. In particular, 
discrimination cannot be justified on the basis of domestic social or political policies. 
The prohibition of discrimination assures all members of equality before the law.' 69 He 
further explains that: 
The doctrine of uniformity, when applied to the use of the Fund's resources, 
does not prevent the Fund from formulating a policy that recognizes a particular 
balance of payments problem if it can be distinguished in good faith from other 
such problems. What the Fund cannot do is to define a policy in terms of a 
particular member or class of members or in terms of all members except a 
particular member or class of members. 70 
2.3.1.2 The PoliticallyDDriven Argument 
The main proposition of the politically-driven argument is that IMF conditionality is 
primarily determined by political considerations, dictated by geo-political and/or 
ideological reasons. Political factors gain more weight than economic factors in 
67 Strange, op. cit., p. 270. 
68 Southard, op. cit., p. 43. See also Strange, op. cit., p. 267. 
69 Gold, op. cit., 1983, p. 147. 
70 Ibid. 
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explaining the decision-making of IMF lending. Thus, IMF decision-making cannot, 
according to this view, be politically neutral, 71 unlike the claim made by the 
economically-driven view. The politically-driven argument can be summarised into two 
main aspects: the first aspect concerns with the structure of the IMF; and the second 
aspect deals with its function. 
A) Structure 
The politically-driven view asserts that the IMF's feature of politicising emerges out of 
the Executive Board.72 This view assumes that IMF conditionality is designed by its 
major members, particularly the US, through the control over their appointed Executive 
Directors. Fred L. Smith notes that: 
That the IMF's fate has rested with the political process has been totally 
appropriate, for the IMF is itself a political institution. It is managed by 
politically appointed individuals from member nations, and the political interests 
of its member influence its decisions.73 
This view then further assumes that it is the Executive Board rather than the Management 
and IMF staff who dominates IMF lending decisions and its conditionality.74 The system 
of weighted voting adopted by the IMF is claimed to contribute to such domination of the 
Board of Executives over the Management and the staff. A considerable proportion of 
IMF resources are derived from member countries' subscription payments in accordance 
with their quotas. The size of a member country's quota also determines its voting power 
and the amount of IMF resources that a country can borrow. The larger the size of a 
member country's quota and of its subscription payment, the greater access to IMF 
resources and the gain in the percentage of votes. As a consequence of the weighted-vote 
system, the major members through their Executive Directors will, according to this view, 
dominate the IMF' s decision-making process. 
71 Butler, N., 'The IMF: Time for Reform,' Young Fabian Pamphlet, no. 50 (London: Young Fabian Group, 
Jan. 1982), p. 17; and Dag Hammarkjold Foundation, 'International Monetary System and the New 
International Order,' Development Dialogue, no. 2, 1980, p. 14, cited in Helleiner, G. K., 'The IMF and 
Africa in the 1980s,' Essays in International Finance, no. 152 (Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Sec., 
Dept. of Economics, Princeton U., July 1983), p. 2. 
72 Lister, F., 'Decision-Making Strategies for International Organizations: The IMF Model,' Monograph 
Series in World Affairs, vol. 20, Book 4 (Denver, C. 0.: U. of Denver, 1984). 
73 Smith, F. L., Jr, 'The Politics ofiMF Lending,' Cato Journal, vol. 4, spring/summer 1984, p. 217. 
74 See, for example, Russell, B., 'Guess Who Calls the Tune at IMF?,' in L. J. McQuillan and P. C. 
Montgomery (eds.), The International Monetary Fund, Financial Medic to the World?: A Primer on 
Mission, Operations, and Public Policy Issues (Stanford, C. A.: Hoover Institution P., 1999), p. 89. 
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Some authors such as Cheryl Payer pointed to the US as the dominant member in the IMF 
in the early years and despite its relatively decline, this dominance continued to exist 
through a unilateral veto over a number of important decisions. He states that: 
From its inception the Fund has been dominated by the wishes of its largest 
member, the United States of America ... [I]n the 1960s, the American 
dominance has declined relatively, but it is still safe to assume that no major 
decisions are taken against the strong wish of the United States. The resignation 
in 1973 of Pierre-Paul Schweitzer as Managing Director, after the US indicated 
that it did not have confidence in him, is an illustration.75 
Similarly, Bahram Nowzad concludes that: 
Because the Fund's largest members provide the bulk of its resources and thus 
have a majority of the voting power, there is no question that they exert 
considerable influence on the direction, policies, and practices of the Fund.76 
R. S. Eckaus further points out that the way in which decisions were made within the IMF 
had allowed the richer countries to impose adjustment conditions without the exercise of 
their majority power in the IMF. IMF decisions were not voted upon. In other words, 
they were based on the 'sense of the meeting' of the Executive Directors.77 
B) Function 
According to the politically-driven view, the IMF is labelled as a politicised international 
institution.78 It is designed to serve as an instrument of its major members, i.e. Western 
industrialised countries, particularly the United States, rather than acting as an IFI. Its 
lending decision is mainly a reflection of economic and geo-political interests of its major 
members in pursuing their foreign policies in developing countries.79 Teresa Hayter in 
examining the role of aid and several financial institutions argues that the policies of these 
institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF, formed 'an integral part of the 
75 Payer, C., The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World (New York: Monthly Review P., 1974), app. II, 
p. 217. 
76 Nowzad, B., The IMF and its Critics,' Essays in International Finance, no. 146 (Princeton, N.J.: 
International Finance Sec., Dept. of Economics, Princeton U., Dec. 1981), p. 9. 
77 Eckaus, R. S., 'How the IMF Lives with its Conditionality,' Policy Sciences, val. 19, no. 3, 1986, pp. 
237-252. 
78 Dag Hammarkjold Foundation, 1980, p. 14, cited in Helleiner, op. cit., p. 2; and Smith, F. L., op. cit., p. 
217. 
79 Bello, W. and D. Kinley, The IMF: An Analysis of the International Monetary Fund's Role in the Third 
World Debt Crisis, Its Relations to Big Banks, and the Forces Influencing Its Decisions,' Multinational 
Monitor, July 1983, p. 13; and Haggard, S., The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended 
Fund Facility,' International Organization, val. 39, no. 3, summer 1985, pp. 513-515. 
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foreign policies of Western capitalist nations towards underdeveloped countries.' 80 Thus, 
the conditionality, according to this view, tends to be lenient towards the allies of the 
IMF' s major members. 
Furthermore, the political-driven view asserts that another principal function of the IMF 
is to serve the ideological objective of major members. Its existence and operations are 
claimed by this view to facilitate the expansion of and to preserve world capitalism with 
an ultimate goal of ensuring capitalist domination in the world economy. 81 Therefore, 
according to this view, IMF decision-making is oriented in favour of capitalist countries, 
regardless of their intention on how to use the loans. Walden Bello and David Kinley 
notes that: 
In choosing preferred clients in the Third Word, both the Fund and the banks 
tried to reduce the 'political risk factor' -which meant that the biggest loans often 
went to capitalist countries with superficial signs of stability imposed by 
authoritarian regimes, like Chile, the Philippines, Argentina, and Brazil. Yet, 
these were often times the borrowers who were not likely to invest the bulk of 
the loans in creating productive assets that could generate the wealth from which 
the loans could be later repaid. 82 
Similarly, in his paper examining the relationship between the World Bank and Tanzania, 
James Mittelman concludes that: 
The role of the World Bank in Tanzania makes evident that its lending criteria, 
loan terms, feasibility studies, reports, missions, accounting procedures, and 
advice are all coloured by the prejudices of American business psychology and 
capitalism profit-and-loss thinking ... international institutions can play a 
prominent role in shaping national policies so that they are consonant with 
capitalist principles. 83 
On the other hand, IMF lending decision is taken against countries which adopt a socialist 
path towards their economic policies and economic development. As Cheryl Payer puts 
it: 
... The Fund seems to be much more lenient ... with some governments than 
with others ... there is a plausible political hypothesis: where the most powerful 
80 Hayter, T., Aid as Imperialism (Middlesex: Penguin, 1971), p. 6. 
81 Hayter, op. cit. 
82 Bello and Kinley, op. cit., p. 13. 
83 Mittelman, J. H., 'International Institutions and Policies of Socialism and Self-Reliance: Are They 
Compatible? The Tanzanian Experience,' Social Research, vol. 47, spring 1980, p. 165. 
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opposition to the government in power is rightist and friendly to the US ... , the 
government is likely to receive more severe treatment from the IMF when it tries 
to support social reform measures than in countries where the chief rival to the 
government's power is left nationalism.84 
Therefore, this view claims that IMF lending decisions are a reflection of the major 
members' desire and thereby an outcome of political bias. 85 
2.3.2 Contending Views on the Nature of IMF Conditionality 
With regard to the nature of IMF conditionality, there are two very different schools of 
thought which are imposition and "ownership." In the literature concerning aid and IFis, 
including the IMF, it is often suggested that IMF conditionality is imposed upon 
borrowing countries against their will. These included the work of Willy Brandt, Richard 
Bernal, Ronald T. Libby, Cheryl Payer, Walden Bello and David Kinley, Nick Butler, 
Roland Vaubel, Mel Watkins, and Mary Soledad Perpinan. 86 This view can also be found 
in the literature regarding the World Bank; for example, in the work of Elaine Elinson.87 
There are a number of assumptions underlying the view of imposition. First of all, there 
assumes to be a lack of alternatives for borrowing countries, particularly developing 
countries. There would be no choice for them. Secondly, there would be a lack of 
freedom or autonomy. The developing countries would lack room to manoeuvre. The 
policy reform programmes are, thus, forced, coerced or dictated upon the developing 
countries. This assumption is clearly expressed by Ronald T. Libby: 
When the LDC [less developed country] became heavily dependent upon the 
!GO's [intergovernmental organisations] and creditors for financial assistance to 
enable the government to survive a disastrous shortfall in foreign exchange 
earnings, it was forced to accept extreme, and politically dangerous, measures in 
order to secure assistance.88 
84 Payer, op. cit., 1974, p. 43. 
85 Ibid., p. 14; and Smith, F. L., op. cit., p. 219. 
86 Bello and Kinley, op. cit., pp. 11-14; Bernal, R., 'Transnational Banks, the International Monetary Fund 
and External Debt of Developing Countries,' Social and Economic Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, 1982, pp. 71-101; 
Brandt, W., North-South: A Programme for Survival, Report of the Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues (London: Pan, 1981); Butler, op. cit.; Libby, R. T., 'External Co-optation 
of a Less Developed Country's Policy Making: The Case of Ghana, 1969-1972,' World Politics, vol. 29, no. 
1, Oct. 1976, pp. 67-89; Payer, op. cit., 1974; Perpinan, M.S., 'The Philippines: Collision Course,' in J. 
Torrie (ed.), Banking on Poverty: The Global Impact of the IMF and World Bank (Toronto, 0. N.: Between 
The Lines, 1983), pp. 169-187; Vaubel, R., 'Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank: A Comparison of 
the Evidence,' World Economy, vol. 19, no. 2, 1996, pp. 195-210; and Watkins, M., 'foreward,' in Torrie, 
op. cit .. 
87 Elinson, E., 'The Philippines: The Failure of Bank Strategy,' in Torrie, op. cit., pp. 154-168. 
88 Libby, op. cit., p. 67. 
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Thirdly, the view of imposition also assumes the hegemony of the IMP. The IMP is often 
seen as the most powerful institution in relation to the developing countries. As Nick 
Butler describes the institution: 
Of all the international institutions created in the wake of the second world war 
the IMP is easily the most powerful .... The IMP's status, as lender of last 
resort has given it effective political power, power which can be used in a variety 
of ways producing sharply different results. ' 89 
Also J. E. Stiglitz shares a similar assumption: 
... these [the negotiations between the IMP and the borrowing country on the 
terms of any loan agreement] are one-sided negotiations in which all the power 
is in the hands of the IMP, largely because many countries seeking IMP help are 
in desperate need of funds. 90 
Fourthly, the developing countries are, on the other hand, viewed as being weak and 
passive. They would have no bargaining power. According to this view, there would be 
no reaction from the developing countries. The latter has always to accept the conditions 
attached to the IMP's loans. As Mary Soledad Perpinan says in the case of the 
Philippines that: 
The Philippines ... has ... gone all the way, bowing and bending to the dictates 
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank . . . . We're the 
sanguine neocolony that is no longer accountable to its people but to the World 
Bank and IMP.91 
The opposing school of thought, often of the IMP, claims that the IMP neither impose 
upon nor dictate to, but rather cooperates with the borrowing country in question on the 
terms of the lending agreement. In its booklet 'Ten Common Misconceptions about the 
IMP' published in 1988, the IMP responded at length to the criticism that the IMP 
imposed austerity on member countries. A number of reasons were put forward to rebut 
such a criticism, including: 
i) What forced a country to adopt austerity measures was not the IMF, but 
rather balance of payment disequilibrium, arising from inappropriate 
89 Butler, op. cit., p. 29. 
90 Stiglitz, J. E., Globalization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2002), p. 42. 
91 Perpinan, op. cit., pp. 169-170. 
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domestic policies and/or unfavourable external developments, and lack of 
financing prospects; 
ii) The country could not continue drawing down its foreign exchange 
reserves or borrowing abroad to finance its payments deficit. Sooner or 
later, the country would, with or without the Fund, have to adjust; 
iii) All economic adjustment programs involved some sacrifice; and 
iv) The Fund was often used by governments as a scapegoat. They implied 
that these reforms had been "dictated" by the Fund.92 
In defending itself, the IMF often argues that the IMF only has an advisory role in 
working out the economic policy programme of a borrowing country. Managing Director 
H. Johannes Witteveen stated in his speech on 8 May 1978 in London that '[t]he Fund can 
counsel and agree but it assuredly cannot- as it, unfortunately, so often said- "impose" 
policies and conditions. ' 93 
According to the IMF, IMF conditionality is based on cooperation between the IMF and a 
borrowing country. Jacques de Larosiere stated in his speech on 15 December 1983 
before the Economic Club of Chicago, on 'Current Policies of the IMF: Fact and Fiction' 
that: 
One sometimes hears it said that the Fund "imposes" conditions on 
member countries having recourse to its financing. This notion betrays a basic 
misconception about the nature of the Fund's relations with its sovereign 
member states. When a member wants to borrow from the Fund, we work 
together with the authorities to determine the nature and causes of the economic 
problems facing the country. And we examine with them the policy options that 
exist for restoring a viable payments position over the medium term, having 
regard to the domestic social and political objectives of the member and its 
economic priorities. The aim of these discussions is to reach agreement on a 
package of measures - an adjustment program - which constitutes a coordinated 
attack on the problems they face and which can be supported by Fund financing 
. . . . The closeness of relations between the Fund and its member countries and 
the continuing nature of the association mean that negotiations, though they can 
be difficult, are normally conducted in an atmosphere of mutual understanding 
and trust [emphasis added].94 
92 International Monetary Fund, Ten Common Misconceptions about the JMF (Washington, D. C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1988), p. 15. 
93 Witteveen, H. J., an address delivered on 8 May 1978 in London before the 1978 Euromarkets 
Conference on "Financing the LDCs: The Role of Public and Private Institutions," in International 
Monetary Fund, JMF Survey, 22 May 1978, pp. 149-150. 
94 de Larosiere, J., an address delivered on 15 December 1983 before the Economic Club of Chicago on 
"Current Policies of the IMF: Fact and Fiction," in International Monetary Fund, IMF Survey, 9 Jan. 1984, 
p. 2. 
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IMP conditionality is also claimed to be "owned" by the borrowing countries as 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus remarked on 25 January 1990 in Washington, 
D.C. before the US Catholic Conference and the Episcopal Conference of Mexico that: 
The economic program that a country itself draws up with our assistance, is 
indeed its own. We have learned from experience that a program can only be 
effective if the authorities are genuinelifs committed to it, and if it is supported 
by a broad consensus of the population. 5 
Similarly, in its booklet 'What is the International Monetary Fund?' published in 1998, 
the IMF argues that: 
Far from being dictated to by the IMP, the membership itself dictates to the IMP 
the policies it will follow. The chain of command runs clearly from the 
governments of member countries to the IMF and not vice versa . . . . The 
specifics of each IMP-supported adjustment program are selected by the 
member, and hence the program of reform is the member's, not the IMF's.96 
Some defenders of the IMF rmse doubt about the idea that IMF conditionality is 
imposed upon the borrowing countries. As Bahram Nowzad in defending the IMF on 
the issue of imposition points out: 
[The] concept is not always fully explained. Furthermore, it is not clear whether 
it is based merely on chance encounters between the critics and particular Fund 
officials or is perceived as a deeper failing affecting the Fund. Fund officials 
who conduct negotiations with member countries are of course subject to the 
same failings and mistakes as other humans.97 
Some observers hold a view against the imposition perspective. Sebastian Edwards 
asserts that it was 'incorrect' to view IMP conditionality as being imposed on developing 
countries. He remarks that: 
One of the many myths that surround the Fund is that its staff travels around the 
world imposing unnecessarily harsh adjustment policies on the developing 
95 Camdessus, M., excerpts of remarks delivered on 25 January 1990 in Washington, D. C. before the US 
Catholic Conference and the Episcopal Conference of Mexico, in International Monetary Fund, 'Managing 
Director's Address ... Fund's Experience in Mexico Demonstrates Cooperative Approach,' IMF Survey, 5 
Feb. 1990, p. 33. 
96 International Monetary Fund, 'What is the International Monetary Fund?,' in McQuillan and 
Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 11 and 19. 
97 Nowzad, op. cit., p. 9. 
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countries. Strictly speaking this is incorrect: the IMF cannot impose any policy 
on any country.98 
However, the author did not go on to explain why this would be the case. 
In sum, what both schools of thought imply are quite opposed to each other. On the one 
hand, the imposition school of thought suggests the following points: i) the lack of 
alternatives and room to manoeuvre of the borrowing countries; ii) a relative weakness 
and passivity of the borrowing countries; and iii) the lack of the borrowing countries' will 
in accepting IMF conditionality. On the other hand, the ownership argument is based on 
the following points: i) the context of power relativity may not be necessary due to the 
presence of 'mutual understanding and trust'; and ii) there exists the will of the borrowing 
countries. 
2.3.3 Criticisms of tllle Two §choons of Thought: Are ][mposition and Ownership 
Dichotomous Alternatives? 
There are, however, several weaknesses in both schools of thought. First of all, they 
oversimplify the relationships between the IMF and borrowing countries. Secondly, the 
imposition perspective is of a static nature. It does not include the dynamics of the 
relationship between the IMF and the borrowing countries. For instance, this perspective 
overlooks the economic and political circumstances of the negotiating country. In reality, 
the situations of the country would not be fixed as the arguments assume. It is expected 
that changes in the economic or political situations could have an impact on IMF 
conditionality. Thirdly, the imposition view also assumes a passive role of the borrowing 
countries in dealing with the IMF. The argument often focuses on the IMF side in an 
attempt to find out the determinant of IMF conditionality. In dealing with the issues of 
the relationships between the IMF and the borrowing countries, the latter should not be 
left out since they may not be passive actors. In fact, they may possibly interplay with the 
IMF in seeking the best deal for themselves. Last, but not least, both perspectives of 
imposition and ownership assume unitary actors; the IMF, on one side, and the borrowing 
country, on the other. This is particularly far from the reality. For example, as has been 
pointed in Chapter One, the IMF as an organisation consists of several hierarchical actors, 
namely the Board of Governors, the Executive Board, the Management, and staff. There 
98 Edwards, op. cit., p. 7. 
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are also a number of internal actors in the borrowing countries such as the technocrats, the 
decision-making bodies and interest groups. 
With these criticisms in mind, one could go further by asking an important question 
regarding the two contending views: are the ideas of imposition and ownership 
necessarily dichotomous alternatives? If IMF conditionality is imposed by the IMF, how 
can one explain the complete implementation of economic policy programme by some 
countries? Surely, among other factors which help facilitate implementation, there must 
be the element of willingness of the borrowing countries in implementing the policy 
programmes? On the other hand, if IMF conditionality is owned by the borrowing 
countries in the first place, why is there a need for the negotiations themselves and why 
are so many programmes aborted during the programme period? 
This study thus argues that the nature of IMF conditionality is characterised by neither 
absolute imposition nor complete ownership. In this respect, IMF conditionality should 
be conceived of as being located on a linear spectrum where imposition is situated on one 
end and ownership at the other (see Figure 2.1). That is, the question that one should ask 
is not whether IMF conditionality is imposed upon or owned by the borrowing countries. 
Rather what is the extent of the imposition and of the ownership of IMF conditionality? 
Figure 2.1 A Linear Spectrum 
Imposition ~--------------------i> Ownership 
As previously discussed above, one of the deficiencies of one of the two schools of 
thought concerning the nature of IMF conditionality is its static feature. In order to avoid 
such a deficiency, the study will utilise the process analysis for the purpose of introducing 
the dynamics needed. The nature of the outcome of the interplay between the two parties 
can be examined in the context of how the two parties interact during the process by 
which the outcome is obtained. Thus, in order to understand the nature of IMF 
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conditionality, one needs to examine it in the context of the relationship between the IMF 
and the borrowing country in question during the process of lending to determine how 
conditionality is derived. As discussed in Chapter One, it seems that the idea of a balance 
of power in the relationship between the IMF and the borrowing country does not exist. 
However, as it will later be argued, the borrowing countries do have the possibility to 
increase their relative strength within the relationship. The borrowing country is in 
search of manoeuvrability or ways to improve its relative power. 
Section III 
2.4 Analytical Framework 
This section aims to establish an analytical framework for assessing the nature of IMF 
conditionality. As suggested above, one way of determining the extent of imposition and 
ownership of IMF conditionality is to consider the lending process to see how the IMF 
and the borrowing country interact regarding IMF conditionality. It is then necessary to 
consider the relative power of the IMF and of the borrowing country as a tool utilised in 
their interaction. It should be noted that since a lending agreement of a borrowing 
country with the IMF is not legally binding, the concept of 'authority' would not be 
appropriate here as a tool of analysis because it is a legal concept. Instead, the term 
'power' as a political concept will be employed instead in this study, forming part of the 
analytical framework. 
It has often been pointed out that despite its great capabilities, the IMF is not always able 
to obtain the full implementation of the policy programmes. Such an inability on the part 
of the IMF to achieve the fully implemented programmes could be interpreted to mean 
that the IMF is not as powerful as many think. In addition to this, this study argues that 
the relative weakness of the IMF vis-a-vis the borrowing countries can be found prior to 
the implementation, i.e. during the lending process that leads to the signing of agreements. 
This would depend on a number of factors at play which will be identified in the 
following section. 
The analytical framework of this research is inductively drawn from the literature in 
several fields. The framework constitutes the concept of power which is inserted in the 
context of the lending process and also embedded in the background of a triangular 
relationship, as will be explained below. Section III will begin with the discussions on 
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the concept of power with an attempt to provide an appropriate conceptualisation of the 
term to be used in the analysis. Then, the next section will look at the lending procedures 
of the IMF. This is followed by the notion of a triangular relationship as a network among 
the two major parties (the IMF and the borrowing country) and third parties. Last, but not 
least, the final section will identify the possible factors which determine the power of the 
two major parties. 
2.4.1 The Concept of Power 
First of all, it should be pointed out that in social sciences the term 'power' is theoretically 
problematic. There exist several definitions of the term 'power.' The fundamental 
problem is that there seems to be no single universally satisfactory definition of power in 
social science studies. As Steven Lukes explains: 
It is more likely that the very search for such a definition is a mistake. For the 
variations in what interests us when we are interested in power run deep ... and 
what unites the various views of power is too thin and formal to provide a 
generally satisfying definition, applicable to all cases.99 
In International Relations, power is a crucial concept in the realist tradition. Realists 
understand power to be the sum of capacities (or resources or possessions) held by a state, 
whether considered in an absolute term (in isolation) or a relative term (relative to the 
capacities of other states). 100 In assessing power, economic, military, technological, 
political, and diplomatic factors are often employed. They include natural resources in 
terms of food and raw materials, industrial capacity, the sizes and skills of population, the 
size and geographical location of land area, the size and quality of armed forces, the 
efficiency of government and the quality of diplomacy. 101 However, there are several 
shortcomings of defining power as capacities. First of all, it would provide quite a limited 
tool of analysis, particularly in a comparative analysis involving different types of actors, 
not on a state-state basis. Secondly, power is viewed as either immutable or unlikely to be 
alterable in the short term. From this perspective, it mentions nothing about the 
interactions between or among actors. Thus, it provides little insight for a dynamic 
analysis for which the study seeks. Furthermore, viewing power as endowed resources 
99 Lukes, S. (ed.), Power (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 4-5. 
100 Viotti, P.R. and M. V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 2"d ed. 
(New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 44. 
101Morgenthau, H. J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, briefed. (Boston, M.A.: 
McGraw-Hill, 1993), ch. 9, pp. 124-165. 
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and capacities cannot explain why the strong with their superior resources do not always 
prevail over the weak. 
In explaining the paradox of power as a causal concept, something lying between the 
cause and the outcome, David Baldwin argues that the degree of fungibility of power 
resources (i.e. transferability of power resources to be used in lieu of another) is relative 
and thus both domain (who has power in relation to whom) and scope (with respect to 
what) need to be specified in analysing power. 102 Power resources which are useful in 
one policy-contingency framework may not be equally useful in another. Moreover, 
power resources may be assets in one policy-contingency framework but liabilities in 
another context. 103 That is, they can be not only the sources of power but also its 
constraints, depending on the context in which they exist. Power is, thus, contingent upon 
context and must be examined in a specific issue area. Drawing from Baldwin's 
arguments, in conceptualising the term 'power' for the analysis of this study, one needs to 
place it in the context of the relations between the IMF and the borrowing country 
regarding IMF conditionality; otherwise, the concept of power would be rather useless in 
the analysis. 
Although endowed resources or capacities are an important element in the causal concept 
of power, they are not alone in affecting the outcomes of interactions. In the literature 
concerning international negotiations, outcomes depend not only on absolute or relative 
capacities, but also the interaction between/among parties, the way in which the resources 
are organised and utilised. 104 
In the context of the relations between the IMF and the borrowing countries, their 
positions are often said to be or appear to be asymmetrical, as has been pointed out 
Chapter One. The fact that the IMF holds the credit needed by the borrowing countries to 
deal with their balance of payments deficits is commonly used to show the asymmetry 
between the IMF and the borrowing country. From this perspective, the analysis tends to 
consider power as the sum of capabilities, especially in terms of the sources of power and 
102 Baldwin, D. A., 'Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,' World 
Politics, vol. 31, no. 2, Jan. 1979, pp. 161-194. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Habeeb, W. M., Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with 
Strong Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. P., 1988); and Hopmann, P. T., The Negotiation Process and 
the Resolution of International Conflicts (Columbia, S. C.: U. of South Carolina P., 1996). 
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then jump to the conclusion, without or with only little reference to the interaction 
between the two parties and the possible changes arising during the interaction. 
In order to capture the interactions of actors in the analytical framework, the concept of 
power is, in this study, considered to be dynamic. Since it is necessary to specify the 
scope and domain in analysing power as has been discussed earlier, neither capabilities 
(as sources of and constraints to power) nor the extent of power are treated as static. They 
can be varied throughout the process of interactions. The sources of and constraints to 
power can be either permanent or temporary. The extent of power can, thus, be increased 
or decreased throughout the process and is not fixed according to what capacities a party 
is initially endowed, but also depends on circumstances. Nevertheless, it should not be 
taken to mean that the study rules out the relevance of capacities in the conceptualisation 
of power. Rather, capacities provide the foundation upon which power can be 
conceptualised, i.e. they are potential sources of and constraints on power (see Figure 2.2). 
In this study, power will refer to the ability of a party to affect the interaction outcomes in 
a specific-issue area. 
Figure 2.2 The Causation of Power 
Capacities 
(sources and 
constraints) I I 
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2.4.2 The Lending Procedures of the IMF105 
The lending procedures of the IMF are generally preceded by the consultations held 
regularly between the IMF and its member countries. Eduard Brau (1981) identified 
three main purposes served by these consultations. Firstly, they were the means by which 
105 The information on the consultations and IMF lending process presented in this section is substantially 
drawn from Brau, E., 'The Consultation Process of the Fund,' Finance and Development, vol. 18, no. 4, 
Dec. 1981, pp. 13-16; Crockett, A., 'Issues in the Use of the Fund Resources,' Finance and Development, 
vol. 19, no. 2, June 1982, pp. 10-15; and Korner, P. (eta!.), The IMF and the Debt Crisis: A Guide to the 
Third World's Dilemma (London: Zed, 1992), pp. 63-65. 
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the IMF keeps itself informed of economic developments and policies in member 
countries. Secondly, through the regular consultations, the IMF received the fundamental 
information for the exercise of surveillance over exchange rate policies. The final 
purpose was that they helped the IMF fulfil other jurisdictional responsibilities. 
Initially, the consultations were arranged with a few countries to discuss the reasons for 
their restrictions on international payments and transfers. The IMF commenced the 
consultations with its members in 1952, originated in Article XIV of the original Articles 
of Agreement. Under Article XIV, members had the right to maintain and to adopt 
restrictions on payments and transfers on a transitional basis, subject to an annual 
consultation with the IMF 'as to their further retention.' 
However, in 1960 the usefulness of the consultations was recognised by the Executive 
Directors, who then decided that consultations should be held regularly with members, 
even though they had abandoned restrictions on payments and transfers. By this time 
the consultations had shifted their focus from restrictive practices on payments and 
transfers to a comprehensive review of the member countries' economic situation and 
policies (both domestic and external). In addition, the Second Amendment of the 
Articles of Agreement, which entered into force in April 1978, required each member 
country to hold regular consultations with the IMF on their exchange rate and 
adjustment policies. Under the new Article IV of the Second Amendment of the 
Articles of Agreement, members may pursue exchange arrangements of their choice, 
but they were to collaborate with the IMF to ensure and promote stability in the 
exchange rate system. To oversee the members' compliance with these obligations, the 
IMF exercised firm surveillance over members' exchange rate policies through its main 
tool - the consultation process. 
The consultations begin with an annual visit to a member country by an IMF staff team 
whose main tasks are to collect information concerning the economic and financial 
situation and policies of the member country before holding discussions with its officials. 
Following the discussions, the IMF staff team prepares and presents a report, constituting 
a preliminary assessment of the domestic economic and financial situation and 
recommendations, to the government officials who are invited to make comments on the 
staff's assessments. A final draft of the staff report, which provides a basis for a 
discussion among the Executive Directors, is then submitted to the Executive Board. It 
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includes a summary of key facts and of recommendations with an aim of maintaining or 
restoring external financial balance. This is then followed by a discussion conclusion (or 
a so-called 'summing-up') which is reached by the Executive Board and is then passed on 
to the member country. 
During the consultation visits by the IMF staff team in the member country, discussions 
regarding the probable terms of an IMF loan may be held. Nevertheless, a request for 
negotiations on an IMF loan must come from the member country itself. Usually, the 
officials of the member country address the request to the IMF staff or the Executive 
Director responsible for the region, who then passes it on to the Managing Director. The 
request and the negotiations which are carried out by officials of the responsible regional 
department (who also hold the consultations) are confidential and unpublished. 
Prior to the departure of the IMF staff team and also the negotiations themselves, the IMF 
staff team drafts a so-called briefing paper. This contains a summary of the member 
country's economic situation, possible policy measures, and the probable amount of the 
IMF loan. If there is a need to obtain more information, a questionnaire will be sent by 
the IMF to the government officials. After being reviewed by a number of other IMF 
departments responsible, the briefing paper is then presented to the Managing Director 
for his approval. 
An IMF staff team, which usually visits the member country for two to three weeks, 
consists of four to six economists and a secretary, headed by a senior IMF official in the 
regional department responsible. The rest of the team are normally two staff members 
from the responsible regional department, specialising in the country concerned, a staff 
member from the Exchange and Trade Relations Department (now the Policy 
Development and Review Department), and staff members from other IMF departments 
(such as the Fiscal Affairs Department). In recent years, an increasing number of 
missions have also included a staff member from the World Bank. 
If a request for an IMF loan has been made by the member country, following the task of 
data-collection, the IMF staff team will carry out an additional task; that is, bargaining 
and negotiation on the conditionality. The IMF staff team outlines the conditions 
attached to the loan agreement. In some cases, the preconditions which a requesting 
country has to meet in order to be qualified for an IMF loan may be included in the 
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programmes. On the other hand, the government may try to moderate the conditions. Its 
ability to do so depends on a number of factors affecting its power. However, if the 
government can resist the IMF's conditions in the negotiations, the whole procedure 
comes to an end and the IMF staff team leaves the member country. 
However, one critic argues that: 'The standard IMF procedure before visiting a client 
country is to write a draft report first. The visit is only intended to fine-tune the report and 
its recommendations, and to catch any glaring mistakes.' 106 
However, in the case that an agreement is reached, a Letter of Intent will to be drafted, 
addressed to the Managing Director, and normally signed by the Minister of Finance and 
the Central Bank Governor of the member country. The Letter of Intent contains a formal 
request by the member country for a drawing of a certain amount and a detailed 
description of policy measures to which the member country commits itself. The Letter 
of Intent also contains performance criteria which are quantitative economic targets 
allowing the IMF to check quarterly whether the agreement is being kept. 
On their return, the IMF staff produces a so-called 48-hour report which contains a 
two-page summary of the negotiations presented to the Managing Director. The report 
attached to the draft Letter of Intent is then circulated to the relevant IMF departments 
which may propose minor changes in the Letter of Intent. The staff then prepares another 
report for the Executive Board, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's 
economic situations and describes the expected effects of the programme measures. The 
report accompanied by the already-signed Letter of Intent is presented to the Executive 
Board which holds discussions and make the final decision. The discussions in the 
Executive Board themselves may have an impact on how the IMF monitors the 
implementation of the policy measures. It has been a convention that the Executive 
Board is likely to follow the Managing Director's recommendations. Finally, the detailed 
report of the Executive Board discussion is transmitted to the requesting country. Then 
the loan agreement enters into force with the first instalment of the loan can be 
withdrawn. 
106 Stiglitz, op. cit., p. 47. 
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When the extent of imposition and ownership is being analysed, one may think that it 
would be an ideal to look at the process from which IMF conditionality is initially derived 
until an agreement is signed, separate from the process on how IMF conditionality is put 
into. practice, i.e. the implementation process. However, the analysis in this study cannot 
afford to ignore the discussions on the implementation ofiMF conditionality. First of all, 
the separation of the two processes would in practice prove difficult. The negotiation and 
the implementation processes are in fact intertwined; there is no clear-cut division 
between the end of the negotiation process on IMF conditionality and the beginning of the 
implementation process. This is partly due to the usage of pre-conditions (conditions that 
must be implemented prior to IMF Executive Board's approval for IMF credits), and 
partly to the idea of phasing, involving periodical reviews, particularly in the EFF. 
Furthermore, the course of an arrangement with the IMF is sometimes marked with 
waivers or breakdowns which often lead to renegotiations on IMF conditionality in either 
the same arrangement or a new arrangement. Thus, there are always negotiations on IMF 
conditionality taking place through out the period of IMF credits, even after an agreement 
is reached and signed. More importantly, the interweaving of the two processes itself can 
have an impact on the course of the relationship between the IMF and a borrowing 
country in question and thus on IMF conditionality. Therefore, the analysis in this study 
will include discussions on both the negotiation leading to a conclusion of an 
arrangement, i.e. the signing of a Letter of Intent, and the implementation processes. In 
other words, it is necessary to look beyond the period between the informal request for the 
use of IMF credits and the signing of an agreement by broadening the analytical period 
until the expiration of each agreement. 
2.4.3 The Notion of a Triangular Relationship 
This section aims to construct the idea of a triangular relationship among the three actors: 
the IMF, the borrowing country and third parties. Before going on to consider the 
triangular relationship, one may raise the following questions: why does this section 
deserve a space here or why should the discussions on the role of third parties be left to 
the next section which will anyway deal with the factors affecting the power of the IMF 
and the borrowing country? First of all, because one party in the relationship between the 
IMF and the borrowing country, i.e. the IMF, is not a state, but an international 
governmental organisation, the characteristics, interests and role of the third parties 
involved in the relationship are thus diverse. Furthermore, in my opinion the third parties 
have a great impact upon the way in which the IMF and the borrowing country interact 
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and their relative power. Thus, I do see a need to create an idea of a triangular 
relationship in an attempt to provide a clearer picture on the interactions between the IMF 
and the borrowing country and to highlight the role of the third parties in the interactions, 
rather than subtly dealing with it in the next section. 
Although at a glance, negotiations between the IMF and a borrowing country appear to be 
bilateral, there may in fact be possibilities for other parties to be involved in the 
negotiations directly or indirectly. The importance of the third parties in negotiations has 
been recognised in the literature regarding international negotiations. 107 For example, J. 
W. Salacuse has concluded that building supportive relationships with strong third parties 
who are not at the negotiating table was one of the most effective ways for a weaker party 
to increase its power. 108 As has also been pointed out in Chapter One, in addition to the 
borrower-lender relationship, there exists a relationship between the IMF and the third 
parties such as the private commercial banks, the creditor countries, and other IFis 
(namely the World Bank). There also exists another type of relationships: one between 
the borrowing country and the third parties. All these types of relationships form a 
broader and more complex relationship, which in this study will be called 'a triangular 
relationship.' 
Figure 2.3 A Triangular Relationship 
107 See, for example, Hopmann, op. cit., ch. 12, pp. 221-243. 
108 Salacuse, J. W., 'Lessons for Practice,' in I. W. Zartman and J. Z. Rubin, Power and Negotiation (Ann 
Arbor: U. of Michigan P., 2000), p. 258. 
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It can thus be useful to conceive of the IMF conditionality negotiations in the wider 
context of a triangular relationship as summarised in Figure 2.3. From Figure 2.3, the 
double-head arrows (1, 2 and 3) represent the relationship between two parties in question 
which is interactive, that is neither party is passive in dealing with the other. The dash 
arrow (4) represents the impact of the third parties upon the course of the relationship 
between the IMF and the borrowing country. 
The interests of each party in the triangular relationship may not always fall on the same 
line, although some parties may share similar interests. Neither party is a unitary actor. 
As for the IMF and the borrowing country, there are several interest groups existing 
within the two negotiating parties. The internal actors in the borrowing country include 
decision-making bodies, bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, and the 
public. The principal internal actors within the IMF in dealing with the issue of IMF 
conditionality are the Executive Directors and the Alternates at the Executive Board, the 
Management (the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director(s)) and staff. 
Due to the existence of various internal actors, the interests of both the borrowing country 
and the IMF are diverse, and there may be possibilities of internal conflicting interests 
within each party. The hierarchy of their interests is not immutable; whose interests 
within each party will prevail depending on who in each party has the final say on the 
subject matter and their perception and preferences. 
The borrowing country's interests include obtaining the IMP's financial support and/or 
side benefits from reaching agreement with the IMF (such as the gain in international 
investors' confidence in the country's economy; the restoration of international capital 
and aid flows; debt rescheduling; and debt cancellation). The borrowing country may 
simultaneously seek to reduce costs (actual and/or perceived) such as conditions attached 
to the lending and the perceived adverse consequence of domestic developments arising 
from agreeing to and adopting the conditions. 
As for the IMF, which is a governmental financial organisation, its interests are also 
broad. Repayment as a way to ensure the revolving nature of its financial resources 
through the borrowing country's adoption of economic policies forms part of its interests. 
Other important interests of the IMF can also be found in its functions and purposes 
assigned to it mainly by the Western industrialised countries. They include lending; 
surveillance of exchange rate policies; providing technical assistance and publishing; and 
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ensuring that its member countries pursue their adjustment policies in accordance with its 
purposes outlined in the Articles of Agreement (see Chapter One). 
The third parties are heterogeneous in characteristic; some are private firms, while the 
others are governments and international financial organisations. For private creditors, 
namely commercial banks, their involvement in negotiations is motivated by a desire for 
repayment. The official creditors, the majority of who coordinate their rescheduling 
negotiations through the Paris Club, also share the similar interest. Since the official 
creditors are also the governments of states, their interests are multiple and extend beyond 
the repayment to include the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. When they are in 
conflict, the official creditors often subordinate the former to the latter. The borrowing 
country may, if in a position to do so, manipulate/play on the conflicting interests of 
creditors to their advantage in relation to the IMF. Similar to the IMF, the World Bank 
has also broad interests, including lending and repayment. With the shared origins and 
similar organisational structure, the two institutions often cooperate with each other in 
dealing with the borrowing countries particularly since the 1980s, although at times 
tensions between them may arise (see Chapter One). 
For a similar reason, the third pa.Ities do not always form a unified coalition among 
themselves. How the third parties could have an impact on the power of the IMF and of 
the borrowing countries will be elaborated on in the following section which will be dealt 
with the factors affecting the power of the negotiating parties. With the pursuit of their 
own interests, the third parties may shift in their strategies throughout the course of the 
negotiations between the IMF and the borrowing country in accordance with their 
prevailing interests at a particular time. 
2.4.4 Factors Affecting the Power of the Parties 
To determine the extent of imposition and ownership, one would also need to identify the 
possible factors affecting the power of each party. By examining the relationship 
between the IMF and the borrowing country in a broader context of a triangular 
relationship, a number of factors which have an impact upon the two major parties' power 
can be identified. 
In this study, the factors which could have an effect on the power of each party can be 
divided into three main 'levels of analysis': individual negotiators; internal factors; and 
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international factors. In addition to these three level-of-analysis factors, there are also 
additional factors which do not fall into one of these categmies but are crucial elements, 
constituting part of the determinants of each party's power. Besides their effects upon the 
power of the parties, these factors may be related to one another; one may have an impact 
upon another or other factors. We now consider each of these factors in tum. 
2.4.4.1 Three Level-of-Analysis Factors 
A) Individual Negotiators (The First Level of Analysis) 
At the level of the role of individuals, negotiating skills of negotiators can have an impact 
on the power during negotiations. Good negotiating skills can be a source of power in 
negotiations. Fred C. Ikle identifies a number of 'rules of accommodation,' which 
constitute negotiating skills, including avoiding emotionalism and rudeness, and 
maintaining flexibility. 109 On the other hand, the insufficiency or lack of negotiating 
skills represents a weakness of or constraint on the negotiating party, respectively. 
B) Internal Considerations (The Second Level of Analysis) 
Factors Affecting the IMF's Power- Creditors/Donors' Political Influence 
The major donors and creditors of the borrowing countries are also the major creditor 
countries to the IMF, namely the five members whose quotas and also votes are the 
largest (the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK). With the largest quotas and votes, 
they are in a position to exert their influence on decision on IMF conditionality through 
informal discussions. As John Loxley points out: 'In practice, in the Executive Board, 
decisions are usually arrived at by consensus and hence informal influence and lobbying 
is more important there than the exercise of formal voting power.' 110 Whether the 
donor/creditor political influence will act as a sources of or a constraint on the power of 
the IMF depends upon the relationships between the donors/creditors and the borrowing 
country. 
Some commentators argue that the role of the IMF in debt rescheduling had 'undermined 
its capacity to perform its policy role.' It was asserted that 'creditor government concern 
109 Ikle, F. C., How Nations Negotiate (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), ch. 7, pp. 87-121. 
110 Loxley, J., Debt and Disorder: External Financing for Development (Boulder: Westview P., 1986), p. 
89. 
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with speedy debt relief can, in some instances, bring pressure to bear on the IMF to reach 
a credit agreement without insisting on the usual policy conditionality, or to draw up a 
programme that it knows is unlikely to be carried out by the debtor government..JII 
Factors Affecting the Borrowing Country's Power 
i) Internal Reactions: Political Development, Socio-Economic Impact and 
Internal Unrest 
The importance of domestic considerations in international negotiations is highlighted by 
Robert Putnam in his model of 'two-level games' which seeks to account for the 
interaction of diplomacy and domestic politics. 112 Here, he argues that when engaging in 
international negotiations, a party has to negotiate not only with its counterpart 
negotiating party in question, but also simultaneously with its own internal actors. The 
Putnam model conjectures that negotiating parties can benefit from their domestic 
constraints by exploiting the latter. The domestic constraints can, thus, act as a source of 
the power to the exploiting party: 'I'd like to accept your proposal, but I could never get it 
accepted at home.' 113 
Although they are meant to be beneficial in the long term, economic policy measures 
containing in IMF conditionality often have certain adverse effects, at least in the 
short-term, on various groups in the society. The distribution of such effects are various 
among different sectors of the economy and different groups of the society. For instance, 
the poor and workers are likely to be worse off as a result of a cut in government spending 
in areas such as subsidies and an increase in the price of imported foodstuff arising from 
devaluation. Trimming government budget through a reduction in public wages and 
salaries and privatisation will affect public employees. Such policy measures could 
provide the conditions for the occurrence of social protests and violent riots. Such social 
resistance is, among others, one of the hurdles to the successful implementation of IMF 
conditionality. This is likely to be used by the borrowing country as an argument for less 
111 Brown, R. P., 'The IMF and Paris Club Debt Rescheduling: A Conflicting Role?,' Journal of 
International Development, vol. 4, no. 3, 1992, p. 292. 
112 Putnam, R. D., 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,' in P. B. Evans, H. 
K. Jacobson, and R. D. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic 
Politics (Berkeley: U. of California P., 1993), pp. 431-468. See also Putnum, R. D., 'Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,' International Organization, vol. 42, summer 1988, pp. 
427-460. 
113 Putnam, op. cit., 1993, pp. 441-442. 
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severe IMF conditionality. In particular, the previous occurrence of social unrest is likely 
to provide a stronger ground and thus add to the borrowing country's power m 
conditionality negotiations. This factor can be more effective when it works m 
conjunction with the donors/creditors political influence within the IMF. Therefore, the 
power of the borrowing countries can be enhanced by previous or perceived domestic 
reactions to economic policy measures. 
H) Economic Circumstances 
The power of the borrowing country can also be affected by its economic circumstances. 
By and large, the borrowing countries approach the IMF after their balance of payments 
deficits have become unmanageable. However, in some cases, the talks with the IMF are 
precautionary, even though there are no obvious signs of balance of payments crises. The 
severity of an economic crisis experienced by the borrowing country represents a 
constraint on the power of the borrowing country. The more severe the initial economic 
situation of the borrowing country, the less power it is likely to have. An improvement in 
economic circumstances can, on the other hand, act as a positive input to its power. 
Several good indicators of the borrowing countries' economic circumstances include the 
level of foreign reserves and/or the import cover (i.e. the ratio of the level of their 
non-gold foreign reserves to imports expressed in terms of the number of months). This 
is because foreign reserves can be used to settle balance of payments deficits and also 
have an impact on imports of the borrowing country. Other economic indicators are 
current and capital balance of payments, inflation, unemployment, and government 
budget deficit. 
C) The International Context (The Third Level of Analysis) 
The international context (which includes regional issues) within which negotiations are 
taking place can also alter on the power of the parties. The parties involved both directly 
and indirectly in the negotiations are not completely independent actors but form integral 
parts of the international system which is subject to constant change. The major 
developments in the contemporary international relations are likely to have an impact on 
perceptions and interests of these parties and also on other factors affecting the power of 
the negotiating parties such as economic circumstances. Through such an impact, the 
power of the negotiating parties is in turn likely to change. 
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Barbara Stallings points out that the condition of the international economy, and thus the 
degree of constraints they face, are fluctuating factors that will be relevant for the 
developing countries in determining their bargaining stances. 114 However, Stallings' 
argument represents only part of the story since the changing condition of the 
international economy may also have a positive effect upon the countries' bargaining 
stances; i.e. it becomes a source of their power, and at the same time, has effectively a 
negative impact upon the IMF - it acts as a constraint on its power. Therefore, the 
broader context may act in favour to the parties, or provide the basis upon which the 
parties themselves may be able to exploit to their advantage. It may, on the other hand, 
act against the parties' power. 
2.4.4.2 Additional Factors 
In the context of conditionality negotiations, however, there remam some factors 
contributing to the relative power of the negotiating parties that do not sit comfortably 
within such clearly demarcated levels of analysis. I refer to these as 'additional factors,' 
which nonetheless can be linked to the level-of-analysis factors. 
A) Additional Factors for the IMF 
i) Cooperation among Creditors/Donors: Cross-Conditionality 
The ability of creditors to cooperate in making their lending decision for the 
borrowing/debtor countries can increase the power of the IMF. Particularly there is at the 
same time a lack of coordination among debtor countries, due in part to strategic side 
payments by creditors to the key debtor countries and those who refuse to participate in a 
debtor cartel. 115 This results in all negotiations over debt rescheduling and also 
adjustment programmes conducted on a case-by-case basis and, thus, weakens the 
negotiation stance of the borrowing/debtor countries. 
The method commonly used by creditors m reinforcing their position is 
cross-conditionality. This was developed particularly since the 1980s following 
coordination among creditors in dealing with the borrowing/debtor countries regarding 
the issue of indebtedness. Stephany Griffith-Jones defines the term 'cross-conditionality' 
114 Stallings, B., 'International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform,' 
in S. Haggard and R. Kaufman, The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, 
Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. P., 1992), p. 57. 
115 Ibid., p. 67. 
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to exist where 'acceptance by the borrowing country of the conditionality of one financial 
agency is made a pre-condition for financial support by the others.' 116 It is the acceptance 
of IMF conditionality which is most often set as a pre-condition before the borrowing 
country is able to obtain financial resources from other financial agencies. 117 The IMF' s 
'seal of approval' is often required by other creditors and donors before the latter grant 
their own. This means that unless the borrowing country first agrees to a package of 
economic policy measures with the IMP, other creditors are reluctant to provide financial 
support in terms of new loans, debt rescheduling and debt relief to the developing 
countries m debt arrears. Therefore, coordination among creditors and 
cross-conditionality help strengthen the power of the IMP. At the same time, they 
weaken the borrowing country's power since it results in a reduction in the room to 
manoeuvre of the borrowing countries. 
ii) 'Social Learning' and Technocratic Alliances 
Miles Kahler has pointed out the significance of 'social learning' which can affect the 
beliefs, interests and perceptions of the internal actors within the borrowing country, 
particularly the negotiators themselves. The IFis and other external agencies may be able 
to shape the process of learning by the government in directions that will lead to greater 
alignment with their economic policy preferences, for example, through the government 
technocrats, particularly who trained as economists at American or European 
universities. 118 However, it should be pointed out that how successful the technocratic 
alliances in shaping the outcomes depends on the autonomy of economist technocrats 
delegated to them by the political leadership or on whether they manage to obtain support 
from the decision-making bodies such as their cabinet colleagues and the president. 
B) Additional Factors for the Borrowing Countries 
In addition to the three-level factors, a number of factors, which mostly involve political 
influence of the third parties, can affect the power of the borrowing country. They 
include: the size of debts; geopolitics; colonial past; and the availability of 
non-conditional financial resources. 
116 Griffith-Jones, S., 'Cross-conditionality or the Spread of Obligatory Adjustment: A Review ofthe Issues 
and Questions for Research,' in E. Rodriguez and S. Griffith-Jones (eels.), Cross-Conditionality Banking 
Regulation and Third-World Debt (Basingstoke: MacMillan P., 1992), pp. 53-54. 
117 Ibid., p. 60. 
118 Kahler, M., 'External Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of Adjustment,' in Haggard and 
Kaufman, op. cit., 1992, pp. 123-131. 
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i) The Size of Debts 
Because the effect of the borrowing country's debt size upon its relative power may be 
different from economic circumstances in general, it deserves to be looked at separately 
from the section of economic circumstances. As previously discussed, the worsening of 
economic indicators other than the size of debt is likely to have a negative impact on the 
borrowing country's power. On the contrary, the borrowing country may actually benefit 
from its large size of debts. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman found that the large 
debtors fare better than smaller ones in the interest rates, maturities, and grace periods 
they receive, and in securing additional forms of relief and unorthodox rescheduling 
agreements and adjustment packages. 119 This factor is linked with the relationship 
between the borrowing country and the third parties, particularly the official creditors. 
The latter can put pressure on the IMF to reach an agreement with a particular borrowing 
country, often a large debtor, due partly to concern over their national financial 
institutions. 120 In other words, a small size of debts is a country's problem; but if the size 
of debts is large, then it is the lender's problem since this threatens the lenders', especially 
commercial banks', solvency. As H. James points out in the case of Mexico: 
Any Mexican action threatened bank's solvency, since if there were no 
agreement, and interest payments on loans were to be suspended, the loans 
would have to be reclassified as nonaccruing. The lenders had every interest in 
avoiding such a step, and could in consequence be coerced into being compliant 
over additionallending. 121 
ii) Geopolitics 
Similarly to the size of debts, geopolitics is also linked to the borrowing country's 
relationship with the third parties. However, it is specifically related to the official 
creditors, namely those which are the major creditor governments of the IMF. Special 
relationships between the borrowing country and the official donors or creditors, 
especially the US, can provide a source of power to the former vis-a-vis the IMF. The 
borrowing country's power can be augmented by direct and/or indirect support provided 
to them by the official creditors. Direct support is through their dominant power within 
the IMF. The IMF is said to be sometimes prevented from applying the principle of 
119 Haggard, S. and R. Kaufman, 'The Politics of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment,' in J.D. Sachs, 
(ed.), Developing Countries Debt and the World Economy (Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1989), pp. 264-265. 
12° Kahler, op. cit., 1992, p. 113. 
121 James, H., International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (Washington, D. C.: International 
Monetary Fund; New York: Oxford U. P., 1996), p. 366. 
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uniformity of treatment by the lobbying of its major creditors (industrial country 
governments) to secure easy terms for favoured borrowing countries, in pursuit of foreign 
policy and security goals. 122 Indirectly the official creditors can provide their support to 
the borrowing country through the provision of financial assistance to the latter. Stephan 
Haggard and Robert Kaufman, by pointing to countries such as Zaire and Turkey, argue 
that a number of states have manipulated their strategic position or concern about 
domestic political instability to gain additional assistance. 123 On the other hand, the 
soured relationship of the borrowing countries and the major shareholders of the IMF can 
have an adverse impact on their power. The left-wing government of Tanzania in the 
early 1980s faced an IMF mission instructed to take a tough line. 124 
iii) Colonial Past 
Many developing countries, especially the Francophone countries in Africa, are closely 
linked with their former colonies. They peg the exchange rates of their domestic 
currencies to those of their former colonial powers and their trade are carried out mainly 
with them. The former colonial powers have the significant voting power in the IMF' s 
Executive Board. The support from the former colonial powers to the borrowing country 
would strengthen the latter's power in relation to the IMF. 
iv) The Availability of Non-Conditional Financial Resources 
The availability of non-conditional financial resources can reinforce the power of the 
borrowing country during the negotiations. It helps lessen the severity of the borrowing 
country's balance of payments deficit and also reduce its need for the IMF' s financial and 
policy package. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman point out the importance of 
'nonconditional resources,' which help shift the bargaining power towards the debtor 
countries and make them less likely to accept IMF conditionality. 125 The possible 
sources of alternative financial resources include the sudden improvement in the 
borrowing country's exports and its export earnings, financial assistance from the third 
parties as well as private capital flows. 
122 Killick, T., IMF Programmes in Developing Countries: Design and Impact (London: Routledge, 1995), 
p. 118. 
123 Haggard and Kaufman, op. cit., 1989, pp. 265-266. 
124 Killick, op. cit., 1995, p. 119. 
125 Haggard and Kaufman, op. cit., 1989, pp. 266-267. 
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Barbara Stallings argues that if a country has a large market and valuable natural 
resources, private-sector firms will require fewer incentives to enter. 126 While the 
availability of such international capital flows can provide additional resources to the 
borrowing country's bargaining power, the lack of them represents constraints. To some 
developing countries, access to alternative sources of lending, especially from private 
commercial banks, could be limited. As Irving Friedman clearly explains: 
[B]ecause they depend upon full and prompt servicing of their loans for their 
financial profitability and viability, private banks (in contrast to the Fund and the 
Bank) understandably tend to focus their activities upon the best managed 
countries, and, within these countries, the best managed firms in the most 
advanced sectors of the economy. 127 
Summary 
This chapter has examined the evolution of IMF conditionality and the major concern 
raised regarding the nature of IMF conditionality. It has also developed an analytical 
framework which consists of the concept of power, the lending process, the notion of a 
triangular relationship, and the power determinants. The framework suggests that it is 
unhelpful and insufficient to consider the two schools of thought (imposition and 
ownership) solely as dichotomous or mutually exclusive alternatives. The following 
chapters will demonstrate that, in any set of negotiations and resulting agreements, 
between the IMF and the borrowing country, there will be a process of bargaining, based 
on relative power, that results in a combination of imposed and "owned" elements, which 
leads to the conclusion that these exist along a spectrum between imposition and 
ownership. 
Thus, this chapter has argued that although there appears to be an imbalance of power (as 
endowed resources) between the IMF and the borrowing country, discussed in Chapter 
One, there may exist room to manoeuvre for the borrowing country which can alter its 
position along the spectrum. This depends on the availability of factors affecting the 
power of each party and the tactics used by parties in utilising these factors to their 
advantage. The framework built up in this chapter will provide direction and guidelines 
in analysing the nature of IMF conditionality in the case of Egypt. 
126 Stallings, op. cit., p. 57. 
127 Friedman, I. S., 'Evaluation of Risk in International Lending: A Lender's Perspective,' in Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, Key Issues in International Banking (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
1977), p. 119. Cited in James, op. cit., 1996, p. 360. 
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PART ITll 
The NatlUure @[ JIMF Conditionality in the Case oJf Egypt: 
Jl960a 1998 
][ntrodlllldion 
Egypt has had a long relationship with the IMF, which can be traced back to when it 
was one of 44 countries represented at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. 29 
countries, including Egypt, joined the IMF by signing the Articles of Agreement on 27 
December 1945.1 Despite the long-standing relationship between the two parties, the 
relationship between the IMF and Egypt (and also many other borrowing countries) 
with regard to the upper credit tranche lending (with conditionality attached) is in fact 
episodic in character. The IMF's upper credit tranche lending to Egypt, similar to the 
lending to many of its member countries, occurred at irregular intervals. This sporadic 
feature of IMF lending is partly due to its focus on dealing with difficulties of balance 
of payments. It also depends upon the demand factors: the timing of the balance of 
payments problems faced by the member countries and their subsequent requests for 
IMF lending. Table 11.1 summarises the upper credit tranche arrangements of the IMF 
to Egypt since the latter joined the IMF in December 1945. Between the 1960s and 
1990s, Egypt concluded six SBAs and two EFFs. The four decades were marked by 
several failures on the part of Egypt to fully implement the policy programmes reached 
with the IMF. Out of eight policy programmes, six were abandoned without 
completion: the SBAs of 1962, 1964, 1977, and 1987; and the EFFs of 1978 and 1993. 
Thus, in its long history with the IMF, only the policy programmes under the 1991 and 
1996 SBAs were fully implemented. 
1 Horsefield, J. K., The International Monetary Fund 1945-65: Twenty Years of International Monetary 
Cooperation, vol. 1: Chronicle (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), p. 116. 
Table ILl Egypt's Agreements with the IMF (in millions ofSDRs, otherwise stated) 
'fypes of Date of Inception Date of Expiration Period of Amount Amount Implementatiollll Facility (Effective Date) or Cancellation Agreement Agreed Drawn 
1960s 
SBA 7 May 1962 6 May 1963 I year US$ 42.5 miiiion• US$ 38 million• Not fully implemented 
SBA 23 May 1964 22 May 1965 I year US$ 40 million" US$ 25 million• Not fully implemented 
]970s 
SBA 20 April 1977 19 April 1978 I year 125 105 Not fully implemented 
Not fully implemented, 
EFF 28 July 1978 27 July 1981 3 years 600 75 suspension of the second 
tranche 
li980s 
Not fully implemented, 
SBA 15 May 1987 30 November 1988 I Yz years 250 116 suspension of the second 
tranche 
li990s 
SBA 17 May 1991 31 May 1993b 2 yearsc 234.4d 147.2 Fully implemented 
EFF 20 September 1993 19 September 1996 3 years 400 o• Not fully implemented 
SBA I 1 October 1996 30 September 1998 2 years 271.4 o• Fully implemented 
Sources: Most of information for the 1980s and 1990s is drawn from International Monetary Fund, 'Egypt: History of Lending Arrangements [online],' 31" Mar. 200 I. Available from: 
http://www.imf.org/np/tre/tad/extra ... lkey=2001 %2003%2031 %2000%3A00%3AOO (accessed 3"' May 2001]; and IMF, Annual Report, various years. For the earlier period, the information is drawn 
from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, various years; IMF, 'Press Release,' in IMF Survey; and the IMF's confidential documents. 
Note:' at that time, SORs had not come into existence; 
• extended from 30 November 1992, I March 1993, and 22 March 1993; 
c extended from the initial period of I Y, years; 
d decreased from SOR 278.00 million; and 
<the authorities indicated their intention not to draw under the arrangements. 
SBA = Stand-By Arrangement; EFF = Extended Fund Facility 
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The following chapters examine the nature of IMF conditionality in the case of Egypt. 
Although the study covers the period since the 1960s, the focus will be on the period of 
the 1970s onward. This is due largely to the fact, as has been pointed out in Chapter 
Two, that it is in the second half of the 1970s that IMF conditionality has become 
internationally controversial. 
The study of the nature of IMF conditionality in the case of Egypt is divided into four 
major periods: the 1960s; 1974-1979; 1985-1988; and 1989-1998. These periods will 
be dealt with in Chapters Three-Six, respectively. The period of the 1960s is distinct 
from the other periods in many major aspects. First of all, this period is characterised 
by a different domestic environment. It was set in the pre-Open Door policy with the 
pursuit of lSI and populist/socialist policies under Nasser's regime. Moreover, as has 
been pointed out in Chapter Two, IMF conditionality at that time was rather limited in 
scope, focusing largely on stabilisation policy. Thus, it was by-and-large less 
controversial. The second period witnessed the development of controversy over IMF 
conditionality. Also, during the period 1974-1979, Egypt underwent both political and 
economic changes: the change in its leadership from Nasser to Sadat following the 
former's death in 1970; and the introduction of the Open Door (lnfitah) policy in 1974. 
The main features of the following period (1985-1988) are the international debt crisis 
of the 1980s and another change in the leadership in Egypt to Mubarak following the 
death of Sadat in 1981. It was during the final period that, for the first time since the 
1964 agreement, Egypt remained on course with an agreement with the IMF for its full 
term (the 1991 SBA) and, more importantly, that the policy programme under that 
agreement was fully put into practice, again for the first time in its history. In addition, 
the international environment had altered in this period, namely the end of the Cold 
War. In this regard, it would, therefore, be appropriate and helpful to consider the 
subject matter into the four main periods. 
Chapters Three, Four, Five, and Six will be divided into three major sections. They will 
begin with a background on why Egypt needed the IMF and the relevant context. The 
second section provides a narrative of the interaction between Egypt and the IMF 
regarding IMF conditionality in the upper credit tranche loans. As has previously 
argued in Chapter Two, by merely focusing on the process until an agreement is 
concluded and ignoring the subsequent implementation, the picture obtained from the 
The Nature ofiMF Conditionality in the Case of Egypt: 1960-1998 122 
study would be rather narrow and may even be distorted. The broadening of the period 
of coverage would allow one to apprehend more accurately the nature of IMF 
conditionality. Therefore, the study attempts to remedy this shortcoming by including 
in the discussions the period after the signing of the agreement in the narrative section 
dealing with the case of Egypt. Last, but not least, the relative power held by the two 
parties will be determined in the final section. Here the nature of IMF conditionality 
regarding the question of imposition-ownership will also be assessed. 
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Clbtapteir 1I'Ilniree 
Nasseir~§ Greatt Rehnctaurnce~ The 1960§ 
Chapter Three is concerned with the nature of IMF conditionality in the case of Egypt 
during the 1960s. This period witnessed Egypt's continuing efforts to seek the upper 
credit tranche loans from the IMF. The balance of payments crises had forced the 
country to resort to IMF financial assistance, culminating in two SBAs of 1962 and 
1964. The second half of the 1960s was marked by several failed attempts to conclude 
another SBA. Following the two SBAs, subsequent attempts to gain financial assistance 
from the IMF were also made by the Egyptian governments, but the two parties were 
unable to reach any formal agreement. Although another agreement was almost 
reached in 1967, due to the outbreak of the 1967 war against Israel, Egypt's request for 
a SBA was withdrawn. 
Prior to the second half of the 1950s, Egypt's drawings from the IMF were very limited, 
amounting to only SDR 3 million during the period 1947-55. 1 Table 3.1 shows the 
position of Egypt in the IMF during the period 1956-69. It indicates that Egypt made 
total drawings (or purchases) of SDR 273.7 million. The drawings from the IMF 
became intense during the period 1960-65. They amounted to SDR 173.2 million, 
representing about 63.3 per cent of the total drawings. During the period between the 
1950s and 1967, most of the drawings were the ordinary credit tranche drawings, with 
some exceptions of SBAs in 1962 and 1964, and Compensatory Financing Facility 
(CFF) drawings of SDR 16 million during the period 1963-67. Egypt was one of the 
three countries (Brazil and Egypt in 1963, and Sudan in 1965) to use the CFF during the 
first three years of its existence. 2 
1 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1981, p. 12. 
2 de Vries, M.G., The International Monetary Fund, 1966-1971: The System Under Stress, vol. 1: 
Narrative (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1976), p. 263; and Horsefield, J. K. (ed.), The 
International Monetary Fund 1945-65: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, vol. 2: 
Analysis (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), p. 423. 
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Table 3.1 Egypt's Financial Position in the IMF, 1956-1969 (in millions of SDRs) 
Years 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
All drawings 15 15 - - 34.8 10 67.4 21 25 15 7.5 - 63 -
Repayments by repurchase - - - 2.7 9.6 12.7 10 2.5 12 28.5 28 - 69.2 24 
Use of Fund credit - 15 15 12 30 27 85 103 109 95 70 74 72 51 
Of which 
Ordinary credit tranche drawings - 15 15 12 30 27 85 87 93 79 51 51 38 14 
Compensatory Financing Facility - - - - - - - 16 16 16 16 16 23 23 
Standby Arrangements: 
Amount drawn - - - - - - 38 - 25 - - - - -
Undrawn balance - - - - - - 5 - 15 - - - - -
Extended Fund Facility: 
Amount drawn - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Undrawn balance - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Oil Facility - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Trust Fund Loans Outstanding - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Quota 60 60 60 60 90 90 90 90 120 120 150 150 150 !50 
Fund holdings of currency 60 75 75 72 120 117 175 193 229 215 220 224 222 201 
Per cent of quota 100 125 125 120 133 130 194 215 191 179 147 149 148 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1981, pp. 12-13, 16-17,26-27, and 1983, pp. 
202-203. 
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During the last decade prior to Egypt's approach to the IMF, Egypt's balance of 
payments was characterised by trade deficits, which were financed in part by surpluses 
in services account and, at times, by net transfer and capital inflows. The overall 
balance of payments was persistently in deficit throughout this period (see Table 3.2). 
Nonetheless, Egypt encountered little difficulty in meeting its balance of payments 
deficits, which were financed mainly out of net gold and foreign exchange reserves 
accumulated during the Second World War. Therefore, prior to the early 1960s, there 
was little need for Egypt to negotiate an upper-credit tranche loan with the IMF. 
The depletion of Egypt's foreign exchange reserves served as a catalyst for the first-
time negotiations between Egypt and the IMF over the use of IMF credit under an SBA. 
By 1961, it had become clear that Egypt's foreign exchange reserves accumulated 
during the Second World War were exhausted. Its net gold and foreign exchange 
reserves declined from LE 379 million in 1945 to LE 16 million in 1961, and even 
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turned into a negative value of LE -7 million at the end of 1962.3 Several developments 
further caused the Egyptian government to run down its foreign exchange reserves. 
Unlike its moderate development efforts in the 1950s, the Egyptian government 
engaged in a large development programme, particularly the building of the Aswan 
High Dam which incurred a high level of financing not only for the building itself but 
for the resulting displacement of Nubians. Also, the poor performance of Egypt's major 
commodity exports in the early 1960s contributed to the loss of its income in terms of 
foreign currencies. This was due partly to the failure of the cotton crop caused by 
cotton leaf worm and partly to the reduction in rice supply caused by a low flood of the 
Nile. 
Table 3.2 Egypt: Balance of Payments, 1950-1969 (in millions of Egyptian pounds )a 
Exportsb Imports Trade Net Net Trade Net Net Capital Net Overall Year Transfers (f.o.b.) (c.i.f.) Balance Service and Services Transfers Inflow' 
and Capital' Balance 
1950 190.2 -208.9 -18.7 8.3 -10.4 -- -1.5 -1.5 -11.9 
1951 204.5 -233.8 -29.3 12.9 -16.4 -- -1.4 -1.4 -17.8 
1952 148.8 -208.2 -59.4 6.0 -53.4 -- -3.8 -3.8 -57.2 
1953 137.7 -166.7 -29.0 21.1 -7.9 -- -1.4 -1.4 -9.3 
1954 144.2 -156.2 -12.0 14.2 2.2 -- -2.8 -2.8 -0.6 
1955 139.1 -201.3 -62.2 18.1 -44.1 -- 12.3 12.3 -31.8 
1956 132.5 -206.3 -73.8 24.2 -49.6 10.5 2.2 12.7 -36.9 
1957 167.0 -218.9 -51.9 18.3 -33.6 3.7 -19.8 -16.1 -49.7 
1958 163.1 -215.8 -52.7 31.6 -21.1 0.1 -1.3 -1.2 -22.3 
1959 167.3 -240.6 -73.3 26.2 -47.1 4.8 19.6 24.4 -22.7 
1960 203.7 -269.0 -65.3 30.7 -34.6 4.4 10.8 15.2 -19.4 
1961 164.9 -248.6 -83.7 22.3 -61.4 4.5 31.6 36.3 -25.3 
1962 145.2 -308.5 -163.3 30.8 -132.5 12.8 78.8 91.6 -40.9 
1963 228.8 -405.8 -177.0 50.2 -126.8 -0.4 97.2 96.8 -30.0 
1964 227.6 -402.8 -175.2 47.5 -127.7 5.4 113.0 118.4 -9.3 
1965 246.8 -417.0 -170.2 56.5 -113.7 8.7 67.9 76.6 -37.1 
1966 259.5 -414.3 -154.8 74.3 -80.5 5.2 50.4 50.6 -24.9 
1967 258.7 -415.2 -156.5 26.9 -129.6 58.3 39.6 97.9 -31.7 
1968 288.7 -369.1 -80.4 -27.4 -107.8 110.4 6.1 116.5 8.7 
1969 319.7 -418.4 -98.7 -33.6 -132.3 128.8 -37.0 91.8 -40.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members of the 
Executive Board, From the Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Recent Economic Developments, SM/76/183, confidential, 
18 Aug. 1976, app. ll, Table 45, p. 98. 
a. LEI= SDR 2.87 before 1963; SDR 2.30 between 1963 and 1969. 
b. From 1962 exports include transit trade; before 1962 transit trade was included in services. 
c. Includes net errors ad omissions and SDR allocations. 
3 Hansen, B. and G. A. Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy in the UAR (Egypt), (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1965), pp. 189-190. 
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In addition to the domestic circumstances, the military and political developments of 
Egypt's foreign relations during Nasser's regime brought about a further loss in Egypt's 
foreign exchange reserves. The international context during the second half of the 
1950s was characterised by the Cold War between the West and the USSR and the Non-
aligned Movement in the Third World. The West's attempts to bring Egypt into the 
Baghdad Pact (part of the West's policy to contain Soviet expansion) met with Nasser's 
refusal to join in. He believed that this would lead to growing Western influence in the 
Middle East, especially given that its members included Britain, and would also keep 
the Arab world divided.4 When the US proved reluctant to sell arms to Egypt, the latter 
formed closer ties with the USSR and the Eastern Bloc. It received military and 
industrial aid as well as finance for the Aswan High Dam from the USSR. The refusal 
of the US and Britain to finance the Aswan High Dam, in the light of Egypt's arms 
purchase from Czechoslovakia in September 1955 and its recognition of communist 
China in the spring of 1956, was followed by Egypt's response of nationalising the Suez 
Canal. The incident further deteriorated Egypt's relations with the West, culminating in 
the 1956 war. Several of the Egyptian government's reactions to such developments 
incurred heavy obligations in the form of compensation payments to the relevant 
parties, namely the shareholders in the nationalised Suez Canal Company and foreign 
owners of nationalised property. As a result, the Egyptian government decided to resort 
to IMF financial assistance. 
By the early 1960s, Egypt had become one of the heaviest users of IMF financial 
resources. In 1960, Egypt's quota in the IMF was raised to SDR 90 million from SDR 
60 million in the previous year. Despite the increase in its quota, the IMF's holdings of 
its currency as a percentage of quota went up from 120 per cent to 133 per cent, with a 
rise of IMF credit used from SDR 12 million to SDR 30 million during the same period 
(see Table 3.1). 
Since 1952, it had been IMF policy that a restriction should be placed on the period for 
which its members would have continuous use of its financial resources. According to 
this policy, the repurchase of drawings was to be undertaken within three to five years 
and any further drawing before the complete repurchase of a present drawing required a 
4 Heikal, M., Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library, 1972), p. 56; and Manfield, P., 
Nasser's Egypt (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), p. 84. See also Alterman, J. B., 'American Aid to Egypt 
in the 1950s: From Hope to Hostility,' Middle East Journal, vol. 52, no. 1, winter 1998, pp. 51-69. 
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justification (see Chapter Two). However, during the period 1946-65, there were nine 
countries (including Egypt) which made continuous use of the IMF' s financial 
resources and of whose currencies the IMF held more than 100 per cent of their quotas 
for more than sixty consecutive months. As for Egypt, the IMF held more than 100 per 
cent of its quota for 106 months which was the top figure on the list.5 
3J. The May 1962 §tandl~lBy Arirall1lgement 
In order to alleviate its balance of payments problems, Egypt approached the IMF for its 
first SBA. The negotiation process for the 1962 SBA between Egypt and the IMF 
began as early as the second half of April 1961 when a round of informal discussions 
was held in Cairo on the possibility of a stabilisation programme. After one year of 
negotiations, agreement was reached between the two parties in the second half of April 
1962 and a Letter of Intent was drafted. Ultimately, this led to the IMF Executive 
Board's approval on 4 May 1962 of Egypt's request for a one-year SBA in an amount 
equivalent to US$ 42.5 million.6 The Board approved the requested SBA on the 
condition that drawings would not exceed US$ 20 million in the first three months, US$ 
30 million in the first six months, and US$ 37.5 million in the first nine months. The 
repurchase of the drawings would be made over a three-year period.7 
In the Letter of Intent, the Egyptian government pledged to implement an economic 
programme with several measures and policies.8 Monetary policy was to be tightened 
with a number of credit ceilings, a rise of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE)' s discount 
rate from 3 to 5 per cent, and an increase in the reserve requirements for commercial 
banks from 12 Y2 per cent to 17 V2 per cent. The latter two were to be implemented no 
later than 15 May 1962. Price controls were to be dismantled with the aim of eventual 
elimination. With regard to the exchange rate reform, the practice of premiums was to 
be abandoned. In addition, a new exchange rate of US$ 2.30 per Egyptian pound for all 
5 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 446-447. The other eight countries were Argentina, Turkey, Brazil, 
Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Paraguay, Syrian, and Honduras. 
6 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangement, 1952-1963, 'United Arab Republic- 1961 
Article XIV Consultations, Request for Stand-By Arrangement, and Change in Terms of Previous 
Drawings,' EBM/62/21, 4 May 1962, p. 17. 
7 Horsefield, J. K., The International Monetary Fund 1945-65: Twenty Years of International Monetary 
Cooperation, vol. 1: Chronicle (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969), pp. 525-526. 
8 For more details on IMF conditionality under the 1962 SBA, see Appendix A. 
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exchange transactions was to be announced no later than 15 May 1962 and prior to any 
request for a drawing under the SBA. Export taxes were to be imposed temporarily in 
order to prevent windfall profits from exports following the introduction of a new 
exchange rate. To facilitate price adjustment, subsidies on essential foodstuffs such as 
wheat, flour, kerosene, edible oil, and sugar, were retained, but their amount would be 
gradually reduced. There were also import policies including the establishment of an 
open general license no later than 1 July 1962 for a substantial proportion of permitted 
imports. The use of import duties was to be increased whereas the use of quotas and 
outright prohibitions on nonessential goods was to be decreased. Also state owned or 
controlled importing agencies were to be allowed to make import decisions on a 
commercial basis and given freedom to choose sources of supply. Bilateral payments 
agreements with IMF members were to be terminated at the earliest possible date and 
not later than present termination dates. There would be neither introduction and 
intensification of any restrictions on current payments and transfers, nor introduction of 
any multiple currency practice. 
An outline of a stabilisation programme was first proposed by the IMF team, mainly 
dealing with the fiscal, monetary, and external sector and with exchange rate policies. 
It included: a limitation of an increase in bank credit for the public and the private 
sectors; fiscal measures to reduce government expenditures or to increase its revenues; 
an increase in the interest rate structure; gradual steps towards import liberalisation to 
allow importers to make a decision on what to import and how much with a preference 
of tariffs over restrictions; a reduction in dependence on bilateral arrangements; and a 
realistic exchange rate policy.9 
During the negotiations, a discrepancy between the two sides emerged over the extent 
of the needed policy programme, rather than its merits. On the one hand, although the 
Egyptian team agreed to the need for a policy programme proposed by the IMF, it 
viewed the IMF staff's proposal as being unnecessarily severe. On the other hand, the 
IMF team stressed that a considerable reorientation of policy in Egypt was needed and 
felt that Egypt's proposals were insufficient to justify a SBA. The gap lay in several 
key issues, including credit control, devaluation, the elimination of bilateral payments 
9 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission John W. Gunter, Apr. 1961, 'Notes on a Stabilization Program 
for the Egyptian Region,' in International Monetary Fund, Minutes of Meetings, held in Cairo, Egypt, 
confidential, 17 and 20 Apr. 1961. 
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agreements, and limiting import restrictions. 10 With regard to credit control, the credit 
limitation to an annual rate of LE 20 million proposed by the IMF team was 
unacceptable to the Egyptian team in the light of Egypt's need to continue its 
development programme. Concerning the exchange rate policy, the Egyptian team 
counter-proposed to reduce the number of effective rates and to establish one rate 
involving a depreciation of about 19 per cent. However, this was regarded as 
inadequate by the IMF team which argued for an effective devaluation from the par 
value of approximately 30 per cent. As for the other issues, the Egyptian team agreed to 
eliminate most, but not all, of their bilateral agreements with IMF members. Also it 
was not prepared to make any substantial relaxation of import restrictions. 
Such reluctance on the part of the Egyptian team to accept IMF demands was reflective 
of the extent of the cost that the Egyptian government expected to deal with. The 
Egyptian team was apparently concerned that such IMF demands would create several 
short-term economic problems such as a severe limitation on its ambitious development 
programme, especially the industrial programme, hindered economic growth and a 
substantial rise in prices. More importantly, a greater concern seemed to be that IMF 
conditionality was associated not only with economic, but also political costs. The fear 
was that IMF conditionality could carry political costs itself or that its economic costs 
might easily feed into the political costs. 
Egypt's request for IMF financial assistance came at the time when the Nasser regime 
followed the socialist/populist path and the lSI strategy in its economic development. 
The regime's economic approach was largely driven by notions of national unity in 
terms of minimum class conflict, and Egypt's independence. The economic policies 
adopted during Nasser's era were, to a large extent, to serve as a tool for political 
control and as a way to maintain political stability. The Nasser regime aimed at both 
getting rid of the economic base of political opposition and also at establishing support 
and legitimacy of its own. The substantial relaxation of import restrictions would not 
only work against its lSI strategy, but would also mean loosening the regime's grip over 
the Egyptian economy. Also, economic hardship arising from a rise in the cost of 
10 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission John W. Gunter, Apr. 1961, op. cit., 17 and 20 Apr. 1961; and 
IMF Records, C/Egypt/810, Mission Bengur-Gunter and Staff, Aug.-Sept. 1961, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Mission to the U.A.R., 14 Sept. 1961. 
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imports which would in tum encourage inflation could lead to domestic unrest and 
violence. Thus, these measures would in tum jeopardise the regime's political aims. 
While it was reluctant to accept the terms demanded by the IMF, the Egyptian 
government adopted a tactic that would enable it to draw on IMF finance but avoid the 
negative effects of IMF conditionality, and would at the same time allow it extra time in 
negotiations so as to reduce the sense of urgency. Its tactic was to secure drawings 
from the IMF with an offer of gold of an equivalent value as collateral security in place 
of the adoption of IMF conditionality. In January 1962, Egypt requested a drawing of 
US$ 22.4 million against gold collateral, II with an offer to repay the drawing within one 
year. As the drawing extended beyond the first credit tranche, the IMF would normally 
have required the adoption of a 'sound programme aimed at establishing or maintaining 
the enduring stability of the member's currency at a realistic rate of exchange.'I 2 
However, such a programme was still not forthcoming. Despite the abstention of some 
Executive Directors (such as those representing France and Belgium) and hesitation 
expressed by others (such as those representing the Netherlands and the US), the 
majority of the Executive Board approved the drawing with the acceptance of gold 
collateral as a substitute for a ,stabilisation programme. The decision was based on the 
grounds that there existed an emergency situation in Egypt arising from an extensive 
damage of the cotton crop caused by the cotton leaf worm and a rapid reduction in the 
supply of rice caused by a low flood by the Nile in the previous year. 13 Two months 
later, Egypt applied for the second drawing of US$ 7.5 million to offset a repurchase 
and again with an offer of gold collateral. Concern was again expressed by some 
Executive Directors (such as those representing Belgium, France and the UK) who 
insisted on the need for an understanding that Egypt was prepared to negotiate and 
agree on a stabilisation programme. However, the Executive Board as a whole finally 
agreed to the drawing.I4 
The implementation of the 1962 SBA programme was disappointing, largely mirroring 
a high degree of Egypt's unwillingness to accept IMF conditionality. Certain 
11 It should be noted that there was an earlier case of Egypt's request for IMF credits (US$ 4.3 million) 
against gold collateral in December 1958. Nevertheless, although an approval had been granted, the 
request was subsequently withdrawn. Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 523-524. 
12 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 1959, p. 22. Cited in Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 524. 
13 Horsefield, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 524-525. 
14 Ibid., p. 525. 
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conditions attached to the 1962 stand-by arrangement were adopted by the Egyptian 
government. However, the underlying reason for their implementation seemed to go far 
beyond Egypt's willingness. During the implementation period, Egypt tried to maintain 
its eligibility of drawing under the 1962 SBA while simultaneously minimising its 
observance of IMF conditions. Conditions, which would enable Egypt to continue to 
draw on IMF credit, 15 namely all three credit ceilings and conditions concerning 
restrictions on current payments and transfers and multiple currency practice, were all 
observed. 16 In addition, a unified rate of US$ 2.30 per Egyptian pound was, in early 
May 1962, introduced to all external transactions, except Egyptian dealings with the 
IMF, students' scholarship abroad and Suez Canal dues. 17 The latter remained to be 
based on the old parity of US$ 2.87 per Egyptian pound until January 1963. 18 In effect, 
the Egyptian pound was devaluated from US$ 2.84 per Egyptian pound to a unified 
exchange rate of US$ 2.30 per Egyptian pound. The change represented a 19 per cent 
devaluation of the par value of the Egyptian pound; this was the amount the Egyptian 
team had argued for, whereas the foreign exchange rates increased by approximately 23 
per cent in comparison with the old rate. 19 The CBE's discount rate was raised from 3 
to 5 per cent effective as from 15 May 1962. The reserve ratio of the commercial banks 
was increased from 12 lh to 17 V2 per cent on the same date.Z0 
Nonetheless, there was hardly any gesture on part of the Egyptian government 
indicating a willingness to adopt the entire economic programme. The Egyptian 
government's intention to trim domestic demand and public investment proved illusory. 
The outlays for the military expedition in Yemen were stepped up. 21 Indeed, there was 
a credit expansion outside of the ceilings set under the SBA programme in terms of 
overdraft facilities for government organisations. Also, little or no progress was made 
on a number of other measures and policies which the Egyptian team was initially 
15 The amount equivalent to US$ 42.5 million was fully disbursed to Egypt. However, according to the 
fcublished International Financial Statistics Yearbook, there was an undrawn balance of US$ 5 million. 
6 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements Progress Reports, 1962-1978, various 
memoranda concerning IMF staffs reports on the U.A.R.'s performance under the May-1962 SBA. 
17 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission J. Gunter, May 1962, a letter from Ali Bengur to John W. 
Gunter, 11 May 1962; and Central Bank of Egypt, Economic Review, vol. 2, no. 9, 1962, p. 172. 
18 The Times, 3 Jan. 1963. 
19 Hansen, B., and K. Nashashibi, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Egypt (New York: 
Columbia U. P., 1975), p. 90; Hansen and Marzouk, op. cit., p. 198; and Mead, D. C., Growth and 
Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy (Homewood, I. L.: Richard D. Irwin, 1967), p. 175. 
20 Central Bank of Egypt, Economic Review, vol. 2, no. 9, 1962, pp. 171-172. 
21 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton U. P., 1983), p. 408. 
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reluctant to accept. They included import and pricing policies and the termination of 
bilateral payments agreements.22 The implementation of IMF conditionality under the 
1962 SBA, therefore, seemed to reveal a substantial degree of Egyptian reluctance in 
adopting certain policies set under the SBA. 
3.21rhe May 1964 §tand.~By Ali"JrangemelDl1t 
With its persistent balance of payments problems, Egypt's need to obtain financial 
assistance continued following the expiration of the 1962 SBA. Thus, the process of 
negotiations with the IMF for another SBA began as soon as the 1962 SBA ended on 6 
May 1963. The issue of a new SBA with the IMF was preliminarily raised during an 
informal visit by an IMF mission in the second half of May 1963.23 By early June 
1963, Egypt requested IMF's help to prepare a new SBA programrne.24 
Following several rounds of the negotiations lasting less than one year, in mid-April 
1964 agreement was reached between the two sides and a Letter of Intent was drafted. 
The objectives of the economic programme under the May 1964 SBA were threefold: 
first, to substantially reduce reliance on restrictions; second, to restore foreign exchange 
reserves to a satisfactory working level; and third, to improve the external debt structure 
by reducing the proportion of short- and medium-term credits as well as the level of 
such credits in absolute terms.Z5 To achieve the above objectives, a number of policies 
were set such as monetary, fiscal, pricing, and external sector policies.26 On monetary 
policy, borrowing by the public and the non-government sectors and the level of cotton 
financing were to be limited. Fiscal policy involved expenditure and revenue measures, 
ceilings on the level of investment expenditures by the public sector and an increase in 
22 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangement, 1952-1963, a memorandum, To Per 
Jacobsson (Managing Director), From John W. Gunter, Assessment of Developments in the U.A.R. Since 
the Stand-By Arrangement Became Effective, confidential, 13 Dec. 1962; and IMF Central Files, 
C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Mar. 1963, a memorandum, To Per Jacobsson, From John W. 
Gunter, Mission to the United Arab Republic, confidential, 1 Apr. 1963. 
23 IMF Records, C/U.A.R./810, Visit J. Gunter, May 1963, a memorandum, To the Acting Managing 
Director, From John W. Gunter, Informal Discussions in Cairo, confidential, 27 May 1963. 
24 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Nov.-Dec. 1963, a letter from Ahmed Zaki 
Saad (Executive Director representing Egypt) to Ahmed Zando (Minister of Economy), 21 June 1963. 
25 United Arab Republic, 'Stabilisation Program of the United Arab Republic,' 18 Apr. 1964, in IMF 
Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1964, International Monetary Fund, Document of 
International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Member of the Executive Board, From the 
Secretary, United Arab Republic- Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/64/69 Supplement 1, confidential, 25 May 
1964, p. 5. 
26 For more details on IMF conditionality under the 1964 SBA, see Appendix B. 
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social taxes. The policy on pricing was to re-examine the formulae for fixing prices of 
domestically produced manufactures to ensure a profit margin, and to review the prices 
for electricity, transportation and other public utilities. External sector policy dealt with 
the external borrowing, imports and exports. The levels of short- and medium-term 
external borrowing were to be subject to ceilings. An additional 5 per cent "statistical" 
tax on imports and a 5 per cent tax on invisible transactions with certain exceptions 
were to be introduced. A general export policy was to be established by 1 January 
1965. Other policies included a ban on new bilateral payments agreements with IMF 
members and the elimination of existing ones. Neither were new restrictions on 
payments and transfers for current international transactions to be introduced nor the 
existing ones to be intensified. 
With an aim of keeping the economic and political costs of borrowing low, Egypt's 
initial position was that it did not want to undertake any new policy commitments other 
than credit ceilings, and that the new ceilings - particularly the one for the public sector 
- would have to be considerably more generous than provided under the last SBA.27 
What Egypt would like to gain from its negotiations with the IMF was the latter's seal 
of approval rather than its credit which would be small in relation to its needs. An 
agreement with the IMF would facilitate Egypt in justifying its case for gaining money 
from other creditors, including creditor countries such as the US and Germany, and 
foreign commercial banks. Indeed Egypt, during the negotiations, indicated that it was 
prepared to accept no use of IMF credit but IMF conditions had to be less strict.28 
However, the IMF Management and staff held that 'a thorough-going new programme' 
was needed for Egypt, particularly in the light of its disappointing performance of the 
previous SBA programme?9 Therefore, pressure was imposed upon Egypt by not only 
its initial economic problems but also the perceived catalysing effect of concluding an 
agreement with the IMF. The IMF's relative strength in the negotiations was, on the 
other hand, well enhanced by these factors. 
27 IMF Records, C/U.A.R./810, Visit J. Gunter, May 1963, op. cit., 27 May 1963. 
28 lMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Jan. 1964, a memorandum, To Pierre-Paul 
Schweitzer (Managing Director), From John W. Gunter, Mission to the United Arab Republic, confidential, 
30 Jan. 1964. 
29 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangement, 1952-1963, Memorandum for Files, From 
Frank A. Southard, Jr., (Deputy Managing Director), Position on U.A.R., 19 Sept. 1963. 
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The IMP team first outlined the elements of a stabilisation programme. The proposed 
programme included an introduction of new taxes; increases in interest rates; 
adjustments in pricing policy for manufactured goods, food items and kerosene, and 
public utilities; adjustment of the exchange system; domestic and foreign credit 
ceilings; and a policy on the restrictive system such as import control and bilateral 
payments agreements.30 The Egyptian team was, however, unwilling to consider new 
tax proposals and to undertake any significant modification of pricing policy, and also 
refused to consider a devaluation of the Egyptian pound and any alternative means to 
the devaluation.31 As for the exchange rate policy, the Egyptian team denigrated its 
usefulness in a socialist state-controlled economy. They argued that a practice of 
directly linking export earnings to the release of foreign exchange needed by most 
industrial enterprises was better that the exchange rate policy on two grounds. Firstly, a 
failure on the export performance would affect their entire production programme 
through the lack of foreign exchange earned. Secondly, profitability was a secondary 
consideration for state-owned undertakings.32 However, the underlying reasons seemed 
to go beyond the economic. The measures that Egypt was reluctant to accept would 
have a profound impact upon the Egyptians' cost of living in terms of additional tax 
burdens and also an increase in prices, which would, in tum, seem to the Nasser regime 
to undermine its political control and stability. Furthermore, there was a unique 
implication of the policy adjustments in the case of Egypt. The domestic costs of these 
measures and, in particular, an action on the exchange rate itself would damage Egypt's 
position of leadership in the Arab World. In fact, the original Egyptian proposals were 
based merely on credit ceilings for the government and the non-government sectors and 
were, thus, regarded by the IMP team as unacceptable as a basis for a SBA?3 
During the negotiation process, an improvement in the economic situation in Egypt and 
the international economic development lent some weight to Egypt's relative strength 
vis-a-vis the IMF. The principal favourable development was an improvement in the 
terms of trade. Prices for long-staple cotton in the international markets were 
particularly improved in 1963 and 1964, partly due to two successive failures in the 
30 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Nov.-Dec. 1963, Elements of a Proposed 
Stabilization Program for the United Arab Republic, confidential, 27 Nov. 1963. 
31 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Jan. 1964, a memorandum, To Mr. 
Schweitzer, From John W. Gunter, Mission to the United Arab Republic, confidential, 30 Jan. 1964. 
32 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1964, a memorandum, To John W. Gunter, 
From A. F. Mohammed, Note on Negotiations with U.A.R., confidential, 28 Feb. 1964. 
33 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Jan. 1964, op. cit., 30 Jan. 1964. 
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cotton harvest in Sudan. Other exports moved favourably, namely rice and petroleum. 
Foreign exchange earnings from the Suez Canal and tourism also increased.34 The Suez 
Canal tolls suddenly increased between 1962 and 1963, rising from LE 53.7 million in 
1962 to LE 71.1 million in 1963 and LE 77.0 million in 1964?5 This was partly due to 
the implementation of IMF conditionality under the previous agreement (the 1962 
SBA), in which Suez Canal receipts were, from January 1963, converted at a new rate 
of US$ 2.30 per Egyptian pound. Such favourable developments contributed to some 
improvement in the balance of payments on current account, which would in tum lessen 
the pressure to reach a policy agreement with the IMF and provided the Egyptian team 
some room to manoeuvre. 
Nevertheless, Egypt's desperate need for IMF assistance remained. In spite of these 
favourable economic developments, Egypt's balance of payments problem continued to 
be under pressure due largely to a heavy debt service burden because of the large 
element of short- and medium-term debt.36 Peter Manfield notes that: 
The gravest consequence of Egypt's chronic balance of payments difficulties is 
that the country has acquired a bad reputation for the payment of commercial 
debts ... the delays [in debt repayments] were becoming longer, until some 
creditors became exasperated. One small but significant example was that 
many foreign booksellers stopped shipments to Egypt in 1964 because 
payments were two or three years behind . . . . Meanwhile Egypt's liabilities 
from interest charges and repayment of principle were piling up at an alarming 
rate . . . . [T]here remained compensation for British, French, Belgian, Swiss, 
Lebanese and other nationalized and sequestrated property ... it was persistent 
delay in making these payments which caused the I.B.R.D. to announce that it 
was making no more loans to Egypt.37 
In addition to Egypt's debt problem, there was also an increasing expenditure burden 
arising from its prolonged military support to the republicans against the royalists (who 
were backed by Saudi Arabia) in Yemen after the Yemeni revolution took place in 
September 1962. 
34 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Nov.-Dec. 1963, a memorandum, To 
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, From John W. Gunter, Mission to the United Arab Republic, confidential, 10 Dec. 
1963; IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Jan. 1964, Preliminary Assessment by 
the IMF Mission; and Manfield, op. cit., pp. 160-161. 
35 Manfield, op. cit., p. 161. 
36 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Nov.-Dec. 1963, op. cit., 10 Dec. 1963; and 
IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Jan. 1964, Preliminary Assessment by the IMF 
Mission. 
37 Manfield, op. cit., pp. 162-163. 
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With a great deal of reluctance, Egypt agreed to a number of issues proposed by the 
IMF where its commitments could easily be evaded and especially without penalty in 
terms of subsequent ineligibility to draw on IMF credit. These included the policy on 
bilateral payments agreements, non-discrimination on trade, and pricing policy. Some 
compromises were made by both sides, namely credit ceilings and exchange rate 
policy.38 Although Egypt rejected the idea of a general sales tax proposed by the IMF,39 
it accepted the introduction of certain new taxes, including a 5 per cent tax on imports 
in addition to an existing tax of 5 per cent and of a 5 per cent tax on invisible payments 
as measures to raise the government revenues. On the other hand, attempts had been 
made by the IMF to gain a stronger commitment from Egypt on the issue of the 
exchange system by pressing for alternative measures having the same effect as 
devaluation, if not devaluation per se. The IMF Management and staff had argued for 
an increase of a tax on invisible payments from 5 per cent to 10 per cent to bring it 
equal to a total 10 per cent tax on imports, and for a uniform export premium of 10 per 
cent applied to all exports except cotton, oil, rice and onion in lieu of devaluation.40 
Nevertheless, Egypt refused to accept such changes proposed by the IMF at that time, 
but merely placed them for future consideration which was left rather uncertain. 
Egypt's negotiation team appeared to lack the support of the Egyptian cabinet and, more 
importantly, President Nasser himself. Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni, Deputy Prime 
Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs, implicitly argued that: 
At the present time it would be most difficult and politically inappropriate to 
agree to proposed change[s]. We may ... consider the matter later on in light 
of experience which will be gained.41 
The government's acceptance of the import tax without the export subsidy seems to 
reflect their interest in finding a way to raise its revenue rather than the exchange 
reform. More importantly, the government's refusal to accept the policy of an export 
subsidy was understandable in the light of the pursuit of its lSI strategy. 
38 IMF Central Files, CIU.A.R./ 1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1964, op. cit., 28 Feb. 1964. 
39 Ibid. 
40 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1964, a memorandum, To Pierre-Paul 
Schweitzer, From John W. Gunter, Proposed Stand-By Arrangement with the United Arab Republic, 
confidential, 6 Apr. 1964; and IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1964, a cable 
(l) from Pierre-Paul Schweitzer to Ahmed Zando (Governor of the Central Bank of Egypt), 9 Apr. 1964. 
41 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1964, a cable from Abdel-Moneim 
el-Kaissouni (Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs) to Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, 12 
Apr. 1964. 
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With Egypt's continuous resistance to the outright devaluation and to stronger terms of 
alternative measures, the IMF eventually showed a certain degree of flexibility. In the 
actual programme under the May 1964 SBA, the export policy, which in conjunction 
with the import tax formed an alternative to devaluation, turned out to be vague. The 
programme provided no more than an export policy, involving an export subsidy, to be 
worked out by 1 January 1965 and also no level of export subsidy was specified, unlike 
the import policy. 
Such flexibility of the IMF came from the Management and the staff, rather than the 
Executive Board. Prior to the Executive Board meeting to decide on the case of Egypt's 
request for a SBA, disagreement had emerged over the SBA programme for Egypt 
between Executive Directors and Alternate Executive Directors representing some 
Western European countries (including Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the 
UK), on the one hand, and the IMF Management and staff, on the other hand. Doubts 
were raised by the former over the adequacy of the proposed programme; in particular, 
the lack of a realistic exchange rate, in relation to the use of the upper credit tranches, 
and over a long-term approach to stabilisation envisaged in the programme. They asked 
for the reconsideration of the proposed programme. Yet, the IMF Management, in 
defending their readiness to support Egypt's case, argued for the opposite case by 
holding that a great deal had been achieved in view of Egypt's agreeing to take further 
steps than it had at first been prepared to do such as the 5 per cent taxes on imports and 
invisibles. They added that the programme was also respectable, particularly in terms 
of drastic steps in the budget and investment, new pricing policy, and very severe credit 
ceilings.42 After long discussions among the Executive Directors at the Board, on 13 
May 1964 the approval of Egypt's request for a one-year SBA in an amount equivalent 
to US$ 40 million was finally granted without any programme reconsideration.43 It 
would be difficult to know exactly why the Management and the staff became flexible 
on these issues and whether there was any political interference by a third party. With 
the available information, the conjectural explanation is that IMF flexibility during the 
1963-1964 negotiations was largely a consequence of Egypt's resistance to IMF 
demands on such issues. 
42 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1964, Memorandum for Files, From Frank 
A. Southard, Jr., Developments Respecting UAR Stand-By Arrangement, 7 May 1964. 
43 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1964, 'United Arab Republic- 1963 Article 
XIV Consultations and Stand-By Arrangement,' EBM/64/24, 11 May 1964, pp. 3-20, and EBM/64/25, 13 
May 1964, pp. 3-32. 
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It should be noticed that the reluctant position of the Western Executive Directors 
regarding Egypt's requests for drawings occurred during a period in which the 
relationship between the West and Egypt was deteriorating. Differences between the 
West, particularly the US under the Johnson Administration, and Egypt began to rise 
during the early 1964 regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and Nasser's increasing attacks 
on Western interests in the Arab world and in Africa. Johnson's apparent pro-Israeli 
approach, Egypt's continuous involvement in Yemen, Nasser's campaign to expel the 
US Air Force from Wheelus Air Base in Libya in February 1964, and the resumption of 
Egypt's involvement in the Congolese civil war in the spring of 1964 through arms 
support to leftist guerrillas, provided the grounds for a deep rift between the two sides. 
In addition, Egypt's growing economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union 
imposed further strains on its relationship with the West. In May 1964, the same month 
when the Executive Board took place, Nikita Krushchev paid an official visit to Egypt 
to celebrate the completion of the first stage of the Aswan High Dam. Krushchev 
promised to provide Egypt with a further US$ 277 million in economic assistance, and 
to meet Egyptian arms requests. This came 'at a time when there was much talk in the 
West about reducing aid and 'getting tough' with the Nasser regime.' 44 However, in the 
context of Egypt's negotiations with the IMF, the Soviet aid pledge did not enhance 
Egypt's negotiating position since this came after agreement was reached and a letter of 
intent had been drafted in the previous month (April 1964). 
How did Egypt fare in implementing IMF conditionality under the 1964 agreement? 
Similar to the 1962 SBA, the implementation of the 1964 SBA programme was not 
fully completed. Egypt only observed the conditions which would allow it to maintain 
access to IMF credit under the 1964 SBA, namely the credit and investment ceilings 
and the policy concerning restrictions on payments and transfers. This enabled Egypt to 
draw the full amount of US$ 40 million by early April 1965.45 Nevertheless, there was 
a substantial credit expansion resulting from items outside credit ceilings under the 
SBA. With regard to other measures and policies, little progress was made on 
implementing policies on bilateral payments agreements and pricing. While Egypt 
44 Burns, W. J., Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981 (Albany, N.Y.: State U. of 
New York P., 1985), p. 154. 
45 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements Progress Reports, 1962-1978, a 
memorandum, To the Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, United Arab Republic- Stand-By 
Perfomtance, 27 May 1965. However, according to International Financial Statistics Yearbook which 
made available to the public, there was an undrawn balance of US$ 15 million. 
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notified the IMF members (except Yugoslavia) its desire to terminate bilateral 
agreements payments, there appeared to have been no further progress. Also, while the 
number of bilateral payments agreements with IMF members had not been increased, 
many existing agreements had in fact been renewed such as those with the Sudan, 
Somalia, and Ethiopia. Neither did progress appear to have been made in establishing 
the policy of a uniform export subsidy.46 
Furthermore, after the 1964 SBA had expired on 22 May 1965 and, more importantly, 
the credit had been fully disbursed, Egypt's efforts to observe the credit ceilings, which 
extended beyond the expired date of the SBA (until the end of June 1965), became lax. 
The net claims of the banking system on the government sector during the April-June 
quarter exceeded the ceiling for the end of June 1965.47 This partly seems to further 
indicate the limited extent of Egypt's willingness to accept IMF conditions under the 
May 1964 SBA. 
3.3 Abortive Attempts to Reach a New Agreement: 1966c 1969 
Following the expiration of the 1964 SBA, Egypt's desire to reach a new agreement 
with the IMF persisted. The deficit problem was aggravated in part by its continuous 
involvement in the Yemeni civil war and in part by the decline in medium- and long-
term bilateral economic assistance, in particular from the two superpowers. In the case 
of the USSR, when Egypt needed assistance most, the annual increment of its economic 
aid to Egypt dropped from US$ 126 million in 1965 to US$ 7 million in 1966.48 There 
was also pressure exerted by the West upon Egypt in terms of the possibility of reduced 
Public Law (PL) 480 assistance from the US and a general cut in financial aid from 
other Western countries. Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni, Deputy Prime Minister for 
Financial and Economic Affairs, implicitly referred to this in his 1965/66 budget speech 
in June 1965: 
The U.A.R. [United Arab Republic] pressed on and scored great victories year 
after year and once more there was feverish propaganda launched against it 
46 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements Progress Reports, 1962-1978, a 
memorandum, To Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, From John W. Gunter, United Arab Republic- Stand-By 
Performance, 24 June 1964. 
47 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements Progress Reports, 1962-1978, a 
memorandum, To the Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, United Arab Republic- Stand-By 
Perfonnance, 23 July 1965. 
48 Mabro, R., 'Egypt's Economic Relations with the Socialist Countries,' World Development, vol. 3, no. 5, 
May 1975, p. 310. 
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when in 1964 we concluded an agreement with the IMF under which the Fund 
was to extend a loan of $40 million to the U.A.R. so that it might face a deficit 
in its balance of payments. Those who attack us seem to forget that the U.S. 
and the U.K. themselves had got loans from the Fund to face similar deficits. 
This year particularly we are facing another campaign of this type. Some 
countries are threatening to stop extending loans to us and cease their economic 
. . h 49 co-operation w1t us. 
The US shipments of PL 480 wheat to Egypt were indeed suspended in the first half of 
1965, after the anti-American actions in Egypt in November-December 1964 (the 
burning down of the US Information Service Library in Cairo and the shooting down of 
an unarmed private plane near Alexandria by the Egyptian Air force). This forced 
Egypt to purchase a large amount of wheat in convertible currency at the time when its 
foreign exchange reserves were drained. By 1965, the balance of payments crisis 
reached a point where Egypt was unable to meet contractual debt service obligations.50 
This led to another series of negotiations during the period 1966-1969 for a new SBA 
between Egypt and the IMF. The period of 1966-1969 was characterised by Egypt's 
several attempts to reach a new deal after the 1964 SBA had come to an end. However, 
the prolonged negotiations, which lasted for about three years until the end of 1969 
(interrupted by the June 1967 war), yielded no success in concluding a formal 
agreement. 
By 1965, the realisation of increasing economic and financial difficulties, particularly 
the acute shortage of foreign exchange which ensued from the prolonged severe balance 
of payments deficits on current account since 1962 (see Table 3.2), had brought the 
Egyptian authorities' recognition of the need for retrenchment and also a change in 
government. A new government was headed by Prime Minister Zakariyya Mohi ed-Din 
(former Minister of the Interior), appointed by Nasser to replace Ali Sabri in September 
1965. It was believed that Zakariyya Mohi ed-Din was to the right of his predecessor, 
and thus would be more acceptable to the West and the IMF.51 In December 1965, the 
new government introduced its own policy programme, entailing several austerity 
measures in line with ones that had been suggested by the IMF. They were designed to 
improve the fiscal situation, including reducing government expenditures and increase-
revenue measures such as higher income taxation, higher domestic prices (for example, 
49 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a memorandum, To Pierre-Paul 
Schweitzer, From John W. Gunter, United Arab Republic 1965/66 Budget, 8 June 1965. 
50 Waterbury, op. cit., 1983, p. 95; and Hansen and Nashashibi, op. cit., p. 108. 
51 Woodward, P., Nasser (London: Longman, 1992), p. 95. 
Nasser's Great Reluctance: The 1960s 141 
prices of bread, sugar, tea, rice, com, consumer durables, textiles, butane gas and 
fertilisers), and higher customs and excise duties. Others included a sharp cut of credit 
to the agricultural sector through collection of arrears and reduced cash lqans, a re-
examination of investment priorities, particularly in the industrial sector, and a 
limitation of external borrowing for financing investment. Such a programme was 
expected to result in savings of about LE 100 million in the 1965/1966 fiscal year 
(ending in June), and LE 150 million in the following fiscal year. 52 
Egypt's own recognition of the severity of its economic problems was also evident 
during the discussions with the IMF. As early as the first half of December 1965, Egypt 
expressed its desire to have a new SBA with the IMF during Article XIV Consultation 
discussions. During the discussions, the IMF team found that the Egyptian team 
became more forthcoming in discussing policy problems than they had previously been, 
and noted a high degree of policy co-ordination in the economic field in contrast to 
previous inconsistencies of policy. 53 In April 1966, the negotiation process between the 
two sides began. Initially, the Egyptian team had an expectation that the IMF team 
would accept the measures taken in December 1965, as well as a reduction in military 
expenditures resulting from the partial withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from Yemen, 
as constituting satisfactory stabilisation measures.54 However, the IMF team made it 
clear that a radical programme based on an 'adequate' adjustment of the exchange rate 
was indispensable for a satisfactory stabilisation programme.55 
In its first programme proposals, the Egypt team agreed to the need for most of what the 
IMF team viewed as constituting a suitable stabilisation programme, including the 
issues of prices, credit, foreign indebtedness, and bilateral payments agreements.56 
Nonetheless, the major hurdle during the negotiations lay in the issue of the exchange 
52 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Dec. 1965, Office Memorandum, To 
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer and Frank A. Southard, Jr., From M. M. Hassanein, New Economic and Financial 
Policies of the United Arab Republic, 14 Dec. 1965; and IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter 
and Staff, Dec. 1965, a memorandum, To the Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Mission to the 
Unites Arab Republic, confidential, 23 Dec. 1965. 
53 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Dec. 1965, op. cit., 23 Dec. 1965. 
54 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Apr. 1966, a memorandum, To Pierre-Paul 
Schweitzer and Frank A. Southard, Jr., From John W. Gunter, Mission to the United Arab Republic, 3 May 
1966. 
55 Ibid. 
56 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Apr. 1966, United Arab Republic, 
Memorandum, confidential, 26 Apr. 1966. This was a memorandum containing Egypt's proposed 
stabilisation programme as a basis for a SBA handed by the Egyptian team to the IMF mission during their 
discussions in April 1966. 
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rate. The IMP team initially proposed a 30-per-cent devaluation of the Egyptian pound 
to the rate of US$ 1.60 per Egyptian pound.57 Yet, the Egyptian team considered 
devaluation, an outright action on the exchange rate, neither economically useful nor 
politically possible in the circumstances at that time. Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni, the 
head of the Egyptian team and Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic 
Affairs, was apparently well aware that the outright devaluation would not be accepted 
by his colleagues and President Nasser, and thus disagreed with the IMP team on this 
matter. In lieu of devaluation, the Egyptian team hastily proposed a 'price-increase' 
approach after the IMP team determined not to agree to any programme without some 
type of exchange rate action. This proposal involved a gradual rise in prices of 
imported raw materials and intermediate goods, with the exception of essential supply 
goods, by 20 per cent, and subsidisation of exports of manufactured goods through the 
proceeds gained from the increase in import prices. 58 
Yet, the IMF Management and staff viewed this price increase measure, instead of 
devaluation, as inadequate in terms of its magnitude and a lack of action on invisibles. 
Despite its strong preference for devaluation,59 the IMF Management and staff showed 
a certain degree of flexibility; they did not rule out an alternative action on the exchange 
rate. They insisted that a satisfactory alternative would involve a uniform tax on 
foreign exchange payments with a limited number of exceptions (essential imports by 
the Ministry of Supply and debt service payments by the Treasury), and a uniform 
subsidy which would be applied to all exports, except certain traditional ones (cotton, 
rice, onion, petroleum and Suez Canal dues), and to invisible receipts except Suez Canal 
dues.60 They insisted on their initial proposal concerning the extent of the effective 
depreciation; the degree of the import price increase; and the export subsidy should be 
equivalent to the effect of a 30 per cent devaluation to US$ 1.60 per Egyptian pound. 
57 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Apr. 1966, op. cit., 3 May 1966. 
58 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Apr. 1966, United Arab Republic, op. cit., 
26 Apr. 1966. 
59 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a cable from Pierre-Paul 
Schweitzer to Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni, 5 May 1966. 
60 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Aug.-Sept. 1966, International Monetary 
Fund, United Arab Republic: Briefing Paper- Negotiations Relating to Possible Stand-By Arrangement, 
prepared by the Middle Eastern Department and the Exchange and Trade Relations Department, approved 
by Ernest Sture and John W. Gunter, confidential, 5 Aug. 1966, p. 3. 
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This would mean an import tax of 43.5 per cent (with an elimination of a 'statistical' tax 
of 10 per cent applying to imports) and an export subsidy of the same magnitude.61 
After several months of dispute, a tentative agreement for a stabilisation programme 
was subsequently reached between the two negotiating teams during the negotiations in 
August-September 1966. However, the main issue left undecided concerned the extent 
of the effective exchange policy. During this round of negotiations, both parties moved 
to make their compromises. On the one hand, the Egyptian team increased their 
proposal on the extent of the effective depreciation from a 25 per cent to 30 per cent tax 
with the elimination of the 'statistical' tax. On the other hand, the IMF team reduced its 
initial 43.5 per cent tax (with the elimination of a 'statistical' tax of 10 per cent) to a 35 
per cent tax (with the retention of the statistical tax at the level of 5 per cent).62 Since 
the Egyptian team was unable to offer more than a 30 per cent tax with a 5 per cent 
statistical tax, the issue was left pending until a decision was made on the home front. 
Although a compromise had been made by both sides, it is doubtful whether the change 
in Egypt's attitude towards the exchange rate policy, or at least over the extent of the 
effective depreciation, was drawn from its convincement of the need for such a policy 
or the degree of change considered necessary by the IMF. Egypt's relative power in 
bargaining with the IMF was at this time weak due partly to growing difficulties that 
Egypt was experiencing in meeting its international payments and also partly to 
uncertainty regarding the receipt of PL 480 assistance from the US. Substantial arrears 
were accumulated and negotiations to reschedule debt repayments met with only limited 
success.63 Additional pressure on Egypt also came from its deteriorating relationship 
with the US in 1966. Convinced that the US's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was 
plotting to topple him, Nasser's hostility towards the US grew during the 1966, marked 
by his anti-American speeches in Cairo and the permission for the opening of the 
Vietnamese National Liberation Front's office in Cairo. By 1966, the Johnson 
Administration was preoccupied with the Vietnam War. Also, with diminishing 
American agricultural surpluses and a retrenchment period of the PL 480 programme, a 
61 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, Office Memorandum, To Frank 
A Southard, Jr., From John W. Gunter, Comments on the U.A.R. Memorandum, confidential, 10 May 
1966; and IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Aug.-Sept. 1966, a memorandum, 
To the Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, U.A.R.- Discussions of Stabilization Program, 13 Sept. 
1966. 
62 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Aug.-Sept. 1966, op. cit., 13 Sept. 1966. 
63 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Aug.-Sept. 1966, op. cit., 5 Aug. 1966. 
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selective approach in its food aid policy had been adopted. In the light of the growing 
Egyptian-US differences, the renewal of the 6-month PL 480 accord with the US in 
January 1966 came under threat when the latter did not respond to Nasser's April 1966 
c h . 64 request 10r t e extensiOn. 
The IMF team was well aware of its greater negotiating strength. John Gunter, the head 
of the IMF negotiating team, writes: 'The U.A.R. needs a stand-by with the Fund very 
much and our refusal would force reconsideration of direct action on the exchange 
rate. ' 65 Thus, the Egyptian team appeared to accept the term with great reluctance when 
its bargaining power vis-a-vis the IMF was at a low ebb. 
However, due to political difficulty on the domestic front, the magnitude of effective 
exchange policy proposed by the IMF team (a 35 per cent tax plus the retention of a 
statistical tax at 5 per cent) was not accepted by the Egyptian government. Abdel-
Moneim el-Kaissouni was reportedly unable to obtain any action on the issue from the 
Egyptian cabinet.66 More important, Egypt's political resistance to the exchange rate 
policy apparently went beyond the cabinet level of decision-making. As John 
Waterbury points out: '[T]he devaluation, advocated by Muhi al-Din, was too bitter a 
pill for Nasser to swallow ... [the latter] was incensed at the idea of further devaluation 
and refused to comply. '67 This was clearly illustrated by the fact that the change in 
government in the first half of September 1966, two days following the final day of 
negotiations in August-September 1966, brought no alteration in the Egyptian 
government's attitude towards the exchange policy and thus no hope of concluding an 
agreement. Mohi ed-Din was replaced by Sidqi Sulaiman as Prime Minister. The new 
government headed by Sulaiman continued to refuse to accept the extent of action on 
exchange policy agreed earlier.68 This mirrors at least two points: first, the Egyptian 
team failed to convince the decision makers, particularly President Nasser, of the need 
for the extent of the exchange rate policy; and second, the economic policy-making in 
64 Burns, op. cit., pp. 165-169. 
65 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Apr. 1966, op. cit., 3 May 1966. 
66 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Aug.-Sept. 1966, op. cit., 13 Sept. 1966. 
67 Waterbury, op. cit., 1983, pp. 96 and 409. 
68 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, Memorandum for the File, 
From John W. Gunter, Discussions with the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Egypt, confidential, 9 
Dec. 1966. 
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Egypt was largely dominated by the President,69 who in practice appointed and removed 
Prime Ministers and his cabinet, not parliament (the People's Assembly and the 
Consultative Council), especially over such controversial issues as the exchange rate. 
On the other hand, the IMF Management, in insisting on its demand, claimed that they 
too had faced difficulty on the internal front in dealing with the case of Egypt. The 
Managing Director, Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, stated: 
He had had more personal difficulty with his Executive Board over the U.A.R. 
than with any other member. He felt that the Fund could be of a great deal of 
help to the U.A.R., but that his hands were tied unless the U.A.R. was prepared 
to take adequate action on exchange rate policy ... [which] was an essential 
condition for approaching the Executive Board within the framework of 
existing Fund policies.70 
While the gap between the two sides over the issue of the exchange rate policy could 
not be narrowed, there remained pressure upon Egypt to reach an arrangement with the 
IMF caused by its serious financial problems. The two factors continued to lessen 
Egypt's relative power in the negotiations. With an accumulation of substantial arrears, 
Egypt experienced growing difficulties in meeting its international payments. By 
December 1966, the Egyptian government was concerned about Egypt's ability to meet 
the repurchase commitments regarding the IMF's credit made available under the May 
1962 SBA.71 Due to the five-year rule, it would not be possible to rearrange further 
Egypt's repurchase schedule. Egypt's failure to meet these obligations would be 
damaging to not only its credit standing with the IMF but also to the international 
financial confidence towards Egypt. Furthermore, Egypt's deteriorating relations with 
the US since 1966 persisted in 1967 and continued to put pressure on Egypt to reach an 
agreement with the IMF. The US's refusal to reply to the request for a new PL 480 
accord eventually forced Egypt to withdraw its request in the spring of 1967. This had 
a negative impact on Egypt's foreign exchange requirement to pay for imported wheat 
and flour. In addition, there was also a decline in cotton production due to pests, which 
69 The second point implicitly presents in the conversations between the Egyptian officials to the IMF 
officials. See, for example, IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, op. 
cit., 9 Dec. 1966; and IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, 
Memorandum for Files, Discussion with U.A.R. Ambassador, confidential, 21 Dec. 1966. 
70 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, op. cit., 9 Dec. 1966. 
71 Ibid. 
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was anticipated to lead to a shortfall in cotton export proceeds, putting additional 
pressure on Egypt's foreign exchange reserves.72 
Despite financial pressure, Egypt did not give in to the IMF demand on the exchange 
rate policy in order to obtain IMF credit. Instead, Egypt opted to remain in arrears 
regarding its repurchases with the IMF since December 1966 and at the end of 
September 1967 these arrears totalled US$ 40 million.73 
Egypt's resistance to give in to the IMF's demand eventually paid off. By the second 
half of May 1967, agreement between the two sides was reached and a letter of intent 
was drafted. A compromise was made by both parties with a greater concession from 
the IMF concerning the exchange policy. The import and export taxes contained in the 
draft programme dated 21 May 1967 was a uniform rate of 15 per cent with the 
retention of the 'statistical' tax of 5 per cent (on items covered by the operations of the 
Ministry of Supply) and 10 per cent (on all other items).74 This was considerably less 
than the IMF's original and subsequent proposals (43.5 and 35 per cent with the 
retention of a 5 per cent statistical tax, respectively), and also even less than what the 
previous team had initially argued for in August-September 1966 (25 per cent).75 
However, due to the outbreak of the June 1967 war, Egypt's request for a SBA had to 
be postponed,76 despite the IMF Management's preparation to support its request at the 
IMP's Executive Board.77 No agreement was, thus, ultimately concluded with the IMF. 
In the aftermath of the June 1967 war, Egypt's economic situation was further 
weakened by the temporary loss of its major sources of foreign exchange in Suez Canal 
receipts, tourist earnings, and oil revenues. However, the June 1967 war transformed 
the hostile relations between Nasser's revolutionary regime and monarchical regimes, 
72 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission RudolfKroc, Jan.-Feb. 1967, United Arab Republic, Aide 
Memoire, 8 Feb. 1967, p. 3. 
73 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Nov. 1967, Briefing Paper- Article XIV 
Consultation and Discussions Relating to Possible Stand-By Arrangement, confidential, 24 Oct. 1967, p. 2. 
74 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, United Arab Republic, 
Stabilization Program of the United Arab Republic [a memorandum setting forth a stabilisation programme 
attached to a letter of intent], 21 May 1967. 
75 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Aug.-Sept. 1966, op. cit., 13 Sept. 1966. 
76 On 3 June 1967, a cable was sent from Nazmy Abdel-Hamid (Governor of the Central Bank of Egypt) to 
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer to request the postponement of all actions relating to Egypt's request for a SBA. 
IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a cable from Pierre-Paul 
Schweitzer to Nazmy Abdel-Hamid, 6 June 1967. 
77 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a cable from John W. Gunter to 
Nazmy Abdel-Hamid, 24 Apr. 1967. 
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especially with the oil-rich Arab states. The balance of payments position, although 
continuing to be difficult with imports being held at a comparatively low level, seemed 
to be under control, due largely to a partial compensation in terms of cash aid received 
from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya totalling£ 95 million.78 
After the end of the June 1967 war, Egypt's efforts to obtain a SBA from the IMF 
continued in the light of its persistent financial problem. At Egypt's request in 
September 1967,79 negotiations were resumed in the following month but did not lead to 
the conclusion of an agreement with the IMF due mainly to disagreement over the 
exchange policy. Although it admitted that an adjustment in exchange policy was 
necessary, the Egyptian government refused to carry it out under the present 
circumstances until the impact of severe austerity measures was absorbed.80 
Meanwhile, the search for a solution to its continuing shortage of foreign exchange 
made it desirable for Egypt to improve its relations with the West and in December 
1967 diplomatic relations with Britain were resumed. A bridging loan from British, 
West German and Italian banks obtained in February 1968, enabled Egypt to make 
repayments to the IMF which had been outstanding since December 1966.81 Although 
it would not pull Egypt out of its economic problems, it at least provided Egypt with 
some room for manoeuvre on a temporary basis. 
Again in August 1969, the Egyptian government made another request for the use of 
IMF credit.82 Negotiations continued until the end of 1969 without reaching an 
agreement. The difficulty remained over the issue of establishing a parallel exchange 
arrangement. Although the Egyptian negotiators agreed to this condition, due to the 
delay in the government's decision regarding the proposed parallel exchange 
78 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810 Mission Gunter and Staff, Nov. 1967, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Mission to the United Arab 
Republic, confidential, 16 Nov. 1967. 
79 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, Memorandum for Files, From 
Frank A. Southard, Jr., Meeting with UAR Delegation, confidential, 28 Sept. 1967. 
80 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./810 Mission Gunter and Staff, Nov. 1967, op. cit., 16 Nov. 1967. 
81 Middle East and North Africa 2000, 46th ed. (London: Europa, 1999), p. 410. 
82 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a cable from Nazmy 
Abdel-Hamid to John W. Gunter, 23 Aug. 1969. 
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arrangement, involving a premium of 35 per cent charged over the official rate,83 
apparently the request for a SBA was not officially submitted to the IMF. 
Section C: Assessment of Relative .Power and the Impositiona 
Ownership Nature of :U:MF Conditionality 
After the long narrative of Egypt's relations with the IMF, what does this tell us about 
the relative power of both parties during the 1960s? To begin with, Egypt was initially 
forced by its economic circumstances to approach the IMF. Its relative power at the 
beginning of the negotiations was weak in terms of its balance of payments difficulties 
and the lack of sufficient non-conditional financial resources. This in tum strengthened 
the IMF' s bargaining position. This was reflected in the fact that it was the IMF who 
initiated the proposals or demands for the stabilisation programmes whereas the 
Egyptian team had to react to the IMF's expectations. This is partly because the IMF 
was in a stronger position prior to the negotiations. Also, this reflects a lack of 
preparation on the Egyptian side,84 which was largely due to the lack of coordination 
among the Egyptian ministries who guarded their own areas of responsibility against the 
involvement of others. 
Despite its weak initial position in the negotiations, Egypt demonstrated that it was not 
a passive party in conducting its relations with the IMF. In the light of possible 
negative socio-economic and political effects of IMF conditionality, Egypt tried its best 
to avoid concluding an agreement with the IMF, reflected by its tactic of drawings twice 
from the IMF with a gold offer as collateral security during the negotiations leading to 
the 1962 SBA. 
During the 1960s, Egypt was still under the socialist system, although the second half of 
the 1960s saw the move away from socialism. The appointment of the senior officials, 
including Prime Minister and Ministers, was in the hands of President Nasser. An 
attempt had been made by Nasser to appoint those whose thinking was believed to be in 
line with that of the IMF to facilitate the negotiations. However, the final decision on 
83 1MF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, U.A.R. Request for Stand-by 
Arrangement, 15 Dec. 1969. 
84 Gunter, J., unpublished paper, p. 37. Here, Gunter describes some of his activities as an IMF staff 
member. See Appendix I for a section on Egypt. 
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important issues of the negotiations remained with President. John Gunter, the head of 
the IMF negotiators, noted: 
What bothered me most in the early years of our discussions with Egypt was 
that Kaisouni made little effort to defend the lack of action to correct the 
situation. It became increasingly clear that Kaisouni and the group around him 
understood the situation quite well, but were unwilling or unable to do much 
about it. I pressed on several occasions for discussions at the political level, 
and this understandably was resented by Kaisouni as a minister. In any event, I 
was careful to leave a written statement about the dangers in the situation, at 
the conclusion of each consultation mission. (I learned years later when I 
accompanied Mr. Schweitzer to met [sic] President Nasser that the President 
had seen my statements regularly).85 
Thus, in this regard, it could be said that the technocratic alliances did not lend much 
support to the IMF in the negotiations. At the same time, the lack of support within the 
Egyptian cabinet and, more significant, President Nasser himself, allowed the Egyptian 
team to take a tougher stand towards the IMP's proposals. As illustrated in the above 
narrative, following Egypt's resistance as a result of the lack of such support, IMF 
demands regarding the exchange rate were, on several occasions, lessened. 
Throughout the negotiations during this period, economic circumstances were at times 
favourable to Egypt's strength in negotiations such as temporary improvements in the 
terms of trade. But this seemed to be insufficient to outweigh the negative impact of 
other economic circumstances upon its relative negotiating power, namely its debt. 
Egypt's negotiating position was considerably weakened by its growing debt, which 
served as a constraint rather than acting as a resource to enable it to alter the outcome of 
the negotiations. The deficit in the balance of payments current account during the 
1960s was mainly with Western Europe and the United States and thus a deficit in 
convertible currency. During the period 1963-1966, the trade deficit with these 
countries ranged approximately between LE 150 million and LE 200 million.86 
Particularly, its inability to pay its obligation to the IMF revealed a considerable 
weakness in Egypt's relative power as the failure to meet this debt would damage 
international financial confidence and thus it should be the first obligation that Egypt 
would need to make if it could. Yet, it was unable to do. Thus, Egypt's decision to 
85 Gunter, J., op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
86 Hansen and Nashashibi, op. cit., pp. 119-120. 
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remain in arrears with the IMF was a good reflection of the lack of non-conditional 
financial resources that it could tum to. 
As for the IMF, much of its relative strength in negotiations stemmed from the 
perceived catalysing effect of concluding a programme agreement. There seemed to be 
enormous pressure on Egypt regarding cross-conditionality: the need to obtain other 
financial sources of money from creditor countries such as the US and Germany and 
foreign commercial banks. 
Its colonial history with France and Britain did not seem to provide favourable support 
to Egypt during its negotiations on IMF conditionality. Instead, the hostile relationship 
between Egypt and the West in the Cold War atmosphere produced the opposite effect 
as illustrated by the reservations made by several Western Executive Directors at their 
discussions on Egypt's requests for SBAs. Egypt's negotiations with the IMF in the 
1960s were very much operating in the atmosphere of the rivalry between the two 
superpowers. The Cold War context of the negotiations between the IMF and Egypt 
was in theory favourable to Egypt. However, to a large extent, Egypt was seemingly 
unable to exploit the competition between the two superpowers to its own advantage 
regarding IMF conditionality negotiations, as one may expect. Thus, one could say that 
Egypt during the 1960s could have been a stronger position than it was if it had used 
such a potential capability to alter IMF conditionality. Egypt could have capitalised 
upon its strategic and political significance in the region to bring substantial change to 
the outcomes. Yet, it seems that Egypt did not use it effectively. This seems to reflect 
that there were other issues which the Nasser regime regarded as more important and 
should have a priority over the outcome of the negotiations with the IMF, namely its 
foreign policy over the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Nasser's support for 
revolutionary movements, and his anti-foreign domination stance. 
It remains to be said that some factors are difficult to assess due to the lack of 
information such as the role of individual negotiators. Due to the unavailability of data, 
the relative power at the level of individual negotiators during this period cannot, thus, 
be assessed. 
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In sum, the relative bargaining strength of the two parties constantly changed 
throughout the negotiations in the 1960s. The alterations in the relative strength of the 
two parties in tum affected the position of IMF conditionality along the imposition-
ownership spectrum. With Egypt's initial relative weakness, inability to put forward its 
own proposals and unwillingness to accept IMF demands as reflected by its resistance 
to IMF proposals, initially IMF conditionality can be said to be located closer to the 
imposition end of the spectrum than the ownership end. Despite Egypt's initial relative 
weakness, its subsequent resistance to IMF demands and the certain degree of flexibility 
of the Management helped yield some changes in IMF conditionality such as the extent 
of the exchange rate policy. Thus, this seemed to suggest that the degree of imposition 
and ownership had been altered along the spectrum since the beginning of negotiations 
and that it had moved away from the imposition end towards the ownership end. 
However, such a movement was trivial. Overall, Egypt seemingly remained to be in a 
weaker negotiating position in relation to the IMF during the 1960s. The record of its 
negotiations with the IMF and programme implementation indicated that Egypt seemed 
to be in a desperate need for IMF lending. Also, the record of the implementation of the 
policy programmes under the 1962 and 1964 SBAs suggested a high degree of the 
Egyptian government's unwillingness to accept and adopt IMF conditionality. It chose 
to implement only conditions which were necessary for gaining access to the drawings, 
whereas the rest of the programme, some of which it initially resisted, remained 
unimplemented. The high degree of unwillingness, together with the relatively stronger 
power of the IMF, seemingly suggest a high overall degree of imposition of IMF 
conditionality during this period, despite some flexibility of the IMF (e.g. in terms of an 
alternative measure to devaluation), and compromises made on certain issues. 
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The period 1974-1979 saw intense negotiations between the Egyptian government and 
the IMF. This resulted in the conclusion of two agreements between the two parties in 
the second half of the 1970s: a SBA of 1977; and an EFF of 1978. Given the severity of 
Egypt's economic difficulties in the mid-1970s, an EFF was initially viewed by both 
parties as more appropriate than a SBA in dealing with such problems. However, due 
to disagreement over the extent of the policy programme, agreement could not be 
reached between both parties on the contents of the medium-term programme required 
under the EFF. As a consequence, a SBA was concluded in 1977 instead as an interim 
arrangement, forming part of a reform process that would extend over several years. A 
series of negotiations took place during the operation of the 1977 SBA, leading to the 
conclusion of another lending agreement under an EFF, in the following year. In both 
occasions, the withdrawal of IMF credits was only partial (see Table 4.1) and the 
agreements were abandoned, reflecting the low degree of Egypt's implementation of 
IMF conditionality. 
This chapter aims to analyse the nature of IMF conditionality in the Egyptian case 
during the period between 1974 and 1979 under President Sadat's era. Similarly to 
Chapter Three, the outline of the chapter will be divided into three major sections. The 
first section will provide the background, covering the period of the early 1970s (the 
period leading to the negotiations for the 1977 SBA). This will be followed by a 
section of narrative of the negotiations for both 1977 SBA and 1978 EFF. Finally, the 
chapter will end with an assessment of the relative power of Egypt and the IMF and the 
nature of IMF conditionality. 
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Table 4.1 Egypt's Financial Position in the IMF, 1970-1981 (in millions of SDRs) 
Years 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
All drawings 17.5 32 - 47 40 - 125.7 105 75 - - -
Repayments by repurchase 9 11.5 45 9 9 24.5 16 28 35 51.2 78.9 77.9 
Use of Fund credit 49 70 24 62 93 68 178 255 296 246 139 85 
Of which 
Ordinary credit tranche drawings 14 35 3 3 34 9 - 98 82 58 35 25 
Compensatory Financing Facility 23 23 9 47 47 47 141 113 94 72 24 -
Standby Arrangements: 
Amount drawn - - - - - - - 105 - - - -
Undrawn balance - - - - - - - 20 - - - -
Extended Fund Facility: 
Amount drawn - - - - - - - - 75 75 75 -
Undrawn balance - - - - - - - - 525 525 525 -
Oil Facility - - - - - - 32 32 32 26 19 II 
Trust Fund Loans Outstanding - - - - - - - 20 78 135 183 184 
Quota 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 228 228 342 342 
Fund holdings of currency 237 258 212 250 281 256 366 443 524 474 481 403 
Per cent of quota 126 137 113 133 149 136 195 236 230 208 141 118 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1985, pp. 20-21,24-25, and 273. 
Section A: Background 
During the 1970s, Egypt underwent several developments on the domestic (political and 
economic), and on the foreign fronts. After the death of Nasser in 1970, Sadat took 
office as the president of Egypt. At the beginning of Sadat' s regime, there was little 
change in Egypt's economic policy. Sadat spent the first few years consolidating his 
political power. He sought to expand his power base by outmanoeuvring his internal 
opponents, such as Ali Sabri who staged an abortive coup in May 1971 in protest 
against the proposed federation of Egypt, Libya and Syria, and who tried to mobilise the 
mass in the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) and the police force to oppose Sadat. Also, 
Sadat gradually reinforced his position in power within the army and purged his regime 
of those who he termed 'Centres of Powers', referring to a number of senior officers in 
the army, the intelligence units, and the police force who owed their allegiance to the 
. . prevwus regtme. 
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Following the October 1973 war, Sadat introduced a new idea towards economic 
development which to some extent departed from that of Nasser. The principle concept 
of the Open Door Policy (infitah), Sadat's new economic policy, was laid out in the 
October Paper of 1974. It called for an investment programme which would mobilise 
Egyptian domestic capital and Arab and foreign resources, and would stimulate a 
greater role of the private sector in the economy. 
A number of factors which influenced Sadat's initiative of the infitah policy can be 
identified at three distinct levels: the domestic, the regional, and the international. At 
the domestic level, the socialist experience during Nasser's era proved to be a manifest 
failure. Sadat's critical attitude towards the socialist ideas and policies of Nasser and 
his more liberal views had been showed as early as December 1970 when he lifted the 
sequestration order on private property. The October 1973 war and the popular sense of 
victory further provided Sadat with the needed power and legitimacy in his own right 
and so an opportunity to further reveal his critical views towards Nasser's socialist 
policies. 
At the regional level, there was an opportunity for Egypt to attract extensive capital 
from Arab oil-producing countries generated by the oil price booms during the 1970s. 
The oil price shock ultimately brought a vast amount of resources to the Egyptian 
economy. It enhanced the opportunities for employment and capital flow to Egypt 
through not only labour migration to the Arab oil-producing countries, but also through 
Arab tourists, Arab journalism, broadcasting, and television. Foreign policy and 
relations factors, namely peace with Israel and alliance with the West also played a 
significant role in encouraging the Open-Door policy. Unlike Nasser who was devoted 
to revolution, anti-colonialism, social equity, and socialism, Sadat put his emphasis on 
the intangible values of love, peace, and faith. 1 As early as February 1971 Sadat 
introduced a peace initiative, which indicated his willingness to sign a peace treaty with 
Israel and re-open the Suez Canal in return for a partial Israeli withdrawal and the re-
crossing of the Egyptian troops into Sinai. However, his peace initiative faced a setback 
when the Israelis were not persuaded. Partly in an attempt to bring back the balance in 
negotiations which he believed to have been lacking in the previous peace attempts, 
1 Dessouki, A. E. H., 'Ideology and Legitimacy in Egypt: The Search for a 'Hybrid Formula',' in Oneil, 
A.,<;. Keyder, and S. E. Ibrahim (eds.), Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and 
Turkey (Cairo: Amer. U. in Cairo P., 1994), p. 85. 
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Sadat decided to wage war in October 1973 with Israel. Sadat's policies towards the 
domestic economy and towards Israel were interlinked. Sadat put an emphasis on peace 
with Israel which he believed would be beneficial to the pursuit of economic 
development in Egypt. Peace with Israel would provide a more stable and secure 
environment, which would in tum encourage foreign investment, and would also reduce 
defence expenditures. Also in relation to this, the decision to wage a war in part 
represented an attempt to solve or distract attention from domestic problems confronted 
by Sadat's regime in its earlier years. Pressure was mounting during the period 1972-
1973 prior to the October 1973 war, which witnessed violent demonstrations by 
students who demanded both domestic reform and action against Israel to end the 
continuation of the state of 'no war, no peace,' as well as frequent violence between the 
Coptic and Muslim communities and criticism over the Egyptian government's 
economic policies. 
Further political considerations lay in the international context of the detente period and 
in the change in Egypt's foreign policy towards a rapprochement with the West, 
particularly the US, further pushing Egypt towards a new set of economic policies. At 
the international level, the Soviet-US detente had a significant implication for Egypt. It 
indicated that during the detente period, Egypt would no longer have an opportunity to 
exploit the hostility between the two superpowers by playing one against the other for 
the purpose of receiving their assistance. This became clear when one considers 
Egypt's relations with the USSR during Sadat's regime which were initially uneasy and 
later turned sour. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw growing Soviet involvement in 
Egypt's defence and Egypt becoming increasingly dependent on the USSR, both 
militarily and economically. Despite the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union in May 1971, disagreement between the two 
countries emerged over the supply of Soviet weapons. Sadat complained that the Soviet 
Union never delivered the most advanced equipment. In addition to such Soviet 
behaviour, the coup attempt to topple Sadat led by Ali Sabri and a group of pro-Soviet 
officials in May 1971 did not help lessen Sadat's frustration with the USSR. The 
worsened relationship between the two countries reached its peak in July 1972 when 
there were delays in arms deliveries. In the eyes of the Egyptian ruling elite, it looked 
as if the Soviet Union would not help Egypt regain the Sinai from Israeli occupation. 
This culminated in Sadat's ordering of all Soviet military experts to leave Egypt. 
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Despite this incident, Egypt's contacts with the USSR continued since a sudden rupture 
in its relationship with the USSR was neither possible when there were too many Soviet 
sympathisers in the Egyptian armed forces and administration, nor desirable as this 
would repeat Nasser's mistake in rebuffing the US.Z While the Egyptian-Soviet 
relationship began to deteriorate, the relationship with the West, particularly with the 
US started to improve. Sadat put his trust on the US, which he believed to be the only 
state able to put pressure on Israel. Egypt began to tum to the West and the US for aid 
which was partly aimed at facilitating the expansion of the private sector in the 
Egyptian economy. This aim was reflected in the key element of the USAID mission 
growth strategy for Egypt which had been to provide the incentives to increase 
production and to expand the role of the private sector.3 
However, Sadat's initiative of the infitah policy was 'not a major economic turnaround 
but a ruse intended to maintain the flow of rents into Egypt.' 4 Furthermore, despite 
some liberal elements where the regime was open to foreign investment, there remained 
the retention of tight state control over the economy. For instance, under Law No. 43 of 
1974 concerning the investment of Arab and foreign capital and the free zones, the 
General Authority for Arab and Foreign Investment and Free Zones (the so-called 
Investment Authority) was created with the authority to check and select the 
applications for all projects and then obtain the approval of all other relevant 
government agencies for those selected projects. The establishment of the Investment 
Authority seems to suggest that the Egyptian government was still unwilling to curtail 
its control as well as the degree of intervention in the economy. Thus, the infitah 
policy, together with such tight state control over the economy, would be insufficient in 
dealing with its balance of payments problems, according to the IMF standard. 
Similar to the 1960s negotiations, the negotiations between Egypt and the IMF during 
the 1970s began as a result of alarming problems in Egypt's balance of payments. The 
overall balance of payments deficit during the early 1970s, prior to Egypt's informal 
2 Fernandez-Armesto, F., Sadat and His Statecraft, 2nd ed. (Windsor Forest, Bershire: Kensal P., 1983), p. 
124. 
3 Ali, A. M. S., 'The International System and State Policies: The Case of Egypt,' in Oneil, Keyder, and 
Ibrahim, op. cit., pp. 191-192. 
4 Harik, 1., Economic Policy Refomz in Egypt (Gainesville: U. P. of Florida, 1997), p. 199. See also 
Hamed, 0., 'Egypt's Open Door Economic Policy: An Attempt at Economic Integration in the Middle 
East,' International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 13, 1981, pp. 1-9. 
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request for IMF credit, was on a constant rise from only US$ 12 million in 1970 to US$ 
489 million and US$ 1,217 million in 1973 and 1974, respectively (see Table 4.2). 
The rapid rise in balance of payments deficits during the early 1970s was mainly due to 
a rapid increase in the demand for imports. Although the value of merchandise exports 
did increase substantially during 1970-1974 by 104.65 per cent in four years, the value 
of merchandise imports rose much more rapidly, by 168.82 per cent in the same period. 
As a result, deficits in trade and current account balances dramatically increased from 
US$ 267 million and US$ 148 million in 1970 to US$ 1,242 million and US$ 1,320 
million in 1974, respectively (see Table 4.2). Part of the rapid import growth stemmed 
from the sudden introduction of a more liberal trade system, allowing a rapid rise in 
imports of not only capital and intermediate goods but also consumer goods. This, 
together with the high annual population growth of over 2.2 per cent, in part led to a 
higher growth in imports than that of exports. Military expenditures on the October 
1973 war represented a further drain on the Egyptian economy. 
It cannot be denied that external conditions could have an adverse impact on Egypt's 
balance of payments position. Food imports upon which Egypt was heavily dependent 
had to be purchased at the time when the international price of wheat (its major 
imported commodity) rose considerably. The deterioration in Egypt's terms of trade in 
relation to cotton (its main export item) and wheat in part contributed to the worsening 
of the trade balance. During the first half of the 1970s the world price of wheat 
increased 4.5 times (from LE 25 to LE 112 per ton), whereas that of cotton rose only 
about 100 per cent (from LE 530 toLE 1,068 per ton). This resulted in a rapid decline 
in the capacity of cotton exports to finance wheat imports: a ton of cotton exported in 
1975 bought less than half of the amount of wheat that Egypt had bought in 1969.5 
5 Ikram, K., Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. P., 
1980), p. 224. 
Table 4.2 Egypt's Economic Indicators, 1970-1980 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
GNP (LE million) 2,927 3,086 3,403 3,634 4,085 4,738 6,409 8,643 10,765 13,260 ... 
GDP at market prices (LE million) 2,971 3,146 3,417 3,663 4,197 4,886 6,276 8,210 9,782 12,475 ... 
GDP (LE million) 1975 prices 3,784 3,968 4,121 4,089 4,297 4,886 5,266 5,682 6,258 6,801 ... 
GDP per capita (LE) 89.14 92.31 98.08 102.84 115.24 131.24 165.72 211.65 245.66 304.42 ... 
Real GDP per capita (LE) 113.53 116.43 118.28 114.80 117.98 131.24 139.05 146.48 157.16 165.96 ... 
GDP growth(%) 10.20 5.89 8.61 7.20 14.58 16.42 28.45 30.82 19.15 27.53 ... 
Real GDP growth(%) 1.83 4.86 3.86 -0.78 5.09 13.71 7.78 7.90 10.14 8.68 ... 
Consumer prices index number 74.9 77.2 78.8 82.2 91.1 100 110.3 124.3 138.1 151.8 183.1 
Consumer price inflation(%) 3.88 3.07 2.07 4.31 10.83 9.77 10.3 12.69 11.10 9.92 20.62 
Budget deficit (LE million) ... . .. ... . .. . .. -938 -1,557 -1,114 -1,246 -1,964 . .. 
Total debt service (US$ million) ... 224.70 364.00 441.80 301.60 305.40 266.80 498.20 583.00 518.50 1,235.20 
Total debt service ratio (% of exports of 21.77 32.46 31.09 11.94 10.34 6.44 10.17 9.71 6.36 13.41 goods and services ... 
Export (fob) (US$ million) 817 851 813 1,000 1,672 1,567 1,609 1,974 1,939 2,424 3,854 
Import (fob) (US$ million) -1,084 -1,131 -1,170 -1,429 -2,914 -3,941 -3,842 -4,038 -4,743 -6,002 -6,814 
Trade balance (fob) (US$ million) -267 -280 -357 -429 -1,242 -2,374 -2,233 -2,064 -2,804 -3,578 -2,960 
Current balance (US$ million) -148 -207 -464 -558 -1,320 -2,383 -1,430 -1,200 -1,220 -1,542 -438 
Overall balance of payments (US$ 
-12 -58 -295 -489 -1,217 -2,868 -1,306 -1,906 -1,064 -16 610 
million) 
Foreign exchange (US$ million) 74 49 41 222 214 177 216 402 481 529 1,046 
Population (millions) 33.33 34.08 34.84 35.62 36.42 37.23 37.87 38.79 39.82 40.98 42.29 
Population growth 2.55 2.25 2.23 2.24 2.25 2.22 1.72 2.43 2.66 2.91 3.20 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IFS), 1981, pp. 170-173, and 1983, pp. 202-205. For balance of payments, International Monetary Fund, IFS Yearbook, 1992, pp. 330-
331. For total debt service and total debt service ratio, World Bank, World Development Indicators [CO-Rom], 2000. 
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However, the blame for the deficit burden could not solely be placed on external 
conditions. As G. Amin argues that ' ... one must raise the question why domestic 
production failed so badly in meeting domestic requirements ... much of this failure 
must be due to lower investment in agriculture in earlier years, partly due ... to the 
impact of the 1967 war.' 6 
After the October 1973 war, substantial deficits on the current account were largely 
financed by official loans and grants and, until 1976, by short-term commercial 
borrowing. Post-October 1973 saw the rapid growth of official Arab financial 
assistance in several forms such as cash loans, grants, project and programme loans, and 
deposits with the CBE. The total amount of main types of Arab assistance to Egypt 
(grants, cash loans and deposits, and project and programme loans) rose from US$ 905 
million in 1973 to a peak of US$ 2,774 million in 1975.7 As a result, foreign exchange 
reserves rose from less than US$ 50 million in 1971-1972 to above US$ 200 million in 
1973-1974 (see Table 4.2). In addition to official grants and loans, to meet the higher 
cost of food imports, Egypt was obliged to resort heavily to short-term borrowing from 
foreign commercial banks at high interest rates after the period of controlling its overall 
use during 1967-71.8 However, despite the increasing flow of money after the October 
1973 war, there remained the need for Egypt to seek financial assistance from 
elsewhere, including from the IMF. 
Section B: Narrative 
4.1 The April1977 StandQBy Arrangement 
With the deterioration of its external economic situation, Egypt began its negotiations 
for an upper credit tranche arrangement with the IMF in the mid-1970s. In late April 
1974, the Egyptian government approached the IMF to request the latter's assistance in 
drawing up a stabilisation programme for a SBA.9 The two visits by the IMF team to 
Cairo in June-July 1974 and November-December 1974led to no final conclusion. The 
efforts continued throughout 1975 and 1976 but still no formal agreement could be 
reached. 
6 Amin, G., Egypt's Economic Predicament: A Study in the Interaction of External Pressure, Political 
Folly and Social Tension in Egypt, 1960-1990 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), p. 8. 
7 Ikram, op. cit., pp. 349-351. 
8 Ibid., p. 363. 
9 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Paul Dickie, June-July 1974, a letter from Abdel-Aziz Higazy 
(First Deputy Prime Minister) to H. Johannes Witteveen (Managing Director), 28 Apr. 1974. 
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After prolonged negotiations of nearly 3 years, by early March 1977 agreement was 
reached between the two parties. This was followed by the IMF Executive Board's 
approval on 20 April 1977 of a SDR 125 million SBA for Egypt to be drawn over a 
twelve month period until April 1978. 10 The major aim of the economic programme for 
the April 1977 SBA was 'to restructure relative prices so as to develop the external 
sector.' 11 To achieve this aim, a number of policy measures and targets were set under 
several policy areas, including exchange reform and external trade policy, domestic 
price liberalisation, fiscal policy, monetary and credit policy, and external debt policy 
and arrears. 12 
An outline of IMF conditionality was first drafted by the IMF team in a lengthy 
memorandum, describing its concept of a suitable programme. It dealt with a list of 
reform policies similar to the one above, including the exchange and trade system, 
pricing policy, fiscal policy, monetary and credit policy, external debt policy and 
administrative reform. 13 Throughout a series of discussions, differences between the 
two sides emerged over the pace of reform rather than what should be included in the 
programme. 14 While generally accepting the IMF staff's proposal on the economic 
programme, the Egyptian side, including those at the top, namely, President Sadat and 
Prime Minister Mamdouh Salem, insisted that the programme had to be implemented 
only gradually. 15 With frequent occurrences of demonstrations and violent riots against 
the rising cost of living, there was a great deal of reluctance on the Egyptian side to 
undertake IMP-proposed measures having a substantial effect on prices, 16 namely 
exchange rate reform and pricing policies through a cut in subsidies and an increase in 
public sector prices. 
10 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/ 1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1977-1985, IMF Executive Board's 
Decision no. 5375-(77/59), 20 Apr. 1977. 
11 Arab Republic of Egypt, Annex to Stand-By Arrangement [the Letter of Intent], 4 Mar. 1977, in IMF 
Central Files, C/Egypt/1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1977-1985, International Monetary Fund, 
Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members of the Executive Board, 
From the Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/77/90 Supplement 1, 
confidential, 21 Apr. 1977, p. 5. 
12 For more details on IMF conditionality under the 1977 SBA, see Appendix C. 
13 1MF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Nov.-Dec. 1974, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Mission to Egypt 
Concerning the Extended Fund Facility, confidential, 10 Dec. 1974. 
14 Ibid. 
15 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, John W. Gunter, Mission to Egypt on Use of the 
Fund's Resources, confidential, 25 Nov. 1975. 
16 Ibid.; and IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Apr. 1975, a memorandum, To 
the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Mission to Egypt, 
confidential, 1 May 1975. 
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4.1.1 Demonstrations and Riots as Domestic Pressure 
While the negotiations with the IMF were under way, the Egyptian government faced 
severe domestic constraints in accepting the IMP-proposed measures. Besides the 
balance of payments problem, Egypt was faced with other mounting economic 
difficulties. The population growth of over 2.2 per cent during the first half of the 
1970s put a strain on its already-run-down infrastructure and overburdened its food 
production which in turn created an increasing reliance on imported food stuffs. The 
inflation rate substantially rose from a range of 2-4 per cent during 1970-1973 to nearly 
11 per cent in 1974 (see Table 4.2). 
The frequent outbreak of demonstrations and riots during the mid-1970s, which 
appeared to have been caused by public dissatisfaction with Egypt's state of economy in 
terms of deteriorating urban infrastructures and rising inflation, placed more pressure 
upon the Egyptian government in addition to the economic and financial problems. In 
October 1974, a bus station in Cairo was set on fire in a protest against the inadequacy 
of public transport. The following month witnessed a public outcry over the state of 
Cairo's drinking water, which ran brown from the taps. Demonstrations in Helwan at 
the end of September 1974 by industrial workers from Helwan and Shoubra al-Khaima 
against the rising cost of living and low wages re-erupted in Cairo on New Year's Day 
of 1975.17 It was only two months after the January 1975 riots that another set of 
demonstrations by textile workers at Mehalla el-Koubra (the centre of Egypt's textile 
industry 80 miles north of Cairo) took place and led to violent three-day riots. 18 Against 
the background of domestic riots, it is understandable why the Egyptian government 
could not accept the extent of the IMP-proposed measures on prices which would have 
an adverse impact upon the cost of living and political stability, which would in turn 
undermine the regime's political survival. 
As a way to ensure domestic political stability, President Sadat, in the wake of the 
January 1975 riots in Cairo, responded by issuing a Presidential Decree of emergency 
measures to alleviate the shortages and high prices of basic food commodities. 19 The 
measures pledged by President Sadat included the allocation of additional money for the 
importing of basic food items (such as wheat, flour, maize, lentils, beans, sugar, tea, 
17 MEED, 18 Apr. 1975, p. 4. 
18 Ibid.; and EIU, Egypt: Quarterly Economic Review (hereafter called QER), no. 2, 1975, p. 2. 
19 MEED, 10 Jan. 1975, p. 7. 
Sadat's Continuity of Unwillingness: 1974-1979 162 
meat, and cheese), and wages increases and promotion for public-sector employees.20 
Due to the stalled process of the Arab-Israeli peace settlement, Egypt was able to get a 
substantial inflow of financial aid from Saudi Arabia, helping Sadat fulfil his promises. 
During his visit to Egypt on 19-20 January 1975 as part of a tour aimed at maintaining 
Arab unity in dealing with the issue of the Arab-Israeli dispute, King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia gave Egypt a pledge of an immediate assistance of US$ 100 million, which 
would cover the purchase of essential commodities.21 In the following month, Egypt 
received this financial aid.22 
Moreover, with the forthcoming presidential referendum scheduled for 2 October 1976, 
an increase in food subsidies was announced in the 1976 budget with an aim of gaining 
popular support and also reducing the public outcry at home, particularly at the time 
when widespread unrest had frequently taken place. In addition, other measures were 
adopted in a hope that the regime would be seen to be carrying the burden of giving 
more money to the population. They included reducing extravagant government 
spending by LE 100 million through a cut in the public sector entertainment budget by 
20 per cent, a halt of purchasing government limousines, and leasing construction of 
large-scale government buildings.Z3 The money saved from the government's lavish 
spending was diverted to raise subsidies on basic foodstuff to a total of LE 700 million, 
representing an increase of LE 58 million on the 1975 allocation.24 
4.1.2 Seeking a Coalition: Tactics Employed by Both Parties 
While they were unable to reach agreement, each party sought third parties' assistance 
to enhance their relative power vis-a-vis the other. On the IMP's side, there had been a 
close collaboration of its staff with the World Bank's staff since the outset of the 
negotiation process between Egypt and the IMF.Z5 The World Bank's staff had 
indicated to the Egyptian government that in the World Bank's lending policy on a 
programme loan, importance was attached by the Bank to an agreement being reached 
20 MEED, 10 Jan. 1975, p. 8. 
21 MEED, 24 Jan. 1975, p. 9. 
22 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 1, 1975, p. 8. 
23 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 1, 1976, p. 2. 
24 6 MEED, 30 Jan. 197 , p. 16. 
25 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Apr.-May 1974, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Egypt: Mission for Article 
XIV Consultation Discussions and Use of Fund Resources, confidential, 10 May 1974. 
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with the IMF.26 In the negotiations between Egypt and the World Bank on a 
programme loan of about US$ 70 million during 1974, the World Bank lent its support 
for the IMF staff's view that the parallel market of exchange rate should be expanded 
by requiring Egypt to use most of the funds at this parallel market rate. 27 Also, efforts 
were made to avoid disagreement between the two institutions, which might act against 
the IMF's negotiating power. There had been an exchange of the two institutions' staff 
members to work with each other's mission in negotiations with Egypt such as over the 
issue of external debt.Z8 The World Bank's co-operation with the IMF was sought with 
the objective of strengthening the IMF's bargaining power vis-a-vis Egypt. This was 
clearly reflected in the IMF staff's view: 'The hope of getting effective action by Egypt 
depended greatly ... on a coordinated approach by our two institutions.' 29 In their 
discussions in May 1975, Munir Benjenk (Vice President of the World Bank for 
Europe, the Middle East and North Africa) assured John W. Gunter (the staff in the 
IMF's Middle East Department and the head of the IMF's negotiating team) of the 
Bank's position towards the negotiations between the IMF and Egypt. As Gunter noted 
in his memorandum: 
[T]he Bank would ... emphasize strongly to the Egyptians the importance that 
the Bank attaches to there being an agreement between Egypt and the Fund and 
that if there were no such agreement the detailed conditionality that would be 
required by the Bank for further lending would have to be expanded greatly as 
compared to last year.30 
Similar to the IMF, Egypt sought to reinforce its bargaining power through gathering 
counter-support from 'friendly' states. The international political conditions in the post-
October 1973 war era were conductive for Egypt to use its strategic importance in 
pursuing such a tactic vis-a-vis the IMF. Egypt's negotiations during 1974-early 1977 
with the IMF coincided with the US's desire to induce Egypt's commitment to the 
Egyptian-Israeli Sinai disengagement agreements and also with its efforts in the Arab-
Israeli peace initiatives in general. Seemingly being aware of what the post-war 
26 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/80 1, Relations with Missions of Other Organizations in the Area of Fund 
Interests and Jurisdiction, Office Memorandum, To the Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Egypt: 
Bank/Fund Cooperation, 8 Nov. 1974. 
21 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/80 1, Relations with Missions of Other Organizations in the Area of Fund 
Interests and Jurisdiction, Memorandum for the Files, From John W. Gunter, Meeting with the Regional 
Vice-President of the IBRD for EMENA [Europe, Middle East and North Africa] on Tuesday afternoon, 
May 20, 21 May 1975. 
30 Ibid. 
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situation might bring, the Egypt government approached the US in a hope to gain the 
latter's support for its position in negotiations with the IMF. In May 1975, Egypt 
officials had reportedly made strongly-worded complaints to the US Embassy in Cairo 
over the IMF mission urging for economic policies that were politically impossible. In 
addition to the complaints, Egypt also sought from the US substantial balance of 
payments assistance, with an annual amount of US$ 1 billion.31 With its dominant 
political motive, the US approached countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, 
Germany and Japan, to take part in a package of aid to Egypt, admitting that this 
amount was larger than would be feasible from the US alone. 32 In addition to the US 
economic aid and support, Egypt tried to secure aid inflows from the Arab world. By 
January 1976, Prime Minister Mamdouh Salem was reportedly on a tour of Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to raise about US$ 3-5 billion a year on at 
least a five-year basis.33 
Therefore, both parties, especially the Egyptian government, remained active during the 
negotiations regarding IMF conditionality. They were in search of the possibility of 
increasing their relative power to ensure that the outcome of their negotiations would be 
what they preferred. 
4.1.3 Technocratic Alliances versus Cabinet Division 
During the negotiations with the IMF, there emerged substantial disagreements within 
the Egyptian team which apparently developed into tensions within the Egyptian 
cabinet.34 Far from being united, the Egyptian team and also the Egyptian cabinet were 
divided over the politically sensitive issues, namely exchange reform which could have 
a great impact upon domestic prices. On the one hand, the IMP's analysis and 
proposals gained support from Mohamed Zaki Shafei, Minister of Economy and 
Economic Co-operation, and Ibrahim Helmi Abdel-Rahman, Minister of Planning and 
Administration. However, the two ministers appeared to be unable to press for policy 
31 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/80 1, Relations with Missions of Other Organizations in the Area of Fund 
Interests and Jurisdiction, op. cit., 21 May 1975. 
32 Ibid.; and IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/80 1, Relations with Missions of Other Organizations in the Area 
of Fund Interests and Jurisdiction, a memorandum, To the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing 
Director, From John W. Gunter, New Aid Package for Egypt being Organized by the U.S., confidential, 
30 May 1975. 
33 IMF Central Files, Witteveen and Staff, Mar. 1976, Office Memorandum of the World 
Bank/International Finance Corporation, To Mr. Hollis B. Chenery (VP, Development Policy), From 
Mahbub ul Hag (Director, PP & PP), Visit to Egypt, 27 Jan. 1976. 
34 MEED, 28 May 1976, p. 16. 
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changes in the government. On the other hand, Minister of Finance Ahmed Abu Ismail 
and other important officials in the Ministry of Finance strongly opposed some parts of 
the exchange reform which the IMF had pressed for, the establishment of the 
commercial exchange market with a floating rate to unify the parallel and 'own 
exchange' rates and a shift of a large proportion of public sector imports from the 
official to the commercial rate, as a path towards achieving the ultimate objective of a 
unitary exchange rate. Other ministers such as Issa Chahine (Industry), Ahmed Izzedin 
Hasan Hilal (Petroleum) and Abdel Rahman el-Chazli (Supply) were not prepared to 
take an active role in the policy reform?5 
In this regard, it can be said that there existed technocratic alliances between the IMF 
and some figures in the Egyptian negotiating team and government. Yet, such 
technocratic alliances were rather ineffective in reinforcing the IMP's relative power. 
Its potential effect was undermined by the division within the Egyptian team and 
cabinet. Especially, those ministers and also negotiators whose view on the policy 
programme was in line with that of the IMF were not in a position to make the final 
decision or at least to convince their colleagues and superior of IMF demands. As 
Gunter, the head of the IMF team puts it: 
Soon thereafter, Kaisouni dropped out of the picture for a number of years. 
We dealt with several Ministers of Economy, all of whom were bright and 
seeking to do a good job . . . . [One] was Professor Zaki Shafei of the 
University of Cairo, an able economist and a good friend of Shaalan [an IMF 
staff]. He understood the issues very well and made a substantial effort at 
reform. However, ultimately the "politics" were too much for him to cope 
with.36 
Instead, the outcome of these negotiations suggested that the division in the Egyptian 
cabinet partly helped strengthen Egypt's bargaining power vis-a-vis the IMF. In the 
end, the Egyptian team was successful in obtaining some concessions from the IMF 
counterpart. Some exceptions were allowed such as imports of wheat flour and raw 
materials for pharmaceuticals which would continue at the official rate.37 By mid-May 
1976, following the talks in mid-March and April-May 1976, agreement on an 
35 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, op. cit., 25 Nov. 1975. 
36 Gunter, J., unpublished paper, pp. 37-38. 
37 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Apr.-May 1976, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Mission to Egypt, 
confidential, 20 May 1976. 
Sadat's Continuity of Unwillingness: 1974-1979 166 
economic programme for a SBA was reached and a Letter of Intent was drafted. In 
addition to the exchange rate reform, other measures included ones to improve 
monetary and fiscal position, for example, credit ceilings; an increase in the interest 
rates by two percentage points, making a total of three during 1976 (the interest rates 
had already been increased by one percentage point in January 1976); the elimination of 
subsidies on a large number of foodstuff items, except basic food commodities such as 
wheat, rice and sugar; an upward wage adjustment to cushion the negative impact of the 
price increases; an adjustment of custom duties valuation to the commercial rate for 
imports for which that rate applied; administrative reforms to increase the freedom of 
enterprises to make decisions such as the abolition of the Public Economic Organisation 
(the holding companies for the public-sector companies); and new legislation in the 
taxation field. Regarding external sector policy, multiple currency practices, 
restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions and bilateral 
payments arrangements were to be curtailed. There were also provisions on external 
debt designed to reduce reliance on short-term external borrowing and eliminate arrears, 
and on an establishment of an administrative unit in the Ministry of Economy to 
manage the external debt.38 
Nonetheless, Egypt did not submit the official request for a SBA, even though the 
Managing Director was, by early June 1976, prepared to support Egypt's request on the 
basis of the draft letter.39 In mid-July 1976, it was reported that Egypt had withdrawn 
its request for a SBA with the IMF, even though substantial elements of the economic 
program had already been implemented. They included considerable transfers of 
imports from the official rate to the more realistic parallel market rate and valuing of 
imports for customs purposes at the parallel market rate.40 Also, an attempt was made 
to reduce subsidies. In May 1976, subsidies on flour, com, sesame, meat and coffee 
were abrogated with savings of LE 55 million in 1976.41 However, the Egyptian 
government found it not feasible to fully implement other elements of the economic 
38 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Egypt: Draft Letter of 
Intent for Stand-By Arrangement, 1 June 1976. This memorandum contained a draft Letter oflntent 
dated 15 May 1976 (Revision II). 
39 IMF Central riles, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a cable from John W. Gunter 
to Zaki Shafei (Minister of Economy and Economic Co-operation), 2 June 1976. 
40 lMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a cable from John W. Gunter 
to Abdel-Aziz al-Quraishi (Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency), 14 July 1976. 
41 Ikram, op. cit., p. 322. 
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programme reached in April-May 1976,42 namely the floating of the Egyptian pound. 
Even though at the end of April 1976 the Egyptian government had announced plans to 
introduce a new floating commercial market rate,43 the decision on the matter was later 
postponed.44 Egypt argued for no phasing of the IMF credit and for the availability of 
the whole amount (SDR 125 million) when the new commercial exchange market 
became effective. With the IMF's insistence on phasing the credit as a way to ensure 
the implementation of IMF conditions, Egypt rejected the terms attached to the SBA 
arranged with the IMF to underwrite the floating of the Egyptian pound on the grounds 
that Egypt would not risk floating the pound when there would be inadequate 
stabilisation fund.45 Furthermore, public borrowing and deficit financing increased in 
1976.46 Therefore, the whole package of the IMF's financial assistance was turned 
down by Egypt since it was considered to be unacceptable, leading to rises in import 
prices at a time when inflation was already a sensitive political issue. 
What enabled Egypt to prolong negotiations for about two years since June 1974, gain 
concessions from the IMF and subsequently withdraw its request in July 1976? A 
pledged and actual large package of aid organised by the US in conjunction with other 
contributors coupled with the Gulf Organisation for the Development in Egypt's47 
(GODE) pledge of US$ 2 billion announced in mid-July 1976 near the time of Egypt's 
withdrawal appear to provide the answer. Indeed, Egypt's efforts in obtaining the US's 
backing paid off. Following the October 1973 war, the US economic aid to Egypt, 
which had been practically ceased after the 1967 war, had been revived with an aim to 
provide support to the Sadat regime's interest in a policy of rapprochement with the US 
and conciliation with Israel, and also to its ability to convince its own population that 
such a policy was beneficial and thus worth taking. When the Egyptian government 
signed the Sinai I disengagement accord in January 1974, the US immediately released 
42 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, op. cit., 14 July 1976. 
43 MEED, 30 Apr. 1976, p. 15. 
44 MEED, 12 Nov. 1976, p. 17. 
45 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, two cables from Zaki Shafei to 
John W. Gunter, 5 June 1976, and 10 June 1976, and a cable from John W. Gunter to Zaki Shafei, 8 June 
1976. 
46 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy ofTwo Regimes (Princeton, N. 
J.: Princeton U. P., 1983), p. 410. 
47 The GODE was established in April 1976, comprising four Arab Gulf members: Saudi Arabia; Kuwait; 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The headquarters of the GODE was located in Riyadh. The 
president of the Board of Governors was the Saudi Finance Minister and the remainder of the board 
consisted of the finance ministers of the rest of the member countries. EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 4, 1976, p. 
7. 
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US$ 85 million to fund the offered reconstruction of the Suez Canal area. To strengthen 
Sadat's interest in the pursuit of a broader Sinai disengagement agreement, the Nixon 
Administration decided in March 1974 to request US$ 250 million from Congress to 
finance Egyptian development projects in fiscal year 1975. President Nixon informed 
Sadat of this request during his June 1974 trip to Egypt and the fund was finally 
appropriated in December 1974. More importantly, this was followed by a substantial 
expansion of the US economic aid to Egypt during 1975-1976. To reward Sadat 
following the signing of the Sinai II disengagement agreement, the Ford Administration 
pledged in the fall of 1975 to provide Egypt with nearly US$ 1 billion in economic 
assistance, comprising US$ 750 million in grants and concessionary loans and US$ 200 
million in PL 480 Title I food aid.48 The top priority of the US aid programmes in 
1975-1976 was Egypt's serious foreign exchange shortage, dealt with mainly through 
the financing of food, industrial raw materials, and spare parts.49 This would in tum 
help lessen the need for Egypt to conclude a policy programme with the IMF. 
Furthermore, it seemed that little pressure had been exerted by the US upon Egypt in 
reaching an agreement with the IMF. On the one hand, the US informed the Egyptian 
government that in relation to its aid package, importance was attached to appropriate 
understandings being reached between Egypt and the IMF and the World Bank. 
However, it was doubtful whether the US took the matter seriously. Both the IMF and 
the WB were well aware of this point. In the light of the US's ongoing peacemaking 
efforts in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, in particular, and in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
general, the US State and Treasury officials acknowledged to both the IMF and the 
World Bank that they did not consider it politically feasible to make the new aid 
package in any sense conditional on such understanding, in spite of being aware that the 
aid package would substantially reduce pressure for Egypt to reach an agreement with 
the IMF.50 
As has previously been pointed out, in addition to the IMF and the US, Egypt also 
sought financial assistance elsewhere, particularly from Arab states. Its efforts paid off 
48 Burns, W. J., Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1955-1981 (Albany, N.Y.: State U. 
of New York P., 1985), pp. 180-181, and 184. 
49 Weinbaum, M.G., Egypt and the Politics of U.S. Economic Aid (Boulder: Westview P., 1986), p. 37. 
50 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/80 1, Relations with Missions of Other Organizations in the Area of Fund 
Interests and Jurisdiction, op. cit., 30 May 1975; and IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/801, Relations with 
Missions of Other Organizations in the Area of Fund Interests and Jurisdiction, op. cit., 21 May 1975. 
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when by mid-July 1976, the GODE agreed to provide US$ 2,000 million for investment 
projects in Egypt. A protocol was signed in Cairo on 18 July 1976.51 It is questionable 
whether Egypt turned down the SBA because it thought the whole US$ 2 billion would 
be coming from the GODE or whether the Egyptian government was unaware of the 
cross-conditional of the GODE's economic aid. For certain, the disbursement of the 
GODE fund to Egypt was reported to be conditional upon Egypt's acceptance of IMF 
conditionality. 52 Perhaps Egypt decided to take the risk of withdrawing its request for a 
SBA in the hope that its strategic and political importance in the Middle East at such 
favourable time would make creditors other than the IMF re-consider their cross-
conditionality. 
Therefore, both the US-organised aid package and the GODE's promise seemed to 
substantially strengthen Egypt's relative power vis-a-vis the IMF. Due to Egypt's 
effective tactic, there were non-conditional financial resources available or expected to 
be available. This largely enabled Egypt to afford avoiding IMF conditionality through 
its mid-July 1976 withdrawal of the request for IMF lending. Egypt seemed to 
withdraw its request for IMF credit in anticipation that money from elsewhere would 
soon be available to it. Nonetheless, this tactic worked only on a temporary basis as 
Egypt later discovered that there remained pressure for it to reach an agreement with the 
IMF. 
4.1.4 External Pressure from the GODE 
Despite money flowing in from the US, Egypt's financial situation in the summer of 
1976 was approaching a crisis. The balance of payments situation was becoming 
increasingly difficult with overdue payments continuing to rise and the placing of 
import orders being delayed.53 By 1976, Egypt experienced a difficulty in repaying its 
short-term debt. After the October 1973 war, Egypt's short-term borrowing (bearing 
interest rates of 15-17 per cent with a repayment period of 90 to 180 days) was about 
US$ 1.5 billion. These short-term credits resulted in aggregate debt service which 
reached 40 per cent of all visible and invisible exports in 1975.54 The arrears on its 
short-term repayments rapidly accumulated from US$ 32.9 million in December 1975 
51 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 3, 1976, p. 3; and MEED, 23 July 1976, p. 13. 
52 MEED, 30 July 1976, p. 12. 
53 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, a cable from John W. Gunter 
to Abdel-Aziz al-Quraishi, 18 Aug. 1976. 
54 Waterbury, op. cit., 1983, p. 409. 
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to US$ 452.9 million by December 1976.55 This situation was largely a consequence of 
the continuous growth of the import bill of grain due to high prices at the world market 
(caused by large purchases of US grain from the USSR). In an attempt to pay for its 
import bill, the government resorted to short-term commercial bank loans and suppliers' 
credits at high interest rates. The sizeable inflows of cash aid from the Arab Gulf states 
in 1973 temporarily alleviated Egypt's short-term debt burden by enabling it to pay for 
the due payments, and also to meet its import requirements.56 However, 1976 saw the 
accumulation of arrears on its short-term repayments as well as a decline in the inflows 
of financial resources, particularly those from the Arab Gulf states. Between 1975 and 
1976, total Arab assistance to Egypt fell considerably from US$ 2,774 million to US$ 
1 ,072 million. 57 
Moreover, the amount of aid pledged by the GODE in mid-July 1976 fell far behind 
what Egypt had envisaged. President Sadat remarked in an address at Alexandria 
University on 26 July 1976: 'What Egypt wanted from the Development Fund [GODE] 
was not 2,000 million dollars over five years but 10,000 to 12,000 million over the same 
period.' 58 He added: 'I say to our friends, with all the gratitude, recognition and respect 
that we owe them, that the fund must take a different form than that which they want it 
to take ... I hope our friends will not become upset over this.' 59 In his speech on the 
anniversary of Nasser's death on 29 August 1976, President Sadat reiterated his appeal 
to the Arab Gulf states for US$ 10,000 million development aid to Egypt. 60 The 
reiteration of Sadat's public criticism of Arab aid seemed to reflect Egypt's increasing 
financial difficulty and at the same time represented his tactical move to rally more 
financial support from the Arab Gulf states. 
Although there was cross-conditionality attached to the GODE fund, part of it was 
released to provide Egypt with balance of payments assistance despite Egypt's 
continuous rejection of IMF terms. This came after Saudi Arabia, the largest 
55 Ikram, op. cit., p. 364. 
56 Waterbury, op. cit., 1983, p. 409. 
57 Ikram, op. cit., p. 351. 
58 Summary of World Broadcast (hereafter called SWB), ME/5271, 28 July 1976, p. N2. See also MEED, 
30 July 1976, p. 12. 
"9 
' EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 3, 1976, p. 4. 
60 MEED, 8 Oct. 1976, pp. 13-14. 
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contributor of the GODE fund,61 had learned of the severity of Egypt's financial 
situation and of Egypt's seeming unwillingness to push economic measures 
recommended by the IMF, particularly during the run-up to the parliamentary elections 
scheduled in October 1976 to avoid jeopardising the regime's political survival.62 By 
early September 1976, negotiations were under way for US$ 500 million of balance of 
payments assistance to Egypt from the GODE.63 Half of the amount was in the form of 
a guarantee by the GODE to commercial banks agreed in late November 1976. The 
other half, agreed in early January 1977, was a cash loan from the GODE itself with 
concessional terms of a 5 per cent interest rate and a repayment period of ten years plus 
a three-year grace period.64 However, the amount of cash provided by the GODE to 
Egypt was far from covering its needs. In effect, the GODE's cash aid would only 
allow Egypt to buy time in dealing with its chronic economic problem, at least until the 
forthcoming parliamentary elections came to an end. 
The Egyptian government was well aware that further aid to Egypt from Saudi Arabia 
and other Arab countries was made contingent upon the conclusion of an arrangement 
with the IMF.65 The flexible attitude of the oil-rich Arab countries towards Egypt as a 
result of their solidarity in the October 1973 war against Israel evaporated when the 
Egyptian government kept dragging its feet over the policy programme. The GODE 
was reportedly concerned that Egypt had not implemented the economic stabilisation 
programme worked out earlier in the year, including a reduction in the budget deficit by 
cutting back the subsidies on consumer goods, the introduction of a new commercial 
exchange rate and the levying of customs duties at the commercial rather than the 
official rate.66 In mid-October 1976, the GODE rejected Egypt's request for a US$ 
1,250 million loan to support its balance of payments deficit.67 Furthermore, to ensure 
that its funds made available to Egypt would be used appropriately, Saudi Arabia 
originally proposed to the IMF the idea of linking disbursement of its money to the 
61 The GODE fund was set up by its members in the following proportions: Saudi Arabia, 40 per cent; 
Kuwait, 30 per cent; and the UAE and Qatar, 15 per cent each. EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 3, 1976, p. 3; and 
MEED, 30 July 1976, p. 12. 
62 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./ 1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, op. cit., 18 Aug. 1976. 
63 IMF Central Files, C/U.A.R./1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1965-1976, Memorandum for Files, From 
John W. Gunter, Balance of Payments Assistance for Egypt, confidential, 9 Sept. 1976. 
64 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 1, 1977, p. 9; and MEED, 26 Nov. 1976, p. 16, and 7 Jan. 1977, p. 14. 
65 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Gunter and Staff, Jan.-Feb. 1977, Office Memorandum, To the 
Managing Director, From Ernest Sture, Mr. Gunter's Cable re Saudi Arabia Aid to Egypt, 11 Feb. 1977. 
66 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 4, 1976, p. 7-8. 
67 MEED, 15 Oct. 1976, p. 14. 
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phasing of drawings under the SBA through a medium of a Trust Fund administered by 
the IMF. However, owing to its concern over the potential pressure from the third party 
to ease its conditionality, the IMF was unwilling to be directly involved in the 
disbursement of Saudi Arabia's funds to Egypt.68 It was only after Egypt had reached 
agreement with the IMF in early March 1977 that the GODE agreed later in the same 
month to provide further lending to Egypt in an amount of US$ 1,500 million to cover 
its balance of payments deficit. The US$ 1,500 million loan carried similar 
concessional terms to those of the US$ 250 million loan agreed earlier.69 It seemed that 
the cross-conditionality called for by the GODE added immense pressure on Egypt to 
pursue the negotiations with the IMF. 
4.1.5 Resumption of Negotiations with the IMF 
By December 1976, Egypt's negotiations with the IMF had to be resumed over the 
policy programme which would provide the basis for a SBA or an EFF preferred by the 
Egyptian government. Following the parliamentary elections in October 1976, a new 
cabinet was formed in the following month. The new Egyptian team was led by Abdel-
Moneim el-Kaissouni, a newly appointed Deputy Prime Minister for Finance and 
Economic Affairs (the same position he held during the mid-1960s). As it turned out, 
the IMF had made certain concessions by acceding to the government's insistence that 
the Egyptian pound was too weak to be floated. According to Hamed Abdel-Latif al-
Sayih Sayih, Minister of Economy and Economic Co-operation, the Egyptian pound 
was not a convertible currency, given the huge current deficit, and the demand for 
foreign exchange was out of proportion to supply, so that the question of floating 'was 
not a question at all.' 70 The IMF' s initial demand for the establishment of a commercial 
market to unify the parallel market and 'own exchange' rates was dropped. In a 
tentative agreement reached in December 1976, the IMF team agreed to the policy of 
widening the parallel market to cover the transactions of a number of items at the 
official rate such as exports of cotton yam and textiles, cement, potatoes, raw onion and 
garlic, and all imports of raw materials and intermediate goods, except wheat, wheat 
flour, edible oils, sugar, tea, fertilizers, insecticides and the non-capital imports of the 
petroleum sector.71 Also, the timing of an increase in interest rates by 3 percentage 
68 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Gunter and Staff, Jan.-Feb. 1977, op. cit., 11 Feb. 1977. 
69 MEED, 1 Apr. 1977, p. 17. 
70 MEED, 17 Dec. 1976, p. 20. 
71 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Dec. 1976, Memorandum on Program 
Related to Use of Fund Resource, prepared by IMF mission, confidential, 19 Dec. 1976. 
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points originally proposed by the IMF staff as a prior action 72 (which was a condition 
needed to be met before the Executive Board's approval) was extended by the 
Managing Director. This meant that there would be an immediate increase of 1 per cent 
with a further correction to be considered not later than the mid-term review .73 Based 
on the available information, it is uncertain why the IMF changed its position. 
However, this at least illustrates that being able to prolong negotiations and not yielding 
to the IMF demand easily, Egypt managed to obtain concessions from the IMF and 
more importantly, to direct IMF conditionality closer its preference in terms of a 
gradual pace of reform. 
Furthermore, prior actions put forward by the IMF negotiating team, were numerous. 
They were contained in the first paragraph of Section 12 of a memorandum on the 
policy programme prepared by the IMF staff mission which read: 
Certain steps will need to be taken before the stand-by agreement becomes 
effective, such as shift of items from official to parallel market rate ... ; steps 
taken so that higher costs are reflected in prices from shifts to parallel market, 
reduction in subsidies and other fiscal measures, and adjustment of interest 
rates.74 
However, the number of pnor conditions was later reduced in the actual IMF 
conditionality under the April 1977 SBA. The change in the IMF's view over the 
number of the prior conditions to be included in the SBA was largely influenced by 
concern raised by Muhammed al-Atrash, Executive Director representing a group of 
fourteen countries,75 including Egypt. In his memorandum to Gunter, Muhammed al-
Atrash strongly argued against the need for a large number of prior conditions that: 
I believe that these measures could be among the ones to be taken during the 
course of the stand-by and inter alia, in support of which the stand-by would be 
granted, and not before the stand-by becomes effective. Otherwise, I am 
inclined to believe that the staff may run the risk of seeming uneven-handed, 
particularly in view of the fact that in practice the Fund does not normally 
72 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Dec. 1976, op. cit., 19 Dec. 1976. 
73 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, a cable from H. Johannes 
Witteveen to Mohammed Abdel-Fattah Ibrahim (Governor of the Central Bank of Egypt), 27 Dec. 1976. 
74 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Dec. 1976, op. cit., 19 Dec. 1976. 
75 The other thirteen countries were Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen Arab Republic. 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 1978 Supplement: Annual Data 1953-
1977, vol. 31, no. 5, May 1978, p. 2. 
Sadat's Continuity of Unwillingness: 1974-1979 174 
impose so many prior conditions before a stand-by becomes effective [original 
emphasis].76 
Nevertheless, the major difference remained over the issues of price adjustments in 
relation to the exchange reform. After having considered IMF conditions which had 
tentatively been reached in December 1976, the Egyptian government asserted that the 
elimination of the subsidies together with the partial unification of the exchange rates 
would have 'an unbearable impact on prices' and argued for 'a flexible and more 
prolonged approach.' 77 However, when the riots broke out in Egypt in January 1977, 
the prospect of reaching an agreement was cast in doubt. 
4.1.6 'fhe January 1977 Riots and Their Repercussions on Negotiations 
The Egyptian government's attempts to tackle Egypt's chronic debt problems in line 
with what the IMF had been pressing for led to another major incident indicating 
popular discontent over the government's economic policy. Just prior to a new round of 
discussions between the two parties scheduled in the second half of January 1977, riots 
broke out throughout Egypt on 18 and 19 January after the government announced price 
increases in the 1977 budget. The 1977 budget announcement involved price increases 
of 12-46 per cent78 for a number of important goods resulting from shifts to the parallel 
market and from cuts in subsidies such as bottled gas, gasoline, refined white bread (not 
the popular loaves consumed by the masses), rice and sugar. The budget also provided 
for large rises (to a maximum of 250 per cent) in customs duties on luxury goods such 
as electrical household goods, cars and textiles, and increases in excise duties on 
cigarettes and alcoholic drinks. The formulation of the economic programme was 
placed in jeopardy by the riots, which immediately prompted the Egyptian government 
to rescind subsidy measures by Presidential Decree (although the custom duties 
measures were retained) and subsequently to review the budget.79 
76 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Dec. 1976, a memorandum, To John W. 
Gunter (Acting Director of the IMF's Middle East Department), From Muhammed al-Atrash, 10 Jan. 
1977. 
77 IMF Central Files, C/Egyptf 1791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, a cable from Abdel-Moneim el-
Kaissouni (Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs) to H. Johannes Witteveen, 12 Jan. 
1977. 
78 Rivlin, P., The Dynamics of Economic Policy Making in Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 178. 
79 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 1, 1977, pp. 8 and 16; MEED, 21 Jan. 1977, p. 18; and IMF Central Files, 
C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, 'A Note on the Staff Mission to Cairo in Jan. 1977,' 
in Office Memorandum, To William B. Dale, From A. S. Ray, Egypt- Staff Mission, January 1977, 10 
Jan. 1978, pp. 1-2. 
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There were also the government's political reactions to the January 1977 riots. The 
cabinet, which had been formed only three months before, was reshuffled in early 
February and involved the change of the Minister of Interior, the post of which was 
taken over by Prime Minister himself. However, economic portfolios remained the 
same which seemed to reflect Sadat's confidence in Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni and 
his economic team in handling Egypt's economic problems and also dealing with the 
IMF, despite Kaissouni's refusal following the riots to withdraw from his view that 
price increases of some kind would have to be introduced. 8° Furthermore, in addition to 
the change of Minister of Interior, repressive laws were introduced on 3 February 1977 
in an attempt to further reinforce the regime's political control over the population for 
its own purposes. They involved the imposition of imprisonment for life with hard 
labour for offences such as forming a political group outside the three legal political 
parties, the holding of strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations, vandalism, a failure to submit 
an accurate statement of earnings and property, and tax evasion.81 
However, the effects of the January 1977 riots on the government's econormc and 
political policies were merely one side of the coin. Although these riots lessened the 
government's room to manoeuvre in the domestic economic arena, on the one hand, 
they helped enhance Egypt's negotiating strength with the IMF, on the other hand. 
Ironically, the way the price rises had been announced was rather politically insensitive. 
The government left out the announcement of compensation for the price increases such 
as a wage increase which the IMF team had suggested in their discussions,82 even 
though they had planned to include it in the original budget. 83 Whether this was a 
deliberate tactical act planned by the government, the incident had clear repercussions 
on IMF demands. In informal discussions between the two parties slightly before the 
January 1977 riots took place, the Egyptian government asked for three main issues to 
be reconsidered. First of all, import commodities of broad popular consumption, which 
were to be included among those shifted from the official to the parallel exchange rate, 
were politically too sensitive for such a shift, unless the price impact could be fully 
mitigated by additional provisions in the price adjustment fund. Second, a commitment 
to establish a unitary exchange rate system by the beginning of 1978 was not possible. 
80 MEED, 28 Jan. 1977, p. 16, and 4 Feb. 1977, p. 18. 
81 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 1, 1977, p. 4-5; and MEED, 11 Feb. 1977, p. 16. 
82 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, op. cit., 10 Jan. 1978. 
83 Interviewee 24 (a former Egyptian official), personal interview, Cairo, 20 Mar. 2001. 
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Third, the valuation of IMF accounts would have to be continued for the time being at 
the official exchange rate. 84 In the immediate aftermath of the riots, the IMF had to 
make further concessions in negotiations with Egypt. By insisting on its pre-1977 riots 
demands, the IMF would only do harm rather than good to its credibility. It, thus, 
agreed that it would accept the need to provide for addition funds to mitigate 
temporarily the price impact of shifting imports to the parallel market, which Egypt had 
previously asked for but had faced the IMF's resistance. 85 The price adjustment fund, 
previously set at LE 200 million, would be increased to a maximum of LE 300 million 
in 1977. It also temporarily left out the requirements for the termination of the price 
adjustment fund and for the full attainment of exchange rate unification by the end of 
1977, but these issues would be subject to discussions at a later stage (hopefully, at the 
mid-term review of the SBA).86 In addition, due to the riots, bank financing of the 
government deficit was re-projected in the revised budget for 1977 at LE 400 million, 
as compared toLE 150 million in the original budget.87 
Furthermore, to show its support for Sadat's regime, immediately after the January 1977 
riots, the US shifted US$ 190 million in already committed capital development funds 
to commodities that would have a quicker impact upon the Egyptian economy.88 In 
addition to the shift in the type of funds, the US at the beginning of February agreed to 
provide Egypt with an additional US$ 60 million in food loans for wheat, flour, 
tobacco, and beans. This brought the US concessionallending to Egypt in 1977 to US$ 
960 million. 89 
Following another visit by the IMF mission in the second half of February 1977, in 
early March 1977 a visit to Washington by a delegation headed by Abdel-Moneim el-
Kaissouni led to the conclusion of an agreement and the signing of a Letter of Intent. 
84 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Jan.-Feb. 1977, Office Memorandum, To 
the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From Hans W. Gerhard, Egypt- Resumed 
Discussions Concerning Use of Fund Resources, confidential, 27 Jan. 1977. 
85 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, op. cit., 27 Dec. 1976. 
86 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Jan.-Feb. 1977, op. cit., 27 Jan. 1977. 
87 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Gunter and Staff, Jan.-Feb. 1977, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From John W. Gunter, Mission to Egypt: 
Continuation of Discussions Concerning Stand-By Arrangement, confidential, 2 Mar. 1977. 
88 Weinbaum, op. cit., 1986b, p. 37. 
89 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 1, 1977, p. 8. 
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It should be pointed out that Egypt's decision to seek an agreement with the IMF was 
not simply to obtain the needed additional IMF credits for its balance of payments and 
debt problems. There was also a desire to attract the financing of sources other than 
that of the IMF through the latter's seal of approval. Certainly, the size of the IMF 
direct contribution alone could not meet Egypt's overall requirements but their 
availability could pave the path towards other potential sources of funds. Shortly after 
the agreement with the IMF, in May 1977, the first meeting of the Consultative Group 
was convened in Paris to discuss the rescheduling of Egypt's debt payments and the 
provision of further financial resources. The Consultative Group was created under the 
chairmanship of the World Bank, consisting of Arab and Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries as well as private creditors. At the 
meeting, the Consultative Group pledged US$ 3.6 billion in credits of which a large 
proportion was provided by the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. 90 
4.1.7 Implementation of IMF Conditionality 
When it comes down to the question of implementation, IMF conditionality under the 
1977 SBA was not wholeheartedly put into practice by the Egyptian government. By 
the end of August 1977, it was clear that the main ceilings for the end of June 1977 on 
credit expansion to the Government and on the overall domestic credit expansion were 
observed while the ceilings on cotton financing, external debt, and external payments 
arrears had been exceeded. However, the excesses were largely the result of technical 
and timing factors beyond the government's control. For instance, the ceiling on cotton 
financing was exceeded because of the delay in export shipments to the Soviet Union 
and Czechoslovakia brought about by the failure to reach an agreement with them.91 
Following Egypt's request and the IMF Management and staffs recommendation, in 
September 1977 the Executive Board granted a waiver of the three ceilings and thereby 
permitted the drawing of the second tranche (worth SDR 21 million) under the 1977 
SBA.92 
90 Waterbury, op. cit., 1983, pp. 412-413. 
91 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1977-1985, Office Memorandum, To the 
Managing Director, From A. S. Shaalan (Director of the IMF' s Middle Eastern Department), Egypt-
Developments under the Stand-By Arrangement, 31 Aug. 1977. 
92 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/ 1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1977-1985, IMF Executive Board's 
Decision no. 5549-(77/140), 19 Sept. 1977. 
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This was followed by a further slippage on the ceiling for cotton but the main concern 
raised by the IMF staff was over the slow progress on the fiscal and the price 
adjustment policies. Between late October and early November 1977, a mid-term 
review over the progress made in implementing the economic programme was carried 
out in conjunction with Article XIV consultation discussions. There were also 
preliminary discussions on the possibility of an EFF following the end of the April 1977 
SBA (see the following section). Almost all of the ceilings, including ceilings on bank 
financing of budget deficit, external debt and external arrears for the end of September 
1977 were observed, except the ceiling on cotton financing. More importantly, most of 
the fiscal and public sector pricing measures were not implemented due to the fear of 
popular resistance. Besides the improvements in tax collection, no additional measures 
were taken. The subsidy on higher-grade textiles was not eliminated, which largely 
accounted for the non-observance of cotton finance. Concerning the public sector 
pricing policy, most of the increased cost to the public sector companies arising from 
transferring their imported inputs to the parallel market rate was not reflected in the 
form of higher prices passed on to consumers.93 Another request was, as a result, made 
by the Egyptian government for a waiver of the June 1977 cotton ceiling.94 The IMF 
again showed its sympathetic flexibility when the Executive Board, following the staff's 
recommendation, granted another waiver of performance criterion on grounds of 
Egypt's promise to take action to correct the problem of the exceeding cotton finance in 
the 1978 budget, and permitted Egypt to purchase the amount of SDR 21 million.95 
It seemed that the factors that enabled the Egyptian government to meet most of the 
September 1977 ceilings, despite its lack of action in implementing fiscal and pricing 
measures, went beyond a very few measures taken such as the improvements of tax 
collection. This included the receipt of US$ 47 million in grants in September 1977 
under the Rabat Agreement.96 There were also substantial earnings from oil, tourism, 
93 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Oct.-Nov. 1977, Office Memorandum, To 
the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From A. S. Shaalan, Egypt- Article XIV 
Consultations and Review of Stand-By, confidential, 10 Nov. 1977. 
94 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1977-1985, a cable from Mohammed 
Abdel-Fattah Ibrahim to the Managing Director, 16 Nov. 1977, in International Monetary Fund, 
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rt 4-5. 
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96 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Oct.-Nov. 1977, op. cit., 10 Nov. 1977. 
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and expatriate workers' remittances combined with the disbursement of GODE 
economic aid.97 This led to a substantial improvement in its balance of payments with a 
dramatic rise in foreign exchange reserves in 1977-1978 to over US$ 400 million (see 
Table 4.2). 
In addition to the second wruver of performance criterion granted to Egypt, the 
Executive Board's sympathetic support was evident in the language of its decision on a 
review of the 1977 SBA and the 1977 Article XIV consultation with Egypt. After 
lengthy discussions at the IMF's Executive Board in early February 1978, the decision 
adopted by the Board was toned down from the decision proposed by the IMF staff. In 
particular, the phrase 'over a period of several years' was added and the phrase 'without 
delay' was replaced by the vague 'in the near future,' as strongly suggested by 
Mohammed al-Atrash, Executive Director representing a group of fourteen countries, 
including Egypt.98 They appeared in the two last sentences in the final version of the 
Executive Board's decision which stated: 
[T]he Fund notes that the Egyptian authorities remain committed, in the 
context of a restructuring extending over a period of several years [emphasis 
added], to the pricing and budgetary objectives set forth in the economic 
program supported by the stand-by arrangement. The Fund notes with 
satisfaction the recent decision by the Egyptian authorities to extend the scope 
for public sector companies to determine prices in accordance with real costs, 
and notes their intention to take further measures in this direction in the near 
future [emphasis added].99 
This can be compared with the stem wording of the originally proposed decision by the 
IMF staff as follows: 
[T]he Fund expects the Egyptian authorities to take substantive [emphasis 
added] measures to implement the pricing and budgetary objectives set forth in 
the economic program supported by the stand-by arrangement. The Fund notes 
that the Egyptian authorities remain committed to these objectives and 
97 MEED, 17 Feb. 1978, p. 6. 
98 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/ 1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1977-1985, 'Arab Republic of Egypt - 1977 
Article XIV Consultation and Review under Stand-By Arrangement,' EBM/78115 and EBM/78/16, 3 Feb. 
1978, pp. 3-19 and 3-17. 
99 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1977-1985, Executive Board's Decision no. 
5647-(78/16), 3 Feb. 1978. 
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considers that it would be in the best interest of the Egyptian economy for the 
necessary measures to be taken without delay [emphasis added]. 100 
The 1977 SBA was eventually not fully completed. Only three tranches were drawn, 
while the final tranche was left undrawn due to the failure to meet some performance 
criteria. According to the IMF staff's report, the overall credit ceiling in December 
1977 exceeded by LE 80 million which was accounted for largely by an increase in 
lending to the private sector. As a result, the IMF staff recommended the Egyptian 
government not to request another waiver since only part of the public sector pricing 
and other fiscal measures had been implemented, and suggested a new arrangement 
with the IMF, either a one-year SBA or an EFF. 101 Therefore, instead of working on the 
existing SBA which came to an end in April 1978, the focus was shifted towards the 
negotiations for a new agreement. 
4.2 The July 1978 Extended Fund Facility 
As has been mentioned, the April 1977 SBA was concluded in a hope that another 
financial programme under an EFF could later be negotiated. The July 1978 EFF, thus, 
formed part of a medium-term approach starting with the April 1977 SBA. The 
negotiation process for the 1978 agreement was taking place while the 1977 SBA was 
still operative. On 28 July 1978, the IMF's Executive Board approved a three-year EFF 
for Egypt in an amount of SDR 600 million. The economic programme under the July 
1978 EFF aimed at: 102 
i) achieving a high and sustained rate of economic growth of at least 8 per 
cent over the three years under the programme; 
ii) reducing the rate of inflation to less than 10 per cent by the end of the 
programme; 
iii) further strengthening the balance of payments. 
100 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1977-1985, International Monetary Fund, 
Document of International Monetary Fund, and Not for Public Use, To Members of the Executive Board, 
From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt: Staff Report for the 1977 Article XIV Consultation and 
Review of Stand-By Arrangement, SM/78/9, confidential, 6 Jan. 1978, p. 17. 
101 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, a memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From A. D. Crockett, Egypt- Use of Resources, 
confidential, 2 Mar. 1978. 
102 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, International Monetary Fund, 
Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Member~ of the Executive Board, 
From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Extended Arrangement, EBS/78/358 Supplement 1, 
confidential, 2 Aug. 1978. 
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Since the EFF was a medium-term lending arrangement, economic circumstances of the 
borrowing country were likely to change during the EFF period. In this regard, policies 
and measures were set for only the first year of the programme whereas conditions for 
the rest of the period were subject to the future discussions during the reviews of the 
programme. The policy areas in the first-year programme included exchange reform, 
pricing policy, fiscal policy, monetary and credit policy, and external debt policy. 103 
41.2.1 Disagreement over the Extent and Pace of Reform 
By the time that the 1977 SBA lapsed following the slippage m implementing the 
economic programme, the two sides had already begun their negotiations for a new 
agreement. In May 1977, an outline of measures proposed by the IMF team was given 
to the Egyptian officials at a meeting of the Consultative Group for Egypt. 104 The two 
sides commenced their preliminary discussions on the possibility of a new agreement 
during late October-early November 1977 in Cairo in conjunction with the mid-term 
review under the April 1977 SBA. In a further round of discussions held in the second 
half of February 1978 in Cairo, it became clear that differences existed over a number 
of issues including price adjustments in the public sector, interest rates, and credit 
ceilings. Although both sides agreed to the need for reform in these policy areas, the 
disagreement remained over the extent and pace of reform. 
Not surprisingly, among these issues, pnce adjustments appeared to be the most 
difficult in view of the January 1977 riots. The difference lay in the degree and pace of 
the increase in commodity prices to be undertaken during 1978. During the February 
1978 discussions, facing the objections from the Egyptian team and more importantly 
the US's lobbying in January 1978 (see Section 4.2.4 US Interference), the IMF staff's 
proposal for the public sector pricing was modified twice, but the gap between the two 
sides could still not be closed. The IMF staff's final proposal in the discussions was 
that in addition toLE 50 million and LE 107 million of price increase measures already 
taken in 1977 and early 1978, respectively, a further LE 50 million of price increase 
measures would be taken as a prior action, and an additional LE 150 million would be 
phased in during the first year of the programme. The Egyptian team agreed to the first 
103 For more details on IMF conditionality under the 1978 EFF, see Appendix D. 
104 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, Office Memorandum, To the 
Acting Managing Director, From A. S. Shaalan and Subimal Mookerjee, Egypt- Forthcoming 
Discussions on Further Use of Fund Resources, confidential, 6 Jan. 1978. 
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part of the proposal but rejected the latter. They pointed to the domestic constraints that 
they had faced in the past as an attempt to gain more concession from the IMF team. 
They argued that they had promised in 1977 more than they could realistically achieve 
and were determined not to repeat the same thing. 105 Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni, who 
led Egypt's negotiation team, asserted that: 
[W]e have gone to the furthest extent possible in accomodating [sic] IMF 
conditionality and believe that a further acceptance of price increases on our 
part could be dangerously harmful socialy [sic], politicaly [sic] and 
economically. 106 
However, it should be noted that the IMF team claimed that 'at no time [during the 
discussions in February 1978] did the mission suggest price adjustments for subsidized 
staple commodities. The only specific items which were discussed were prices for 
cigarettes, gasoline and public transport, and these items were brought up by the 
authorities in the context of possible future measures they were considering.' 107 
As for the issue of interest rates, a substantial increase of 4 per cent was initially 
proposed by the IMF staff, but later dropped their demand to a rise of 2 per cent (1 per 
cent immediately and 1 per cent later in the year) after the Egyptian team strongly 
rejected the first proposal. However, the Egyptian team argued for an initial 1 per cent 
increase, with the possibility of review later. In the area of credit ceilings, the 
difference was over the amount of ceilings. For instance, the IMF pressed for a ceiling 
of LE 400 million on the government's borrowing from the bank system while the 
Egyptian team argued for an upward adjustment to LE 500 million. 108 
In this regard, there was room for bargaining and a certain degree of flexibility and 
compromises coming from the IMF team which seemed to be partly influenced by the 
US's interference regarding the extent of proposed measures. However, in the Egyptian 
team's view, this evident degree of the IMF team's flexibility was still insufficient. The 
reluctance to take significant measures was understandable when it is viewed in the 
105 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, op. cit., 2 Mar. 1978, p. 3. 
106 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, a cable from Abdel-Moneim 
el-Kaissouni to Mohammed ai-Atrash (Executive Director representing a group of 14 countries, including 
Egypt), 27 Feb. 1978, in Memorandum to Files, From William B. Dale (Deputy Managing Director), 
Egypt, 2 Mar. 1978. 
107 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, op. cit., 2 Mar. 1978. 
108 Ibid. 
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context of political developments in the region and of President Sadat' s need for 
domestic support for his efforts to achieve a peace agreement with Israel. Sadat's peace 
efforts marked by his November 1977 visit to Jerusalem could be jeopardised if his 
regime was threatened by political instability at the domestic front. It seemed that from 
the Egyptian government's perspective the time was not right for major measures to 
deal with the budget deficits which might undermine the domestic backing to attain the 
overriding political objective. Moreover, it was possible that the Egyptian team might 
hope that the ongoing peace efforts in the Middle East would somehow act to their own 
advantage in negotiating with the IMP and bring about further concessions from the 
IMF, as had occurred during the negotiations leading to the previous agreement. Thus, 
the Egyptian team was unwilling to give in to the IMP team's demands very easily. 
4.2.2 Bypassing Negotiations with IMF Staff 
Without success in closing the gap with the IMF staff, the Egyptian government 
adopted a tactic of bypassing the negotiation procedures with them. Instead the 
Egyptian government tried to shift the negotiations to be held at a higher hierarchical 
level of the IMF, the IMF Management, in a hope that more lenient terms than those 
insisted by the IMF staff could be secured. Immediately following the end of 
discussions in February 1978, the Egyptian government sought support for their gradual 
approach towards price increases, from the IMF Management via the Executive 
Director representing Egypt. 109 In his cable on 27 February 1978 to Mohammed al-
Atrash (Executive Director representing fourteen countries, including Egypt), Abdel-
Moneim el-Kaissouni stated that: 
[T]here have been considerable difficulties in reconciling our views with those 
of IMP mission regarding the absolute amounts by which commodity prices 
are to be increased in 1978 . . . . We, therefore, appreciate using your good 
offices in clarifing [sic] our difficulties in accepting higher and tougher 
d. . 1" 110 con 1t10na tty ... 
This was followed by intensive negotiations through an exchange of cables between 
Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni and William B. Dale, Deputy Managing Director, which 
took place during the end of February-March 1978. In effect, the Egyptian government 
109 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, op. cit., 27 Feb. 1978; and 
IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, Memorandum to Files, From 
William B. Dale, Egypt, 2 Mar. 1978. 
110 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, op. cit., 27 Feb. 1978. 
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managed to achieve a temporary postponement of negotiations with the IMF staff until 
further consideration by the IMF Management. As it turned out, some concessions had 
been made by the Management who were prepared to accept and recommend for the 
Executive Board's approval changes in the timing of implementation of measures as 
recommended by the staff. This included the issues of price increase measures and 
interest rates. Regarding the issue of price increase measures, the Management 
proposed that in addition to the LE 107 million of price increases already introduced, 
and the additional LE 50 million Egypt agreed to implement as a prior action, 
approximately half of the further LE 150 million of prices increases recommended by 
the staff would be implemented during the first year of the programme. The remainder 
of the LE 150 million would be taken during the first quarter of the second year. 
Interest rates would be raised by 2 per cent by the end of 1978 and this could be done in 
two stages. 111 
Nevertheless, the difference over the issue of price increases could not be narrowed. 
Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni, while insisting that the Egyptian government did not 
depart from the IMF on the necessity for price adjustments, argued for 'more 
understanding and flexibility' on the issue of price adjustments and for a more gradual 
approach on grounds that 'the action taken so far is already causing a great deal of 
controversy in cabinet, parliament and among the people.' 112 On the other hand, the 
IMF Management insisted on its proposals, having felt that what the Egyptian team had 
argued for (which was taking price adjustments as a prior action but without any further 
action during the period of the EFF) would weaken the measures to the extent that they 
would be inconsistent with the decision of the Executive Board regarding the EFF. 113 
Once again from the Egyptian government's perspective, the IMF Management's 
flexibility did not live up to their expectation. However, the domestic constraints faced 
by the Egyptian government seemed not to assist the Egyptian team in arguing for softer 
terms over the issue of price adjustments. By adhering to the IMF's own principle in 
order to ensure neutrality in its decision regarding IMF conditionality, the IMF 
111 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt11791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, a cable from William B. Dale 
(Acting Managing Director) to Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni, 16 Mar. 1978. 
112 IMF Central Files, C/Egyptl1791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, a cable from Abdel-Moneim el-
Kaissouni to William B. Dale (Deputy Managing Director), 23 Mar. 1978. 
113 IMF Central Files, C/Egyptll791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, a cable from William B. Dale 
to Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni, 24 Mar. 1978. 
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Management and staff effectively underestimated the significance of the political and 
economic circumstances in the borrowing country. Although they differed in their 
proposals regarding IMF conditionality, the similarity shared by the negotiating teams 
on both sides was that they had to face internal constraints. They needed to take into 
account such factors in coming up with what they could offer to the other party. These 
will now be assessed. 
4.2.3 Cabinet Division over the ]ssue of Price Adjustmentts 
The issue of price adjustments was not only the major hurdle m the negotiations 
between the IMF and Egypt but also created substantial problems on the domestic front. 
The measures proposed by the IMF Management in March 1978 were discussed in the 
Egyptian cabinet. However, it was reported in early April 1978 that there was a cabinet 
split over measures to implement the proposed price increases. Differences emerged in 
the cabinet between Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni, on the one hand, and Prime Minister 
Mamdouh Salem and Zakariya Tawfiq Abdel-Fattah (Minister of Trade and Supply), on 
the other. The latter opposed Kaissouni's proposal to raise the price of utility services 
such as water, electricity and rail travel. 114 However, these specific items seemed to 
have been chosen by Kaissouni since, according to the IMF staff, in their discussions 
with the Egyptian team, they had not themselves specifically recommend increases of 
such items. 115 
The division within the cabinet further deepened and, in combination with his poor 
health, brought about Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni's resignation. This came after the 
government had approved new public sector wage rises without consulting his 
ministry. 116 He was also reported to have been upset that his recommendation to 
increase public utility charges was rejected by the cabinet. 117 According to Hamed el-
Sayeh, Minister of Economy and Economic Co-operation, Kaissouni' s submission of 
his resignation was accompanied by a detailed statement to Prime Minister on the need 
to take measures in accordance with what the IMF had been proposing. 118 The cabinet 
114 MEED, 7 Apr. 1978, p. 20. 
115 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Apr.-May 1978, Office Memorandum, To 
the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From A. S. Shaalan, Egypt- reported Cabinet 
Split over proposed price increases, 20 Apr. 1978. 
116 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 2, 1978, p. 4; and MEED, 27 Apr. 1978, p. 24. 
117 MEED, 27 Apr. 1978, p. 24. 
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division was important not only in the sense that the Egyptian negotiators could use it as 
a constraint factor in justifying its inability to accept IMF demands, but also that it drew 
attention of the third parties to intervene in the Egyptian-IMP negotiations. 
4.2.41 US Interference 
On the IMF side, there emerged difference between the US Executive Director, on the 
one hand, and the IMF Management and staff, on the other, over the issue of pricing 
policy in Egypt. In the first half of May 1978 following the forming of the new 
Egyptian cabinet, Sam Y. Cross, US Executive Director, and Thomas Leddy, US 
Alternate, approached the IMF Management regarding price adjustments of public 
enterprises in Egypt. The former, whose view mirrored the prevailing attitudes in the 
US Congress, 119 contended that it was inappropriate for the IMF to press for price 
adjustments since this might be seen as interference with the social prerogatives of the 
Egyptian government. Cross added that the IMF should confine itself to 
macroeconomic targets, and should leave the country to decide what measures should 
be adopted to achieve the budgetary objective. 120 Although this was perhaps a sound 
argument which could in general apply to other countries, the fact that the US Executive 
Director lobbied the Management particularly in the case of Egypt highlighted Egypt's 
bargaining strength and how politics could involve in shaping IMF conditionality in 
certain countries such as Egypt. 
This was not the first attempt by the US to influence IMF conditionality towards Egypt 
during the negotiations for the 1978 EFF. Upon their return from the October-
November 1977 discussions with the Egyptian officials, the IMF staff, as requested by 
the US Executive Director, fully briefed US government officials (from the US State 
Department, the USAID and the Treasury Department) on the outcome of the 
discussions. 121 Following the briefing, in mid-January 1978 Hans Binnendijk, the staff 
118 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Apr.-May 1978, Office Memorandum, To 
the Acting Managing Director and the Managing Director (on return), From A. S. Shaalan, Egypt-
Informal Visit, 8 May 1978. 
119 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Apr.-May 1978, Office Memorandum, To 
the Managing Director, From Ernest Sture, Fund Approach to Prices, urgent, 24 May 1978. 
120 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Apr.-May 1978, Memorandum for Files, 
From S. Mookerjee (Senior Advisor, Exchange and Trade Relations Department), Meeting with Mr. 
Cross and Mr. Leddy, 11 May 1978. 
121 This had always been the practice in the Middle Eastern Department to brief US government officials. 
IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Oct.-Nov. 1977, Office Memorandum, To 
the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From A. S. Shaalan, Briefing of U.S. 
Government Officials, confidential, 9 Dec. 1977. 
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of the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, in his conversation with one of the IMF staff, emphasised that it was a 
mistake to press for austerity measures in Egypt at the present time. This was because 
they would undermine the Government and because the problems would be solved in 
the medium term in any case as a result of expanded oil production and other factors. 
He added that on the subject of subsidies, they were extremely important for social and 
political stability and made reference to the January 1977 riots. 122 This had an effective 
impact upon the IMF staff's demands since the IMF team, as previously discussed, 
reduced its demands during the February 1978 discussions following the US lobbying. 
In retrospect, the US's interference in the Egyptian-IMF negotiations and its sympathy 
to Egypt came at the time between Sadat's November 1977 trip to Jerusalem, which 
indicated his willingness to make peace with Israel, and peace talks culminating in the 
signing of the Camp David Accords and of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 
September 1978 and March 1979, respectively. To ensure that Sadat's regime would 
survive to sustain its partnership with the US in the peace process in the Middle East, 
such US support within the IMF for Egypt's negotiating position was to be expected. 
IMF conditionality in Egypt was too costly in the short term for the US to stay aloof 
since its implementation could undermine political stability of the regime and thus its 
ongoing peace initiatives launched after the October 1973 war. 
4.2.5 Resumption of Negotiations with the IMF 
President Sadat was seemingly aware of the lack of alternatives and thus recognized 
that there was an urgent economic need to deal with Egypt's chronic problems. 
Following Kaissouni's resignation, President Sadat reportedly issued instructions to 
continue negotiations with the IMF along the lines Abdel-Moneim el-Kaissouni had 
recommended. 123 Such a position of Sadat towards this issue seemed to be highlighted 
by the fact that in the forming of a new cabinet on 7 May 1978, there was little 
alteration in the portfolios of the economic ministers, except the departure of Abdel-
Moneim el-Kaissouni. The negotiations with the IMF then resumed in the second half 
of May 1978 after a new cabinet had been formed, and agreement between the two sides 
was finally reached. 
122 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Feb. 1978, Memorandum for Files, From 
James E. Blalock, Telephone Conversation with Mr. Hans Binnendijk, 24 Jan. 1978. 
123 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Apr.-May 1978, op. cit., 8 May 1978. 
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As the results of the negotiations turned out, it seemed that the US's interference in May 
1978, through its Executive Director, came too late. During the discussions, price 
adjustments were no longer the issue of dispute since the Egyptian team finally 
accepted the March 1978 proposals made by the IMF Management. As the IMF staff 
reported: 
Price adjustments already undertaken by public sector companies were 
sufficient to meet the target figure the staff suggested should be implemented 
prior to the establishment of the extended arrangement. The further pricing 
measures proposed by the staff (of LE 75 million before the end of the first 
year of the program, and a further LE 75 million in the first quarter of the 
second year of the program) were accepted by the [Egyptian] authorities 
without discussion. 124 
Consequently, the US's interference in May 1978 had no bearing on IMF conditionality, 
namely the issue of price adjustments for Egypt. In fact, Egypt's acceptance of price 
adjustments was, to a large extent, influenced by the GODE. It was reported in the IMF 
staff's report that the GODE had played a constructive role in stressing the need for the 
Egyptian government to present a realistic program that would obtain the IMF' s 
support. 125 Agreement was also reached on other issues, including the degree of 
reduction of the bank-financed deficit by at least LE 200 million in the 1979 budget, 
and credit and external debt ceilings. 
4.2.6 Implementation of IMF Conditionality 
In second half of November and early December 1978, an IMF mission visited Cairo to 
carry out Article IV consultation discussions and to review Egypt's economic 
performance under the 1978 EFF programme. The main purpose of the review was to 
reach understandings on exchange rate and budgetary policy for 1979. The review was 
not completed during the November-December 1978 visit since the 1979 budget was 
not finalised. To complete the review, two additional IMF missions visited Cairo in 
February and April 1979. 
Under the July 1978 EFF, IMF conditionality was implemented in a piece-meal fashion. 
This seems to reflect the extent of Egypt's unwillingness to accepting certain terms of 
124 lMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Shaalan and Staff, Apr.-May 1978, Office Memorandum, To 
the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From A. S. Shaalan, Egypt- Extended Fund 
Facility Discussions, 5 June 1978. 
125 Ibid. 
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IMF conditionality. In some areas, conditions were met which included the unification 
of the official and the parallel exchange rates by 1 January 1979, and increases in the 
interest rates by 2 per cent. Prices of some non-essential goods, such as beer, cigarettes, 
soft drinks and petrol, were raised by 15-50 per cent as a result of increases in excise 
duties. Telephone installation charges, train and taxi fares, airport taxes as well as 
locally produced cement and steel reinforcing bars were also increased. 126 
Nonetheless, only two months after the SBA became effective in July 1978, Egypt's 
problems with the IMF emerged over the issues of credit ceilings and the 1979 budget. 
Under the 1978 EFF, the Egyptian government would limit its budget deficits and its 
reliance on bank financing. According to the IMF staff's report, the net credit to the 
public sector exceeded the September 1978 ceiling of LE 60 million by a vast amount 
(the actual increase was LE 243 million) due to laxity in controlling expenditures and a 
slow progress in implementing price increases in the public sector, although the ceilings 
on net domestic assets and foreign debt were observed. 127 Government expenditures on 
consumer subsidies actually rose from LE 710 million in 1978 to LE 1,279 million in 
1980.128 This was followed by slippages in other areas. Not only the bank credit to the 
public sector but also the net domestic assets of the banking system expanded by more 
than their ceilings for the end of December and March 1978.129 Furthermore, in the 
1979 budget, as approved by the People's Assembly, the planned overall deficit 
amounting to about LE 2,581 million was in excess of LE 331 million over the 
programme target of LE 2,250 million. 130 
In the first half of April 1979, at the Egyptian government's request, an IMF mission 
visited Cairo to reach new understandings which could allow Egypt to resume drawings 
126 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, Arab Republic of Egypt: 
Review of Extended Fund Facility Arrangement, prepared by the Middle Eastern Department, the 
Exchange and Trade Relations Department and the Fiscal Affairs Department, approved by A. S. 
Shaalan, Subimal Mookerjee and Richard Goode, confidential, 8 May 1979; and EIU, QER: Egypt, no. 1, 
1979, p. 14. 
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To the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From A. S. Shaalan, Egypt: Article IV 
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128 Waterbury, op. cit., 1983, p. 214. 
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130 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, op. cit., 8 May 1979, p. 10. 
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under the 1978 EFF. However, understandings could not be wor:Ked out. The major 
hurdles still remained over the IMF' s dissatisfaction over the pace of structural reforms 
in fiscal areas such as price increases, and over the discrepancy on the estimates of the 
1979 budget deficit. Concerning the budget deficit estimates, the Egyptian government 
argued that due to expected reductions in expenditures on investment and subsidies and 
additional revenues from small items, the budget deficit would be close to the LE 2,250 
million target. 131 Following the non-observance of credit ceilings and the limit on 
overall budget deficit since September 1978, few attempts had been made by the 
Egyptian government to close the gaps, including excise tax increases, improvements in 
customs and tax administration and subsidy rationalisation. 132 However, the IMF 
considered these measures, which were based on Egypt's gradualism, inadequate to 
achieve the fiscal objectives. 
While the importance of the measures adopted by the authorities was 
recognized, it was noted that these measures have not been sufficient to prevent 
a further serious deterioration in the fiscal outlook, and an unsustainable 
acceleration in the rate of monetary expansion. 133 
On the other hand, the Egyptian government felt that their efforts towards further 
measures to improve the fiscal situation and to carry forward structural reforms, 
particularly price increases in the public sector was constrained by domestic 
circumstances. Concern about the inflationary pressure had made the Egyptian 
government reluctant to allow the price increases which might have adverse effects 
upon the cost of living. 
Following an informal visit by an IMF staff in mid-June 1979, it became clear that the 
1978 EFF was to be aborted134 and negotiations for a new agreement began as early as 
131 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/810, Mission Goode and Staff, Apr. 1979, Office Memorandum, To the 
Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director, From Richard Goode, Egypt- Review under 
Extended Arrangement, confidential, 18 Apr. 1979. 
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Apr. 1979, a cable from Hamed el-Sayeh (Minister of Economy, Foreign Trade and Economic Co-
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September 1979. Therefore, under the April 1978 EFF, only the first tranche of SDR 75 
million was drawn while the remaining tranches were suspended and the programme 
was abandoned by the Egyptian government. 
Gaining economic strength during the implementation period had, to a great extent, 
allowed Egypt room to manoeuvre. Some macroeconomic indicators, which pointed to 
the improvement of Egypt's external economic situation, were evident. Egypt's balance 
of payments position in 1978 was considerably more favourable than in 1977 and than 
had been anticipated. The actual overall balance of payments deficit for 1977 was said 
to be US$ 742 million, and the overall payments deficit for 1978 was, at the time the 
1978 EFF programme was formulated, projected at US$ 825 million, when compared 
with a substantial lower figure of the provisional overall payments deficit for 1978 of 
US$ 215 million, as revised in May 1979. 135 A reduction in imports and a substantial 
rise in expatriate workers' remittances, 136 combined with inflows of aid gave Egypt 
such a strong balance of payments position. The sudden rise in such export earnings 
would lead to a high level of foreign exchange which reduced Egypt's need to draw 
from the IMF under the 1978 EFF. The full amount of the GODE's capital of US$ 
2,000 million was drawn by Egypt to finance its balance of payments deficits. 137 The 
short-term debt had been reduced from US$ 1.4 billion in 1976 to US$ 550 million by 
the end of 1977 and all arrears had been paid off. The medium- and long-term debt had 
been raised to US$ 8.1 billion but no further rescheduling of the foreign debt appeared 
to be required during the next two to three years. 138 
In addition to the improvement in its economic situation, Egypt had developed new 
sources of financial assistance owing to its rapprochement with the West and the 
alteration in its foreign policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict marked by Sadat's 
visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. To provide Sadat with an incentive to negotiate a 
peace treaty in 1977-1979, US economic aid was promised. In the period between the 
Camp David Summit (September 1978) and the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty 
(March 1979), the Carter Administration increased its aid, pledging US$ 300 million in 
post-treaty economic assistance to supplement the ongoing billion-a-year programme. 
135 IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, op. cit., 8 May 1979, Table 4: 
Summary Balance of Payments, 1977-1979, p. 17. 
136 Ibid., p. 16. 
137 The remaining amount of US$ 25 million was for the GODE's expenses. MEED, 11 Aug. 1978, p. 7. 
138 EIU, Egypt: QER, no. 3, 1978, p. 6. 
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The US government also promised a supplemental package of US$ 1.5 billion in 
military aid, to be spread over three years. 139 Egypt began to rely increasingly on 
financial aid from the US, Western European countries, and Japan, particularly after 
nineteen Arab countries had imposed economic sanctions against Egypt at a meeting of 
the Arab League in Baghdad at the end of March 1979 swiftly following the signing of 
Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. Therefore, pressure on Egypt to implement some of 
the politically sensitive policies in the 1978 EFF economic programme was eased. 
Section C: Assessment of Relative Power and the Imposition~ 
Ownership Nature of IMF Conditionality 
The period 1974-1979 saw two major successful efforts by both parties to conclude an 
agreement. The power balance at the start of the negotiations on both occasions was 
tilted towards the IMF, reflecting its issue-specific capabilities. However, the power 
balance shifted throughout the negotiations since neither party was inactive in the 
negotiations and also circumstances changed favourably or unfavourably towards the 
parties. 
Similar to the 1960s negotiations (as shown at the end of Chapter Three), the beginning 
of negotiations leading to both agreements was characterised by unbalanced power 
between Egypt and the IMF. The IMF entered the negotiations with several issue-
specific advantages. First of all, the IMF possessed credit needed by Egypt, even 
though it was ultimately inadequate. Secondly, although the IMF might have felt 
obliged to conclude an agreement due to its role to provide lending to a member country 
facing a balance of payments problem, Egypt was not the only member country of the 
IMF which needed its financial assistance. The IMF had a vast number of its member 
countries, particularly developing countries, who were also in need of its credit. On the 
other hand, Egypt had initially limited alternatives to IMF financial assistance. It was 
aware that it might need the IMP's 'seal of approval' to gain or facilitate access to other 
sources of finance. Thirdly and more importantly, the IMF was in the control of the 
policy issues to be included in the policy programmes, although the details (such as the 
extent of policy measures and the timing of their implementation) were subject to 
discussions. It was the IMF team who first determined the issue list for IMF 
conditionality discussions for both the 1977 SBA and 1978 EFF. On the other hand, the 
139 Burns, op. cit., p. 192. 
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Egyptian team had never been in a position to do so and only responded to the IMF 
team's proposed policy issues by either rejecting or accepting them and then negotiating 
over their details. Part of the explanation is that, unlike the IMF team which was guided 
by procedures of the IMP's lending policy, the Egyptian team was weakened in its own 
initial negotiating position through the absence of coordination among their members. 
Egypt's negotiating team normally consisted of Ministers in the economic groups such 
as Ministries of Economy, of Finance, of Planning and of Supply, and the Governor of 
the CBE. The institutional instability of Ministries in the economic group (as indicated 
by the abolition and merger of ministries and their disappearance) often resulted in a 
great deal of overlapping, repetition and competition in the assigned and specialised 
areas.
140 Thus, the lack of coordination among the members of the team partly 
explained why the Egyptian team was in too weak a position to come up with the 
proposals regarding the policy programme first. On this basis, at the commencement of 
the negotiations, the IMF, therefore, held a considerable degree of negotiating power 
vis-a-vis Egypt and thus the relationship began closer to the imposition end of the 
spectrum than to Egyptian ownership. 
Despite the initial imbalance in relative power, neither proved to be passive. Each party 
always sought to improve their relative power vis-a-vis the other. The sources of 
relative power of each party were various throughout the negotiation period. During the 
first set of negotiations leading to the 1977 SBA, the IMF gained its additional power 
from its tactical move in securing cross-conditionality of the World Bank at the early 
stage of negotiations and also from cross-conditionality that other creditors required 
Egypt to fulfil before granting their own financial assistance in terms of new loans and 
also the rescheduling of Egypt's debt repayments. 
However, some factors on the IMF side appeared to be ineffective in altering the 
outcome of the negotiations. These included the individual negotiators' flexibility from 
both the IMF Management and the IMF staff negotiators, and the technocratic alliances. 
During the 1970s, the IMF staff and the Management did show some degree of 
flexibility, although the former tended to be more rigid and take a tougher line 
140 See, for example, Qandil, A., 'Analyses of the Economic Group of the Government and the 
Relationship between Its Members,' in M. Shimizu, A. Qandil, and S. S. Imam, 'Pressure Groups and 
Economic Policies in Egypt,' Middle East Studies Series, no. 21 (Tokyo: Institute of Developing 
Economics, 1988), ch. 4, pp. 265-303. 
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regarding IMF conditionality than the latter. However, such flexibility of the IMF 
personnel seemed not to add much to the relative power of the IMF as it did not help to 
alter the position of the Egyptian team and thus the outcome of the negotiations. Also, 
for some Egyptians, the tough line of the IMF staff would rather aggravate the sense of 
imposition of IMF conditionality. With regard to the technocratic alliances between the 
IMF and the Egyptian negotiating team and government, although some Egyptian 
negotiators did share a similar view over the analysis and solution of Egypt's economic 
problems, the idea of technocratic alliances did not lend much support for the IMF's 
relative power in the negotiations. Indeed, its positive effect upon the IMF's bargaining 
power was outweighed by the negative impact of the division in the Egyptian cabinet. 
On the Egyptian side, there were several tactics used by Egypt during the negotiations 
leading to the 1977 SBA. They included its requests for the US's direct and indirect 
support in terms of the US's influence within the IMF and its economic aid to finance 
Egypt's balance of payments deficits, and also for the Arab Gulf states' direct support 
in terms of their financial assistance. Such tactics were enabled by a combination of 
both Egypt's geopolitical significance in the region and the favourable aftermath of the 
October 1973 war. The indirect support from both the US and the Arab Gulf states 
allowed Egypt to prolong its negotiations, not to give in to the IMF's demands easily 
and brought about the IMF's concessions and thus certain changes in the outcome of 
negotiations. 
Besides the above tactics, Egypt in part improved its relative power during the 
negotiations from two types of its domestic constraints: the socio-economic impact of 
its initial economic difficulties and of the implementation of policies advocated by the 
IMF; and the division within the Egyptian cabinet. Both were effective in extracting the 
IMP's concessions. After the occurrence of the January 1977 riots, the IMF was 
obliged to give more concessions to Egypt. As for the cabinet division, it allowed 
Egypt more time to resist the IMF' s demands and also altered the outcome of 
negotiations. Moreover, at the individual level, having an influential representative in 
the IMF (Mohammed al-Atrash), who strongly argued in favour of Egypt, provided 
Egypt with greater degree of power in gaining more lenient terms than it would have 
been achieved without one. 
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During the second set of negotiations leading to the 1978 EFF, Egypt's relative power 
was reinforced by the US's interference in January 1978 and Egypt's own tactic to 
negotiate with the IMF Management instead of the IMF staff. Both factors led to 
certain changes in the IMF's demands. After the US had intervened in January 1978, 
the IMF staff showed its flexibility regarding the extent of policy measures. Egypt also 
attempted to bypass negotiations with the IMF team, whose view over the policy 
programme was rather rigid than what the Egyptian team would accepted, and managed 
to gain small concessions from the IMF Management. Thus, both Egypt's tactics and 
the above factors enabled the degree of imposition and ownership to change towards the 
direction of ownership. 
Nonetheless, on the Egyptian side there were several factors which were ineffective in 
bringing about changes in the outcome of the negotiations. The use of domestic 
constraints and the occurrence of the cabinet division did not change the IMF' s 
demands. Also the US's direct support within the IMF in May 1978 resulted in few of 
the intended consequences due to the timing of its interference. Not only did it not 
produce the intended result, but also the US's interference in IMF conditionality 
negotiations did harm to the IMF's principle of neutrality regarding the use of financial 
resources. 
On the IMF side, the US's emphasis on the importance of reaching understanding with 
the IMF and the World Bank played only a minor role in enhancing the IMF's relative 
bargaining power due to the overriding political aim of the ongoing peace talks between 
Egypt and Israel. It was the cross-conditionality of the GODE which played an 
overwhelmingly important role in getting Egypt to agree with the IMF reluctantly. 
Cross-conditionality, thus, seems to work at times. The creditors who placed cross-
conditionality on their financial assistance did not always adhere to such a condition, 
depending on their overriding objective. There was some leniency regarding cross-
conditionality of creditors other than the IMF and this at times allowed Egypt room to 
manoeuvre in dealing with the IMF. 
In sum, during this period, Egypt demonstrated that to the extent that it gained some 
concessions from the IMF, it was able to exploit its political and strategic importance to 
its advantage in conducting the negotiations with the IMF regarding IMF conditionality. 
Egypt's ability to utilise such an asset was largely facilitated by its embarking on the 
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1973 war. The rapid flow of substantial US economic aid in 1975-1976 provided Egypt 
with 'breathing space' which Egypt badly needed, enabling Egypt to refuse the IMF 
demands during 1975-76. 
Overall, during the period, 1974-1979, Egypt managed to gain some concessions from 
the IMF regarding the details of IMF conditionality. However, it seemed to show the 
weaker overall negotiation strength in relation to that of the IMF, especially the 
GODE's cross-conditionality added a greater weight to the IMF's power. The 
cancellation of both programmes under the 1977 SBA and the 1978 EFF when its 
economic condition improved reflected Egypt's unwillingness to follow IMF 
conditionality. Egypt's relatively weaker power in negotiations, together with the 
unwillingness to adopt the whole programmes, did reveal the low degree of the 
programme ownership. Similar to the previous period, IMF conditionality during this 
period, thus, involved a high degree of imposition while the sense of ownership of the 
programmes was rather limited. Egypt accepted IMF conditionality after prolonged 
resistance just because it was under pressure from the GODE to do so, even though the 
support provided by the US helped to ease the pressure and to prolong the negotiations. 
Therefore, in this period, Egypt strived to resist IMF conditionality and utilised various 
tactics. However, despite some IMF concessions gained, it was overall unable to move 
significantly along the spectrum towards ownership. 
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Cb.apter Five 
Mubarak9s Gaining the Upper Hand.~ Jl985=1988 
1Intll:"oduction 
As discussed in Chapter Four, relations with the IMF were worsened when Egypt 
exceeded credit and budgetary ceilings a few months after a three-year facility had been 
agreed in July 1978. However, talks still continued between the two sides in late 1978 
and 1979 with regard to the possibility of drawing on the second tranche of the July 
1978 EFF but the parties failed to resolve their differences. Immediately following the 
collapse of the 1978 EFF, the two parties, especially the Egyptian government, 
attempted to conclude a new arrangement. However, due to the improvement in the 
balance of payments situation in 1980, reaching agreement with the IMF became 
irrelevant since IMF credit was to support countries in balance of payments deficits, not 
balance of payments surpluses. 
The second half of the 1980s witnessed the conclusion of another SBA in May 1987 
after prolonged negotiations between the Egyptian government and the IMF beginning 
in the mid-1980s. Similar to the previous period, there seemed to be US involvement in 
the IMF's decision-making regarding IMF conditionality in the case of Egypt in this 
period. This greatly enabled Egypt to obtain the vague terms under the 1987 SBA, 
which in tum caused the effective division of the negotiations over IMF conditionality 
into two major phases. The first phase took place during the period 1985-May 1987. 
The second phase was after May 1987 until mid-1988 when the 1987 SBA eventually 
collapsed as no agreement could be reached between the two parties on the economic 
programme for this phase. 
Section A: Background 
During the 1980s, a major change in political leadership took place in Egypt but without 
any dramatic changes in the new regime's economic policy and in its foreign policy 
towards Israel and the US. Muhammed Husni Mubarak took presidential office 
following the assassination of his predecessor (Anwar Sadat) by a group of Islamic 
militants during the military parade in October 1981. Unlike Nasser who eliminated the 
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monarchy and Sadat who defeated the Left, Mubarak inherited power rather than seized 
it. 1 At the outset of his office, Mubarak made it clear that the Egyptian economy would 
not be reversed to the socialist system pursued during the Nasser's regime. The infitah 
policy initiated by Sadat would continue. However, he stressed that economic benefits 
would be shared among all society and not merely the 'fat cats' who had proliferated 
during Sadat' s infitah. Thus, what Mubarak had in mind regarding economic policy 
seemed to be the synthesis of Nasser's and Sadat's policies, an infitah of production 
rather than consumption, from which the poor could also benefit. Subsidies on essential 
foodstuffs would be retained whereas luxury imports would be reduced in order to bring 
down the level of conspicuous consumption of the rich.2 
Egypt's foreign policy under Mubarak did not fundamentally depart from that of Sadat. 
Mubarak made it plain from the start that he was not going to scrap Sadat's legacies in 
foreign affairs, which essentially meant the peace treaty with Israel and a close alliance 
with the us? Severing relations with these two countries would only serve to 
undermine Egypt's hope for the return of Sinai under the Camp David accord agreed 
with Israel, which eventually withdrew from the area on 25 April 1982, and to create at 
least the risk of sharp curtailment of US civil and military aid upon which Egypt had 
greatly relied after the October 1973 war.4 In addition, it was likely that a rupture of the 
peace treaty might bring about the possibility of war with Israel, which would in tum 
lead to the threatened loss of essential foreign exchange earnings, namely the Suez 
Canal dues and revenues from the Sinai oilfields.5 In this regard, despite strains in its 
relationship with Israel, Egypt was thus keen to adhere to the peace treaty with Israel 
and to keep good terms with the US, even after the return of Sinai. For instance, the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 did not lead to the withdrawal of the Egyptian 
ambassador to Israel until September in protest against the massacres of Palestinians at 
the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut. 
Whilst Egypt under Mubarak maintained its rapprochement with the US, it also sought 
improved relations with the USSR. In the later years of Sadat's rule, Egypt's relations 
1 McDermott, A., Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 
75. 
2 Hopwood, D., Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-1990, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 184. 
3 McDermott, op. cit., pp. 82-83. 
4 Ibid., p. 83. 
5 Tripp, C., 'Egypt and the Region in the 1980s,' in C. Tripp and R. Owen (eds.), Egypt under Mubarak 
(London: Routledge, 1989), p. 164. 
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with the USSR had deteriorated, culminating in the expulsion of the Soviet Ambassador 
to Egypt and at least 1,000 Soviet 'experts' in the summer of 1981. With the aim of 
restoring a balance in relations by reducing Egypt's heavy reliance on the US,6 Mubarak 
allowed the Soviet experts to return and signed trade and cultural agreements with the 
USSR. In 1984, the full resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR was 
achieved. 
Egypt's relationship with the Arab world gradually began to improve due in part to the 
circumstances which some Arab countries faced and in part to Egypt's stance on the 
Iran-Iraq war. In December 1983, Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), who had been expelled from Lebanon under Syrian 
pressure, visited Egypt in order to gather support for the Palestinian fighters in 
Lebanon. Egypt's diplomatic relations with Jordan were resumed in September 1984 
since Jordan had to deal with Israel and also had close links with the US. In January 
1984, Egypt was readmitted to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Also, 
Egypt's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, which began in September 1980, in part 
helped bring about the rehabilitation of Egypt after its isolation in the Arab world as a 
result of the Camp David agreements and the subsequent peace treaty with Israel. At 
the Amman conference of the Arab League in November 1987, a resolution was passed 
to establish diplomatic links with Egypt at the discretion of member governments. This 
was in recognition of Egypt's support for Iraq in its war against Iran and of its populous 
and military power in dealing with the problems of the region. By 1989, Egypt's 
diplomatic relations with most Arab countries were restored with the readmission of 
Egypt to the Arab League in May. A further sign of the rehabilitation of Egypt in the 
Arab world was also manifest in economic affairs. February 1989 saw the formation of 
the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), which was an economic association with a major 
aim to remove trade barriers and encourage investment among the member countries. 
Among four Arab member countries were Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen. 
However, the ACC came to a prompt end after the invasion of Kuwait due to the 
withdrawal of Egypt as a protest against the Iraqi action in 1990. 
Although peace with Israel in the late 1970s had raised hopes of economic prosperity in 
Egypt, by the middle of the next decade such optimism was dim. In the mid-1980s, 
6 Hopwood, op. cit., p. 192. 
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Egypt's external economic situation deteriorated dramatically. The Egyptian economy 
was hit by another major balance of payments problem. The long-standing structural 
problems in Egypt's balance of payments in terms of deficits in trade and current 
accounts were exacerbated by the sudden decline in oil prices after 1981 and thus 
Egypt's oil revenues, and also by the falls in workers' remittances. As a consequence, 
the trade deficit had widened, the current account deficit was increasing, and the overall 
balance of payments was in deficit (see Table 5.1). This in tum affected the ability of 
Egypt to pay off its annual debt repayments. 
David Butter has identified four factors to explain Egypt's heavy debt,7 which also 
explain its balance of payments crisis. In addition to the dramatic fall in oil prices, 
another factor was the shift from the Soviet Union to the US as the main source of 
military procurement after the 1973 war. Re-equipping the Egyptian armed forces with 
weapons from the US and Western Europe was highly expensive. Like many 
developing countries, Egypt contracted much of its military debt to the US at the time of 
high interest rates prevailing in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which was a 
consequence of the anti-inflationary policy of major industrial countries, particularly the 
US, as has been pointed out in Chapter One. The third reason was the substantial 
investment made m infrastructure projects. Sectors such as sewerage, 
telecommunications, irrigation, and housing had been neglected during Nasser's era 
since the emphasis was on heavy industry and an ambitious political strategy. Neither 
did Sadat's regime pay much attention. Thus, the major task of rehabilitating 
infrastructure was simply left to Mubarak's regime. Last, but not least, the failure of 
agricultural production to keep pace with the growth of population contributed to 
Egypt's debt. Food production grew at about two per cent annually while the annual 
rate of population growth was 2.7 per cent. This meant that the food gap had to be 
filled by imports purchased with scare foreign exchange earnings or foreign borrowing. 
7 Butter, D., 'Debt and Egypt's Financial Policies,' in Tripp and Owen, op. cit., pp. 126-128. 
Table 5.1 Egypt's Economic Indicators, 1980-1990 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
GNP (LE million) 17,231 17,892 21,327 26,051 30,605 35,892 39,397 46,818 ... ... . .. 
GDP at market prices (LE million) 15,470 17,150 20,753 25,895 31,547 37,240 42,563 51,500 61,600 76,800 96,100 
GDP (LE million) 1984/85 prices ... ... 29,436 31,331 33,212 37,240 40,616 43,216 45,565 47,831 50,558 
GDP per capita (LE) 367.20 411.57 484.43 588.26 697.48 801.38 890.25 1,049.95 1,225.38 1,510.03 1,851.28 
Real GDP per capita (LE) ... . .. 687.11 711.74 734.29 801.38 849.53 881.06 906.41 940.44 973.95 
GDP growth(%) 24.01 10.86 21.01 24.78 21.83 18.05 14.29 21.00 19.61 24.68 25.13 
Real GDP growth(%) ... ... . .. 6.44 6.00 12.13 9.07 6.40 5.44 4.97 5.70 
Consumer prices index number 51.8 57.2 65.7 76.2 89.2 100 123.9 148.3 174.4 211.5 247.0 
Consumer price inflation (%) 20.47 10.42 14.86 15.98 17.06 12.11 23.9 19.69 17.60 21.27 16.78 
Unemployment(% of total labour force) 5.20 5.40 5.70 6.60 ... . .. . .. . .. . .. 6.90 8.60 
Budget deficit (LE million) -1,096 -3,554 -2,364 -3,258 -3,439 -4,655 -2,613 -4,716 -4,126 -5,494 
Total external debt (US$ billion) ... . .. . .. . .. . .. 40.07 46.05 50.78 52.49 51.69 40.44 
Total debt service (US$ billion) 1.24 1.55 1.71 2.08 2.42 2.82 2.70 1.66 2.47 2.91 3.07 
Total debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and 13.41 17.01 19.29 20.14 21.37 25.77 27.05 17.84 21.97 23.31 22.46 
services) 
Export (fob) (US$ million) 3,854 3,999 4,018 3,693 3,864 3,836 2,632 3,115 2,770 3,119 3,924 
Import (fob) (US$ million) -6,814 -7,918 -7,733 -8,251 -10,080 -9,050 -7,170 -8,095 -9,378 -8,841 -10,303 
Trade balance (fob) (US$ million) -2,960 -3,919 -3,715 -4,558 -6,216 -5,215 -4,538 -4,980 -6,608 -5,722 -6,379 
Current balance (US$ million) -438 -2,136 -1,851 -330 -1,988 -2,166 -1,811 -246 -1,048 -1,309 185 
Overall Balance of Payments (US$ million) 610 53 -245 87 -247 -200 -31 315 -102 -533 -10,224 
Foreign exchange (US$ million) 1,046 688 698 739 736 792 829 1,378 1,263 1,520 2,683 
Population (million) 42.13 41.67 42.84 44.02 45.23 46.47 47.81 49.05 50.27 50.86 51.91 
Population growth 2.81 -1.09 2.81 2.75 2.75 2.74 2.88 2.59 2.49 1.17 2.06 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (IFS) Yearbook, 2000, pp. 424-427. For consumer price index numbers and GDP and GNP figures, International Monetary Fund, IFS Yearbook, 
1993, pp. 332-333. For total debt service, total debt ratio and unemployment, World Bank, World Development Indicators [CD-Rom], 2000. For total external debt, EIU, Egypt: Country Report, various issues. 
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The worsening state of the Egyptian economy raised the IMF' s concern. In its June 
1985 report, the IMF warned Egypt of a 'substantial deterioration' in the balance of 
payments and the possibility of an overall balance of payments deficit in 1984-85 of 
US$ 1.3 billion.8 It also concluded that Egypt's total international debt amounted to no 
less than US$ 31 billion.9 By the end of 1985, it became clear that this amount had 
been underestimated. Egypt appeared to owe at least US$ 32 billion. 10 
Section B: Narrative 
The May 1987 StandDBy Arrangement 
Despite the failure on the part of Egypt to complete the 1978 EFF, the Egyptian 
government subsequently attempted to reach a new agreement during the late 1970s and 
the first half of the 1980s. Nonetheless, it appeared that during the period prior to 1985 
the Egyptian government was not in dire need of reaching an agreement with the IMF. 
Mahmoud Salah Hamed, Minister of Finance, pointed out that there was no urgency to 
secure another stand-by facility from the IMF for the balance of payments support. It 
was mainly intended to give Egypt a 'health certificate' to improve its creditworthiness 
with the IFis. 11 Indeed, Egypt's external economic position had substantially improved 
during the early 1980s. In particular, Egypt declared a balance of payments surplus in 
1980, owing to large capital inflows that it had received after 1979 as a result of the 
signing of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, as well as the second rise in oil prices in 
1979-80. As a result, the Egyptian government could not draw on IMF credit. Ali 
Abdel-Razzaq Abdel-Magid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, stated in July 1980 that: 'If we sign an agreement with the fund for us 
to draw on it, our balance of payments will have to be in deficit, but we have a surplus 
of well over $ 400 million.' 12 In December, he further explained: 'The fund is not 
advising us to reach agreement. As long as we have a balance of payments surplus we 
cannot draw.' 13 The overall payments surplus, thus, transformed Egypt's relationship 
with the IMF by preventing the former to reach an agreement with the latter at least 
temporarily. 
8 Financial Times, 3 Aug. 1985; and MEED, 10 Aug. 1985, p. 7. 
9 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1986, p. 15; and MEED, 19 Oct. 1985, p. 21. 
10 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1986, p. 15. 
11 Financial Times, 7 Dec. 1983, p. 4; and MEED, 9 Dec. 1983, p. 11. 
12 MEED, 18 July 1980, p. 20. 
13 MEED, 12 Dec. 1980, p. 24. 
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It was not until the mid-1980s when Egypt faced severe economic problems that the 
process of negotiations started to be seriously revived. With chronic economic 
conditions, the Egyptian government looked to the IMF for financial assistance. In the 
autumn of 1985, it was reported that the Egyptian government had requested US$ 1.5 
billion from the IMF to help cover the expected balance of payments deficit. 14 
5.1 Differences between the Two Parties 
According to Prime Minister Ali Lutfi, it was the Egyptians who themselves prepared 
the economic programme and then invited the IMF to advise them in this regard. 15 The 
parties did not have differences in economic orientation. 16 They agreed on the measures 
needed to be taken in dealing with Egypt's economic problems. 17 However, there was a 
major point of disagreement over the pace of economic policies; the Egyptian team 
preferred gradualism whereas the IMF team emphasised a faster pace of economic 
adjustment. 18 
By the second half of 1986, talks between the Egyptian government and the IMF 
continued without reaching an agreement. It became clear that there were still major 
differences between the two sides with regard to the pace and extent of the economic 
reforms. The IMF urged for conditions such as an immediate unification of exchange 
rates within 12 months, a considerable rise in domestic interest rates (from a range of 
11-16 per cent to about 20 per cent), an abolition of food subsidies, an increase in 
energy prices, and a rise in producer prices for agricultural products. However, the 
Egyptian government only agreed to the two latter conditions, while the three former 
issues remained contentious. The government, which had, in mid-October 1986, 
proposed unifying the official floating rate of US$ 1 = LE 1.36 with the free market rate 
of US$ 1 = LE 1.90 within 18 months, rejected the 12-month deadline favoured by the 
IMF on the grounds that it lacked foreign exchange reserves to deal with sudden 
14 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1985, pp. 19-20; Financial Times, 16 Oct. 1985; and MEED, 19 
Oct. 1985, p. 21. 
15 Lutfi, Ali (Prime Minister during 1985-1986), personal interview, Cairo, 3 Feb. 2001. 
16 Interviewee 6 (a former Egyptian official), personal interview, Cairo, 4 Feb. 2001. 
17 Lutfi, Ali, op. cit., 3 Feb. 2001. 
18 Ibid.; Interviewee 6, op. cit., 4 Feb. 2001; and International Monetary Fund, Arab Republic of Egypt: 
Request for Stand-By Arrangement, prepared by the Middle Eastern Department and the Exchange and 
Trade Relations Department, in consultation with the Fiscal Affairs, Legal, Research, and Treasurer's 
Departments, approved by A. S. Shaalan and J. T. Boorman, 29 Apr. 1987, p. 5, in International 
Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and not for Public Use, To Members of the 
Executive Board, From The Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Request for Stand-By Arrangement, 
EBS/87/93, confidential, 29 Apr. 1987. 
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changes in the market. Concerning the mcrease m interest rates, it found this 
unnecessary, especially at the time of recession, and was concerned that such a move 
would restrict investment and economic growth. As for the food subsidy removal, the 
government insisted that this was impossible to achieve overnight and a gradual 
approach should be followed to raise both prices and wages. 19 President Mubarak, in an 
interview with the West German weekly Der Spiegel in late July 1986 said: 'There is a 
threshold which we cannot cross. The IMF does not seem to care about that.' He 
stressed that if IMF conditions were implemented, prices of basic commodities would 
rise sharply: 'There would be unrest. The people would get out of control.' 20 
5.2 Tactic :n:: Seeking Indirect Support- Financial Assistance from 'Friends' 
While the process of its negotiations with the IMF was taking place, Egypt was 
simultaneously seeking alternative or supplementary assistance from its 'friends,' 
particularly the US, in an attempt to strengthen its bargaining position vis-a-vis the 
IMF. For instance, during his visit to Washington in March 1985, President Mubarak 
requested additional emergency funds for balance of payments support.21 
Following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the US peace efforts in the 
Middle East began to subside and the Egyptian-US relationship became less intense. 
However, it remained a key interest of the West, in particular the US, to sustain the 
treaty and also to maintain Egypt's support for the broader Arab-Israeli peace process. 
It was not until 1985 that the US's peace efforts were revived. During the period 
between 1979 after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and 1985, the issue 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict was largely overshadowed by three main developments: 
Carter's re-election campaign; the American hostages held in Tehran in November 
1979; and the pro-Israeli views of the administration of Ronald Reagan. The adverse 
impact of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 on US-Arab relations was one of 
the reasons why Reagan's administration decided to launch its own peace initiative. 
However, there was little movement prior to 1985 partly because 1984 was the US's 
election year.22 Egypt's role in promoting the rapprochement between Jordan and the 
19 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1986, p. 9; and MEED, 5 July 1986, p. 7, 18 Oct. 1986, p. 8, and 1 
Nov. 1986, p. 8. 
20 Mubarak, H., interview, Der Spiegel, July 1986. Cited in MEED, 2 Aug. 1986, p. 8. 
21 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1985, p. 11; Financial Times, 4 May 1985, p. 3; and MEED, 1 Mar. 
1985, p. 11. 
22 Quandt, W. B., The United States and Egypt: An Essay on Policy for the 1990s (Washington, D. C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1990), pp. 17-21. 
Mubarak's Gaining the Upper Hand: 1985-1988 205 
PLO so as to facilitate ultimate negotiations between the Arabs and Israel led to a joint 
statement outlining an approach to peace signed by King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser 
Arafat of the PLO in February 1985. By the second half of 1985, the Jordanian-PLO 
peace initiative had virtually failed since a series of terrorist incidents (such as the 
Achille Lauro affairs), in which factions of the PLO were implicated, damaged the 
PLO's credibility as a participant in peace negotiations. As that peace process stalled, 
the US remained committed to sustaining Egypt's support for its own peace initiative. 
To this end, the US Congress's approval was, in the summer of 1985, granted to 
increase the US's allocation to Egypt in the fiscal years 1985 and 1986. Egypt managed 
to secure the US's additional emergency assistance worth US$ 500 million, which was 
smaller than the amount Egypt had originally requested. The additional US$ 500 
million assistance was divided into two halves: the first half was to be disbursed in 
1985/86 and the other half in 1986/87.23 
5.3 OrossaConditionalH:y of Creditors and lDonoll's and [ts lLaxity 
Although the tactic described above was successful for Egypt in obtaining additional 
financial support from the US, the latter (in the form of the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID)), as well as other creditors and donors, including the World 
Bank, at the same time tried to impose cross-conditionality upon the former. For 
instance, attempts were made by the US to put pressure on Egypt to accelerate its 
economic reform by delaying the disbursement of the final tranche of the US$ 500 
million additional funds (worth US$ 150 million) approved in 1985 and of US$ 115 
million of the cash transfer portion of the US$ 815 million economic support fund for 
US fiscal 1986 (ending in September).24 The US's action was mainly due to its 
disappointment with Egypt's sluggish pace of economic reform. The reforms sought by 
the US included: reaching agreement with the IMF; implementing a second round of 
cuts in electricity subsidies; introducing more effective management of the public debt; 
and granting more support to the private sector.25 
23 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1985, p. 19. 
24 MEED, 1 Mar. 1986, p. 13. The US president had been authorised by Congress to disburse economic 
support funds to Egypt as cash transfer, on condition that this would yield additional development 
activities or economic reforms. Congress must receive advance notification of the additional reforms or 
activities to be undertaken. EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1985, p. 11. 
25 MEED, 1 Mar. 1986, p. 13. 
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Nevertheless, US pressure proved temporary and thus less effective when economic and 
socio-political tensions in Egypt were high. On 25-26 February 1986, riots by the 
conscripts of the Central Security Force (CSF) (which had been created by Sadat after 
the January 1977 riots to deal with demonstrations without summoning the army) took 
place. When the CSF conscripts, who were mostly poor and illiterate and had already 
been dissatisfied with their living conditions during their service, heard a rumour that 
their term of conscription might be extended from three to four years, they went on the 
rampage and began burning casinos and tourist hotels. Subsequently, the conscript riots 
had to be suppressed by the army. 
Such an incident not only threatened the political stability of Mubarak' s regime but also 
could damage the US's efforts in the Middle East peace process. The fear that the 
achievements of the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty might be 
endangered by the political instability of Mubarak's regime, which could in tum 
produce severe drawbacks on the on-going peace process in the Middle East, kept 
ensuring that the West's interest in stabilising Mubarak's regime lived on. Therefore, in 
the following month after the February riots, the US decided to provide Egypt with its 
support by releasing the last US$ 150 million tranche of its 1985 cash supplement to the 
existing aid programme?6 
Furthermore, the US seemed to be concerned about Egypt's economic problems posed 
by the decline in oil prices, particularly over its US military debt. 27 In 1986, Egypt's 
total military debt to the US was about US$ 4,550 million and its annual interest 
payments stood at approximately US$ 500 million. According to the Brooke 
Amendment, all US aid would be suspended if Egypt fell more than 12 months behind 
in meeting interest payments on US military debt. In order to ease Egypt's problem of 
military debt owed to the US, the Reagan's administration decided to release the 
withheld cash aid of US$ 115 million in the summer of 1986.28 Even though the 
leniency of US cross-conditionality did not do away with Egypt's debt problem, this 
portion of cash aid at least enabled Egypt to avoid such a penalty. 
26 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1986, p. 19; and MEED, 15 Mar. 1986, p. 17. 
27 Ibid. 
28 MEED, 15 Mar. 1986, p. 17, and 5 July 1986, p. 7. 
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As the process of negotiations with the IMF got underway, Egypt's difficulty in meeting 
the high fixed interest charges (12-14 per cent) on its military debt owed to the US 
continued. However, once again pressure over its US military debt was lessened when 
the US, as part of its broad refinancing programme, agreed to refinance Egypt's military 
debt. In late 1986, Reagan's administration decided to provide a refinancing package 
for military debt to countries which had suffered from the burden of high fixed interest 
rates on their US military loans and had faced difficulty in servicing their US military 
debt. The refinancing package included reducing interest charges to a uniform rate of 7 
Y2 per cent for a four-year period.29 Both the laxity of the US over its cross-
conditionality and Reagan's refinancing package helped lessen financial pressure upon 
Egypt and thus provided it with some room to manoeuvre in dealing with the IMF. 
However, there remained the need for Egypt to tackle the rest of its mounting debt, 
which was mainly owed to several Western country creditors other than the US. 
5.4 Tactic H: Seeking Indirect Support - Attempts at Reaching a Separate ])eal 
with an Individual Creditor 
In order to reduce the pressure generated by its debt problem and at the same time 
reinforce its relative bargaining strength vis-a-vis the IMF, Egypt adopted another tactic 
by trying to secure separate debt rescheduling deals with its creditors. This was evident 
in President Mubarak's and Egyptian officials' several trips to Western European 
countries in order to rally their support. During mid-July 1986, President Mubarak 
visited four Western European capitals (Rome, Paris, Bonn, and London). The purpose 
of his visit was reportedly to discuss bilateral debt with each of the European countries 
and to request new flows of aid from Europe. Moreover, he was to seek help from these 
countries to persuade the IMF to soften its conditions for the provision of a stand-by 
credit.30 On the whole, President Mubarak received statements of sympathy.31 
According to the Cairo press, during his European visit, President Mubarak received 
pledges of support for Egypt's position in negotiations with the IMF concerning a 
stand-by credit.32 Even before his tour in Europe, sympathetic remarks were expressed 
by Claude Cheysson, Commissioner of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
who called for urgent international action to ease Egypt's external debt problem during 
29 MEED, 20 Dec. 1986, p. 6. 
30 MEED, 19 July 1986, p. 9. 
31 McDermott, op. cit., p. 90. 
32 MEED, 26 July 1986, p. 6. 
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his talks with President Mubarak in Cairo. Cheysson said an agreement with the IMF 
should not entail unbearable sacrifices for the Egyptian people.33 However, concerning 
bilateral aid negotiations, President Mubarak received no firm promise of support 
during his visit to the four Western European capitals?4 Instead, he was said to receive 
from Margaret Thatcher of the UK a lecture on the merits of putting one's economy in 
order.35 
Egypt's attempts at bilateral debt rescheduling with each of its Western creditors failed 
to generate results. At first, some Western European countries seemed to be willing to 
reach a bilateral debt deal with Egypt. However, their preference finally shifted 
towards a multilateral deal in order to strengthen their position in dealing with those 
debts owed to them by Egypt. For instance, Spain had initially expressed its willingness 
to assist Egypt over the arrears accumulating on military orders worth more than US$ 1 
billion made by Egypt. By mid-October 1986, it was reported that the Spanish 
government was considering taking the issue to the Paris Club.36 Instead, the IMF and 
the Western creditors represented in the Paris Club asked for a multilateral debt 
rescheduling agreement. Furthermore, this would be possible only after the Egyptian 
government had agreed to the terms of an IMF economic adjustment programme?7 
This meant that there would be no rescheduling of outstanding debt repayments unless 
the IMF approved a SBA with IMF conditionality attached. Thus, the imposition of 
cross-conditionality by Western country creditors augmented the relative power of the 
IMF while acting against that of Egypt. 
Indeed, the Paris Club debt rescheduling was cross-conditional upon the agreement with 
the IMF. It was only immediately following the IMP's approval of the SBA that the 
debt rescheduling with the Paris Club was allowed to take place. On 18 May 1987, an 
Egyptian economic team headed by Salah Hamed, Governor of the CBE, left for Paris 
33 MEED, 19 July 1986, p. 9 
34 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1986, p. 19. 
35 McDermott, op. cit., p. 90. 
36 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1986, p. 18. The Paris Club was formed in 1977, comprising major 
official creditors. However, the Paris Club is not an international organisation and thus, has no a fixed 
membership. Instead it 'represents a set of procedures ... used for negotiating arrangements to defer 
payment obligations' on official debts. Rieffel, A, 'The Role of The Paris Club in Managing Debt 
Problems,' Essays in international Finance, no. 161 (Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Sec., Dept. of 
Economics, Princeton U., Dec. 1985), p. 3. In the case of Egypt, they included Austria, Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US, and West Germany. MEED, 30 May 1987, p. 5. 
37 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1986, p. 18. 
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to prepare for rescheduling debt service payments. On 22 May 1987, the Paris Club 
agreed on a framework for rescheduling debt service payments. Under the agreement, 
Egypt's debt repayments (i.e. arrears due up to the end of 1986 and interest and 
principal payments between January 1987 and June 1988 on official and government 
guaranteed debts), worth approximately US$ 12 billion including both civilian and 
military debt, were consolidated and spread over a 10-year period. Originally, Egypt 
asked for a repayment period over 15 years. The deal also included a five-year grace 
period on debt payments, allowing the Egyptian government to undertake IMF reforms. 
During the grace period, interest would be calculated on neither the original loan nor on 
the unpaid interest.38 
5.5 Tactic III: Seeking Direct Support from 'Friends' 
Egypt's efforts to gain support among 'friends' went on, while disagreement with the 
IMF over the pace of policy measures remained a major obstacle to gaining access to 
the needed financial assistance. Mubarak's July visit to Europe was followed by a 
series of visits by senior Egyptian ministers to various European capitals in September 
1986.39 Egypt's efforts in seeking support for its protracted negotiations for the stand-
by credit continued through early 1987, when President Mubarak made additional trips 
to Europe in December 1986 and January 1987.40 His December 1986 European tour 
(France, West Germany, Romania, Italy and Greece) appeared to be successful. The 
French, West German, and Italian leaders pledged their full support for Egypt's position 
in negotiations with the IMF. Following his tour, the atmosphere of the discussions was 
said to be substantially improved and the IMF agreed to modify its demands for rapid 
economic reforms.41 
5.6 Cabinet Division versus Technocratic Alliances 
The negotiation process between Egypt and the IMF was briefly disrupted by a sudden 
Egyptian cabinet reshuffle in November 1986. This was initiated by, among other 
things, the failure of Ali Lutfi's government to regulate Islamic investment companies 
and the subsequent financial crisis in relation to al-Rayan (an Islamic investment 
38 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1987, p. 8; Financial Times, 23 May 1987; and MEED, 30 May 
1987, p. 5. 
39 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1986, p. 18. 
40 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1987, p. 8; and MEED, 20 Dec. 1986, p. 6. 
41 MEED, 20 Dec. 1986, p. 6. 
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company).42 The sharp division within the cabinet over the economic reform 
programme also contributed to the departure of the two main figures who had been 
responsible for the economic policy and at the same time the Egyptian negotiators. One 
was Prime Minister Ali Lutfi himself, former Minister of Finance and a leading 
Egyptian economist whom President Mubarak had appointed to push forward economic 
reform in September 1985 and to deal with Egypt's economic problems, following the 
resignation of Kamal Hassan Ali. The other was Ali Negm, Governor of the CBE. The 
two Egyptian officials appear to have been more willing to make compromises with the 
IMF than were some of their powerful cabinet colleagues and, more importantly, 
President Mubarak himself.43 For instance, to reduce the subsidy burden on the 
government budget in fiscal year 1986/87, Ali Lutfi proposed moving away from the 
subsidy system of selling a range of basic commodities at subsidised prices to a system 
of cash benefits which would target only those in need.44 Ali Negm, in an interview 
with Reuters on 29 October 1986, said that although he disagreed with the IMF about 
the need to increase domestic interest rates, he was prepared to be flexible. 45 In this 
regard, such a political move on the domestic front by President Mubarak greatly 
signalled the unwillingness of non-sympathisers of the IMF' s proposals among the 
Egyptian political elite, and especially President Mubarak himself, to yield to the IMF' s 
pressure and also their effort to resist it. 
Instead, Atef Sidqi and Mohammed Saleh ed-din Hamid were appointed as a new prime 
minister and a new governor of the CBE, respectively. The arrival of a new cabinet had 
an impact on the course of the negotiations with the IMF, in particular on the attitudes 
of the Egyptian officials towards IMF conditionality. This cabinet took a tougher stand 
towards IMF conditions, which was also in line with and thus reinforced by President 
Mubarak's view. In his lengthy speech at the opening of the People's Assembly 
following the forming of the new government in mid-November 1986, President 
Mubarak made clear that Egypt would not accept outside interference in its economic 
management. He remarked: 'We do not accept that a foreign institution should 
intervene in directing our economic policy or take decisions on the manner of its 
42 See Springborg, R., Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order (Boulder: Westview P., 
1989), pp. 53-58. 
43 According to the weekly El-Musawwar, whose editor-in-chief Makram Mohamed Ahmed was seen as 
being close to President Mubarak, the negotiating Egyptian team under Ali Lutfi's government went too 
far in accommodating the IMF's demands. MEED, 22 Nov. 1986, p. 10. 
44 MEED, 21 June 1986, p. 13. 
45 MEED, 1 Nov. 1986, p. 8. 
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. I . .46 Imp ementation. Along a similar line to Mubarak' s message, Atef Sidqi told 
reporters on 12 November 1986 that several of the IMP conditions were unacceptable, 
in particular the call for the abolition of consumer subsidies and for a unification of 
Egypt's exchange rates. He argued that 'a unification of the exchange system in one go 
is not possible. ' 47 Concerning the issue of subsidies, Atef Sidqi insisted that the 
government did not consider drastic reductions. He claimed that, while subsidies were 
his first priority, he did not believe they could or should be ended. Unlike his 
predecessor's government which was more amenable to phase out subsidies on many 
items, including bread and electricity, Sidqi believed that subsidies should be retained 
but should be selective, targeting only poorer sections of the population.48 
Following the cabinet reshuffle, the talks with the IMP resumed in Cairo in mid-
November 1986.49 By early February 1987, negotiations with the IMP still continued 
since a gap between the two parties over a key issue of the pace of the exchange rate 
unification could not be narrowed. In an interview with the Cairo weekly Al-Ahram Al-
lkhtisadi, Youssri Mustapha, Minister of Economy, said that the unification of Egypt's 
various exchange rates within a period of 18 months pressed for by the IMP was 
impossible. The process of the exchange rate unification would require a number of 
stages, the first of which could not start until May 1988. A swift unification of the 
exchange rates would bring about an adverse impact on domestic prices and investment 
as well as foreign debt arrangements. Mustapha then emphasised the necessity of a 
gradual approach towards the unification.50 
5.7 The May 1987 Stand-By Arrangement and 'Soft' IMF Conditionality 
After a prolonged period of negotiations, an agreement was finally concluded between 
the IMP and the Egyptian government. On 15 May 1987, the IMP's Executive Board 
approved a SDR 250 million (US$ 325 million) SBA for Egypt, to be drawn over an 18-
month period to November 1988. Immediately a SDR 116 million (US$ 152 million) 
first tranche of the total stand-by credit was drawn. The IMP's credit available was 
substantially less than what the Egyptian government originally had in mind (US$ 1.5 
46 MEED, 15 Nov. 1986, pp. 9 and 12. 
47 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1986, p. 9; Financial Times, 13 Nov. 1986; and MEED, 15 Nov. 
1986, p. 12. 
48 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1986, p. 9. 
49 Financial Times, 18 Nov. 1986; and MEED, 22 Nov. 1986, p. 9. 
50 MEED, 7 Feb. 1987, p. 8. 
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billion). This was voiced by Ali Negm, former Governor of the CBE and a major 
negotiator with the IMF until November 1986, when he said that 'The amount available 
from the fund may not be sufficient to support the range of reforms being enacted.' 51 
This reflects, at least, the desire of the Egyptians to maximise its gain in terms of the 
amount of IMF credit that it could obtain with the given costs incurred to them in terms 
of IMF conditionality. 
The economic reform programme attached to the SBA fundamentally aimed to 'make 
possible over the medium term a sustainable level of economic growth consistent with a 
manageable balance of payments position and an improved price performance,' and to 
increase 'the contribution of the private sector to the growth of the economy' and 'the 
interaction of market forces. ' 52 However, it should be noticed that the aim of the 
programme stated in a press release published in IMF Survey, which was available to 
the public, was put slightly different. In addition to the aim of sustained economic 
growth, the phrase of 'ensuring that a safety net is provided to the least-favored 
members of society through the maintenance of current social policies' was added. 53 
This would not be surprising in the light of the 1977 'Bread Riots' that had occurred in 
Egypt. The emphasis of the idea of a safety net by including it in the aim of the policy 
programme reflected the IMF's awareness of the negative impact that IMF 
conditionality could have upon the views of the public in Egypt (and also in other 
borrowing countries) regarding its role and lending policy. To ensure the successful 
implementation of IMF conditionality in a borrowing country as well as at the same 
time to protect its reputation and credibility in the eyes of the public, the IMF 
considered that there was a need for the support of the public in the borrowing country 
in question. 
The major objectives of the programme were: i) to bring about a recovery of real 
economic activity; ii) to reduce the rate of inflation; iii) to stabilise the current account 
deficit; and iv) to improve the net international reserve position of the banking system. 54 
51 MEED, 23 May 1987, p. 9. 
52 Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Statement by the Government of Egypt on its Economic and Financial 
Policies,' 25 Feb. 1987, in International Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and 
Not for Public Use, To Members ofthe Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of l!.gypt-
Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/87 /93 Supplement 1, confidential, 20 May 1987, p. 7. 
53 International Monetary Fund, 'Egypt: Stand-By Arrangement,' Press Release, no. 87/122, 15 May 
1987, in International Monetary Fund,IMF Survey, 1 June 1987, p. 174. 
54 Ibid. 
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To achieve the above objectives, a number of policy measures and targets covering both 
supply-oriented and demand management policies were set. On the supply side, they 
included adjustments in the exchange system, energy prices, interest rates, and 
agricultural prices. These policies were at the same time to be accompanied by demand 
restraint through reductions in fiscal deficit, limits on credit expansion, and targets on 
external debt, external borrowing and net international reserves. There were also 
provisions with regard to multiple currency practices, payment and trade restrictions, 
and bilateral payments agreements. 55 
Egypt's efforts to rally support from the US and Western European countries, with 
regard to negotiations with the IMF, appeared to pay off in terms of the 'soft' conditions 
for the stand-by credit. A dispute among the members of the IMF's Executive Board 
prior to the signing of Egypt's stand-by agreement with the IMF and its culmination in 
the resignation of C. David Finch, a senior IMF official, in mid-March 1987, seemed to 
confirm US support for Egypt's view that IMF proposals for economic reform 
programme had been too severe. Finch believed that the US had placed undue pressure 
on the IMF to approve credits for Egypt (and also Zaire).56 He stated in his paper 'Let 
the IMF be the IMF' that: 
[T]he Egyptian government, fearing a domestic political backlash, refused to 
take the required action. Instead, it sought protection from other governments. 
The Fund was told to reach 'agreement' with Egypt without insisting on the 
necessary policy changes [emphasis added].57 
The relative leniency of IMF conditionality for Egypt was well illustrated by the IMF's 
generous flexibility on the pace of economic reform. In particular, IMF concessions 
were apparent over the controversial issue of the exchange system. Instead of a rapid 
float of exchange rates, a step-by-step approach was adopted, the first stage of which 
had already been introduced prior to the signing of the May-1987 SBA as one of the 
prior conditions (the so-called prior actions). Furthermore, the wording of the 
agreement was remarkably vague, i.e. in several issues of the programme the agreement 
55 For more details on IMF conditionality under the 1987 SBA, see Appendix E. 
56 MEED, 28 Mar. 1987, p. 5. See also Sadowski, Y., 'The Sphinx's New Riddle: Why Does Egypt 
Delay Economic Reform?,' American-Arab Affairs, no. 22, fall 1987, p. 37. 
57 Finch, D., 'Let the IMF be the IMF,' The International Economy, Jan./Feb. 1988, p. 127. Cited in 
Brown, R. P. C., 'The IMF and Paris Club Debt Rescheduling: A Conflicting Role?,' Journal of 
International Development, vol. 4, no. 3, 1992, p. 304. 
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laid down only general policy guidelines without specific measures, targets or 
schedules. These issues were instead subject to the future discussions. They included: 
i) the unification of all exchange rate markets; 
ii) the increase in nominal interest rates on domestic currency deposits and 
loans to levels that were positive in real terms; and 
iii) the reduction of subsidies on energy prices and the liberalisation of 
procurement prices for agricultural goods (cotton and rice) for crop year 
1988/89.58 
For instance, a term on the interest rate policies was loosely stipulated to achieve 
positive real interest rates by the end of the programme period (i.e. November 1988). A 
schedule of interest rate adjustment to meet such an objective was not set and would be 
worked out during the first review of the programme (which was scheduled to be in 
September 1987).59 
5.8 A Short-Lived 1987 Agreement: Disagreement over the Second Phase of the 
Policy Reform Programme 
By late 1987, the relationship between the Egyptian government and the IMF had been 
aggravated by disagreement over how to proceed with the economic reform programme 
agreed in May 1987. In early November 1987, an IMF team arrived in Cairo to carry 
out the first review of Egypt's economic reform performance.60 The review also 
included the objective of establishing policy targets and schedules for the second period 
of the economic reform programme which the May 1987 agreement had left 
unspecified. 
During the first revtew, little progress was made on reaching agreement over the 
economic reform programme of the second period. Consequently, the disbursement of 
the second tranche of the SDR 250 million stand-by credit was not approved by the 
IMP's Executive Board in late November 1987 and had to be re-scheduled for March 
1988. In the meantime, talks continued but the two sides still failed to narrow the 
differences on the increase in domestic interest rates, the timing of exchange rate 
reform, the rise in energy prices, as well as the cut in budget deficit. Regarding the 
58 Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Technical Memorandum of Understanding,' 31 Mar. 1987, in International 
Monetary Fund, op. cit., 20 May 1987, p. 17. 
59 Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Statement by the Government of Egypt on its Economic and Financial 
Policies,' 25 Feb. 1987, in International Monetary Fund, op. cit., 20 May 1987, p. 9. 
60 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1987, p. 9. 
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issue of interest rate policy, disputes emerged over interpretation of the policy and the 
methods used to determine Egypt's current economic position. In an effort to reduce 
inflation and encourage savings, the IMF urged for an increase in interest rates to levels 
that were positive in real terms. In effect this would mean that the new interest rates 
had to rise above the inflation rate. The official inflation rate was claimed to be 18 per 
cent61 which was substantially lower than one estimated by the IMF and other 
independent observers at approximately 28-30 per cent.62 The Egyptian government 
resisted the IMF demands on the grounds that a rise in domestic interest rates based on 
the higher estimate of the inflation rate would be seriously damaging to the expansion 
of domestic investment. Instead, Egypt reportedly suggested restrictions on credit 
through direct instructions given to the commercial banks as an alternative.63 
As for the other issues, the disputes between the two sides arose over the pace of the 
economic reforms. The rapid reform of exchange rates preferred by the IMF was 
rejected by the Egyptian government, which criticised the IMF for wanting 'everything 
at once. ' 64 As a result, the timing of the exchange rate reform could not be concluded. 
According to Prime Minister Atef Sidqi, the Egyptian government considered that 
implementing such a reform would need five to ten years, rather than the one year 
originally demanded by the IMF. The Egyptian government was, thus, determined to 
keep the fixed official exchange rate of US$ 1 = LE 0.70, which was used to finance 
and subsidise imported foods. As for the issues of energy subsidies and the budget 
deficit, the IMF viewed that steps taken to raise energy prices and to cut the budget 
deficit were inadequate65 while the Egyptian government viewed the energy price 
increase and the budget deficit cut required by the IMF as having been too sharp.66 
With their previous support lent to Egypt during the negotiations of 1985-1987, one 
might anticipate that Egypt's major creditors, such as the US and Western European 
countries, would put pressure on the IMF to be lenient in its demands. Claude 
Cheysson, European Community (EC) commissioner for North-South relations, spoke 
61 Critics of the methods used by the Egyptian government pointed out that the official inflation rate was 
based on food prices in Cairo and Alexandria only, and on a range of other goods, including items sold at 
the government-controlled prices. MEED, 2 Jan. 1988, p. 9. 
62 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1988, p. 9; and MEED, 2 Jan. 1988, p. 9. 
63 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. l, 1988, p. 9. 
64 This was the remark of Prime Minister Atef Sidqi, in an interview with El-Musawwar. Cited in MEED, 
6 May 1988, p. 5. 
65 MEED, 2 Jan. 1988, p. 9. 
66 MEED, 6 May 1988, p. 5. 
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of 'the impossibility of brutally applying' IMF terms during his visit to Egypt in early 
March 1988. He asked how a cost of living could be imposed on a population that 
would be way beyond its means.67 Nevertheless, this concern seemed to be merely 
sympathetic rhetoric since the second tranche of the May 1987 stand-by credit was in 
fact never released. 
During the three-year period of negotiations, sympathetic support from the official 
creditors for Egypt's position in negotiating with the IMF had been abundant for 
political reasons, as has been previously discussed. However, the sympathy of the 
official creditors virtually evaporated during the implementation of IMF conditionality. 
Such a shift of the official creditors can be understood in the light of their 
simultaneously existing characteristics: states (political entities) and creditors (financial 
entities). As a result, these official creditors in dealing with Egypt were of two main 
contradictory objectives: first, their foreign policy goals which indicated that their 
support should be given to Egypt; and second, their longing for repayments of debt 
owed to them which signalled that their support should be given to the IMF. To 
reconcile both objectives, they adopted a 'stick-and-carrot' approach. However, the 
degree of the 'stick' which was motivated by their desire for debt repayments and that 
of the 'carrot' by their foreign policy goal varied. To make IMF conditionality more 
acceptable to Egypt and thus to induce Egypt to enter into an agreement with the IMF, 
their political support to Egypt during the 1985-1987 negotiations, which was driven by 
Egypt's political and strategic importance in the Middle East, gained more significance 
over their financial objective. Nevertheless, Egypt's tactic of dragging its feet on 
implementing the economic reform, which the official creditors had hoped would put 
right the Egyptian economic problems and, more importantly, would restore the ability 
of Egypt to repay the debt owed to them, worked against their second objective. 
Therefore, during the implementation period, the political support of the official 
creditors simply had to give way to their desire for debt repayments. 
Consequently, instead of their support, Egypt received pressure from its creditors asking 
for an increase of energy prices to match world prices within the next five years. The 
release of the World Bank loans to Egypt's energy and agricultural sectors were delayed 
due to the World Bank's co-ordinating with the IMF. Also the US, through the USAID, 
67 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1988, p. 11. 
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held up its finance to increase Egypt's electricity generating capacity.68 However, since 
Egypt's major financial problem, i.e. its vast debt, had temporarily been resolved 
through the rescheduling with the Paris Club, such pressure produced no effect in 
forcing Egypt to agree to the IMF' s demands. 
After several months of talks between the November 1987 review and the first half of 
1988, no agreement could be reached on the second stage of the reform programme and 
the second tranche of the May 1987 stand-by credit was never disbursed. Only SDR 
116 million of the agreed SDR 250 million in balance of payments support was drawn 
(see Table ll.1 on p. 120). Although prior actions, which were required before the IMF 
Executive Board's approval of an agreement, were implemented, the budget deficit for 
fiscal 1988/89 appeared to exceed the target of 11 per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)69 and no action seemed to be envisaged on cutting consumer subsidies or on 
raising agricultural prices.70 Eventually, the May 1987 reform programme was aborted 
by the Egyptian government. 
Section C: Assessment of Relative Power and the Imposition-
Ownership Nature of IMF Conditionality 
The above discussions shows that the balance of power between Egypt and the IMF was 
subject to constant change due to a combination of Egypt's tactics and factors affecting 
the relative power of both parties. Similar to the two previous periods of the study, 
there was at the start of the negotiations unbalanced power in favour of the IMF. When 
it entered into the negotiations with the IMF, Egypt was in a weaker economic and 
financial position and had less choice in dealing with its problems. However, unlike the 
two earlier periods, at the outset of the negotiations the Egyptian team seemed to be 
able to come up with its own draft of the economic reform programme to be attached to 
the IMF's financial package. Perhaps part of the explanation was Mubarak's 
appointment of reformers in the cabinet, reflecting the priority he attached to tackling 
Egypt's long-standing economic problems, which enabled the Egyptian team to initiate 
the first proposals of IMF conditionality. This was also due in part to the familiarity of 
68 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1988, p. 8. 
69 MEED, 17 June 1988, pp. 3-4. 
70 Niblock, T., 'International and Domestic Factors in the Economic Liberalization Process in Arab 
Countries,' in T. Niblock and E. Murphy (eds.), Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East 
(London: British Academic P., 1993), p. 61. 
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the Egyptians with the contents of IMF conditionality after their experiences in dealing 
with the IMF in the two previous decades. Despite its ability to put forward the first 
proposals, the control of Egypt over the policy issues included in IMF conditionality 
was weakened by the initially stronger position of the IMF, which from the start did not 
completely agree with Egypt's own proposals. Therefore, at the beginning of the 
negotiations, the degree of imposition could be said to be equal to that of ownership, i.e. 
lying approximately in the middle of the imposition-ownership spectrum (described in 
Chapter Two, Section 2.3.3). 
During the 1985-1987 negotiations, Egypt proved itself to be an active negotiating 
party. Aware of its initial weaknesses but at the same time its political and strategic 
importance in the region, Egypt was continuously searching for ways to improve its 
relative bargaining strength. Together with its geopolitical significance, Egypt's tactics 
largely worked to great effect in enhancing its relative negotiating power and thus 
extracting concessions from the IMF in terms of several lenient IMF conditions. 
In addition to its tactics, part of Egypt's gain in its relative power during the 1985-1987 
negotiations stemmed from domestic riots by the CSF conscripts of February 1986, 
coupled with its political and strategic importance in the region to the US. In the light 
of the latter's interest and efforts in the on-going Arab-Israeli peace process, ensuring 
the political survival of Mubarak's regime had become a vital goal in conducting its 
foreign relations. In this regard, the availability of resources other than those of the 
IMF, such as the increase in the US financial aid and the US refinancing package, 
allowed Egypt to drag on the negotiations as financial pressure had lessened, even 
though the total amount of assistance was too small for Egypt to avoid agreement with 
the IMF entirely. 
As for the IMF, it gained its relative power during the negotiations from the cooperation 
among Egypt's donors and creditors through their cross-conditionality and insistence on 
multilateral debt rescheduling. The US, the USAID, and the World Bank tied the 
release of their funds to agreement with the IMF or to similar conditions that the IMF 
would ask for. Other Western creditors demanded debt rescheduling to be carried out 
on a multilateral rather than bilateral basis and linked debt rescheduling to agreement 
with the IMF. By refusing to engage in bilateral debt rescheduling agreements with 
Mubarak's Gaining the Upper Hand: 1985-1988 219 
Egypt and instead insisting on a multilateral one, the official creditors of the Paris Club 
effectively pressured Egypt to resort to the IMF. 
Yet, their cross-conditionality and the extensive coordination between them did not 
guarantee that Egypt would lack room to manoeuvre in negotiating with the IMF 
regarding IMF conditionality. Egypt was able to prolong the negotiations, for example, 
when the US released its withheld aid in March 1986 at the time Mubarak's regime was 
under threat of political instability on the domestic front. Also, Egypt's geopolitical 
significance and political circumstances at domestic and regional levels ensured that 
there remained sufficient opportunities for Egypt to instigate divisions within the donors 
and creditors, as marked by the split within the IMP's Executive Board over IMP 
conditionality under the 1987 SBA. With such divisions, Egypt was thus able to 
manoeuvre between them and altered the outcome of the negotiations closer to its 
preferences. 
Besides the cooperation between the donors and creditors, the role of other factors in 
strengthening the IMP's relative negotiating power appeared insignificant since they 
hardly brought about any change in the outcome of the negotiations. These included the 
technocratic alliances between the IMP and the Egyptian negotiators, and factors at the 
level of the individual negotiators. Concerning the technocratic alliances, they provided 
only little support to the IMP. Their effectiveness in enhancing the IMP's relative 
negotiating power was undermined by the failure of Ali Lutfi' s negotiating teams to 
convince their powerful cabinet colleagues and, more significantly, President Mubarak 
himself and also by the latter's control in the decision-making, as evident in the removal 
of two major political figures (the Prime Minister and the Governor of the CBE) and a 
tougher stand adopted by the new figures towards IMP conditionality. 
At the level of individual negotiators, at least two elements can be assessed: the 
language used by and the flexibility of the IMP negotiating team. According to Prime 
Minister Ali Lutfi, the language used by the IMP staff was 'not an order ... [but] a kind 
of recommendation, not obliged' and the IMP negotiating team was 'flexible ... but 
they were not flexible enough.'71 However, both the language used by and the 
flexibility of the IMP negotiating team appeared to play only a minor role in altering the 
71 Lutfi, Ali, op. cit., 3 Feb. 2001. 
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outcome of the negotiations since the Egyptian team's views on the pace of economic 
reform were more or less unchanged. 
In sum, as the negotiations got underway, Egypt made substantial gains in its relative 
power. The considerable augmentation of its relative power, which was best reflected 
by the leniency of IMF conditionality reached under the 1987 SBA, was due largely to 
apparent US pressure on the IMF. Despite the relatively greater power of the IMF at 
the start of the negotiations, the moderate economic programme under the 1987 SBA in 
line with Egypt's preference indicated that over the negotiation period the relative 
power of Egypt had grown and had exceeded that of the IMF by the time agreement was 
reached. As IMF conditionality came close to what Egypt had proposed, IMF 
conditionality reached under the 1987 SBA cannot be said to have been completely 
imposed and there was a greater element of ownership than imposition. Thus, Egypt's 
resistance to IMF demands was successful in moving the degree of imposition and 
ownership along the spectrum from its starting point (the mid-point) towards the 
ownership end. What 'soft' IMF conditionality also suggested was that Egypt's relative 
power and the degree of ownership of IMF conditions were greater than in the two 
previous periods due to its greater relative power vis-a-vis the IMF. In retrospect, the 
vague terms regarding the interest rates and the exchange rate policy were simply 
awaiting the abandon of the economic programme when Egypt's economic and 
financial situations were improved following the rescheduling agreement with the Paris 
Club was reached. 
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During the period 1989-1998, IMP conditionality was substantially more 
comprehensive t~an in any previous period, due mainly to the enlargement of the IMP's 
focus since the 1980s to include structural adjustment policies in addition to its 
traditional stabilisation policies (see Chapter Two). Ironically, the two parties managed 
to conclude three agreements, despite numerous conditions involved; and of the three 
agreements, the Egyptian government successfully stayed on course with two. The 
period between 1989 and 1998 saw the successful conclusion of three agreements: the 
two SBAs of May 1991 and October 1996; and an EFF in September 1993. The 
negotiations held immediately following the collapse of the 1987 SBA had been 
protracted for three years before the 1991 agreement was reached. However, in the new 
international environment after the end of the Cold War and following the Gulf crisis of 
1990-1991, the periods of negotiations leading to the two subsequent agreements were 
considerably shorter than that of the 1991 agree111ent. In the post-Gulf crisis, the IMP 
credit made available under the 1991 agreement was not fully drawn on and those under 
the subsequent agreements were unused due partly to the financial gains as a result of 
Egypt's eventual stand in the Gulf crisis and partly to the substantial improvement in 
Egypt's external economy as a result of having undertaken economic reform. All of the 
agreements remained effective until their expiry dates, with the exception of the 1993 
EFF which had to be abandoned following major disputes over devaluation and the pace 
of reform. 
This chapter will assess the nature of IMP conditionality in the case of Egypt during the 
final period of the study, i.e. the period of 1989-1998. However, before moving on to 
that task, we need to consider the background and narrative of the negotiations between 
Egypt and the IMP. It needs to be pointed out that these negotiations took place 
immediately after the 1987 SBA had lapsed; hence the background section in this 
chapter will be dealing with the major changes that took place during the period 1989-
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1998, rather than the changes occurred in the pre-negotiation period as has been done in 
the three previous chapters. 
Section A: Background 
During the period 1989-1998, several major changes took place at both domestic and 
international levels which helped shape the course of the relationship between Egypt 
and the IMF. They included the end of the 'Cold War,' the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, 
and the conflicts between Mubarak's regime and various Islamist groups and the 
former's increasingly repressive and/or restrictive policy in dealing with actual and/or 
potential domestic resistance. 
The period 1989-1998 witnessed a major event in the international system, the declining 
and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. As it became 
increasingly preoccupied with domestic matters, including its economic problems, the 
commitments and influence of the Soviet Union in the region were on a decline during 
the late 1980s, particularly after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988. 1 The year 
1989 saw the crumbling of Communist regimes and the victories of non-Communists in 
several Eastern European countries. The declaration of independence of nearly all the 
Soviet republics at the end of 1991 brought about the decisive moment of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and its role of the superpower. With the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the US was left as the sole superpower in the world. The East-West tension and the 
hostility between the two superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union) became past 
history. In other words, the Cold War came to an end, which was officially declared by 
• 
President Bush of the US and President Yeltsin of Russia in February 1992. However, 
the end of the Cold War did not result in the termination of interests of the US and the 
former Soviet Union (Russia) in the region, as clearly illustrated by their involvements, 
particularly that of the US, in the Middle East peace process during the 1990s and the 
Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. Yet, during the post-Cold War period, their interactions were 
transformed from hostility into a partnership in dealing with the above matters. 
1 Yapp, M. E., The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995, 2nd ed. (Harlow: Longman, 
1996), p. 499. 
Table 6.1 Egypt's Economic Indicators, 1989-1999 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GDP at market prices (LE million) 76,800 96,100 111,200 139,100 157,300 175,000 205,000 228,300 256,250 280,220 302,300 
GDP growth (%) 24.68 25.13 15.71 25.09 13.08 11.25 17.14 11.37 12.24 9.35 7.88 
Real GDP growth (%) 4.91 5.68 1.11 4.48 2.90 3.97 4.64 4.99 5.49 5.60 6.04 
Consumer prices index number 44.9 52.4 62.7 71.3 79.9 86.4 100 107.2 112.1 116.8 120.4 
Consumer price inflation(%) 21.35 16.70 19.66 13.72 12.06 8.14 15.74 7.20 4.57 4.19 3.08 
Unemployment(% of total labour force) 6.90 8.60 9.60 9.00 10.90 11.00 11.30 ... 8.4 8.2 8.1 
Budget deficit (-) or surplus (LE million) -4,126 -5,494 -1,067 -4,831 2,681 589 1,828 -4,411' -5,178 -2,591 ... 
Total external debt (US$ billion) 51.69 40.44 33.0 31.6 30.6 32.3 33.3 31.3 29.8 32.0 30.4 
Total debt service (US$ billion) 2.91 3.07 2.61 2.70 2.18 2.24 2.38 2.28 1.93 1.81 1.73b 
Total debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and 23.31 22.46 17.00 15.94 11.23 14.90 13.37 12.65 9.72 9.49 9.0b 
services) 
Export (fob) (US$ million) 3,119 3,924 4,164 3,670 3,545 4,044 4,670 4,779 5,525 4,403 5,237 
Import (fob) (US$ million) -8,841 -10,303 -9,831 -8,901 -9,923 -9,997 -12,267 -13,169 -14,157 -14,617 -15,165 
Trade balance (fob) (US$ million) -5,722 -6,379 -5,667 -5,231 -6,378 -5,953 -7,597 -8,390 -8,632 -10,214 -9,928 
Current account balance (US$ million) -1,309 185 1,903 2,812 2,299 31 -254 -192 -711 -2,566 -1,635 
Overall Balance of Payments (US$ million) -533 -10,224 -2,073 3,360 18 -1,164 -1,827 -1,725 -635 -1,387 -4,614 
Foreign exchange (US$ million) 1,520 2,683 5,324 10,677 12,761 13,316 15,998 17,198 18,479 17,888 14,278 
Population (millions) 50.86 51.91 52.99 54.08 55.20 56.34 57.51 59.31 60.07 61.34 62.65 
Population growth 1.17 2.06 2.08 2.06 2.07 2.07 2.08 3.13 1.28 2.11 2.14 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2001, pp. 434-437, and 2002, pp. 438-439. For total debt service, total debt service ratio and unemployment, World Bank, 
World Development Indicators [CD-Rom], 2000. For total external debt, ETU, Egypt: Country Report, various issues. 
Notes: 
• Prior to 1996, data include the operations of the Public Authority for Insurance and Pensions and the Public Authority for Social Insurance, which were incorrectly included as social security funds. Prior to 
1996, data also exclude the operations of the General Authority for Supply of Commodities (GASC). 
b ETU, Egypt: Country Profile, 200 I. 
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During the process towards the end of the Cold War and the post-Cold War period, 
Egypt's foreign policy objectives were to draw closer to the US in order to obtain 
economic and military benefits and to sustain its leadership in the Arab world which 
was linked to the former objective. On the other hand, Egypt served US interests by 
becoming an interlocutor with all of the Arab states after Egypt's rehabilitation into the 
Arab world.2 This position concerned not only the Middle East peace process (as Egypt 
was so far the only Arab state which held a peace treaty with Israel), but also the Gulf 
crisis of 1990-1991. 
During the second half of the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt sought to play an active role of 
facilitator in the peace process. As the peace process stalled in 1990 following the 
internal division within the Israeli Unity government and retaliatory violence in the 
occupied territories following the killing of seven Palestinians by an Israeli in Rishon 
LeZion, Egypt's ability and role in the peace process declined.3 The Palestinians 
became increasingly dissatisfied with Egypt's role and began to look to Iraq which had 
emerged as a rival to Egypt's bid for Arab leadership after the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-
1988. Meanwhile, regional developments in other areas provided further evidence on 
Egypt's relative decline of Arab leadership and the growing conflict with Iraq for this 
role. Such developments included the creation of regional organisations during the 
1980s such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 1981, the Arab Cooperation 
Council (ACC), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in February 1989. Sadam 
Hussein's mistreatment of some two million Egyptian migrant workers in Iraq led to a 
crisis in Egyptian-Iraqi relations in November-December 1989 with the return of 
thousands of Egyptian workers from Iraq whose savings were blocked.4 At the first 
annual meeting of the ACC in Amman in February 1990, animosity between Saddam 
Hussein and Mubarak was apparent when Saddam called those cooperating with the US 
'cowards,' and President Mubarak and his delegation stormed out of the meeting.5 
Egypt's relative decline of influence in the region as well as the adverse consequences 
of the Gulf crisis in terms of loss of revenues from oil transit dues through the Suez 
2 Cantori, L., 'Unipolarity and Egyptian Hegemony in the Middle East,' in R. 0. Freedman (ed.), The 
Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait (Gainesville: U. P. of Florida, 1993), p. 340. 
3 Ibid., p. 344. 
4 Vatikiotis, P. J., The Middle East: From the End of Empire to the End of the Cold War (London: 
Routledge, 1997), pp. 174-175. 
5 Cantori, op. cit., p. 345. 
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Canal, tourism and the remittances of Egyptian workers in Kuwait and other oil-rich 
Gulf states, led to its wish to pursue its regional leadership role in the crisis. Initially, 
Egypt acted as a mediator in the Gulf crisis between Iraq (which Egypt had assisted 
during the Iran-Iraq war by providing military equipment and advisors) and Kuwait, in a 
hope that an Arab solution would be found. Prior to Iraq's invasion and subsequent 
annexation of Kuwait in August 1990, Egypt sought a dialogue between the two parties 
in the interests of Arab solidarity. However, the Arab solution which Egypt had hoped 
for did not materialise. As its diplomatic efforts failed, in the light of its economic and 
financial difficulties, the Egyptian government sided with the US-led UN coalition 
forces in the Gulf war in a speculation that there would be a large portion of its debt 
cancelled (perhaps 50 per cent).6 At the Arab League summit in Cairo on 10 August 
1990, twelve (including Egypt) of twenty-one members voted for a call for the 
withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait and to send an Arab force to the Gulf in 
support of the US's effort to deter an Iraqi invasion of another Arab oil-rich state, Saudi 
Arabia. Egypt joined the coalition forces against Saddam Hussain during the 1990-
1991 Gulf war by contributing its 30,000 troops (the second largest force in the 
coalition after the US) to Saudi Arabia. 
On the domestic front, over the years there was a growing influence of various Islamist 
oppositional groups in Egypt, and the subsequent development of conflicts between 
such groups and Mubarak's regime. Before further discussions, it should be noted 
briefly that Islamist groups in Egypt are pluralistic in nature,7 and thus the conflicts 
between the regime and different Islamist groups were not identical. 8 For the purpose 
of the following discussions, a distinction should be made at least between rumed 
Islamist groups which resorted to violence in achieving their objectives (such as the 
Islamic Jihad and the Jama'a Islamiyya), and unarmed Islamist groups which did not 
(epitomised by the Muslim Brotherhood). 
The early 1990s, particularly from February 1992, saw the proliferation of violent 
actions involving armed Islamist groups in several districts in Cairo and the 
6 Haseeb, D, and Malak S. Souchdy, 'Egypt's Speculations in the Gulf Crisis: The Government's Policies 
and the Opposition Movements,' in H. Bresheeth and N. Yuval-Davis (eds.), The Gulf War and the New 
World Order (London: Zed, 1991), p. 75. 
7 See Sullivan, D. J. and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999). 
8 Kienle, E., A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Rejom1 in Egypt (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 
pp. 132-133. 
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governorates of Upper and Central Egypt. These included the assassinations of 
ministers and writers, armed attacks, bombings and other armed incidents against Copts 
and foreign tourists. Unlike the armed Islamist groups, the increasing influence of the 
unarmed Islamist groups was expressed in a non-violent manner. They gained 
increasing popularity and influence in many Egyptian institutions such as state 
administrations, the judiciary, professional syndicates, trade unions, and universities 
among students. 
For Mubarak's regime, such growing influence and/or popularity of Islamist groups, 
regardless of whether they armed or unarmed, represented increasing threats to its 
control and political survival, as well as the economic reform programmes after 1991. 
Moreover, there were dangers that armed (and also unarmed) Islamist groups might take 
an opportunity of economic hardship to mobilise certain groups of actors or even the 
public mass to challenge the regime's control, its economic policy and ultimately its 
political survival. Nevertheless, this, by no means, represents the only possible motive 
behind the repressive measures of Mubarak's regime (see below). Eberhart Kienle has 
identified a number of the regime's possible motives behind its repressive measures 
against the armed Islamist groups. They included a concern for the security of its 
'citizens,' a threat to national unity in the light of the aggravated tension between 
Muslims and Copts, the fear of discontinuation of American aid (which the US 
Congress liked to link to the absence of religious persecution), and the fear of foreign 
tourists deserting the country particularly after the Luxor massacre in autumn 1997, 
when 58 tourists were killed out of 62.9 
The measures adopted by the regime in response to these potential threats were often 
repressive and/or restrictive. The measures adopted against the armed Islamist militants 
includes arms confrontations, arrests, detention under the state of emergency, frequent 
trials of civilians in military courts after December 1992, and severe sentences such as 
capital punishment. The frequent use of such repressive measures was facilitated by the 
introduction of Law No. 97 of July 1992 and the extension of the state of emergency in 
1994, 1997 and 2000 for three years consecutively. Law No. 97 of 1992 involved the 
amendments to the penal code and the law on State Security Courts, including those 
9 Kienle, op. cit., 2001, pp. 135-136. 
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which defined terrorist crimes, and extended the application of the death penalty and the 
jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 
Although such repressive measures were primarily driven by the regime's aim to crack 
down on political violence, their application was not merely restricted to armed Islamist 
groups. The regime seemed to exploit the existence of Islamist militant groups and the 
conflict with them to justify its confrontation with other potential challengers, such as 
Islamist opponents who did not resort to violence. 10 In an attempt to reduce the 
influence of the unarmed Islamists (namely, those belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Labour Party) and their sympathisers, Mubarak's regime resorted to some 
similar repressive measures used with armed Islamists such as arrests, detention, trials 
of civilians in military courts, interrogations and incarceration. There were also other 
measures which were specifically aimed at reducing the influence and ability to 
mobilise of unarmed Islamist groups. They included legislative measures such as Law 
No. 100 of 1993 which required minimum levels of turnouts for the elections in 
professional syndicates to be valid to prevent the Islamists from dominating these 
syndicates. Also, there were attempts to manipulate the results of elections to the 
Student Federations (the representative bodies of university students) in favour of 
candidates closer to the regime, for example, through the rejection by university 
authorities of candidates who were usually believed to be Islamist or left-wing 
sympathisers. Other methods of interference included tampering with ballot boxes, 
miscounting of votes, and arrest of candidates. 11 
Over time, the conflicts between the regime and both types of Islamists groups had in 
part led to further expansion of the list of restrictions. For instance, Law No. 238 of 
1996, which required preachers and teachers of any mosque to obtain the authorisation 
granted by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, was introduced to target the preachers and 
teachers who were of sympathy for Islamist opposition groups. To an attempt to reduce 
the opposition within al-Azhar, the board of the Front of the 'Ulamas of al-Azhar which 
seemed to move closer to the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved in 1998. There were 
also accusations and campaigns of harassment by the regime against human rights 
10 See Kienle, op. cit., 2001, pp. 134, and 137; and Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, op. cit., p. 11. 
11 Kienle, op. cit., 2001, p. 87. 
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organisations from the mid-1990s in forms of bans on their activities, arrests, 
interrogations and confiscations of documents and notes. 
Moreover, as the econolTilc reform programmes were put into practice, additional 
restrictions were introduced as a way to prevent criticisms against the regime and its 
economic policies. The economic crisis of the mid-1980s and also the reforms pursued 
to overcome it since then had had an impact upon the redistribution of resources. The 
latter had in tum produced adverse effects upon many of the Egyptians, who appeared 
to be the losers such as public employees, beneficiaries of many subsidies, and young 
graduates seeking recruitment into the civil service. On the other hand, there were also 
winners as a result of the redistribution such as the owners of capital. Demands and 
reactions of some potential losers or winners towards the resource redistribution could 
in tum represent additional threats to the regime's control over several actors and areas 
including the economic reforms. Such a fear was reinforced by protests, which were 
reflective of organised mobilisation, despite their small scale and geographical limit, 
such as those by workers and by an upward trend of the number of strikes and stoppages 
during the 1990s.12 
In an attempt to compensate the loss of control, the regtme resorted to numerous 
repressive and/or restrictive measures. Among the targets were the media, which were 
one of the major potential sources of criticisms regarding the regime and the economic 
reforms. Under Law No. 93 of 1995 which redefined and newly defined the majority of 
criminal offences and introduced tougher punishments, the definition of crimes was 
widened substantially to cover the propagation of 'false information.' 13 In effect, it 
made it easier for the regime to suppress information which contained accusations of 
corruption, particularly in relation to the economic reforms like the privatisation of 
public enterprises. Other measures to control the media were those against Egyptian 
periodicals which had been registered abroad, including the decision of the Minister of 
Information in October 1997 to cease the distribution of 41 Egyptian periodicals 
registered abroad and the decision in February 1998 to prevent the distribution of the 
weekly Al-Dustur. In January 1998, the amendment to the company law was passed, 
12 See Kienle, op. cit., 2001, p. 153. 
13 However, following a mobilisation of journalists and human right organisations and opposition parties, 
Law No. 93 was subsequently abrogated at the end of June 1996. 
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which required the explicit consent of the Council of Ministers for the creation of any 
new company which sought to publish periodicals or to broadcast satellite television. 
In addition to the media, another major target of the regime's restrictive measures was 
workers, who were one of the major losers of the economic reforms, particularly of 
privatisation. Under the amendments of 1995 to the provisions of the trade union law 
governing the right to vote as well as eligibility for union elections, workers employed 
on the basis of temporary contracts lost the right to vote in union elections. The 1995 
amendments also extended the right to join the unions to almost all ranks of 
management (with the exception of chief executives). This meant that the workers on 
temporary contracts, who were most prone to redundancies arising from the reform of 
the public sector and privatisation, would have no representation at union level. On the 
other hand, the 1995 amendments helped incorporate those who welcomed such 
economic reforms into the unions. Therefore, the amendments of 1995 can be seen as 
attempts by the regime to minimise potential resistance and simultaneously build up the 
number of those who would provide potential support to the economic reforms or at 
least would refrain from anti-economic reforms. In addition to the 1995 amendments, 
there were also several other measures which were seemingly intended to achieve the 
same results. These included the 1995 amendments which facilitated the re-election of 
former union leaders who, in practice, belonged to the ruling National Democratic Party 
(NDP), and the decree which required candidates to have their papers signed by the 
president of their branch union. 
Section B: Narrative 
6.1 The May 1991 Stand-By Arrangement 
Despite its failure to complete the May 1987 SBA programme, there remained a need 
for Egypt to reach agreement with the IMF. The Egyptian government had indicated 
that it wanted to extend the period of its debt rescheduling covered by the May 1987 
Paris Club agreement (which would end in June 1988) by 12 months to June 1989.14 
Talks with the IMF then continued from the first half of 1988. With the desire for more 
time to implement IMF conditionality, Egypt requested from the IMF an EFF, a larger 
14 MEED, 9 Dec. 1988, p. 14. 
Moving towards a New Stance on Economic Reform: 1989-1998 230 
and longer-term credit facility than a SBA, with a preferred amount of US$ 600 
million. 15 
6.1.1 Difficulty in Reaching an Agreed Pace of Economic Reform 
Both parties appeared to agree over some areas of the economic reform programme but 
the major hurdle still lay in the differences between them in terms of pace and extent of 
reform. On the one hand, the IMF persistently argued for a tighter deadline, continuing 
to urge for key reforms to be carried out within one or two years. In its report issued in 
late 1988, the IMF justified its preferred pace on grounds that a sluggish rate of the 
economic reforms 'might well be more costly subsequently' and might necessitate 
'even stronger and less socially acceptable actions' later. 16 The IMF's insistence on its 
demand was apparent in comments made by Abdel-Shakour Shaalan, Director of the 
IMF's Middle East Department, in November 1988: 'Egypt is like an employee who 
earns 100 pounds a month, but spends 122 pounds.' He repeatedly used the phrase 
'mush ma'oul' (translated as 'incredible' or '(something) beyond reasoning') to criticise 
the government policy. He gave an example of the tax issue, saying that the only 
people who pay taxes in Egypt were government employees, small farmers and other 
low-income groups, while the rentiers and big traders drew all the benefits. 17 
On the other hand, the Egyptian government seemed to accept the validity of at least 
some areas of IMF conditions, including a reduction of the budget deficit, a cut in 
energy prices, unification of the exchange rates, and an increase in bank interest rates. 
However, Egypt insisted that such measures should be put into practice gradually. 
According to Maurice Makramallah, Minister of State for International Co-operation, 
the Egyptian government believed that the timetable for enacting the economic reforms 
should be three to four years. 18 Egyptian officials repeatedly argued that carrying out 
economic reforms in a hurry would result in popular unrest, similar to the riots that 
occurred in Algeria in October 1988. Egypt's frustration with IMF demands was well 
illustrated by President Mubarak's speech which seemed to aim at gaining local popular 
support in reinforcing the Egyptian government's negotiating position vis-a-vis the 
IMF. President Mubarak, in a rally in Minufiya province on 8 September 1988, 
15 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1988, p. 11; and MEED, 3 June 1988, p. 10, and 11 Nov. 1988, p. 
16. 
16 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1989, p. 23. 
17 MEED, 11 Nov. 1988, p. 16; and The Middle East, Dec. 1988, p. 31. 
18 MEED, 16 Dec. 1988, p. 10. 
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expressed his severe criticism of the IMP at the time when his government was engaged 
in negotiations in Cairo with IMP officials. He likened the IMP to an unqualified 
doctor: 
The IMP acts like someone in the rural areas in the past who made himself a 
wise man - doctor. He is not a doctor or anything. A patient, for example, 
needs a treatment for one month. Instead of this doctor telling the patient to 
take this medicine daily for one month, he tells him to take all the medicine 
today and tomorrow and you will recover the day after. Of course, he will take 
the medicine to go to sleep at night and will not wake up in the morning. He 
dies . . . It [the IMP] writes a prescription for those who require prolonged 
treatment, just as for those who require short treatment. It says increase the 
price of electricity by 45 %, increase this ... by 80 %. If I did this, we would 
all die. 19 
However, despite his criticism of the IMP, he pointed out that economic reforms were 
crucial. He admitted that foreign government lending money for a power station needed 
to ensure that the electricity authorities would earn enough from tariffs to be able to 
service the loan. Simultaneously, he tried to reassure the public by emphasising that 
price increases should take into account the ability of people to pay.20 
6.1.2 External Pressure from Egypt's Creditors 
There was immense pressure put upon Egypt by Western creditors reluctant to provide 
further lending to Egypt. A number of Western countries and lending institutions had 
held back on their lending due to Egypt's poor repayment record and its unwillingness 
to move forward in economic reform. The Australian government decided to eliminate 
credit sales of wheat to Egypt by 1992. Both the World Bank and the USAID also 
made an energy price increase of 30-40 per cent a condition for the disbursement of 
their loans. In effect, the World Bank and the USAID continued to delay US$ 250 
million in soft loans for structural reforms, and US$ 330 million in aid for additional 
power projects, respectively. In addition, in August 1988, at a board meeting of the 
African Development Bank, the US as a board member refused to provide Egypt a US$ 
270 million loan for expansion of the Cairo West power station.21 
19 Summary of World Broadcast (hereafter called SWB): Weekly Economic Report, MEIW0044, 20 Sept. 
1988, pp. Al/2-3. See also MEED, 23 Sept. 1988, p. 14. 
20 MEED, 23 Sept. 1988, p. 14. 
21 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1988, p. 28. 
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It appeared that foreign aid to Egypt had, to some degree, been curtailed. However, 
Egypt was not completely cut off from receiving foreign aid. It continued to receive 
some external financial assistance. For instance, it was reported in March 1989 that the 
European Investment Bank had agreed to provide Ecu 28 million (US$ 33 million) to 
the Export Development Bank of Egypt to finance industrial and tourism projects, and 
that France had agreed to extend Fr 955 million (US$ 154 million) in soft loans for 
financing rural communications, improving irrigation systems and building the second 
stage of the Cairo metro. In February 1989, Italy provisionally approved an aid package 
worth US$ 500 million to finance the extension of the Assiut power station and supplies 
for a section of Greater Cairo Wastewater Project. It comprised grants of US$ 150 
million and the remainder was in forms of government loans and export credits. 
Finland also granted US$ 2.4 million to a primary health care scheme in Beni Suef 
(south of Cairo)?2 Nonetheless, these small amounts of financial grants and loans 
would not be sufficient to meet Egypt's financial problems. More importantly, they 
were tied to particular purposes other than financing its balance of payments deficit and 
debt. 
Furthermore, an additional source of constraint came from Egypt's obligation to resume 
payments on its military debt owed to the US in July 1989. The total debt was about 
US$ 4,550 million, and the interest repayments stood at US$ 500-600 million per 
annum?3 However, Egypt had not been servicing this debt since June 1988. If Egypt 
failed to fulfil this obligation in July 1989 when its arrears reached 12 months, it had to 
face severe penalties according to the Brooke amendment which stipulated that all US 
aid would be halted if the arrears exceeded one year. 24 
6.1.3 The Egyptian Government's Tactics 
While the negotiations with the IMF were taking place, the Egyptian government 
intensively sought support from outside, as highlighted by a series of foreign visits by 
Egyptian officials, particularly to Western European countries and the US in the late 
1988 and throughout 1989. During his visit to European capitals towards the end of 
September 1988, President Mubarak appeared not only to ask Western leaders for their 
support on the issue of the Middle East peace, but also to appeal for their assistance in 
22 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1989, pp. 23-24. 
23 MEED, 9 Dec. 1988, pp. 14-15. 
24 MEED, 3 Mar. 1989, p. 22. 
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Egypt's prolonged difficulties with the IMF. President Mubarak claimed that he had 
found 'co-operation and complete understanding' in London, Paris, Bonn, and 
Belgrade. However, it was only France and West Germany which publicly announced 
their explicit support for Egypt vis-a-vis the IMF.25 In early March 1989, President 
Mubarak's trip to Western Europe (Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany) and 
the US appeared to be for similar purposes. There were mixed responses from these 
countries. Considerable sympathy came in his talks with EC officials and the leaders of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany. On the other hand, the UK held its hard 
line position towards the issue. Other EC states appeared to be exasperated at the large 
amount of project financing which Egypt had held over from year to year, and also 
resisted the Egyptian requests for a conversion of such funds into cash aid?6 This was 
followed by a tour to Paris and Bonn by a senior Egyptian official team led by Abdel-
Halim Abu Ghazala, presidential assistant and former defence minister, and Atef Obeid, 
Cabinet Affairs Minister.27 In a meeting with President Franc;ois Mitterrand in Paris in 
late September 1989 on his way to New York and Washington, President Mubarak 
reportedly sought French support for its negotiations with the IMF.28 
As for the US, it took a tougher line towards Egypt by making a stand-by agreement 
with the IMF a condition for releasing its funds. President Mubarak's tour in early 
March 1989 appeared to fail to obtain US support for Egypt vis-a-vis the IMF. 
Following his tour, it was announced that for the second consecutive year Washington 
would hold back the US$ 115 million cash portion of the annual US$ 815 million in its 
economic aid to Egypt. US officials said that only if Egypt accepted economic reforms 
along the lines of those supported by the IMF, would it receive cash aid, worth US$ 230 
million which had been withheld for two years.29 It was only after Egypt showed its 
willingness in accommodating such economic reforms by increasing its electricity 
tariffs at the end of March 1989 (see the following section) that the US then reversed 
this decision in mid-April 1989 in addition to the release of part of its funds for projects 
in the energy sector. The US also offered Egypt additional credits of US$ 150 million 
for agricultural purchases and of US$ 100 million under the Commodity Import 
25 EIU, Egypt: Country Rep011, no. 4, 1988, p. 11. 
26 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1989, pp. 5-6; and Financial Times, 9 Mar. 1989. 
27 Financial Times, 5 Sept. 1989; and MEED, 15 Sept. 1989, p. 15. 
28 Financial Times, 28 Sept. 1989. 
29 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1989, p. 5. 
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Programme, which assisted private sector business in importing raw materials and 
capital goods.30 
Under pressure from its high level of debts which needed to be rescheduled, and in 
prolonged struggle with the IMF as well as with little Western support, Egypt turned to 
the Soviet Union, Arab countries and Arab funding organisations for financial 
assistance in coping with the debt problem. Its efforts proved to have been worthwhile 
when returning from a visit to the Soviet Union in August 1988, Boutros Boutros Ghali, 
Minister of States for Foreign Affairs, announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to 
forgo interest on repayment of Egypt's US$ 2-3 billion military debt, incurred during 
the 1960s and early 1970s. It also agreed on a long grace period and a payment 
reschedule.31 It was reported that President Mubarak, in his talks with Arab leaders, 
emphasised that the stability of Egypt was crucial to the stability of the region as a 
whole and this could only be assured by flows of money corning to help Egypt out of its 
severe economic crisis.32 However, Egypt's hope for large scale Arab aid, in terms of 
grants and concessional loans, as provided by the GODE during the 1970s, was not 
fulfilled. 
Furthermore, similar to its previous moves made during the negotiations leading to the 
1987 agreement, Egypt made failed attempts to circumvent the procedure, whereby an 
agreement with the IMF was a precondition for any rescheduling of payments to the 
Paris Club creditors, by approaching its foreign creditors directly. To avoid concluding 
a multilateral agreement, Egypt tried to extend earlier bilateral agreements which would 
cover the payments worth US$ 4 billion due between July 1988 and June 1989. Egypt 
had sent its Paris Club creditors a memorandum outlining economic policies which 
were likely to govern the drafting of the 1989/90 budget due to come into effect in July 
1989. The memorandum referred to a number of specific measures some of which 
would increase revenue and some of which would reduce public expenditure. The 
revenue-raising measures included a proposed new round of price increases for 
petroleum products and electricity, raising additional taxes and improving tax collection 
as well as increasing postal charges, railways fares, and car insurance rates. The 
memorandum claimed that these measures would bring in LE 1,630 million a year, with 
30 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1989, pp. 8-9. 
31 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1988, p. 28. 
32 Ibid., p. 29. 
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the largest single amount (LE 270 million) coming from the increase in the price of 
electricity. 33 
6.1.4 Concessions by Both Sides 
Under intense pressure from some Western countries and particularly the US, the 
Egyptian government seemed to have little room to manoeuvre. Prior to another round 
of negotiations with the IMF held at the end of April 1989, the Egyptian government 
began to make some concessions by implementing a series of economic reforms for 
which the IMF had urged. The reforms included a substantial rise in electricity tariffs, 
starting from 24 March 1989. Small consumers would face an increase in charges of 7 
per cent while larger consumers like industries would face a rise of 35-66 per cent. 
However, despite the large increases, the average prices would be only 30 per cent of 
the actual cost of production. Prices for kerosene, diesel and fuel oil were also 
increased, although gasoline prices (which were raised in May 1988) remained 
unchanged. 34 Fearful of sparking demonstrations and riots, the reforms were introduced 
by stealth without public announcement.35 In this way, consumers would not notice the 
significant increase in the prices of petroleum products and electricity until the reforms 
had actually come into effect. 
Further areas of Egypt's concessions were an increase in interest rates and a planned 
reduction in budget deficit. Shortly following the April 1989 talks with the IMF, the 
CBE announced in mid-May 1989 an overhaul in the interest rate structure. As an 
attempt to attract more savings into the banking system, deposit interest rates were to be 
raised by three to 16 per cent, with the new rates ranged from 5 per cent (on short-term 
local currency deposits) to 16 per cent (on more-than-seven-year deposits). Interest 
rates on various categories of loans were to be increased by two per cent, with a 
minimum of 18 per cent.36 In June 1989, the Egyptian government released its planned 
budget for 1989/90 with a reduction of the budget deficit to the level urged by the IMF, 
10 per cent of GDP.37 To increase government revenues and reduce its deficits, a law 
33 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1989, p. 10. 
34 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1989, p. 8; and MEED, 21 Apr. 1989, p. 11. 
35 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1989, p. 8. 
36 Ibid.; and MEED, 26 May 1989, p. 29. The lending rates were varied according to the sector and 
lending time and thus, the structure of lending rates had not been altered. The range of interest rates for 
loans for agriculture and industry was 13-15 per cent for less than one year; 14-16 per cent for one to two 
years; and 15-17 per cent for more than two years. For the services sector, the rates were 15-17 per cent, 
16-18 per cent and 17-19 per cent, respectively. 
37 MEED, 16 June 1989, p. 14. 
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was passed to tax the earnings of public sector employees working abroad. Tolls were 
to be introduced on major highways, and fees for visits to archaeological sites and 
museums would be raised by as much as 400 per cent. Measures were also taken to 
trim government spending on luxuries such as car telephones for ministers and 
d. 1 . 1 38 1p omatic trave . 
In addition to reforms on energy pnces and interest rates, and its planned deficit 
reduction, the Egyptian government took further steps to reform the economy in relation 
to the move towards unifying the multiple exchange rate system and the reduction of the 
budget deficit. On 15 August 1989, the fixed Central Bank exchange rate was altered to 
US$ 1 = LE 1.10 from its previous rate of US$ 1 = LE 0.70, representing a devaluation 
of 57 per cent. 39 Earlier in the same month, the government had announced the 
abolition of the special rate (US$ 1 = LE 1.89) applied to customs duties. Instead, it 
was replaced by the commercial bank rate (at that time approximately US$ 1 = LE 
2.59). This meant a rise of 37 per cent in the local currency value of imports for 
customs purposes. However, in an effort to reassure the public that the devaluation 
would not produce higher prices for consumers, this rise had been offset by cuts in tariff 
rates and 35 per cent reduction in consumption tax on imports.40 
Perhaps indicators of Mubarak's concessiOns to the IMF went beyond economic 
reforms in the light of the removal of Muhammad 'Abdal-Halim Abu Ghazala, Minister 
of Defence and Military Production, from his post at the end of April 1989. Although 
the factors which brought about his removal may be complex, it was widely interpreted 
as being caused by the minister's refusal to cut the defence budget which was necessary 
if the IMF-proposed budget targets were to be met.41 Unlike Abu Ghazala, the new 
minister, Yusif Sabri Abu Talib, announced that it would be his first objective to lessen 
the burden of the defence sector on the state.42 
38 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1989, pp. 10-11. 
39 The Central Bank exchange rate was used for calculating exports of petroleum, raw cotton and rice; 
revenues from the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) pipeline; and imports of essential 
commodities such as wheat, flour, cooking oil, tea and sugar. 
40 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1989, p. 10. 
41 Niblock, T., 'International and Domestic Factors in the Economic Liberalization Process in Arab 
Countries,' in T. Niblock and E. Murphy (eds.), Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East 
(London: British Academic P., 1993), p. 64. 
42 Ibid. 
Moving towards a New Stance on Economic Reform: 1989-1998 237 
In return for Egypt's concessions over economic reforms during the summer of 1989, 
both the US and the IMF made their own concessional moves. With frequent riots over 
IMP-inspired austerity measures that had taken place in Algeria in October 1988, 
Venezuela in March 1989, and Jordan in April 1989, both seemed to be concerned 
about the spill-over of riots, which would in tum shake Egypt's political stability and 
thus the US's ongoing peace efforts in the Middle East. Domestically, the possibility of 
the recurrence of riots in Egypt on a similar scale to those happened in January 1977 
and February 1986 was alarmingly high in view of the Coptic-Muslim tension, 
particularly in Upper Egypt and the extension of Islamic militant influence as well as 
popular discontent over price increases and food shortages. Against this background, 
the US decided to waive the Brooke amendment which threatened to halt all US aid if 
Egypt could not repay a US$ 41 million instalment on its military debt in July 1989. 
The July deadline was postponed until November 1989 when Washington provided 
indirect debt relief by drawing on an account, which was set up in 1987 for moratorium 
interest on rescheduled US military debt payments, to meet outstanding interest 
payments on the military debt until November 1989. Also in August 1989, the US 
finally released half the US$ 230 million in cash aid to Egypt. The IMF meanwhile 
withheld its insistence on the abolition of subsidies on basic foodstuffs. Instead, it 
reduced its demand to the reorganisation of Egypt's subsidy system in such a way that 
subsidised goods were channelled only to protect the poor. Abdel-Shakour Shaalan, 
Director of the IMF' s Middle East Department, pointed out that: 
I have come with clear instructions from the director-general [Managing 
Director] of the IMF to take care to preserve the living standards of low-
income groups in the context of any measures applied. The IMF is not against 
subsidies, but it does recommend looking for new measures to ensure that 
support reaches those who need it - in particular state-sector employees- for 
example through income support replacing commodity subsidies.43 
However, the IMF still regarded the reforms introduced in the spring and summer of 
1989 as inadequate. In September 1989, the Egyptian government submitted a letter of 
intent to the IMF. It included the removal of all remaining subsidies (except for goods 
sold via ration cards) by the fiscal year 1991-1992; increases in the range of 30-100 per 
cent on agricultural land taxes, railway fares, postage, car insurance rates and land 
transfer fees; an increase in energy prices by 30 per cent annually until 1994/95; an 
43 MEED, 14 July 1989, pp. 4-5. 
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increase in prices of agricultural inputs to match the price of imports; the abolition of 
the Central Bank Pool rate within three years; studying a further 4 per cent increase in 
deposit interest rates (after a 3 per cent rise in May); and a pledge to reduce its stake in 
joint ventures with the private sector, and to sell off some small public sector 
concerns.
44 However, it was rejected by the IMF as insufficient.45 Despite several 
rounds of talks between the two sides after September 1989, an agreement could not be 
reached. The IMF still sought commitments from the Egyptian government to come up 
with schedules for cutting energy subsidies and for liberalising the exchange rate 
system, and a concrete proposal for increasing interest rates.46 The IMF's tough stand 
could perhaps be understood in the light of the lapsed 1987 SBA through which Egypt 
gained debt rescheduling but did not complete the agreement. IMF officials repeatedly 
insisted that they did not want to grant backing for debt rescheduling i.e. to allow Egypt 
to abandon the economic reform programme once a new Paris Club rescheduling 
agreement was agreed.47 The negotiations on the economic reform programme dragged 
on until the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. 
While their agreement could not be reached, the IMF' s leverage was enhanced when the 
World Bank began its study to assess the prospects of providing its lending to support 
Egypt's economic reform programme. The World Bank team was sent to Cairo in 
October 1989.48 Additional pressure was subsequently placed upon Egypt by the World 
Bank through the latter's cross conditionality. The World Bank's loan would be 
released to Egypt, once the latter reached an agreement with the IMF concerning 
economic reforms.49 Indeed, the World Bank held to this condition until Egypt reached 
an agreement with the IMF. Although Egypt signed a memorandum of understanding 
with the World Bank for a US$ 300 million Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) in 
March 1991,50 its loan was released only following Egypt's conclusion of an agreement 
44 Middle East Economic Survey, 9 Oct. 1989. 
45 Posusney, M.P., Labour and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring (New 
York: Columbia U. P., 1997), pp. 210 and 212. 
46 MEED, 15 Sept. 1989, p. 15, 13 Oct. 1989, p. 15, 2 Feb. 1990, p. 14, and 23 Mar. 1990, p. 25. 
47 MEED, 14 July 1989, p. 4. 
48 MEED, 22 Sept. 1989, p. 15. 
49 MEED, 28 Sept. 1990, p. 6. 
50 The memorandum, which outlined reforms advocated by the IMF, called for the restructuring of the 
Egyptian economy on the basis of market forces. Under the March 1991 Structural Adjustment Loan 
agreement with the World Bank, the terms included greater independence for public sector companies 
and freeing restrictions on the private sector (including changes in investment regulations), trade 
liberalisation, and the establishment and operation of a social fund. EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 
1991, pp. 12-13. 
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with the IMF in May 1991. On 24 June 1991, the World Bank approved the SAL with 
repayment over 20 years, including a five-year grace period, and a variable interest rate, 
depending on the World Bank's own borrowing interest rate, to be disbursed in two 
equal tranches.51 
6.1.5 Egypt's Altering Stance on Economic Reform 
The Gulf crisis of 1990-91 highlighted to industrialised countries the significance of 
Egypt as their ally in a volatile region of the Middle East. Its decisive stand against Iraq 
immediately brought Egypt substantial benefits. They included: 
i) The cancellation by the six-member GCC of about US$ 7.7 billion in 
debts owed by Egypt. 
ii) A collective aid package from the GCC. It was expected to comprise 
around US$ 1-2 billion annually, with a further US$ 2-3 billion to be 
spent on development projects. 
iii) A write-off by the US of Egypt's US$ 7.1 billion military debt in early 
November 1990. Most of the remaining debt to the US was, after the US 
military debt cancellation, on concessional loans for development 
projects and food imports. President Bush stated that the write-off 
recognised Egypt's 'unique contribution in galvanising international 
support against Iraqi aggression.' 52 
iv) Japan, as part of its programme to assist the countries affected by the 
Gulf crisis, offered Egypt a US$ 176 million soft loan, repayable over 20 
years with a ten-year grace period and a concessional interest rate of 1 
per cent, to finance commodity imports. 53 
Moreover, President Bush, after a fund raising tour in early September 1990, announced 
the establishment of a multinational group of Gulf and industrialised countries to co-
ordinate financial aid to countries economically affected by the Gulf crisis. The three 
frontline states (which included Egypt, Jordan and Turkey) were the main beneficiaries 
of US$ 13 billion provided by the Gulf Financial Crisis Coordination.54 Overall, the 
compensation Egypt received from the US and its allies was many multiples of its net 
51 Weiss, D. and U. Wurzel, The Economics and Politics ofTransition to an Open Market Economy: 
Egypt (Paris: OECD, 1998), p. 47. 
52 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1990, p. 17. 
53 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1991, p. 20. 
54 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1990, pp. 18-19. 
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loss (about US$ 2.5 billion) arising from decreases m Suez Canal tolls, tourism 
revenues and workers' remittances less an increase in oil export revenues due to higher 
oil prices triggered by the war). 55 
With regard to the impact of the Gulf crisis on the relationship between Egypt and the 
IMF, such aid flows helped ease Egypt's financial pressure immensely. Ironically, 
Egypt seemed to be determined to use the aid flows for economic reform purposes 
rather than to abandon its negotiations with the IMF (The question of what explained 
such an irony will be dealt with later). There were indications that the Egyptian 
government was suddenly willing to take further steps in reforming its economy in line 
with what the IMF (and also the World Bank) had been calling for, as reflected in 
speeches made by senior Egyptian officials. At the opening of the People's Assembly 
in December 1990, President Mubarak called for a '1 ,000 day project to liberate the 
Egyptian economy.' However, the Egyptian cabinet was not united behind the idea of 
econmruc liberalisation, particularly privatisation.56 Within the Egyptian cabinet, 
advocates of privatisation such as Fouad Sultan, Minister of Tourism and Civil 
Aviation, were confronted by adversaries such as Muhammad Farag Abdel-Wahhab, 
Minister of Industry, who had denied in public that there were any preparations for the 
sale of public sector enterprises.57 To avoid political opposition as indicated, for 
example, by a lack of consensus within the Egyptian cabinet over the issue of 
privatisation, details of the plan were not made public, but the measures to be taken 
over a three-year period were said to involve promoting the private sector, curtailing 
bureaucracy, and transforming Egypt into a 'Korean-style economic powerhouse.' 58 
They seemingly included the complete removal of all government subsidies on basis 
foodstuffs; annual energy price rises to bring these prices into alignment with 
international prices by 1994; the abolition of the system of compulsory sale of particular 
agricultural products (e.g. wheat, cotton, sugar cane, rice and maize) to the state at set 
55 Kanovsky, E., 'The Economic Consequences of the Persian Gulf War: Accelerating OPEC's Demise,' 
Washington Institute Policy Papers, no. 30 (Washington, D. C.: Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 1992), p. 49. 
56 Hinnebusch, R. A., 'The Politics of Economic Reform in Egypt,' Third World Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1, 
1993, p. 163; Al-Sayyid, M. K., 'Privatization: The Egyptian Debate,' Cairo Papers in Social Science, 
vol. 13, monograph 4 (Cairo: Amer. U. in Cairo P., 1990), pp. 28-30 and 34; Springborg, R., 'Egypt,' in 
T. Niblock and E. Murphy (eds.), Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East (London: 
British Academic P., 1993), p. 161; and Sullivan, D. J., 'Extra-State Actors and Privatization in Egypt,' in 
H. Iliya and D. J. Sullivan (eds.), Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana U. P., 1992), p. 25. 
57 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 42. 
58 Ibid.; and Niblock, op. cit., p. 69. 
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prices; the abolition of the central bank exchange rate, leading to the convertibility of 
the Egyptian pound; and the undertaking that there would be no new government 
investment in economic ventures.59 Following the call for a '1,000 day project,' Prime 
Minister Atef Sidqi in his speech to the People's Assembly on 28 January 1991, talked 
about Egypt's economic reform programme. He described the government as 
committed to the implementation of a market driven economy, pledging more 
privatisation and a relaxation of controls, the opening up of new areas for private 
interests, and further moves towards a single unified exchange rate. He also announced 
plans to replace the fixed charge consumer tax with a percentage based sales tax, to be 
introduced gradually over three years.60 
Protracted negotiations of over three years eventually resulted in the IMF Executive 
Board's approval of a SBA for Egypt on 17 May 1991. Under the agreement, Egypt was 
enabled to draw SDR 278 million (about US$ 372 million) in stand-by credits from the 
IMF over an 18-month period. The primary objective of the 1991 economic programme 
was to 'create, over the medium term, a decentralized market-based, outward oriented 
economy that will restore noninflationary growth and Egypt's creditworthiness.' The 
programme also envisaged 'a rapidly growing private sector operating in a free, 
competitive and stable environment, with the scaled down public sector operating in the 
same competitive environment and under the same rules, with autonomy from 
government intervention. ' 61 
IMF conditionality under the May 1991 SBA was considerably more comprehensive 
than under any previous agreements. It involved structural as well as macroeconomic 
adjustment, containing numerous policy measures and targets. The programme entailed 
several areas of economic reform, including public enterprise reform, price 
liberalisation, investment decontrol, the reform of foreign exchange system, trade 
liberalisation, fiscal policies, monetary and credit policies, and also social policies 
supported by the Social Fund for Development to help mitigate the negative impact of 
the economic programme.62 
59 Niblock, op. cit., p. 69. 
60 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1991, pp. 10-11. 
61 Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Memorandum on Economic Policy of the Egyptian Government,' 19 Apr. 
1991, in International Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, 
To Members of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Request for Stand-By 
Arrangement- Letter of Intent, EBS/91170, confidential, 22 Apr. 1991, pp. 3-4. 
62 For more details on IMF conditionality under the 1991 SBA, see Appendix F. 
Moving towards a New Stance on Economic Reform: 1989-1998 242 
It should be noted that the 1991 SBA was concluded after three years of negotiations, 
but only about nine months after the Gulf crisis had broken out. It can be questioned 
whether the successful conclusion of the 1991 SBA can be largely explained by the 
IMP's lenient stance towards Egypt after the Gulf war (that is, whether it was subject to 
political influence or not). Certainly, the policy programme under the 1991 agreement, 
which contained numerous conditions, was more comprehensive than any previous 
ones. This, together with Egypt's long-standing resistance to IMP demands prior to the 
Gulf crisis, seem to indicate that it was the Egyptian government which made most of 
concessional moves during its negotiations with the IMP after the Gulf war. 
Shortly following the conclusion of the May 1991 agreement with the IMP, Egypt 
received the cancellation and rescheduling of an estimated US$ 27-28 billion in 
Egyptian official and government-guaranteed civilian and military debts owed to the 
Paris Club, which had earlier been made contingent upon agreement with the IMF.63 
The Paris Club creditors agreed to write off 50 per cent of Egypt's official bilateral 
debts in three phases: 
i) a reduction of 15 per cent from 1 July 1991; 
ii) a further reduction of 15 per cent scheduled in December 1992; and 
iii) a final reduction of 20 per cent scheduled in July 1994.64 
The agreement also provided for a 30 per cent reduction in interest payments in non-
concessional official debt, with the remaining 50 per cent of Paris Club debt to be 
rescheduled over 25 years with 3-4 year's grace.65 
However, the deal was reportedly below the Egyptian government's expectation (30 per 
cent of its debts to be written off immediately, and 20 per cent after 2 years). On the 
other hand, the creditors rejected this and insisted that IMP targets must be met.66 By 
increasing the number of the debt cancellation phases, the creditors had in effect 
enhanced the IMP's leverage vis-a-vis Egypt. 
One crucial question remains to be answered: why did Mubarak's regime seemingly 
welcome economic liberalisation and subsequently conclude an economic programme 
63 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1991, p. 19. 
64 MEED, 7 June 1991, p. 24. 
65 Ibid.; and EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1996, pp. 39-40. 
66 MEED, 7 June 1991, p. 24. 
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with the IMF, despite its earlier protracted resistance and its failure to implement the 
previous economic programme under the 1987 SBA, which was even less 
comprehensive than that under the 1991 SBA? There was a combination of coincident 
factors at various levels which assisted such a move. As has been pointed out earlier, 
the Gulf crisis provided Egypt an opportunity to benefit enormously from its 
geopolitical significance in terms of debt write-off and new aid flows. Such financial 
benefits, in particular the debt relief, created a more favourable environment among 
members of the political elite for accepting IMF demands.67 However, these were by no 
means sufficient since there would be no urgent need for Egypt to adopt economic 
reform when its economic circumstances were improving,68 as had repeatedly occurred 
in the previous periods. Thus, another important factor needs to be considered. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which came at around the 
same time, ensured that such an opportunity of gaining substantial financial benefits 
was indeed rare. With the end of the Cold War, Egypt was no longer in a position to 
play one superpower against the other. Thus, it lost a possible source of power in 
negotiating with the IMF. Also, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc 
signified the triumph of the market economy and the failure of the centrally-planned 
economy, which in tum limited its options in pursuing economic development. 
Moreover, such a shift was partly motivated by domestic considerations. The call for 
economic liberalisation by Mubarak's regime was seen as an attempt to secure its social 
and economic base of support from among the classes that had been stifled during 
Nasser's years and that were not entirely provided for by Sadat. They included those 
who were likely to benefit from economic liberalisation entailed in the 1991 SBA such 
as finance capital, construction, and services interests.69 
6.1.6 Implementation of IMF Conditionality 
The IMF approval of the 1991 SBA came after Egypt had implemented measures which 
were set in the form of prior actions. In early May 1991, prices of electricity and 
petroleum products were substantially increased. Prices of electricity, petrol, cooking 
gas, and kerosene were raised by 10-25 per cent, 33 per cent, 66 per cent and 50 per 
cent, respectively. On 3 May 1991, the sales tax law was passed, aiming at raising 
67 Ayubi, N. N., Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B., 
1995), p. 346; and Hinnebusch, op. cit., p. 164. 
68 Lofgren, H., 'Economic Policy in Egypt: A Breakdown in Reform Resistance?,' International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, vol. 25, 1993, pp. 411-412. 
69 Bush, R., Economic Crisis and the Policies of Reform in Egypt (Boulder: Westview, 1999), pp. 32-33. 
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government revenues and thereby reducing the budget deficit. A 5 per cent sales tax 
was imposed on essentials while non-essentials would be taxed in the range of 10-30 
per cent, with a 10 per cent norm. Customs duties were considerably raised, after 
having been reduced in 1989 to offset the increase in the prices in the local currency of 
imports arising from devaluation (see Chapter Five). Most imports were to be charged 
at 30-40 per cent of their value.70 
In implementing the above economic measures, Mubarak's regime adopted a policy of 
little publicity. All of the economic reforms leading to the 1991 agreement with the 
IMF were enacted with little press attention and fanfare, and the parliamentary debate in 
the spring of 1991 over Law 203 of June 1991,71 which governed public sector reform 
and privatisation programme, was brief.72 Law 203 was passed but not without 
resistance from trade unions whose members in parliament opposed the bill. To show 
that privatisation would not harm workers' rights, the amendments were made to the 
initial draft following the demand of the General Trade Union Federation for the 
addition of provisions in favour of workers. They included the retention of profit shares 
distributed to workers, and the validity of existing public sector labour legislation until 
overwritten by a new labour law.73 Furthermore, repressive and restrictive measures 
were pursued (for further discussions, see Section A). Electoral laws became restrictive 
following the electoral 'reform' carried out only two months before the 1990 
parliamentary elections, which led to the boycott by most opposition parties in the 
elections.74 In the spring of 1991, Mubarak extended the emergency laws for another 
three years and shortly thereafter he rejected appeals from the opposition for 
constitutional reform.75 
70 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1991, pp. 11-12. 
71 Law 203 reorganised the public enterprise sector into 17 financially-autonomous holding companies 
with 314 affiliated companies so as to prepare for their privatisation. The holding companies were in 
charge of the financial and technical restructuring of the affiliated companies before bringing them to the 
~oint of sale. 
2 Posusney, op. cit., p. 214. 
73 Ibid.; and Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 120. 
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Besides policy measures and targets set as prior actions, Egypt managed to meet some 
of the agreed criteria, including the unification of exchange rates on 8 October 1991, 
which was unexpectedly well ahead of the deadline, i.e. by February 1992. However, 
there were some policy targets which Egypt failed to meet. They included the budget 
deficit which stayed above its target of 9.5 per cent of GDP in 1991192. Despite such a 
slippage, Egypt, however, passed the first review of performance in December 1991 
when the IMF, after some amendments to the original targets, approved the 
disbursement of the second tranche of the stand-by credit, worth SDR 88 million, in two 
stages.76 Superficially, the IMF was understood to allow some degree of flexibility in 
assessing Egypt's economic efforts since it was convinced that the Egyptian 
government was serious in its intentions to pursue and maintain the economic reform 
programme as a whole, and particularly to make up the fiscal shortfall in the course of 
the fiscal year 1991192 (i.e. by the end of June 1992).77 However, there seemed to be 
political support from 'big' countries during the implementation period, when the 
agreement was breached.78 Egypt was said to be strongly supported by the US, which 
held its interest in Egypt's political stability, on the IMP's Executive Board.79 
Therefore, the IMP's apparent belief in Egypt's seriousness towards economic reform, 
compared with the second half of the 1980s, was seemingly underpinned by the political 
interference of powerful member countries. 
In the period following the first review of the stand-by programme, the failure to meet 
some policy targets and the slowed pace of Egypt's structural adjustment reform, the 
process of which had lacked behind the monetary and fiscal reforms, were apparent. 
This caused the IMP's and also the World Bank's dissatisfaction. The IMF admitted 
that considerable progress had been made in Egypt's economic reform programme, 
including a stable exchange rate, a decline in inflation, and a surplus in the current 
account. However, the IMF was still concerned about the expansion of money supply, 
the need for further taxation reforms, deregulation of private investment and trade 
liberalisation, the slow pace of privatisation, and the budget deficit. Concerning the 
latter, there was reportedly a technical disagreement over the scale of the cut in the 
76 The first half was released immediately and the other equal half was subject to confirmation that the 
Egyptian government had adhered to its performance criteria set for the end of December 1991. MEED, 
17 Jan. 1992, p. 11. 
77 See, for example, EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1992, p. 10. 
78 Interviewee 10 (a former official of the Central Bank of Egypt), personal interview, Cairo, 15 Feb. 
2001. 
79 Egypt!Monde Arabe, 11, 1992. Cited in Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 54. 
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budget deficit. According to Prime Minister Atef Sidqi, the IMF insisted that since 
Egypt's interest payments on foreign debt had been lessened substantially by the 
concessional terms of the Paris Club agreement, Egypt's budget deficit should be 
reduced to 4 per cent of GDP.8° Consequently, the second review of Egypt's stand-by 
programme and the disbursement of the remaining stand-by credit (SDR 130 million), 
originally due in June 1992, had to be postponed. 
Meanwhile, additional pressure was put upon Egypt by the World Bank. The 
disbursement of the second and final tranche (worth US$ 150 million) of the US$ 300 
million SAL agreed with the World Bank was scheduled to be disbursed around June 
1992. However, it was put off due to Egypt's reluctance to move forwards with the 
Structural Adjustment Programme, in particular with privatisation of public sector 
enterprises and trade liberalisation. The World Bank, as well as the IMF, complained 
that the valuation of the companies to be sold was proceeding slowly and, because of 
the transfer of assets to the private sector had hardly begun, public sector firms were 
placing extensive demands on the credit system, crowding out the private sector. They 
were also dissatisfied by delays in the liberalisation of trade regulations which protected 
the public sector from foreign competition.81 In mid-July 1992, Spiros Voyadzis, the 
head of the World Bank's Middle East division, warned Egypt that in September 1992 
the 15 former Soviet republics would join the World Bank, and 'If Egypt does not move 
fast, it is only one cake that is provided and that cake may be given to other countries.' 82 
However, what Egypt in fact ultimately longed for was not their credits, rather the seals 
of approval from the two institutions, which would enable Egypt to claim the second 
phase (15 per cent) of the Paris Club debt relief, worth around US$ 3 billion. As a 
result, Egypt had to push further the economic reform programme. This included the 
abolition of credit ceilings to the private sector in early October 1992, for which the 
IMF had reportedly urged since June 1992.83 The government, in an effort to comply 
with the 1991 SAL agreement with the World Bank, further eased its trade restrictions 
by removing the special low tariff status of 60 categories of goods. 84 In August 1992, 
80 Sidqi, Atef, interview, Al-Ahram, 1 November 1992, in EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1992, p. 14. 
81 Posusney, op. cit., p. 216. 
82 EIU, Egypt: Country Rep011, no. 3, 1992, p. 14. 
83 The ceilings were introduced in 1991 as part of the counter-inflationary programme agreed with the 
IMF. MEED, 23 Oct. 1992, p. 18. 
84 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1993, p. 13. 
Moving towards a New Stance on Economic Reform: 1989-1998 247 
the number of prohibited imports was reduced from 105 to 78 in line with IMF 
conditionality, which meant that the importation of previously prohibited products such 
as tractors, tobacco, soft drinks, meat, fruits, perfumes, radios, refrigerators and cement 
was allowed.85 Furthermore, the Egyptian government, in February 1993, announced a 
programme of privatisation, including the granting of authorisation on 5 February 1993 
to eight public and mixed banks to sell the state's participation in 16 enterprises and 
Prime Minister Atef Sidqi's announcement on 26 February 1993 to privatise 85 public 
or joint venture enterprises by June 1997.86 
The IMF finally approved the second review of Egypt's economic performance on 18 
March 1993. The IMF appeared to look for the World Bank's seal of approval before 
granting its own since its approval came only a few days after the World Bank's Board 
of Directors agreed on 12 March 1993 to release the remaining US$ 150 million of the 
SAL. Despite receiving the approvals from both IFis, Egypt refrained from drawing on 
the remaining credits of both IMF and World Bank. When the 1991 SBA programme 
with the IMF ended in May 1993, the total amount of IMF and World Bank credits 
disbursed was only SDR 147.2 million (see Table 11.1 on p. 120) and US$ 150 
million,87 respectively. There would be less need for Egypt to draw their credits, in 
particular when its resource position improved, notably a high level of its foreign 
exchange reserves in 1992-1993 (see Table 6.1). 
It was the first time since the mid-1960s that Egypt had succeeded in remaining bound 
to its agreement with the IMF. The agreements signed with the IMF in earlier periods 
(i.e. those of 1977, 1978 and 1987) had all been abandoned by the Egyptian 
government. The successful completion of the May 1991 agreement partly reflected 
Egypt's desire to continue its agreement with the IMF, evident through its requests for 
the extensions of the agreement. This can be understood in the light of the second 
phase of the Paris Club debt relief agreement originally due in December 1992, which 
came after the original expiration date of the May 1991 SBA (November 1992). In 
addition, the completion of the agreement and economic reform programme by Egypt 
85 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 55. 
86 Ibid., p. 59. 
87 International Monetary Fund, 'Egypt- Relations with the World Bank,' in International Monetary 
Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members of the Executive 
Board, From the Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Staff Report for the I996 Article IV 
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was also facilitated by the IMF's flexibility on the timetable of economic reform. A 
number of deadline extensions were allowed. Following Egypt's requests, the initial 
deadline of 30 November 1992 was extended for three months until the end of February 
1993; for three weeks until 21 March 1993; and then again for over two months until 31 
May 1993, while disputes between the two parties over the slow pace of privatisation 
and the size of the budget deficit were dragging on. The IMF granted the first extension 
of agreement period after the Cairo earthquake of October 1992.88 Without further 
information, however, it is difficult to know why the IMF was repeatedly flexible over 
the issue of timetable. 
It was reported that at the meeting of the IMF's Executive Board to consider the 
approval of the final review, criticisms were raised by member states over the Egyptian 
government's commitment to economic reform and its slow pace. The major points of 
disagreement with Egypt's reform performance were the budget deficit, obstacles to 
private investment, liberalisation of housing rents, fiscal reform (including its failure to 
introduce a unified tax law), and delays in implementing the Social Fund.89 
Nonetheless, Egypt gained strong support from Saudi Arabia,90 which might feel 
obliged owing largely to Egypt's stance in the US-led coalition against Iraq. Therefore, 
Egypt's success in keeping its terms with the IMF was thanks to not only coordination 
among creditors and the IMF's flexibility but also their apparent political support for 
Egypt within the IMF. 
6.2 The September 1993 Extended Fund Facility 
6.2.1 Negotiations Leading to the September 1993 Extended Fund Facility 
Despite its improved economic situation, especially its accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves, Egypt strove for a successive agreement with the IMF. There remained an 
incentive for doing so since only one of the three tranches of the debt reduction had 
become effective and Egypt needed to secure another US$ 3 billion of the Paris Club 
debt write-off, the second stage of debt rescheduling. 
88 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 59. 
89 Ibid.; and EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1993, p. 14. 
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To pave the way for a new agreement with the IMF, President Mubarak pursued the old 
tactic of seeking assistance from 'friends.' He told the press that in his meeting with 
President Clinton in Washington, D. C. in early April 1993, he would request the 
maintenance of present levels of US aid for three years, and also US support in Egypt's 
dealings with the IMF, including his meeting with Michel Camdessus on the following 
day.91 
Shortly after the completion of the May 1991 agreement, a new round of what donors 
described as 'exploratory' talks began between an IMF staff team and the Egyptian 
officials in Cairo in early April 1993.92 While its negotiations with the IMF were taking 
place, Egypt (whose previous SAL accord of May 1991 with the World Bank ended in 
March 1993) was simultaneously trying to reach a successive agreement with the World 
Bank, which was co-ordinating with the IMF. The World Bank's task was to monitor a 
large part of the structural adjustment reforms envisaged under the new agreement, in 
addition to the provision of extended technical assistance for the reforms. Negotiations 
were in fact held between a joint IMF-WB team, on the one hand, and the Egyptian 
team, on the other hand. This is because the focus of the economic reform programme 
under a new agreement shifted to structural adjustment, the process of which fell behind 
monetary and fiscal reforms under the previous agreement. This in effect meant that the 
IMF would only sign an agreement with Egypt once the World Bank agreed. Thus, the 
co-ordination between the two institutions seemed to lend the IMF some certain degree 
of bargaining strength vis-a-vis Egypt. 
Egypt's intensive talks with a joint negotiating team of the IMF and the World Bank 
officials held in Cairo in late May and early June 1993 brought about little progress. 
Both sides reportedly agreed on some areas, including general fiscal and monetary 
policies. However, disagreement remained over the pace of implementation and the 
extent of the new economic reforms in several areas. Among them was the sluggish 
pace of privatisation. At a seminar held in Cairo on 7 June 1993 Atef Obeid, Minister 
of Cabinet Affairs and Administration Development, admitted that privatisation was 
progressing slowly. However, while Obeid confirmed the presence of Egypt's political 
commitment towards privatisation, he argued that Egypt lacked sufficient technological 
91 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., pp. 59 and 63. 
92 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1993, p. 14; and MEED, 16 Apr. 1993, p. 10. 
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skills for this complex process. He insisted on Egypt's preferred pace of economic 
reform: 'We think we are doing it the right way - at a slow speed but slowly and 
surely ... we cannot afford to fai1.' 93 He criticised the approach of the World Bank 
(and the IMF) that 'the advisor will not be driving the car but he might be visiting us in 
hospital if we crash it.' On the other hand, the Egyptian government's sluggish pace 
was criticised by Caio Koch-Weser, the World Bank's vice president for the Middle 
East and North Africa. He conceded that the Egyptian government faced bureaucratic 
resistance to privatisation and public sector reform and was correct to be concerned 
about the prospect of increased unemployment as a result of the reform. He, 
nonetheless, implicitly argued for the faster pace: 'Having said that, I believed that the 
pace issue is so important because of the momentum that is needed ... to make this 
economy grow again, to make sure private investors don't sit on the fence.' 94 
In addition to the pace of privatisation, the other areas of disagreement were the 
solvency of the four public sector banks, trade liberalisation, taxation, and budget 
deficit targets. The IMF was reported to be urging for rapid reductions in the maximum 
rate of import tariffs (from 80 per cent to 50 per cent in July 1993, 40 per cent in July 
1994 and 30 per cent in July 1995), for an extension of the sales tax to include a full 
range of goods and services, and for a reduction in the number of tax exemptions. 
However, the Egyptian government argued for a slower timetable for changes in the 
tariff system to allow more time for local industries to adjust, and for more time for 
taxation reform.95 
By July 1993, Egypt came close to agreement with the IMF. An optimistic hope was 
expressed in statements by Egyptian officials. Following Youssef Boutros Ghali' s 
(Minister of State) statement on 6 July 1993 in Washington that a Letter of Intent with 
the IMF would be signed shortly, President Mubarak announced on 14 July 1993 that 
agreement with the IMF 'in a final form' had been reached.96 Although some areas, 
including the development of the sales tax into a full value-added tax, remained 
unresolved, substantial progress was made during talks with IMF and World Bank 
93 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1993, p. 20. 
94 MEED, 18 June 1993, p. 11. 
95 Ibid. 
96 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1993, pp. 18-19. 
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officials in Washington, specifically over the budget deficit target, the reduction in 
maximum import tariff, and a detailed timetable for privatisation.97 
After several months of tough and intensive negotiations, agreement between the 
Egyptian government and the IMF staff team resulted in a Letter of Intent in late July 
1993. On 20 September 1993, the IMF's Executive Board approved a three-year credit 
of SDR 400 million (about US$ 569 million) for Egypt under the EFF. The IMF's 
approval was granted only after Egypt concluded a three-year Structural Adjustment 
Monitoring Programme (SAMP) with the World Bank on 10 September 1993. 
However, with its strong balance of payments position as well as a high level of foreign 
reserves (US$ 1.7 billion in September 199398). Egypt withdrew its right to draw on 
IMF and World Bank credits available under the EFF and the SAMP, respectively. 
The overall objective of the September 1993 EFF was to create 'a decentralized, 
outward-oriented market economy' and to encourage a greater involvement of the 
private sector through 'a stable and competitive environment.' In order to establish and 
maintain increasing market confidence in the economy and to accelerate investment, 
growth and employment, the emphasis was shifted from fiscal and monetary policies, 
which dominated in the previous SBA, towards structural reform policies. The latter 
included public sector restructuring, pri vatisation (including banking and insurance 
companies), deregulation of prices and investment, regulatory reforms (including the 
implementation of a 'Unified Law' for all companies by the end of December 1994), 
tax reforms (including the introduction of a full retail value-added tax (VAT) by the end 
of July 1995 and of a personal income tax by the end of December 1993), exchange and 
trade liberalisation, financial sector reforms, and a social safety net to alleviate the 
adverse consequences of the structural adjustment reform on the vulnerable groups of 
the population.99 
The September 1993 accord entailed a long, comprehensive list of policies and targets 
including continued efforts to keep its budget deficit under control and to further bring 
down inflation. A compromise seemed to be made over the budget deficit target for 
1993/94, after Egypt failed to meet its 1992/93 target of 3.5 per cent, which reached 4.7 
97 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1993, p. 19. 
98 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1993, pp. 13-14. 
99 For more details on IMF conditionality under the 1993 EFF, see Appendix G. 
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per cent of GDP. Under the 1993 EFF, the budget deficit target was raised to 2.6 per 
cent from the IMF's original target of 2 per cent. 100 Inflation was set to decline to 9.5 
per cent on an annual average basis in 1993/94 from an estimated average of more than 
11 per cent in 1992/93. Furthermore, the IMF (and the World Bank which had a 
supervisory role in the large area of structural adjustment reforms under the 1993 EFF) 
seemed to accept the slower pace and lesser extent of economic reform adhered by 
Egypt. This was apparent in the issue of tariff reduction. The maximum tariff of 80 per 
cent was to be reduced to only 70 per cent by the end of 1993, to 60 per cent by the end 
of 1994, and to 50 per cent by the end of 1995, as compared with their original figures 
(see p. 250). 
Following the signing of the September 1993 EFF with the IMF, the second stage of its 
US$ 10 billion debt relief agreed with the Paris Club creditors in May 1991, worth 
about US$ 3 billion and representing a further 15 per cent reduction, automatically 
came into effect. Meanwhile, the third and final 20 per cent tranche (worth about US$ 4 
billion and accounting for a 20 per cent reduction) was due to go into effect in July 
1994, subject to the targets laid out in the EFF programme being met. 
6.2.2 Implementation of .n:MF Conditionality: Two Major Disagreements 
After the two parties had reached agreement in principle in July 1993, efforts were 
immediately made in implementing prior actions so as to ensure the approval of the 
IMF's Executive Board for the agreement. These included the extension of the 
coverage of the sales tax that had been introduced in May 1991 and trade liberalisation. 
An amendment was introduced in July 1993 by presidential decree to establish taxes of 
20-30 per cent on luxury items, of 25 per cent on electrical appliances, and of 10 per 
cent on a number of services (such as express couriers, cleaning, personal security, and 
car hiring). 101 By the end of July 1993, the foreign trade regime was further liberalised 
by degrees. The measures included a reduction of import tariffs on 44 raw materials 
and intermediate products to encourage local manufacturers; the elimination of customs 
duties on 53 locally manufactured products (such as lorries, buses, tractors, motorcycles 
and bicycles); and the lifting of import ban on 52 articles, including that on 
automobiles. Trade protection was maintained on textiles made from synthetic fibres. 
100 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1993, p. 14. 
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Only 4.8 per cent of Egypt's agricultural and industrial production remained subject to 
import prohibition, compared to 36 per cent the year before. The variation of tariffs 
was reduced to a range of 10-80 per cent (with high tariffs on high-powered 
automobiles, cigarettes and alcohol), compared to 5-80 per cent before. Other measures 
were the abolition of preferential tariffs for public enterprises and of the need for prior 
approval of exports and allowing private companies to deal in public sector imports. 102 
Nonetheless, the relationship between the IMF and Egypt reached an impasse not long 
after the signing of the September 1993 EFF. In early December 1993, the first review 
of the September 1993 EFF was undertaken by an IMF team in Cairo. This 
encompassed all areas of the economic reform programme with an emphasis on trade 
liberalisation, privatisation, taxation reform, banking sector reform, and price and 
investment decontrol. 103 There were at least two major disagreements between the two 
sides during the implementation of the September 1993 agreement: one was concerned 
with the pace of economic reform; and the other was over the exchange rate policy. 
6.2.2.1 Disagreement over the Pace of Economic Reform 
The IMF seemed to be satisfied with Egypt's progress on macroeconomic reforms. 
Following Egypt's talks in Washington in mid-April 1994 with the IMF and the World 
Bank concerning the reviews of the economic reform progress, Abdel-Shakour Shaalan 
(the IMP's Executive Director representing Egypt and a group of other Arab countries) 
told Reuters that Egypt's principal macroeconomic indicators fell within the range that 
the IMF was seeking. According to Shaalan, the budget deficit was only 0.8 per cent 
GDP for the first half of the fiscal year 1993/94 while the annual target (ending in June 
1994) was 2.6 per cent. Also inflation at that time showed a rate of about 7.3 per cent, 
compared with the target of 9.5 per cent for the same fiscal year. 104 
However, the IMF and its co-ordinator, the World Bank, were less happy with Egypt's 
progress on the structural adjustment reform, in particular the sluggish pace of 
privatisation and trade liberalisation. The IMF's frustration with Egypt's slow approach 
102 Information on trade liberalisation in this paragraph was taken from Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 62. 
103 Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Memorandum of Understanding,' 18 Aug. 1993, in International Monetary 
Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members of the Executive 
Board, From the Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Request for Extended Arrangement - Letter 
of Intent, EBS/93/139, confidential, 20 Aug. 1993, p. 40. 
104 MEED, 29 Apr. 1994, p. 24. 
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is reflected in an IMF official's remarks prior to the December 1993 review: 'They [the 
Egyptian government] keep pointing to Eastern Europe to try to prove for their case that 
the gradual approach is better - we beg to differ.' 105 Similarly, the World Bank 
reportedly left Cairo expressing disappointment with Egypt's performance, following 
the first review of Egypt's SAMP in mid-March 1994. Disputes between Egypt and the 
World Bank remained over the slow pace of privatisation, trade liberalisation and 
energy pricing. 106 
On the other hand, the Egyptian government often said that they recognised the 
importance of economic reform and were still firmly committed to it. However, the 
Egyptian government insisted that this had to be done at their own preferred pace, 
'slowly but surely.' Youssef Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for International Co-
operation, stressed that it had to be 'an indigenous process, driven by local 
considerations and not processed by the outside world.' 107 In an interview with the 
Financial Times in the first half of May 1995, President Mubarak complained by 
analogy: 
Those sitting in Europe and the US cannot understand the reality we face. If 
you want a paved road from here to Hurghada [on the Red Sea], in the flat 
areas I can do it very quickly, but when I get to the hills I have to change pace. 
If I mess that up, the whole road is useless. 108 
Indeed, while under pressure on the international front to comply with IMF 
conditionality, the Egyptian government also faced difficulties on the domestic front in 
executing the politically sensitive economic reforms. There was internal pressure upon 
the Egyptian government from various local interest groups, depending on what was at 
stake as a result of particular reform areas. For instance, in addition to the lack of 
technical skills as the government often pointed out, the delay in the privatisation 
progress was partly due to resistance from vested interests of the establishment, namely 
the management of the holding companies, in selling state-owned enterprises to the 
private sector. Under Law no. 203 of 1991, state-owned enterprises (the so-called 
affiliated companies) were grouped under a newly-created 17 holding companies, which 
held the responsibility for financial restructuring of the affiliated companies and bring 
105 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1994, p. 13; and MEED, 26 Nov. 1993, p. 25. 
106 Financial Times, 22 Apr. 1994. 
107 Financial Times, 3 Nov. 1995. 
108 Financial Times, 15 May 1995. 
Moving towards a New Stance on Economic Reform: 1989-1998 255 
them to the point of sale. However, in practice, there were limited incentives for the 
holding companies to bring affiliated companies to the point of sale (such as making up 
for losses of other affiliated companies and financing new investments) since this would 
involve a loss of their eventual profits for the holding companies. Furthermore, a rapid 
sale of affiliated companies, if approved by the Ministry of Public Sector, would 
weaken the holding companies' management and would eventually lead to its own 
liquidation. 109 Thus, the majority of the holding companies had developed an interest in 
building a strong and mutually supportive conglomerate of affiliated companies rather 
than dismantling it by privatisation, and tried to postpone the sale of affiliated 
companies as long as possible. 110 In addition, the Minister of Public Sector apparently 
supported the reluctance of these holding companies by repeatedly withholding his 
approval of sales, which had already been negotiated between a private investor and the 
holding company board, or simply by not reacting to a privatisation proposal. The 
Egyptian government sometimes objected to the low valuation of affiliated companies 
to be sold and complained that if privatisation proceeded too rapidly, this would further 
depreciate the value of the assets. 111 Such actions by the government could be seen as 
an attempt to further prolong the privatisation process which would benefit both 
domestically in dealing with domestic resistance against privatisation and 
internationally in its negotiations with the two IFis. 
In order not to antagonise the workers who were likely to be the maJor loser of 
privatisation (for example, as a result of reductions in their supplementary pay or 
layoffs), the government insisted that its privatisation programme was geared towards 
protecting workers' jobs and rights. In the sales of the two bottling companies (the El-
Nasr Bottling Company and the Egyptian Bottling Company), the purchasers agreed in 
writing not to reduce the existing workforce of the firms. However, these were rather 
exceptional cases. Being under pressure to make their firms more profitable, numerous 
public sector managers resorted to lay off temporary workers while some declared that 
large numbers of their full-time, permanent workers were made redundant. 112 
109 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 116. 
110 As a result, in August 1995, a Consultative Committee for the capital market and privatisation 
operations was created to speed up procedures for the divestiture of state assets, to 'support' the holding 
companies and to prevent them from setting 'inaccurate prices.' Ibid., p. 124. 
111 Ibid., p. 116; and Posusney, op. cit., p. 218. 
112 Posusney, op. cit., p. 217. 
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Furthermore, in seeking to remain in power, the 'slowly but surely' approach advocated 
by Mubarak's regime would help. The Egyptian government appeared to delay the 
process of the structural reform programme, fearing that the acceleration of the reform 
risked possible social disruption prompted by economic hardship and an increase in the 
unemployment level (which was already high and estimated to be around 17.5 per cent 
of the workforce or 2.8 million people113) as a result of privatisation. This fear was 
further exacerbated by the attacks launched by the militant Islamist movement. The 
attacks carried out by such militant lslamist groups as the Jama'a al-Islamiyya and the 
Islamic Jihad against security forces, senior government officials, banks and tourists 
since late 1992, including an Islamist assassination attempt on Mubarak himself in 
Ethiopia in June 1995, did not help eradicate the fear either. 
The strategy used by the Egyptian government to launch, formulate and adopt the public 
sector reform further contributed to the delay in privatisation (as well as other structural 
adjustment reforms). To gain the widest possible approval and thereby guarding their 
political status quo, the Egyptian government allowed various actors to voice their 
opinion (which could, sometimes, be contradictory) on whether and how the reform 
should be carried out and what the reform should include. Due to the controversial 
nature of the reform, the government had to cautiously move forward and sometimes 
make compromises as a consequence of interest group lobbying. 114 Simultaneously, 
such an inclusive strategy augmented Egypt's bargaining power with the IMF. By 
pursuing such a strategy, the Egyptian government in effect gained more time as a result 
of the delay and more room to manoeuvre in negotiating with the IMF. 
Trade liberalisation was another sensitive issue, particularly when a powerful private-
sector business lobby opposed to opening the Egyptian market to competition via tariff 
reductions. Egyptian businessmen had expressed particular concern about the target of 
decreasing the maximum tariff to 50 per cent and the increased exposure to 
international competition. Other demands of the business community included 
minimum prices for all imported articles, with customs duties levied accordingly, and 
import quotas for each product group. 115 As a result of adjustments following pressure 
113 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1995, p. 6. 
114 Belev, B., 'Privatization in Egypt and Tunisia: Liberal Outcomes and/or Liberal Policies?,' 
Mediterranean Politics, vol. 6, no. 2, summer 2001, pp. 74-81. 
115 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 65. 
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by Egyptian businessmen, the new Egyptian customs tariff, which should have been 
effective since 1 January 1994, was finally ratified on 13 February 1994. The 
maximum tariff was reduced from 80 to 70 per cent (except for high-powered cars, 
cigarettes and alcohol) and tariff rates for a wide range of goods (such as several raw 
materials; food items including raw and refined sugar, cheese, butter, oil and cocoa; 
paper products; fertilisers; and leather) were also decreased. 116 
The division within the Egyptian cabinet between the reformists and the gradualists also 
contributed to the delay in implementing the structural reform programme. The 
reformists within the Egyptian cabinet did not constitute an overriding majority, and 
their number was in decline following the departure of Fouad Sultan (former Minister 
for Tourism and Civil Aviation) in the October 1993 cabinet reshuffle. Fouad Sultan, 
who was regarded as 'the government's most ardent champion of the private sector,' 117 
was believed to be punished from having gone too far in pushing the large-scale 
privatisation of hotel facilities. 118 This seemed to suggest that President Mubarak had 
used the cabinet reshuffle as a way to maintain control over the pace of economic 
reforms, which would not jeopardise his regime's political survival. This at the same 
time enhanced Egypt's negotiating power vis-a-vis the IMF through the extra time 
derived from the delay in implementing structural adjustment reforms. In addition to 
the above reasons, Mubarak's re-nomination for the presidency in the fall of 1993 added 
to further delay. 119 
As a consequence, IMF conditionality was implemented in a piece-meal fashion. Some 
conditions were fulfilled on time. They included: 
i) the passing of a new unified personal taxation law through the People's 
Assembly on 31 December 1993, which had received substantial 
opposition from deputies, even from within the ruling National 
Democratic Party, which were said to argue for lower-income groups 
and that higher taxation would jeopardise investment; 
ii) the abolition of almost all controls on foreign exchange dealings, 
including the previous requirement on exporters, travel agents, and 
116 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., pp. 66-67; EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1994, p. 15; and MEED, 25 
Feb. 1994,p.28 
117 Financial Times, 22 Apr. 1994. 
118 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 114. 
119 Ibid., p. 122; and Posusney, op. cit., pp. 216-217. 
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public enterprises to repatriate their foreign exchange receipts, following 
the passing of a new foreign currency law by the People's Assembly on 
27 April 1994; and 
iii) the passing of the law liberalising the cotton trade on 7 May 1994, which 
freed cotton prices from 1 September 1994. 120 
On the other hand, the Egyptian government failed to meet targets (either on time or at 
all) in most areas, notably trade liberalisation, privatisation, and price liberalisation. As 
has previously discussed, due to intense lobbying by Egyptian businessmen who feared 
international competition, the reduction of the maximum tariff from 80 per cent to 70 
per cent was implemented one and a half months behind the deadline (by December 
1993). Similarly, the second phase of reducing the maximum tariff from 70 per cent to 
60 per cent was not put into effect by the December 1994 deadline and was left 
unimplemented under the 1993 EFF. Concerning privatisation, at the time of the first 
review by the World Bank of Egypt's SAMP in March 1994, only three sales had been 
agreed (the El-Nasr Bottling Company, the Egyptian Bottling Company and El-Nasr 
Boilers and Pressure Vessels Company) but none of the deals had been completed. 121 
Under the 1993 EFF, a draft amendment of the new rent law to decontrol rents on new 
and vacant units and buildings was due to be present to the People's Assembly by the 
end of 1993, and should have been passed by the People's Assembly and put into 
practice by the end of June 1994 (see Appendix G). However, the draft amendment of 
the rent law was subject to recall following a public outcry over its terms, and the 
passing of the amendment did not come until 30 January 1996. 122 By early 1996, 
another highly sensitive issue, the civil service reform, remained stalled, even though it 
was, according to the 1993 EFF, due to begin in 1994.123 
6.2.2.2 Disagreement over Devaluation of the Egyptian Pounds 
Besides the issue of the pace of Egypt's economic reform, another major contentious 
area between the Egyptian government and the IMF which became public in mid-June 
1994 was over the exchange rate policy, in particular the devaluation of the Egyptian 
pound. 
120 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1994, p. 14, no. 3, 1994, pp. 20-21. 
121 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 2, 1994, p. 13. 
122 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1994, p. 22, and no. 1, 1996, pp. 20-21. 
123 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1996, p. 7. 
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In fact the 1993 EFF contained no explicit provision for the devaluation of the Egyptian 
pound. Therefore, the issue of devaluation was subject to various interpretations, even 
among IMF officials. For some IMF officials, devaluation did not form part of IMF 
conditionality under the 1993 agreement, 124 while for others, it did. 125 However, IMF 
conditionality under the 1993 agreement implied a flexible exchange rate policy. 126 The 
1993 EFF agreement was concerned with the exchange rate to the extent that: 
[A] competitive exchange rate is a key to promoting investment, growth, and 
efficient diversification of the economy through the growth of the tradable 
goods sector. Consequently, exchange rate and financial policy will be geared 
toward gradually improving international competitiveness. The primary 
instrument will be tighter fiscal policy supported by prudent monetary policy, 
but exchange rate market interventions may also be required [emphasis 
added]. An improvement in international competitiveness during the course of 
1993/94 is targeted. The [Egyptian] Government will closely monitor 
indicators of non-oil exports, tourist activity, and nominal and real effective 
exchange rate movements, which will be a key in determining the pace of 
improvement in international competitiveness. 127 
Yet, Egypt did not in practice adopt the flexible exchange rate policy. The CBE in fact 
intervened to protect the Egypt pound by pressuring banks to sell limited quantities of 
dollars except for export purposes. 128 
A) The IMF's View 
With regard to the IMF's view over the exchange rate policy, it claimed that due to the 
lack of progress on Egypt's economic reform during the second half of 1994, economic 
growth was on a decline while unemployment remained high. 129 The IMF, applying the 
concept of real effective exchange rate, 130 argued that the value of the Egyptian 
currency (which had remained stable at around US$ 1 = LE 3.3 since the unification of 
exchange rates in October 1991), should be adjusted downward since inflation was 
higher than that in its major trading partners in the West. The IMF estimated that the 
124 Interviewee 27 (a former IMF official), personal interview, Washington, D. C., 3 Oct. 2001; and 
Interviewee 30 (a present IMF official), personal interview, Washington, D. C., 16 Oct. 2001. It should 
be noticed that under the 1991 SBA, devaluation was part of IMF conditionality and Egypt did devalue its 
currency. 
125 Interviewee 29 (a present IMF official), personal interview, Washington, D. C., 11 Oct. 2001. 
126 Interviewee 27, op. cit., 3 Oct. 2001. 
127 Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Memorandum on Economic Policy of the Egyptian Government,' 18 Aug. 
1993, in International Monetary Fund, op. cit., 20 Aug. 1993, p. 20. 
128 As a consequence, a black market began to develop whereby dollars bought from public-sector banks 
were resold to private exchange dealers at a small profit. EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1995, p. 18. 
129 Ibid., p. 15. 
130 The exchange rate that takes into account the effects of inflation differentials. 
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inflation differential since 1991 was between 35-40 per cent, while over the same period 
the exchange rate had depreciated a mere 6.25 per cent. 131 Thus, on this basis, the 
Egyptian pound was overvalued, which in tum adversely affected Egypt's export 
competitiveness and hindered its economic growth. IMF officials emphasised that they 
did not necessarily look for a significant devaluation of the Egyptian pound for its own 
sake. 132 They had indicated that they were in favour of a reduction in interest rates 
(claiming that high rates also restricted growth) as a policy instrument to bring about 
depreciation of the domestic currency. 133 IMF officials explained that the latter would, 
in tum, stimulate the demand for Egyptian exports and would also prevent an influx of 
imports following the reduction in tariff rates. They added that a cut in interest rates 
would also boost investment and lessen the burden of interest rates on the government 
budget. 134 However, this received resistance from both the Egyptian government, and 
the private sector businesses and bankers. 
B) Egypt's View 
The Egyptian government asserted that devaluation was not part of Egypt's letter of 
intent approved under the September 1993 EFF and was thereby opposed to the idea of 
the government's intervention to devalue the Egyptian pound, as reflected in a number 
of Egyptian officials' pronouncements. 135 Although he admitted that the Egyptian 
pound had appreciated, but only by a 'modest' amount, Atef Obeid (Minister for Public 
Enterprise and Administrative Affairs) said in mid-June 1994 that the devaluation of the 
Egyptian pound would never happen. He cited export-oriented Asian economies as 
examples of countries that achieved rapid growth assisted by stable exchange rates. 136 
131 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1994, p. 15. 
Ill 5 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 199 , p. 15. 
133 It should be noticed that this was different from the IMF demand over changes in interest rates in the 
1980s. In 1987, the IMF asked for an increase in interest rates but now it wanted a reduction in interest 
rates instead. In both occasions, the interest rates were used as an instrument but to deal with different 
economic problems. In 1987, the IMF wanted to use the interest rates as an instrument to deal with the 
high level of inflation, so it asked for an increase in interest rates (so people would save more and spend 
less) as a way to bring down the inflation. In 1994, the IMF aimed to use the lowering of interest rates to 
bring down the overvalued Egyptian pound (the demand for the Egyptian pound in the currency market 
would be less and so its value). Therefore, the difference in movement of interest rates demanded by the 
IMF was due to the different aims in using interest rates. 
134 MEED, 22 July 1994, p. 20. 
135 While the devaluation dispute remained unsettled, speculation about a possible devaluation and a 
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The Egyptian government's decision to resist the IMF's suggestions was fully 
supported by President Mubarak, who had the final say. At a meeting with National 
Democratic Party officials in Alexandria on 6 August 1994, President Mubarak stated: 
'There will be no devaluation of the pound and no increase in the price of dollar. This 
will be left to supply and demand.' 137 
With a lesson learnt from the Mexican peso crisis of late 1994 and early 1995 that a 
sudden devaluation could be damaging, the Egyptian Government continued to resist 
reducing the value of the pound to stimulate exports on grounds that the stability of the 
exchange rate was a crucial factor for rebuilding investors' confidence and that a rise in 
import bills and inflation as a result of devaluation would overweigh its advantages. As 
Ahmed el-Darsh, First Under-secretary for International Finance at the Ministry for 
International Co-operation, put it: 
[D]evaluating the currency is not the right way of handling this situation ... , 
but if we take this general medicine it will have other negative effects. The 
confidence that has been built from the stability of the Egyptian pound over a 
long petiod of time is priceless; something we should not part with. 138 
The Egyptian government rejected the claim that a strong Egyptian pound hindered 
exports and devaluation made domestic products more competitive than imports. The 
government asserted that there were other policy measures available which could be 
utilised to encourage exports, and that the key to promote domestic products and 
exports was through the improvement of marketing efforts and of packaging, delivering 
on time, and ensuring quality control, rather than through financial competitiveness. 139 
As Youssef Boutros Ghali, Minister for International Co-operation, summarised, 'Our 
entire economic policy is geared towards the tradable sector. But I deeply believe the 
issue of competitiveness lies in the technical competence of our exporters- this is what 
we need to worry about.' 140 
137 MEED, 19 Aug. 1994, p. 11. 
138 Al-Ahram Weekly, 30 June-6 July 1994. 
139 Such arguments were expressed by a number of senior Egyptian ministers such as Prime Minister Atef 
Sidqi and Mahmoud Mohammed Mahmoud, Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade. For their 
statements, see EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1995, p. 18; and Financial Times, 15 May 1995, and 3 
Nov. 1995. 
14° Financial Times, 21 June 1994, p. 6. 
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The IMF's insistence on reducing the value of the pound also provoked unanticipated 
opposition from Egyptian business circles, which had been supporting the IMF-inspired 
reform policies since the beginning of the reform programme. Letters were sent to the 
IMF by business organisations and the Chambers of Commerce to express their 
opposition to the IMF-proposed devaluation. During a visit to the IMF by a 
government official team during the mid-July 1994, a letter written by the Egyptian 
Businessmen's Association was passed on to the IMF, arguing against devaluation of 
the Egyptian pound. The Egyptian Businessmen claimed that the devaluation would not 
enhance the competitiveness of their exports. 141 According to Ramzi Rushdi, a member 
of the Board of Governors of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt sent a letter to the IMF arguing that the 
business community was against government intervention in the "free" foreign 
exchange market. In its letter, the American Chamber of Commerce, which shared a 
similar argument to the government's, pointed out that devaluation would increase the 
prices of imports and so build inflationary pressure which would in tum have serious 
social repercussions. The letter also argued that devaluation would also erode the 
current confidence in the Egyptian pound through speculation and thus, discourage 
potential local and foreign investors who would not be able to forecast their profits. 142 
Likewise, little support for devaluation was found among Egyptian bankers. 
Mohammed Abdel-Aziz, Chairman of the Egyptian Banks Federation, expressed his 
rejection of the devaluation by primarily arguing that devaluation would not benefit 
exports, especially since Egypt imports most of the materials needed for production, and 
would instead result in a rise in production costs and a failure to compete in local and 
international markets. 143 One local banker asserted: 'Devaluation is only useful if it 
results in more exports and tourism income.' He suggested that the exchange rate had 
only marginal significance in this respect in Egypt now. He said: 'Tourism has been 
affected by special factors unrelated to price, and the poor performance of exports 
reflects other factors than price, such as freight costs, reliability and proper cover of 
markets.' 144 Those against the idea of devaluation of the Egyptian pound also pointed 
141 MEED, 29 July 1994, p. 8. For views expressed by individual members of the Egyptian 
Businessmen's Association such as Gamal al-N azir, deputy chairman of the Egyptian Businessmen's 
Association (EBA), and Na'ilah Allubah, chairwoman of the export committee at the EBA, see SWB: 
Weekly Economic Report, MEW/0345, 9 Aug. 1994, p. WME/2. 
142 Al-Ahram Weekly, 20 June-6 July 1994. 
143 SWB: Weekly Economic Report, MEW/0345, 9 Aug. 1994, p. WME/2. 
144 MEED, 1 July 1994, p. 16. 
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out that oil and cotton exports (representing some 50 per cent of total exports), as well 
as Suez Canal tolls, were valued in dollars. Furthermore, non-oil exports were 
increasing by more than 10 per cent annually despite the exchange rate factor. 145 
While the two contentious issues of devaluation and the pace of reform ran parallel, the 
Egyptian government was able to exploit the devaluation dispute with the IMF for its 
own political interest in avoiding implementing unpopular reform measures which 
might trigger public outcry in the run-up of the November 1995 parliamentary elections. 
Its over-emphasis on the devaluation dispute in public appeared to be used as a tactic to 
delay the implementation of the EFF economic reform in the light of its deteriorating 
relationship with the IMF. Prime Minister Atef Sidqi said in October 1994 that while 
there were many important disagreements on the economic reform programme, the 
Egyptian government refused to privatise banks and insurance companies as agreed 
upon under the September 1993 EFF. In December 1994 he added: 'We will have 
recourse to privatisation as the last means to improve living conditions.' 146 
As a result of the disagreements over the exchange rate issue and the pace of economic 
reform, the EFF signed in September 1993 became stalled and the first review of the 
September 1993 EFF was not approved. Without passing the first review, the 
implementation of Egypt's third and final stage of its US$ 10 billion Paris Club debt-
relief agreement, which was originally scheduled for the end of June 1994, was held up. 
IMF inflexibility on the exchange rate issue seems to be largely rooted in its concern 
that, once Egypt passed its first review and consequently obtained the final tranche of 
the Paris Club debt write-off, the IMF, the World Bank, and other donors would have 
little leverage on the Egyptian government concerning economic reform for the future 
period. On the other hand, Egypt appeared to take a cost-benefit analysis, viewing that 
the total cost of devaluation outweighed the financial gain of the debt relief (additional 
interest payments of approximately US$ 360 million per annum). In particular, Egypt's 
negotiating position with the IMF was strong not only because of the domestic support 
from Egyptian business circles but also due largely to the timing when its economic 
situation had substantially improved. Owing to a current account surplus (contributed 
to by high remittances and increasing tourism revenues), despite the growing trade 
145 MEED, 1 July 1994, p. 16. 
146 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., p. 69. 
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deficit, foreign exchange reserves excluding gold had been on an upward trend since the 
early 1990s, which made it less urgent to reduce foreign debt. They rose from US$ 6.8 
billion at the end of June 1991 to US$ 18.2 billion at the end of June 1995, which 
represented an 18-month import cover. 147 Other macroeconomic indicators had also 
improved substantially since 1991. Inflation had dropped from about 20 per cent in 
1991 to 9 per cent in 1994, and the budget deficit declined from 20 per cent of GDP in 
1990-1991 to 2.6 per cent of GDP in 1993-1994. 148 Prime Minister Atef Sidqi 
remarked on 17 December 1994 that 'the government would not allow the adoption of 
measures moving in the direction of devaluation such as a decrease of interest on pound 
deposits. The delay of the annulment of the debt is no problem for us and will have no 
consequences on the Egyptian economy.' 149 Thus, despite its desire to secure the final 
stage of debt relief, the macroeconomic improvement, particularly the high amount of 
foreign exchange reserves, seemed to allow Egypt some room to manoeuvre by buying 
time to resist the IMF' s demand and thereby lessened the IMF' s leverage over the 
Egyptian government. 
To show its sincerity in arguing against devaluation but also its willingness to continue 
its economic reform programme in general, measures were announced by the Egyptian 
government to promote exports through means other than devaluation. On 21 
September 1994, the higher committee for exports, under the chairmanship of Kamal el-
Ganzouri, Deputy Prime Minister, announced a series of recommended measures with 
the aim of helping exporters. The measures included a reduction of the interest on loans 
to exporters by 1-2 per cent; a cut in bank fees on export financing by 25-50 per cent; 
the lowering of freight, port services and storage charges; and the provision of 
incentives for aircraft passing through Egypt to carry Egyptian goods for export. 150 
While the devaluation disagreement continued, another series of non-devaluation 
measures aiming at promoting exports was announced in mid-November 1994. Such 
measures included a reduction of land prices for industrial projects in new cities plus 
further tax exemptions to industrialists, and government financial assistance to cover 
part of the costs incurred by textile exporters who improved their product quality. 151 
147 Financial Times, 3 Nov. 1995. 
148 Weiss and Wurzel, op. cit., pp. 60 and 68. 
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In an attempt to break the deadlock over the devaluation of the Egyptian pound and also 
Egypt's slow progress on structural reform, a series of talks between the Egyptian 
government and the IMF had been held in the second half of 1994 but resulted in little 
progress. One of the former IMF officials described how: 'The relation [between Egypt 
and the IMF] was at a low ebb and broke down after the failure of the EFF. The Fund 
staff did not visit Egypt for 18 months from October 1994 until March 1996. There was 
a hiatus.' 152 The relationship between the two sides deteriorated to the degree that the 
devaluation dispute apparently became personalised at the top level between President 
Mubarak and Michel Camdessus, the IMP's Managing Director, who adhered to 
opposite views. 153 
At the IMF Executive Board meeting held on 22 September 1995 for a revtew of 
Egypt's economic performance in the context of the annual Article IV consultations,154 
it was reported that the debate over Egypt's exchange rate policy rumbled on although a 
consensus was reached on the government's need to improve export competitiveness. 
This was partly due to the lobbying of developing country members of the IMF by 
Abdel-Shakour Shaalan to ensure support for Egypt vis-a-vis the 07 country 
members. 155 The IMF staff report prepared for the meeting called for devaluation of 
25-40 per cent, including an immediate 15 per cent devaluation. 156 
However, the devaluation stalemate did not come to an end until the following month 
when the case was discussed at a meeting of the IMF's Executive Board. At the 
meeting, Abdel-Shakour Shaalan argued against the strong recommendation for 
devaluation put forward by the IMF's Management and staff, and the Executive Board 
finally agreed with the former. 157 Consequently, the Executive Board decided that the 
devaluation was unnecessary at the time of the robust performance of Egyptian exports 
over the past year. According to Stanley Fisher, IMF Deputy Managing Director, such 
a shift in the IMF's position on the exchange rate issue stemmed in particular from a 
sharp rise in non-oil exports by 70 per cent during the first nine months of the fiscal 
152 Interviewee 27, op. cit., 3 Oct. 2001. 
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year 1994/95. 158 On 25 October 1995, in response to the question over the devaluation 
of the Egyptian pound, Fisher remarked that: 
There is agreement that the primary areas in which progress has to be made in 
Egypt are with structural reforms. That's agreed by the IMF and agreed with 
the Egyptian government and I don't think there is much ambiguity about that. 
There is nothing in the Egyptian economy now that indicates the need for a 
change in the exchange rate or the exchange system that we see. 159 
As a result of the two main contentious issues, the 1993 economic programme came to a 
halt and was subsequently aborted by the Egyptian government without passing any of 
the IMF's review. The IMF staff in its report summarised how the Egyptian 
government performed in the implementation of the 1993 programme: 
The pace of reform has been sporadic and generally slower than envisaged 
under the extended arrangement (which expires September 19, 1996), with the 
result that none of the reviews was completed. However, important progress 
has been made toward fiscal adjustment and toward creating a more 
decentralized, market-oriented and open economy. 160 
6.3 'fhe October 1996 Stand~By Arrangement 
Prior to the beginning of negotiations for an agreement with the IMF, Egypt's economic 
position remained relatively strong. There were a number of macroeconomic indicators 
suggesting such strength. Real GDP growth increased to more than 4 per cent in 
1995/96 from stagnation in 1991192, while inflation on an annual basis declined to 
slightly over 7 per cent from more than 21 per cent in the early 1990s. The overall 
fiscal deficit was brought down to 1.3 per cent of GDP in 1995/96 from double digits in 
the early 1990s. In particular, the overall balance of payments remained in surplus, 
leading to a substantial accumulation of net international reserves. The latter stood at 
nearly US$ 19 billion in 1995/96, representing about 15 months of imports. The ratio 
of external debt to GDP reduced to about 47 per cent in mid-1996 from about 75 per 
cent in 1991192, and the debt-service ratio fell to about 11 of current account receipts 
(including all transfers) from 14 per cent in 1991/92.161 
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159 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1996, p. 18; and MEED, 17 Nov. 1995, p. 19. See also Al-Ahram 
Weekly, 29 Feb.-6 Mar. 1996. 
160 International Monetary Fund, op. cit., 17 Sept. 1996, p. iii. 
161 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 1997, p. 74; and International Monetary Fund, IMF 
Survey, 28 Oct. 1996, p. 354. 
Moving towards a New Stance on Economic Reform: 1989-1998 267 
Therefore, Egypt's interest in reaching another agreement with the IMF again seemed to 
go beyond the provision of the IMP's credit. With such a high level of foreign 
exchange reserves, there would be no need for Egypt to request extra credits. Indeed, 
the Egyptian government subsequently forewent its drawing right on the stand-by credit 
owing to its strong international reserve position. It was in fact the cancellation of the 
third and final tranche (worth about US$ 4 billion) of the US$ 10 billion Paris Club 
debt, which was conditional on the IMP's approval, that largely induced Egypt to 
conclude another agreement with the IMP. 
6.3.1 Negotiations Leading to the October 1996 Stand-By Arrangement 
Talks between the IMF and the Egyptian government resumed immediately following 
the end of the devaluation dispute. On 26 November 1995, Kamal el-Ganzouri, 
Planning Minister, held talks in Paris with Paul Chabrier, the IMF's Director of the 
Middle East Department. These talks were a preliminary step for a new round of formal 
discussions between the two sides. 162 Due to changes in the general economic situation 
since the signing of the 1993 EFF accord, negotiations between the two sides aimed at 
concluding a new stand-by agreement, 163 rather than reviewing the old EFF. 
On the domestic front, after the elections of November 1995, there seemed to be 
indications that the official commitment to the economic reform was renewed. In 
January 1996, the Egyptian cabinet was altered. In his statements on 2 January 1996, 
President Mubarak used the slow progress of Egypt's economic reform in explaining his 
thinking behind the change of government. He remarked: 'I want to give a new push to 
national work in various domains. I change [personnel] in order to stimulate the 
development process.' He said that if the government's economic reform policy had 
slowed down, 'it is important to step up the pace' since 'maintaining the economic 
reform process is imperative.' He added: '[W]e would change an incompetent minister 
or one who was exhausted so that the process might continue.' 164 The reshuffle of the 
Egyptian cabinet in January 1996 was therefore seen as an attempt by President 
Mubarak to speed up Egypt's economic reform, in particular the privatisation process, 
which had slowed down largely as a result of the substantial improvement of the 
162 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 1, 1996, p. 18; and MEED, 8 Dec. 1995, p. 18. 
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economy and of Egypt's relative bargaining strength, in combination with domestic 
resistance and fear of its negative effect on the result of the November 1995 elections. 
A new government was formed under the premiership of Kamal el-Ganzouri in place of 
Atef Sidqi. The IFis and the US Embassy in Cairo identified the former as someone 
with whom business could clearly be done. 165 At first, it seemed to be a contradiction to 
have Kamal el-Ganzouri appointed as a prime minister with a main agenda to accelerate 
the pace of economic reforms. Kamal el-Ganzouri, who had served as planning 
minister and subsequently deputy prime minister for planning during Mubarak's 14-
year presidency since January 1982, would, on the basis of his long-term career in 
planning, be seen as pro-central planning and pro-public sector, rather than pro-free 
market and pro-private sector. However, Kamal el-Ganzouri, who was described as a 
'born again reformist,' 166 admitted a recent change in his view towards economic 
reforms, particularly over public and private sector reforms, and their benefits. He 
remarked in an interview with the Financial Times: 
Frankly 3 years ago, I thought, why not keep the public sector ... and the 
private sector can come and invest in any activity. Right now I find it very 
hard to invite the private sector to work while we have this big pyramid of 
bl . . 1()7 pu 1c enterpnses. 
However, one important question needs to be addressed: why did Egypt or, to be more 
specifically, President Mubarak make aU-turn policy by adopting a faster pace of the 
economic reform? Perhaps the renewed official commitment lay in a number of 
political factors (both international and domestic). At the international level, there 
seemed to be a better understanding in view of the end of the Cold War, in particular 
from President Mubarak himself, that Egypt could no longer rely on the rivalry of the 
two superpowers to gain economic and financial benefits, and therefore it needed to act 
faster in order to move its economy forward to catch up with the rest of the world. It 
was reported that ministers and diplomats attested that President Mubarak gave 
instructions to accelerate the privatisation after learning that, by South-East Asian 
standards, the amount of foreign investment in Egypt was minute. 168 Kamal el-
Ganzouri complained: 'It was very hard to be in my position and to know that last year 
165 Bush, op. cit., p. 31. 
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[1995] we got foreign investment of US$ 400 million while in Indonesia- I don't think 
they have more potential than Egypt- they got US$ 40 billion.' 169 
Besides the conclusion of the Cold War, Egypt faced a possible loss of another 
underlying source of bargaining strength vis-a-vis the IMF, the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
By the mid-1990s, there was a growing concern that once Arab states established 
relations with Israel (Jordan had already signed a peace treaty with Israel in October 
1994), Egypt's leading regional role and thus its crucial source of bargaining power vis-
a-vis the IMF might be threatened. Furthermore, Egyptian-US relations were strained 
by Egypt's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and over Mubarak's links 
with Colonel Qaddafi of Libya. Thus, a number of US newspapers and journals had 
raised the question as to whether Egypt should continue to receive substantial US 
economic aid, and the view that Egypt no longer deserved substantial US aid had also 
been expressed by some members of the new Republican majority in the US 
Congress. 170 Therefore, it may be possible that being aware of such potential threats, 
the Egyptian government then decided to speed up the economic reforms. 
Domestically, the end of the parliamentary elections of November 1995 and a landslide 
94 per cent victory of the ruling NDP meant that the Egyptian government could now 
afford to divert its attention to the economic reforms. In addition, while the economic 
reform had stalled, Mubarak's regime had continued to pursue its repressive policy 
towards real or potential challenges for its political survival. In September before the 
1995 parliamentary elections took place, more than 80 prominent members of the 
officially banned Muslim Brotherhood, who had probably intended to stand for election 
as independent candidates, were arrested, and some were given three to five year 
imprisonment sentences by a military court for unspecified illegal political activities. 171 
The government was accused by opposition newspapers of wide spread electoral 
abuses, vote rigging, intimidation and harassment. Also by this time, the Egyptian 
government successfully expelled most of the Islamist militants from the main Egyptian 
cities and tourist sites. 172 Nearly all the violence was confined to gun battles between 
the Egyptian authorities and the militants in central and Upper Egypt, and the security 
169 El-Ganzouri, Kamal, op. cit., 20 May 1996. 
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appeared to be stabilising, particularly in Cairo. 173 By the end of 1994, Mubarak's 
regime became more repressive towards informal and more spontaneous labour 
protests, although some concessions were made. The latter emerged in response to 
sudden reductions in their supplementary pay or the threat of layoff as the holding 
companies started reviewing affiliated companies' finances and operations. 174 
Moreover, there was another domestic political reason for President Mubarak to 
accelerate the pace of economic reforms. It was reported that early in 1996 Egyptian 
businessmen, close to the President, had informed him why influential members of the 
business community were concerned about the slow pace of economic reforms. 175 The 
problems such as a brain drain of highly qualified young labour and transfer of private 
investments to foreign countries were likely to remain as long as the economic reforms 
were carried out at a sluggish pace. If President Mubarak wanted to retain the support 
of the leading business circles, the momentum of reform would have to be increased. 
Thus, it seems that in order to satisfy influential supporters of Mubarak' s regime in the 
Egyptian business community, the Egyptian cabinet was instructed to push further 
economic reforms. 
As a consequence, the Egyptian government began to increase the pace of the economic 
reform. In January 1996, customs duties were reduced by 10 per cent on a number of 
imported items, 176 which was far behind schedule as indicated in IMF conditionality 
under the 1993 EFF (see Appendix G). By February 1996, out of 314 unidentified state 
entities initially released for sale, only three had been sold outright, 10 had been 
liquidated, and 16 had been partly divested through the issue of 10 per cent blocks of 
shares to the public. 177 However, following the cabinet reshuffle, the privatisation 
process started to move forward. On 15 February 1996, Egypt took a step towards 
privatising its state-dominated industry by releasing a list of more than 80 companies it 
hoped to sell in 1996, including hotels, Nile cruisers and some of the state's most 
profitable industrial companies in cement, metallurgy textiles and food. 178 After May 
1996, the acceleration of the privatisation programme became apparent. On 6 May 
173 Gerges, F. A., 'The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?: Costs and Prospects,' Middle East 
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1996, the Egyptian government announced its decision to sell 75 per cent of a public 
sector real estate company, Nasr City Housing and Construction, representing the first 
majority sale to private investors through the Cairo stock exchange. 179 Since then, a 
series of sales of public enterprises followed, including fertilisers, electrical products, 
pharmaceutical and chemical firms in May and June 1996. 180 
On the other front, the negotiations between the IMF and Egypt continued in 1996 
following an interruption caused by Egyptian parliamentary elections at the end of 1995 
and January 1996. There were also World Bank staff who participated in the talks 
between the IMF and Egypt. The World Bank had a limited role in the economic 
reform programme in the case of Egypt. It merely collaborated with IMF staff on the 
issues such as civil service reform, trade and privatisation, without being involved in 
negotiations for a prograrnme. 181 According to IMF officials, talks convened in 
Washington at the end of April 1996 were constructive and cordial. One of the IMF 
officials stated: 'We were impressed with the new seriousness of the Egyptian 
authorities, and their determination to place the economy on a high growth 
trajectory . . The fund finds their programme far-reaching and believes it will be 
effective.' 182 
Since devaluation was no longer the issue for discussion, the focus of the talks was on 
speeding up structural reform and in particular privatisation and trade liberalisation in 
order to attract more investment and increase exports. 183 With some progress having 
been made, privatisation proved less controversial between the Egyptian government 
and the IMF. On the other hand, the issues of trade liberalisation and energy pricing 
remained contentious. The IMF reportedly demanded immediate and substantial tariff 
reductions. 184 However, the Egyptian government's concern was over the effect of a 
sharp reduction in import tariffs on the government budget and a perceived need to 
protect specific local industries such as car assembly. Also, Kamal el-Ganzouri wanted 
to keep his promise not to raise energy prices during the 1996/97 fiscal year. 185 By 
early 1996, electricity and domestic petroleum prices equalled to approximately 80 per 
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cent and 90 per cent of international prices, respectively. 186 Fearful that further rises in 
energy prices would trigger public anger, Ganzouri' s government had insisted that there 
would be no further cut in state subsidies, including those on energy. 187 In addition to 
these issues, the IMP also wanted to include Egypt's acceptance of Article VIII (which 
was primarily concerned with the convertibility of the Egyptian pound) of the IMP's 
Articles of Agreement as one of prior actions (i.e. conditions to be implemented before 
the approval of the 1996 agreement). However, Egypt did not accept this condition 
immediately, saying that they would look at it favourable in the course of the 
programme. 188 
While the negotiations with the IMP continued, besides the adoption of repressive 
measures against domestic resistance, the government at the same time intensified its 
efforts on the domestic front to reassure the public in an attempt to avoid public outcry 
triggered by the fear of negative impact of economic reforms. In his statement to Mayu 
on 8 September 1996, President Mubarak said that Egypt adhered to the policy of 
economic reform without placing any burdens on the low-income category. 189 There 
were also attempts by the government to deny any job losses arising from privatisation. 
The official line from the President down was that privatisation was beneficial to 
workers and that the government remained committed to the protection of workers' 
rights. President Mubarak in his Labour Day speech on 24 April 1996 emphasised that 
no jobs would be lost through privatisation. He remarked: 
I have frequently stated that protecting the workers' rights is a major 
responsibility of any government that primarily seeks to safeguard the working 
classes' interests ... the process of privatization in Egypt is governed by 
numerous controls. Foremost among these is ... [that] the new management is 
required to keep the company's workers in their jobs.190 
Similarly, Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri said to Al-Akhbar newspaper published 
on 27 February 1996 that the success of the pri vatisation programme would increase 
workers' income and provide new job opportunities for our youths without harming any 
worker. He stressed the government's promise that no worker would be affected 
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adverse I y through the pri vatisation. 191 He made a similar point on 20 September 1996 
that privatisation did not mean, as some believed, getting rid of the workforce but in 
fact privatised companies would need more workers in addition to those currently 
working with them if the potential of the companies was properly exploited and the 
quality and cost of their products were improved. 192 Also, Atef Obeid, Minister of 
Public Enterprises, emphasised in a statement to Al-Ahram published on 21 May 1996 
that privatisation in Egypt was necessary and inevitable. It was good for workers and 
also for society as a whole, which would benefit from the investment revenue. 193 
In addition to the issue of privatisation addressed to workers, the government's 
reassurance was manifest in other issues such as tax reform. In his speech following his 
first cabinet meetings in Cairo on 6 January 1996, Kamal el-Ganzouri stated that: 
During the former period, it was inevitable that various fees and taxes would 
be imposed to remedy the budget deficit. We needed revenues. However, we 
have reached a point where we have no right to impose new burdens on 
Egyptian citizens. What we will do is to increase state revenue by increasing 
the number of taxpayers without raising taxes or imposing new fees. I assure 
the Egyptian citizens that there are no plans to impose new burdens on them. 194 
Besides the use of public statements, the government also introduced compensatory 
measures along with such economic measures as tariff reductions. To alleviate 
concerns of local industrialists about the decrease of protective barriers as well as to 
stimulate local industrial production and encourage exports, tariff rates on 25 imported 
commodities used as industrial inputs were dropped in late January 1996 from between 
30 per cent and 70 per cent to 10 per cent. The commodities included car components, 
air compressors, textiles machinery, construction vehicles and electric power-generating 
units. 195 A similar action in relation to tariff reductions was also taken by the 
government along with the implementation of IMF conditionality (see later 
discussions). 
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By July 1996, Egypt and the IMF had agreed in principle on an economic reform 
programme after four rounds of talks under way since March in the same year. 196 On 
11 October 1996, the IMP's Executive Board granted its approval for a SBA with a total 
credit of SDR 271.4 million (US$ 391 million) over a period of two years through 30 
September 1998. Again Egypt did not draw on the available credit, thanks to its strong 
international reserve position. The two-year economic programme under the 1996 SBA 
was seen as the third phase of economic liberalisation and structural adjustment 
programme, labelled 'Take off' by Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri. 197 The 
economic programme was designed to 'foster ... stronger output growth, generat[e] 
higher employment, and increas[e] the standard of living of the Egyptian population 
while preserving financial stability and external viability.' 198 Real GDP growth was 
targeted to increase to about 5 per cent in 1997/98 which would thereby facilitate the 
creation of some 400,000 new jobs per year. 199 To achieve the objectives, the 
programme focused on two keys elements: 
i) the consolidation of the gains on macroeconomic stabilisation through 
fiscal, monetary and external policies; and 
ii) The broadening and deepening of the structural reforms through 
privatisation, trade liberalisation, structural fiscal reform, energy prices, 
financial sector reform, and deregulation.200 
The programme entailed numerous policy measures and targets in the above policy 
areas to be implemented before and during the agreement. 201 
A mid-way solution seemed to be reached between the two sides on energy pnce 
liberalisation. Although the Egyptian government agreed to put an end to its energy 
price subsidies as the IMF insisted, this would gradually be adopted (the approach that 
the Egyptian government always argued for) and would not come to an end until July 
1999. By setting the deadline of July 1997 for the first one-third removal of the subsidy 
would in effect allow Kamal el-Ganzouri to keep his promise not to remove energy 
subsidies and thereby raise energy prices in 1996/97. 
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The agreement with the IMF in October 1996 finally paved the way to the third and 
final tranche of Egypt's US$ 10 billion debt write-off and rescheduling agreement with 
the Paris Club later in the same month. According to the IMF, the debt relief was worth 
US$ 5.4 billion undiscounted, US$ 4 billion if discount at 6 per cent per year, or US$ 
3.4 billion if discounted at 7.5 per cent per year. Mohieddin el-Gharib, Financial 
Minister, stated that the debt relief would save Egypt about LE 1 billion (US$ 290 
million) annually in debt serving and would cut Egypt's external debt to about US$ 28 
billion, compared with more than US$ 40 billion before the government embarked on 
the economic reform programme in 1991.202 
6.3.2 Implementation of IMF Conditionality 
To gain the IMF's approval of the 1996 SBA, the Egyptian government had made 
efforts to meet prior actions. These included adopting action plans for extending the 
general sales tax to the wholesale and retail levels, for enhancing prudential regulation 
of banking system, for eliminating energy subsidies, and for improving national income 
accounts. The government also took further steps towards privatisation and trade 
liberalisation. The former included divesting a majority interest in 12 public 
companies, offering a majority interest in a further eight companies, divesting up to 40 
per cent of a further five companies, liquidating one holding company, and announcing 
details of the 1997-98 privatisation programme. As for trade liberalisation, the 
Egyptian government, on 30 September 1996, announced tariff reductions by 10-25 per 
cent. The maximum rate for goods, other than luxuries and cars, had been reduced to 
55 per cent from 70 per cent. The premium rate of 160 per cent went down to 135 per 
cent, 60 per cent to 45 per cent, 50 per cent to 40 per cent, and 40 per cent to 30 per 
cent.203 It should be noticed that the reduction of import tariffs was not formally 
announced and was deliberately ignored by the official press, reflecting the 
government's concern about the reaction of local industrialists, who had lobbied hard 
not to lose the high degree of tariff protection.204 Furthermore, in an attempt to 
compensate local industrialists and lessen their outcry, the Egyptian government also 
adopted a parallel reduction of tariffs on raw materials for plastics, metals and textiles 
industries. 205 
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Under the October 1996 SBA, the economic programme was subject to seven quarterly 
reviews, the first of which started in January 1997.206 Egypt seemed to pass all of the 
reviews with ease and, thus, successfully completed the 1996 SBA agreement in 
September 1998. Following the first quarterly review of the 1996 SBA in late January 
1997, the IMF said it was satisfied with most areas of Egypt's economic performance, 
and 'more than satisfied' with some areas.Z07 Furthermore, the first review was 
approved by the IMF's Executive Board in early April 1997 without discussing the IMF 
mission's report on the review of the SBA's progress. According to IMF officials, this 
reflected the IMF's confidence in the Egyptian government's way of conducting 
economic reforms.Z08 
In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly in August 1998, Mauro Mecagni, the IMF's 
residential representative in Cairo, expressed his overall assessment of the October 1996 
SBA: 
In general, the outcome of the programme has been very positive. Almost all 
the performance criteria have been met: credit, fiscal, monetary, and external 
reserves. From the macroeconomic point of view, the progress that has been 
made is indicated by a continuing disinflationary trend and strength of external 
indicators despite the shocks. 
Structurally, the pace and the extent of privatization have exceeded the 
targets set by the programme. There has also been a degree of success in 
reducing the impediments to trade. 209 
Throughout the two-year period of the 1996 SBA, most of the macroeconomic targets 
were fulfilled, while some did better than the targets. For instance, the 1996/97 budget 
deficit stood at 0.8 per cent of GDP compared with the target of 1.1 per cent. The 
inflation rate was below the target of 6.2 per cent for 1996/97. Furthermore, the net 
international reserves continued to remain high (standing at US$ 20.3 billion by mid-
July 1997).210 At a press briefing following the sixth quarterly review of Egypt's 2-year 
SBA in the spring of 1998, an IMF mission concluded that the Egyptian government 
has made significant progress on economic reforms, withstanding problems caused by 
the Luxor massacre and oil price fluctuations as well as the uncertainties associated 
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with the Asian stock market crisis. Howard Handy, Assistant Director of the IMF's 
Middle East Department, said in May 1998 that the Egyptian economy had been 
performing remarkably well in recent years with over five per cent growth rate, 
declining inflation to less than 4 per cent, the budget deficit of less than 1 per cent and 
'modest and manageable levels' of foreign debt. 211 A similar conclusion was reached 
following the final review in the summer of 1998.212 
The IMF was seemingly tolerant of Egypt's pace of implementing its conditionality, 
particularly structural adjustment reforms. Some conditions were met but not without 
delays which were due partly to bureaucracy. For instance, a new investment law, Law 
8 of 1997, was passed in May 1997 to provide incentives for private investment,213 
although it was due to be passed by 1 January 1997 under the 1996 SBA. In addition, a 
number of conditions concerning trade liberalisation were not met by the deadline, i.e. 
by 1 July 1998. However, it was not until the day before the SBA expired on 30 
September 1998 that they were implemented, including cutting import tariffs by 5-10 
per cent, and reducing the import surcharge from 3 per cent to 2 per cent, although the 
agreement required a fall to 1 per cent. The standard maximum customs tariff was cut 
from 50 per cent to 40 per cent; the tariff rates of 45 per cent dropped to 40 per cent, of 
40 per cent to 30 per cent; and of 35 per cent to 30 per cent.214 It was in fact a 
backdated ministerial decree that enabled the Egyptian government to fulfil the 
conditions on time?15 
Such a failure was apparent even though the IMF had urged the Egyptian government to 
put more efforts to liberalise its trade system. Handy said in Cairo on 5 May 1997: 
'Without progress on reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, the potential for export 
growth is undermined.' 216 This largely reflected the dramatic decline in the IMF's 
leverage over Egypt following the Paris Club's release of the third and final tranche of 
the debt write-off agreement shortly after the Executive Board approved the 1996 SBA. 
On the other hand, Egypt's bargaining strength was high in the light of its robust 
macroeconomic position. 
211 Al-Ahram Weekly, 7-13 May 1998. 
212 Al-Ahram Weekly, 31 Dec. 1998-6 Jan. 1999. 
213 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1997, p. 16. 
214 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 4, 1998, p. 16. 
215 Interviewee 14 (a journalist), personal interview, Cairo, 22 Feb. 2001. 
216 MEED, 15 May 1998, p. 10. 
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However, the completion of the agreement partly reflected Egypt's political 
' -
commitment towards IMF conditionality. Despite its strong bargaining strength and the 
fact that it had already secured the last stage of the Paris Club debt relief, Egypt 
continued to implement IMF conditionality until it completed the agreement, even 
though there were delays in the implementation of some conditions as discussed above. 
Its commitment was also highlighted by the promotion of Youssef Boutros Ghali, who 
was regarded as one of the major driving forces behind economic reforms, to the 
position of the Minister of Economy in the July 1997 cabinet reshuffle. Youssef 
Boutros Ghali received his PhD at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under the 
supervision of Stanley Fischer, Deputy Managing Director at that time, and also worked 
at the IMF as a senior economist before joining the Egyptian govemment.217 Moreover, 
the reshuffle was also seen as the way to consolidate the prime minister's power to push 
the economic reform. The portfolio of international co-operation was removed from the 
ministry of economy and placed with the prime minister who also remained minister of 
planning. Zafer el-Bishri, Prime Minister Ganzouri's close aide, was appointed as the 
Minister of State for International Co-operation and Planning. Also in the cabinet 
reshuffle the power of his potential rival was curbed by taking away the portfolios of 
administrative development and environmental affairs from Atef Obeid, who retained 
his position as the Minister of Public Enterprises.218 
Following a meeting between the IMF delegation and the Egyptian cabinet during a 
visit by the former to Cairo in mid-July 1998 for a final review of the October 1996 
SBA, Atef Obeid announced that Egypt would not be signing any new agreement with 
the IMF when the October 1996 SBA expired in September 1998. However, the 
government would continue to make use of IMF advice where it deemed necessary.219 
Section C: Assessment of Relative Power and the Imposition-
Ownership Nature of IMF Conditionality 
At the outset of the negotiations leading to the 1991 agreement, Egypt engaged in the 
negotiations with the IMF with relatively less power. Egypt's initial weakness stemmed 
from not only the need of balance of payments support from the IMF, but also from the 
need to extend the period of debt rescheduling. On the other hand, the IMF gained its 
217 Financial Times, 9 July 1997. . 
218 EIU, Egypt: Country Report, no. 3, 1997, p. 12. 
219 Al-Ahram Weekly, 23-29 July 1998. 
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pre-negotiation power from both the holding of credit needed by Egypt and cross-
conditionality of Egypt's creditors and donors which giving the IMF a 'seal of 
approval.' 
The power imbalance where the IMF held greater strength did not mean that both 
parties would remain passive throughout the period and that their relative power would 
be static. On the IMF side, its relative power during the pre-Gulf crisis increased as a 
result of the cross-conditionality of Egypt's official creditors and donors and their 
refusal to reschedule its debts bilaterally. Some Western country creditors, the USAID 
and the World Bank cooperated to put pressure on Egypt by making their financial 
assistance contingent on agreement with the IMF. 
In order to enhance its bargaining strength, Egypt adopted similar tactics to those used 
in the previous periods, particularly during the pre-Gulf crisis negotiations when its 
resistance was strong. During the pre-Gulf crisis period, it sought both direct and 
indirect assistance from 'friends,' especially the US, and also attempted to reach 
separate bilateral debt rescheduling deals with its creditors. 
Nonetheless, neither produced significant successes. The tactic of reaching bilateral 
rescheduling agreements completely failed to achieve its goal. The tactic of seeking 
friends' support did not bring to bear the level of support that Egypt needed in 
negotiating with the IMF. This was largely due to the change in creditors and donors' 
strategy in dealing with Egypt in relation to the IMF and also due to better coordination 
between them, compared with the previous period. In the light of the experience under 
the 1987 SBA where the 'soft' conditions did little to guarantee the implementation of 
IMF conditionality, the repetition of lenient policies during the negotiations was 
avoided. The 1987 SBA demonstrated to the creditors and debtors that by starting with 
lenient conditions, the risk of having the reform carried out only to a low extent (or 
even having the reform unimplemented at all) would be substantial. Therefore, the 
creditors and donors adopted a tougher stance towards Egypt and lent little support 
during the negotiations until Egypt first moved to make concessions during March-
August 1989. This was in order not to send a wrong message to Egypt that it would 
again be able to get away with the economic reform like it had done under the 1987 
SBA. Instead, the creditors' and donors' support largely came during the 
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implementation of IMF conditionality under the 1991 SBA in the post-Gulf war period, 
and thus aided Egypt to remain on course with its agreements with the IMF. Although 
there were financial resources available from some Western, and Arab countries as well 
as the Soviet Union, they did not greatly reinforce Egypt's relative negotiating power 
since they only amounted to a relatively small sum and were tied to particular purposes. 
With its weaker negotiating strength and reluctance in accepting the IMF conditions 
implemented during the spring and summer of 1989, the degree of imposition can be 
said to have risen while that of ownership fell on the imposition-ownership spectrum. 
Following its reluctant concessions made in 1989, Egypt's relative power vis-a-vis the 
IMF began to increase. First, the augmentation of Egypt's negotiating power took place 
immediately after Egypt's concessional moves on economic reform. It stemmed from a 
combination of factors working together: Egypt's political and strategic importance in 
the region and social unrest elsewhere in the developing world as well as domestic 
constraints in terms of signs of social instability. In the view of the occurrence of real 
social unrest taking place elsewhere, particularly in the region, and of potential large-
scale riots in Egypt, the US was keen to maintain the political status quo in Egypt and 
thus its ongoing peace efforts in the Middle East. This was achieved through its 
postponement of the deadline for the repayment of Egypt's US military debt and release 
of its cash aid previously withheld. As a result, additional financial resources became 
available, and this, together with the repayment postponement on US military debt, in 
effect reduced the sense of urgency for Egypt to accept IMF demands via extra time 
gained until the outbreak of the Gulf crisis. 
During and after the Gulf crisis, Egypt's relative bargaining power was affected by a 
number of factors, including the international events (the Gulf crisis and the end of the 
Cold War) and its geopolitical significance in the region. At the international level, the 
dramatic changes in the international political system following the collapse of the 
USSR and its Eastern bloc implied a reduction in the strategic importance of Egypt for 
the US, which had consequently emerged as the sole superpower. This resulted in a 
decline in Egypt's relative bargaining strength. On the other hand, the 1990-1991 Gulf 
crisis provided Egypt with a chance to boost its strategic importance for the US. The 
improvement in the balance of payments situation arising from the financial gains from 
Egypt's stance in the Gulf war in terms of debt write-offs and new aid packages 
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substantially reinforced its relative negotiating strength vis-a-vis the IMF. Such a 
significant increase in its relative negotiating power seemed- to outweigh the negative 
effect of the end of the Cold War on its relative power. 
As for the negotiations leading to the 1993 and 1996 agreements, the need for balance 
of payments support was no longer the issue that weakened Egypt's initial relative 
power since Egypt's balance of payments improved substantially as a result of the debt 
reduction and aid inflows as well as the implementation of economic reform. On the 
other hand, the desire for the two remaining tranches of the Paris Club debt reduction 
remained the major constraining factor. On the IMF side, its relative bargaining power 
mainly came from the 'seal of approval' for Egypt's further debt reduction with the 
Paris Club. 
Meanwhile, Egypt's commitment towards econoffilc reform seemed to increase, 
compared with the late 1980s. This was perhaps reflected by relatively shorter periods 
of the post-Gulf crisis negotiations of the 1991 SBA and negotiations leading to the 
1993 and 1996 agreements (all of which lasted less than a year) than that of the pre-Gulf 
crisis negotiations of the 1991 SBA (lasting more than two years), in spite of numerous 
conditions reached. Furthermore, as its economic situation improved, an opportunity 
was open for the Egyptian government to walk out of negotiations with the IMF. 
Despite the substantial gain in its relative power through aid flows and debt 
cancellation, Egypt opted to continue its negotiations with -the IMF due largely to its 
desire to gain the extension of the debt rescheduling period. Also the appointment of 
reform proponents by President Mubarak (such as Kamal el-Ganzouri as Prime Minister 
in January 1996 and Youssef Boutros Ghali as Minister of Economy in July 1997) is 
domestically reflective of the Egyptian government's greater willingness to push 
forward economic reform. 
As they mirrored the greater commitment towards reform, at the same time such 
reformers represented technocratic alliances between the IMF and the Egyptian 
government. Although they acted as the enhancing factor for the IMF's relative 
bargaining strength, given that Egypt's political will towards economic reform had also 
became stronger than before, it would not be correct to say that the level of imposition 
of IMF conditionality had also risen. That is, an increase in negotiating power 
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possessed by the IMF does not always necessarily mean the rise in the level of 
imposition since one should also need to take into account the change in the degree of 
the Egyptian government's willingness in accepting IMF conditionality. 
The significance of factors at the level of individual negotiators such as personality and 
skills of negotiators was highlighted during the time of disagreement over devaluation. 
One of the IMF staff during the devaluation dispute was characterised as being tough, 
less inclined to make compromises in the negotiations, adopting a 'take-it-or leave-it' 
approach, and using language implying threats. His successor was, on the other hand, 
said to be more flexible and diplomatic in negotiations.220 After the end of the 
devaluation dispute, a new IMF negotiating team was set up in order to facilitate the 
1996 SBA negotiations. The lack of flexibility and compromise on the part of the IMF 
negotiator could thus help stall the negotiations process and led to no change in the 
outcome of the negotiations. That is, it worked to reduce the IMF's negotiating 
strength. 
It can be said that in the late 1980s, when the Egyptian economy was deteriorating and 
the creditors began to alter their strategy in dealing with Egypt, Egypt had an overall 
weaker leverage over the IMF. There was also a great deal of unwillingness on the 
Egyptian side as reflected by Egypt's long-standing resistance to IMF demands and the 
protracted period of negotiations. This seemed to suggest that the conditions Egypt was 
asked to fulfil prior to the Gulf crisis involved a larger degree of imposition than that of 
ownership, representing a point closer to the end of imposition than that of ownership 
on the imposition-ownership spectrum. The parallel international events (the Gulf crisis 
and the end of the Cold War) provided a turning point in the power relationship 
between Egypt and the IMF and the nature of IMF conditionality. The rise in the 
relative power of Egypt as well as the greater degree of willingness following the two 
events tended to indicate that there was more of ownership than imposition involved in 
IMF conditionality in the post-Gulf war. Therefore, during the period since the Gulf 
crisis, the rise in Egypt's relative negotiating power, together with its increasing reform 
commitment pushed IMF conditionality towards the end of ownership on the spectrum 
where the degree of ownership is greater than that of imposition. 
220 Interviewee 15 (a present Egyptian official), personal interview, Cairo, 25 Feb. 2001; and Interviewee 
14, op. cit., 22 Feb. 2001. 
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Conclusions 
The objective of this study was to examine the nature of IMF conditionality. In 
particular, it dealt with the issue of imposition-ownership. Unlike the two opposing 
schools which saw the nature of IMF conditionality as a matter of either imposition or 
ownership, the study argued that IMF conditionality could involve both elements. In 
capturing such a perspective regarding the nature of IMF conditionality, the study 
introduced the notion of the linear spectrum, at the opposing ends of which the elements 
of imposition and ownership were located. Their relative degrees could be assessed 
through the negotiation process with the aid of the concept of power, the degree of 
which varied according to the resources of the parties and their tactics. The relative 
power of the party could, in tum, help determine the imposition-ownership nature of 
IMF conditionality. The study further suggested that relative degrees of power, and the 
consequent location on the imposition-ownership spectrum, were not static but may 
vary during the course of negotiations, or indeed between negotiations. 
The study began in Chapter One by providing an account of how the IMF' s role in 
international economic relations between the developed and the developing countries 
had evolved. Then, in Chapter Two, the study moved to look at the development of the 
concept of IMP conditionality and its critiques. It argued that IMF conditionality 
should be considered along a linear imposition-ownership spectrum. An analytical 
framework was also developed for the purpose of examining the nature of IMP 
conditionality. Using the analytical framework developed in Chapter Two, the study 
then examined the nature of IMF conditionality in Egypt during the period from the 
1960s to 1998 in the four subsequent chapters. Each chapter assessed the alterations in 
the relative power through the availability of resources and the use of tactics by the two 
parties, and also assessed their implications for movement along the imposition-
ownership spectrum. 
Here, the study will be concluded under three major sections: first, the relationship 
between the IMP and Egypt and the nature of their relative bargaining power; second, 
the issue of imposition-ownership; and third, lessons to be drawn from the case of 
Egypt. 
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The Egypta][MJF Relationship and the Nature of Their Negotiating 
Power 
During the four decades of the 1960s-1990s, the relationship between the IMF and 
Egypt was, by and large, uneasy. On the one hand, the IMF as an international creditor 
required IMF conditionality so as to ensure repayment of its lending. On the other 
hand, Egypt as a borrowing country tried to avoid or minimise IMF conditionality with 
all its socio-economic and political costs. The relationship between the IMF and Egypt 
often became problematic due not only to a great deal of Egyptian resistance to IMF 
demands but also, at times, to internal disputes within the IMF itself regarding the 
issues related to the upper-credit tranche lending to Egypt. 
The degree of Egypt's resistance to IMF demands was indicated in the length of the 
period of negotiations leading to the conclusion of a lending arrangement. The latter 
varied throughout the period of the study, but its trend can be detected. Prior to the 
outbreak of the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, their negotiations leading to the approval of an 
agreement tended to last for a relatively long period (at least a year) in comparison with 
the negotiations after the Gulf crisis (less than a year). Of the negotiations leading to an 
agreement before the Gulf crisis, the period of negotiations during the 1960s were 
shorter than those during the rest of the period, despite the adoption of the socialist path 
of economic development by Nasser's regime. This was due largely to the limited 
scope and number of conditions developed during the 1960s which in tum reduced the 
likelihood of controversy, disagreement and resistance. As for the period following the 
outbreak of the Gulf crisis, the period of negotiations leading to an agreement was 
relatively shorter than in the pre-Gulf crisis, despite the substantial expansion of the 
number of terms subject to IMF conditionality as well as their scope. This was due 
partly to an apparently increasing degree of willingness on the part of the Egyptian 
government to accept conditions demanded by the IMF, which was brought about by 
major changes in the international environment and inducements from Egypt's official 
creditors in terms of debt cancellation and new aid. The study has suggested that these 
variations in the length of time required to reach agreements are indicative of degrees of 
resistance to imposition of conditionality, which are in tum conditioned by ability - or 
power- to resist! 
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The Nature of Power in the Conditionality Relationship 
Throughout the negotiations during the period of the study, the balance of negotiating 
power between Egypt and the IMF was subject to constant changes. Often at the start 
of the negotiation process, the IMF was a stronger party than the Egyptian government 
due to Egypt's need for the IMP's balance of payments support and/or its 'seal of 
approval.' As IMF conditionality under the 1987 SBA illustrated, the initially weaker 
strength of Egypt did not guarantee that IMF demands would necessarily prevail over 
Egypt's preferences and would finally be reflected in the outcomes of negotiations. As 
a number of factors and/or the tactics pursued took effect, the initial power of both 
parties altered. There were a number of relevant factors affecting the power of the IMF 
and Egypt and thus the balance of power between them. These included: 1) the 
international context; 2) economic circumstances; 3) internal pressures; 4) third parties 
(their cross-conditionality and non-conditional financial assistance); 5) technocratic 
alliances; 6) individual negotiators; and 7) major tactics. The remainder of this section 
will look at how effective each of these seven factors were in affecting the power of the 
two parties. 
1) International Context 
The case of Egypt illustrated that the international environment at times proved to have 
an impact upon the relative power of the two parties through its effects upon economic 
circumstances, either on its own or working in combination with other factors. Changes 
in the international environment alone could lead to an alteration in the economic 
circumstances of the borrowing country, such as the increase in the price of cotton in 
the international market during 1963-1964 which served to add relative negotiating 
power to Egypt. 
Yet, equally, often international events on their own did not have sufficient impact on 
Egypt's economic circumstances to alter the relative power of the two parties. The 
outbreak of the June 1967 war with Israel provided a chance for Egypt not to reach a 
formal agreement with the IMF and enabled it to prolong the negotiations which 
eventually did not result in any agreement at all due to the improvement in its financial 
situation. Such an improvement was thanks to not only the 1967 war itself but also 
Egypt's geopolitical importance to Arab states and the improvement of its relations with 
the West. Without Egypt's geopolitical importance to the third parties (such as the US 
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and the oil-rich Arab Gulf states) and also its tactics of complaining and seeking their 
financial support, the October 1973 war with Israel would have been meaningless and 
insufficient in providing Egypt additional relative bargaining strength. Another 
example was the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, which provided Egypt with a golden 
opportunity to enhance its geopolitical importance in the region. The Gulf crisis alone 
would not have ensured the substantial financial gains to Egypt and improvement in its 
financial position. It needed to work in combination with Egypt's tactic of joining the 
US-led coalition forces. 
The effectiveness of the international context could not, however, be guaranteed as 
shown by the effect of the Cold War and its conclusion in the early 1990s. During the 
1960s, the Cold War environment did not lend much support to Egypt in resisting IMF 
demands. Egypt's ability to play the two superpowers off against each other was 
restricted by, for example, its foreign policy over the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the 
1990s, the end of the Cold War, which was in theory suppo~ed to reduce the relative 
bargaining strength of Egypt, did not in fact lead to such an outcome. Its negative effect 
on Egypt's relative power was by and large dominated by the positive effect of the 
parallel incidence, the Gulf crisis. 
In sum, international events can alter economic circumstances and relative bargaining 
power, but at times they are insufficient on their own and much will depend on 
concurrent alterations in other aspects of the IMF-borrowing country relationship or on 
the tactics deployed by the borrowing country to take advantage of potentially fortuitous 
events. 
2) Economic Circumstances 
In addition to the international context, Egypt's relative power was also affected by its 
economic circumstances. Its initial economic and financial problems created weakness 
in Egypt's negotiating position. However, a slight/moderate improvement in economic 
circumstances during the negotiations (such as the increase in the price of cotton during 
1963-64) provided Egypt with more room to manoeuvre. During the post-Gulf crisis, 
the increasing amount of foreign exchange reserves strengthened Egypt's relative 
bargaining power. On the other hand, the worsening of Egypt's economic situation 
during late 1966 and 1967, which was marked by its inability to repay its arrears to the 
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IMF and the reduction in cotton production, as well as the US refusal to grant a new PL 
480 agreement, weakened Egypt's relative power. 
The Egyptian case demonstrates that the general economic weakness which drives a 
borrowing country to seek IMF assistance can be ameliorated by temporary 
improvements in certain aspects of a national economy in determining the balance of 
power between the two parties. 
3) Internal Pressures 
On the Egyptian side, internal pressures stemmed from domestic reactions towards 
economic reforms, namely cabinet divisions and domestic protests/unrest against 
particular reforms. The cabinet divisions were at times effective in allowing Egypt to 
take a tougher stand towards IMF conditions and offering more time for resisting or 
even attempting to change them, as showed by the experiences of the 1960s and the 
negotiations leading to the 1977 SBA. Nevertheless, they could be ineffective as the 
experience of the negotiations leading to the 1978 EFF had showed. At that time the 
cabinet division did not lead to change in the IMF demands. 
Domestic protests and unrest could act on their own or together with other factors in 
affecting the relative power of the negotiating parties. The January 1977 riots produced 
a direct effect upon Egypt's relative power and IMF demands; the IMF was obliged to 
give more concessions to Egypt. The support from Egyptian business circles in 
campaigning against the IMP's demand for currency devaluation during the devaluation 
dispute of the mid-1990s provided the Egyptian government with support in resisting 
the devaluation. Indirectly, domestic unrest in conjunction with Egypt's geopolitical 
importance to the third parties, particularly the US, enhanced Egypt's relative 
bargaining power through the increase in US financial aid, a US refinancing package 
and the release of its withheld cash aid during 1985-1986. However, domestic 
constraints did not always successfully lead to an increase in Egypt's relative 
negotiating power. For instance, during the negotiations leading to the 1978 EFF, the 
argument concerning domestic constraints put forward by Abdel-Moneim Kaissouni did 
not yield concessions from the IMF. 
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The IMF, at times, gained its additional bargaining power from its own internal 
constraints. For instance, the lack of support by the IMF's Executive Board for Egypt's 
proposals for the exchange rate policy during the 1966 negotiations lent IMF 
negotiators further relative bargaining power. However, the IMF was often faced with 
internal constraints placed by its major creditors, which were also Egypt's major 
creditors/donors, upon its relative power. The period during the 1970s and 1980s 
illustrated how the IMF's major creditors, given that they had an interest in maintaining 
the existing regime in Egypt, played their supporting role to Egypt within the IMF, 
which often resulted in favourable outcomes for Egypt in terms of lenient IMF 
conditions. Thus, the study highlighted the politicised nature of IMF conditionality and, 
to some extent, the politicised decision-making of the IMF in the case of Egypt. 
However, the study did not argue that IMF conditionality was always a product of 
political decision. In the case of Egypt, there existed a mixture of both economically-
and politically-driven motives. 
Internal pressures, within both the IMF and the borrowing country, can therefore serve 
to strengthen or weaken the relative powers of the parties. They can act either to limit 
their manoeuvrability (weakening them) or be utilised as a tactic (strengthening them) 
when one party wishes to make clear that it is conducting negotiations within the 
confines of internal constraints. 
4) Third Parties 
The study showed that third parties played a critical role in the relationship between the 
IMF and Egypt. The IMF-Egypt relationship formed part of a larger and more complex 
triangular relationship among the IMF, Egypt and third parties, namely the official 
creditors/donors and the World Bank. It was closely intertwined with both relationships 
between the IMF and the third parties, on the one hand, and between Egypt and the third 
parties, on the other. 
Through the examination of the IMF-Egypt relationship in a broader context of such a 
triangular relationship, the third parties' role was linked to a number of factors which 
helped the IMF and Egypt reinforce their leverage vis-a-vis one another. These factors 
were either the types of the third parties' support to the IMF (such as cooperation 
among Egypt's major creditors/donors in the form of their cross-conditionality) and 
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Egypt (such as political influence within the IMF of Egypt's official creditors/donors 
(see Section Internal Pressures), and the availability of non-conditional financial 
resources), or its underlying causes (such as Egypt's geopolitical significance, internal 
reactions in Egypt, and international developments). The IMF mainly relied on cross-
conditionality of the World Bank and the official creditors/donors, in pruticular the US, 
the member countries of the GODE and of the Paris Club. Since the involvement of the 
official creditors in IMF conditionality negotiations in the case of Egypt was driven by 
strategic interests (due to Egypt's holding of geopolitical significance in the region) as 
well as by financial interests (due to Egypt's status as their debtor), their role could be 
both supporting and constraining for the IMF's and Egypt's relative power. Thus, 
cross-conditionality of the third parties proved effective in increasing the IMF' s relative 
bargaining power, particularly when Egypt's influential creditors/donors cooperated 
with regard to their cross-conditionality, as happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
However, the lack of co-ordination among the creditors/donors themselves, which was 
evident at times, served to weaken the IMF's relative power rather than enhancing it. 
Despite their initial insistence upon cross-conditionality, financial assistance from some 
major creditors/donors could become available following domestic incidents that 
threatened the Egyptian regime's survival (such as the riots by the CSF conscripts in 
1986), or international incidents that boosted Egypt's geopolitical importance (such as 
the October 1973 war and the Gulf war of 1991 ), or because of the US's overriding 
goals in the Middle East peace process. The availability of financial assistance brought 
about by these factors in tum reinforced Egypt's negotiating power vis-a-vis the IMF 
and enabled it to resist IMF demands. 
The study has showed that the relationship between the IMF and a borrowing country 
should therefore be examined within the context of third parties with a strategic and/or 
financial interest in either or both parties. 
5) Technocratic Alliances 
In the Egyptian case, the effectiveness of technocratic alliances between the Egyptian 
negotiators and the IMF in enhancing the IMF's relative negotiating power proved to be 
inconsistent. During the 1960s-1980s, the technocratic alliances failed to bring about 
change in the outcomes of the negotiations in the IMF' s favour, particularly when they 
faced opposition from their powerful cabinet colleagues as well as the presidents 
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themselves. The technocratic alliances only became effective in the second half of the 
1990s. Thus, they were often ineffective in increasing the lMF's relative power. Their 
effectiveness was greatly hindered by the power of the Egyptian presidents in 
appointing and dismissing the members of the Egyptian cabinet, some of whom 
normally held negotiations with the 1MF regarding the upper-credit-tranche loans. 
Although the presidents did not control every issue included in 1MF conditionality, it 
could not be said that the Egyptian officials/negotiators enjoyed full autonomy in the 
domain of their responsibilities. All three Presidents, particularly Sadat and Mubarak, 
appeared to utilise cabinet reshuffles to control the scope, extent and pace of economic 
reform demanded by the lMF. Thus, such an action can be seen as a tactical move in 
countering the positive impact of technocratic alliances upon the lMF's relative 
bargaining power. 
The study has shown that technocratic alliances, and the role of technocratic groups 
within the national polity of the borrowing country, can have a positive impact upon the 
relative power of the lMF. However, the extent of this impact was not wholly clear 
from the case-study and this did not seem to be as decisive a factor as the others 
discussed here. 
6) Individual Negotiators 
In this study, the analysis at the level of individual negotiators was limited by the 
amount of data available, particularly in the period of the 1960s. However, from the 
data gathered, the findings on the impact of factors at the level of individual negotiators 
upon the outcomes of negotiations were mixed. On the one hand, the experiences of the 
1970s and 1980s suggested that good negotiating skills of 1MF negotiators such as their 
diplomatic language and flexibility had little effect on the relative power of the 1MF in 
altering the outcomes of negotiations. This contradicted the initial suggestion of the 
framework in Chapter Two that: 'Good negotiating skills can be a source of power in 
negotiations.' On the other hand, during the devaluation dispute in the mid-1990s, the 
lack of negotiating skills of an 1MF negotiator was shown to have had a negative impact 
on the lMF's relative power and thus brought about its inability to alter the outcomes 
and the stalled process of negotiations. The 1MF was the party who eventually had to 
withdraw its demand regarding the exchange rate, whereas throughout the dispute Egypt 
stood firm on its rejection of the devaluation of the Egyptian pound. It seemed that the 
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influential Egyptian Executive Director (Abdel-Shakour Shaalan), who rallied support 
from other developing country members, earned Egypt additional bargaining power vis-
a-vis the IMF, which resulted in Egypt's exact preference of no further devaluation. 
Similarly, the role of the Executive Director was highlighted during the 1970s 
negotiations when Muhammad Al-Atrash (Executive Director representing Egypt) was 
able to secure lenient conditions in terms of less number of prior conditions than IMF 
staff had suggested. Therefore, having an influential Executive Director seemed to 
contribute to the increase in Egypt's relative negotiating power. 
Again, this study has suggested that the role of individual negotiators should be 
considered in assessing the balance of power between the two parties, but that it is not a 
consistently identifiable or reliable factor. 
7) Major Tactics Used by the Two Parties 
Being aware of their own initial positions, both the Egyptian government and the IMF 
were on a continuous search to enhance their own relative power. The most common 
tactic utilised by both parties to enhance their relative bargaining power was seeking 
support from third parties. The IMF sought cross-conditionality from the World Bank, 
which helped strengthen its relative power vis-a-vis Egypt. This was clearly evident 
during the mid-1970s when the IMF secured the World Bank's cooperation from the 
beginning of the negotiation process. 
On the Egyptian side, in their efforts to restrict, alter, or, if possible, avoid IMF 
conditionality, the successive regimes under Presidents Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak 
pursued several tactical moves to improve their negotiation position, including seeking 
third parties' support. As has been pointed out, the three presidents also resorted to 
cabinet reshuffles to control several aspects of economic reform, including its scope, 
extent and pace. Nonetheless, the tactics adopted by Nasser's regime were slightly 
different from and more limited than those of the regimes of Sadat and Mubarak. This 
was due largely to the different circumstances, especially regarding Egypt's foreign 
relations. Under Nasser's regime after the mid-1960s, the options to strengthen its 
relative power vis-a-vis the IMF were restricted by the deterioration in Egypt's relations 
with Western and monarchical oil-rich Arab Gulf states, which were in a position to 
influence the IMF as a result of their holding of the majority of the votes within the IMF 
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and/or to increase Egypt's bargaining power through their financial assistance, if non-
conditional. In addition to cabinet reshuffles, another tactic used by Nasser's regime to 
prolong the negotiations was to gain IMF credits without committing itself to IMF 
conditionality through the offers of gold collateral, as took place during the negotiations 
leading to the 1962 SBA. 
The range of tactics was widened under Sadat's and Mubarak's regimes when Egypt's 
relations with the West, especially the US, and oil-rich Arab Gulf states (prior to the 
signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and during the Gulf crisis) improved. The 
tactics which were often employed by both Sadat's and Mubarak's regimes were the 
requests for rescheduling its debts on a bilateral basis and for third parties' support. The 
majority of Egypt's debt was owed to other governments and multilateral aid agencies 
whereas its debt to international commercial banks was relatively small. To reduce 
cooperation among their official creditors, the two regimes attempted to reach bilateral 
debt rescheduling deals with each individual creditor. However, this proved 
unsuccessful as the official creditors wanted to ensure that Egypt would have to 
undertake IMF conditionality to a certain extent. It was likely that Egypt would have 
avoided reaching an agreement with the IMF and adopting economic reform entailed in 
IMF conditionality, unless Egypt's creditors/donors had insisted on a multilateral debt 
rescheduling agreement. 
Another tactic utilised by Sadat's and Mubarak's regimes was the search for support 
from other official creditors/donors. Such a tactic relied upon Egypt's regional political 
and strategic significance and was aided by international developments (such as the 
October 1973 war and the Gulf war of 1991). The support from the official 
creditors/donors, who had interests in keeping the existing regimes, particularly the US 
and oil-rich Arab Gulf states, were in the forms of both direct pressure upon the IMF 
and indirect assistance through their financial aid and/or postponement of debt 
repayment. This enabled Egypt to temporarily resist pressure to accept IMF demands 
and at times alter and bring them closer to its own preferences. Often the financial aid 
might be insufficient to allow Egypt to get out of its economic and financial problems 
straight away and thus avoid IMF conditionality altogether. Yet, it at times enabled 
Egypt to prolong the negotiations until its relative leverage had been strengthened by 
other factors such as an improvement in its economic situation. As had been 
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demonstrated in Chapters Three-Six, on several occasions Egypt was able to obtain 
concessions from the IMP and more lenient conditionality than might otherwise have 
been, and even caused a division within the IMP's Executive Board, as happened prior 
to the approval of the 1987 SBA. 
It is worth noting that the flexibility of the IMF regarding IMP conditionality did not 
solely stem from the political influence of Egypt's creditors/donors over the IMP's 
decision-making. IMP negotiators themselves sometimes proved to be flexible, 
although their flexibility was insufficient in the eyes of the Egyptian government, 
particularly the presidents themselves. When confronting the deadlock, Sadat's regime 
adopted another tactic of bypassing IMP staff and instead negotiating directly with the 
IMP Management during February-March 1978, which resulted in IMP concessions on 
the timing of implementing price and interest rate increases. 
Egypt's tactic of seeking the official creditors/donors' support (both direct and indirect) 
was successful during the period prior to 1988. In contrast, its attempts during late 
1988 and throughout 1989 proved to be a failure due to the change of the official 
creditors/donors' approach in juggling between their two goals of pushing Egypt to 
adopt IMP-supported economic reform and keeping the political status quo in Egypt. In 
the light of the abandoned 1987 SBA, the creditors/donors adopted a tougher stance 
towards Egypt and hence hindered the effectiveness of such a tactic. 
The study has shown, then, that neither the IMP nor the borrowing country is powerless 
to alter their relative bargaining power during the course of negotiations. Each party has 
a range of possible tactics that may be available to them, depending on circumstances, 
and which may affect the outcome of the negotiations. This reinforces the contention 
that conditionality is not wholly about either imposition or ownership but is a negotiated 
result somewhere on a spectrum between the two. 
Imposition versus Ownership or an ImpositionaOwnership Linear 
Spectrum? 
The study showed that the concept of power was important in understanding and 
assessing the imposition-ownership nature of IMP conditionality in the case of Egypt. 
It played a major role in affecting the course of the relationship between the IMF and 
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Egypt, the outcomes of their negotiations and the nature of IMF conditionality. The 
empirical study of Egypt confirmed that a strong party in terms of its superior resources 
did not always prevail over a weaker party in international negotiations. More 
specifically, the initially stronger power of the IMF did not mean that its demands 
would always translate into the outcomes of negotiations and that they would be 
imposed upon Egypt against its will. Unlike the assumption of the imposition school, 
the Egyptian case showed that not all borrowing developing countries lacked room to 
manoeuvre, even where there had been an imbalance of power unfavourable to them at 
the outset of the negotiations regarding IMF conditionality. Neither were all borrowing 
developing countries passive in dealing with the IMF regarding IMF conditionality. As 
had been pointed out earlier, concessions and flexibility on the part of the IMF were 
sometimes evident. On this basis, the notion of imposition is inappropriate in 
describing the nature of IMF conditionality. However, neither was IMF conditionality 
in the Egyptian case completely based on the idea of ownership, as the study found. 
The fact that concessions and flexibility on the part of the IMF did at times exist should 
not be taken to mean that IMF conditionality was thus owned by Egypt, or wholly 
subject to Egyptian willingness to accede. The degree of flexibility offered by the IMF 
was often far less than that desired by Egypt. Moreover, IMF conditionality was, on a 
majority of occasions, not fully implemented, reflecting partly the lack of political will 
of the Egyptian government (which was in tum linked to the second reason) and partly 
the domestic opposition itself towards implementing economic reform. Thus, the 
findings from the Egyptian case also rejected the generalised notion that IMF 
conditionality was based on ownership by the borrowing countries. In this respect, it 
could not firmly be concluded that IMF conditionality was totally forced upon or 
absolutely owned by Egypt. 
By examining the nature of IMF conditionality with the aid of the concept of power, the 
Egyptian case demonstrated that the relative power of the two negotiating parties was 
dynamic and so was the nature of IMF conditionality. The degrees of imposition and 
ownership along the imposition-ownership spectrum could vary throughout their 
interaction, as had been discussed in Chapters Three-Six. This depended upon the 
changing relative power of the two parties, which was in tum determined by a number 
of factors as well ·as the tactics utilised by the parties, as had been discussed above. 
Overall, the element of imposition was, on a number of occasions, greater than that of 
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ownership due to the relative weaker negotiating power of the Egyptian government, as 
showed by the periods of the 1960s, 1970s and between the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Thus, often IMF conditionality in the case of Egypt should be located at a point 
somewhere closer to the end of imposition than that of ownership on the imposition-
ownership spectrum. 
Also, the case of Egypt showed that when the nature of IMF conditionality was 
assessed, considering the relative power of the two parties alone would be insufficient. 
As Chapter Six had argued, the increase in the relative power of the IMF did not 
necessarily mean that the degree of imposition would always rise, given that the degree 
of willingness also increased by more than that of imposition. Thus, an additional 
factor has to be taken into consideration, the degree of willingness of a country to 
embrace economic reform rather than resist it. 
How much is the Egyptian-IMP relationship shaped by the specifics of Egypt as 
opposed to general rules imposed on the relationship by the nature of borrowing and of 
the IMF itself? In other words, how much can we generalise from the Egyptian case 
regarding the relative power of the two parties and the nature of IMF conditionality? 
Egypt was a special case where there were several factors at play, some of which may 
be unavailable to many borrowing developing countries. Among several observers, 
Egypt was often regarded as the special case that held a crucial factor of geopolitical 
importance to the major official creditors, which could provide Egypt leverage over the 
IMF. However, the study showed that often the degree of imposition in the case of 
Egypt seemed to be higher than that of ownership. Even when there were a number of 
factors available to Egypt as well as tactics to enhance its relative power, sometimes the 
effectiveness of the factors were low. Furthermore, as had been discussed above, often 
one factor alone could not bring about the change in the outcomes of negotiations; it 
had to work in combination with other factors and at times the parties' tactics. This 
would suggest that in the case of other borrowing developing countries which disagreed 
with IMF demands and at the same time lacked significant factors (such as geopolitical 
importance) to enhance their relative power, the chance to increase their relative 
bargaining power would be relatively more limited and the degree of imposition could 
be even far greater. 
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.!Lessons of the §tudy 
Before beginning, it needs to be mentioned that this section is not an attempt to generate 
a comprehensive list of lessons in relation to IMF conditionality. It merely aims to 
provide what can be learnt from the single-case study of Egypt. 
The first point to be made relates to the nature of power in the specific issue of the 
relationship between the IMF and borrowing countries. Power in the context of the 
relationship between the IMF as a lender and a borrowing country in question as a 
borrower is not solely an expression of economic status. Rather, it can additionally be a 
function of political and strategic status, plus other variables such as international 
circumstances, internal conditions of the parties, and negotiating skills of individual 
negotiators as well as tactics employed by the parties. Therefore, when one considers 
the issue of the relationship between the IMF and borrowing countries, power of the 
two parties should not be reduced to merely its economic parts. 
Secondly, third parties play a particularly crucial role in affecting the outcomes of the 
negotiations regarding IMF conditionality and the degrees of imposition and ownership. 
The lesson learnt from the study, in particular for borrowing countries is that to increase 
their relative power during the negotiations and to enhance the effectiveness of having 
an impact upon IMF conditionality, assistance from the powerful third parties, if 
available, will have to be sought. The powerful third parties in the context of the 
relationship between the IMF and a borrowing country are the official Western 
creditors/donors, particularly the US, which holds a majority of votes in the IMF. 
Nevertheless, the case of Egypt showed that assistance from powerful third parties 
might not always be available, even though the borrowing country held strategic and 
political importance, as Nasser's regime had experienced in the second half of the 1960s 
when Egypt's relationship with the West deteriorated. Thus, seeking assistance from 
the official Western creditors/donors is insufficient on its own. Another important 
condition which must also be fulfilled before the third parties' assistance will be 
available is the building of supportive relationships with them. 
Thirdly, the experiences of Egypt shed some light on the significance of negotiating 
skills, particularly of IMF staff. What the findings did suggest was that the negotiating 
skills of the IMF staff could at times have an impact upon the bargaining power of the 
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IMF and thus their importance should not be ruled out. In addition, negotiating skills 
could also have an impact on one party's perception and the presence of good 
negotiating skills would help to enhance the sense of ownership of IMF conditionality. 
The occasionally bold remarks of IMF staff or their stern writings damaged, or could 
potentially have damaged, the relationship between the IMF and Egypt and their 
negotiation process. Therefore, the significance of negotiation skills of IMF staff in 
dealing with borrowing countries should be stressed and training in negotiation skills 
should be encouraged. 
Last, but not least, the Egyptian case showed that there was some strong evidence of 
politically-motivated conditionality at the expense of the notion of economic neutrality 
in IMF decision-making. The politicised nature of IMF conditionality, even on 
occasions, served to undermine the principle of neutrality of the IMF' s policy on the use 
of its financial resources and also violate the doctrine of uniform treatment of its 
members. Furthermore, it has been suggested that one of the measures to enhance the 
sense of ownership of IMF conditionality and thus the record of implementation is 
selectivity whereby the approval of the use of IMF resources depends particularly on 
the IMP's assessment that a borrowing country is sufficiently committed to successful 
implementation. 1 The major drawback of this approach is related to the issue of equal 
treatment of all member countries. In practice, the selectivity approach is, if followed, 
likely to further damage the principle of uniformity to which the IMF has claimed to 
have adhered and thus, its credibility. In the light of the records of the politicisation of 
IMF conditionality, it is hard to see how this notion would in practice be adhered to 
without bias. As long as the structure and voting power system of the IMF remain 
unaltered, the occasional politicisation of IMF decision-making regarding IMF lending 
and conditionality would be likely to persist and so would the violation of the uniform 
treatment doctrine. 
1 See, for instance, International Monetary Fund, Strengthening Country Ownership of Fund-Supported 
Programs, prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department in consultation with other 
departments, approved by Jack Boorman, 5 Dec. 2001. Available from: 
http://www.imf.org/extemaVnp/pdr/cond/200 !/eng/strength/ 12050 l.pdf [accessed 8th Oct. 2003] 
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Appendix A 
IMF Conditionality under the May 1962 SBA 1 
1) Monetary policy and credit control: 
i) ceilings on the net claims of the banking system on the Government, on 
the total claims of the banking system on the non-government sector 
(excluding cotton financing), and on the level of cotton financing by the 
banking system; 
ii) the CBE would tmpose separate ceilings on each commercial or 
specialised bank, one for cotton financing and one for other financing of 
the non-government sector; 
iii) the CBE would, not later than 15 May 1962, raise its discount rate from 3 
to 5 per cent and adjust its interest rate schedule accordingly; 
iv) the CBE would, not later than 15 May 1962, increase the reserve 
requirements for commercial banks from 12 1f2 per cent to 17 Y2 per cent; 
and 
v) the CBE would take steps to assure that the banks as a group maintain at 
least the same ratio of holdings of government obligations to their total 
assets as existing on 31 December 1961, and that banks henceforth 
purchase government obligations only from the CBE or from another bank. 
2) Price control - to dismantle price controls as rapidly as possible with the aim of 
eventual elimination. 
3) Exchange rate reform: 
i) to abandon the practice of premiums; and 
ii) to announce a new realistic rate of US$ 2.30 per Egyptian pound for all 
exchange transactions not later than 15 May 1962, and in any event prior 
to any request for a drawing under the SBA with the IMF. To deal with the 
1 United Arab Republic, 'Stand-By Arrangement-· United Arab Republic' [the text of the May-1962 SBA 
with an attached letter of intent], confidential, 26 Apr. 1962, in International Monetary Fund, Document 
of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members of the Executive Board, From the 
Secretary, United Arab Republic- Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/62/49 Supplement 2, confidential, 4 May 
1962. 
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side effect (such as windfall profits from exports) of a new rate, export 
taxes would be used temporarily. Also to ease the price adjustment, there 
would be limited use of subsidies, applying to wheat, flour, kerosene, 
edible oil, sugar and other similar essential foodstuffs. The amount of 
these subsidies would gradually be reduced. 
4) Import policies: 
i) to establish an open general license not later than 1 July 1962 for a 
substantial proportion of permitted imports; 
ii) to increase the use of import duties, and to decrease the use of quotas and 
outright prohibitions on nonessential goods; and 
iii) to instruct state owned or controlled importing agencies to operate, m 
making import decisions, on a commercial basis, and to give them freedom 
to choose sources of supply. 
5) Bilateral payments agreements with IMF members would be terminated at the 
earliest possible date and not later than present termination dates. 
6) There would be no introduction or intensification of any restrictions on current 
payments and transfers. 
7) There would be no introduction of any multiple currency practice. 
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Appendix lR 
lfMF Condlitiiollllaiity under the May 1964 §JBA 2 
1) Monetary policy and credit control - ceilings on the net claims of the banking 
system on the public sector (excluding cotton financing), on the total claims of the 
banking system on the non-government sector (excluding cotton financing), and on 
the level of cotton financing by the banking system. 
2) Fiscal policy: 
i) ceilings on the level of investment expenditures by the public sector; and 
ii) an increase in social security taxes. 
3) Pricing policy: 
i) re-exarrunmg the formulae for fixing pnces of domestically produced 
manufactures to ensure a margin of profit and the reviewed formulae 
would become effective by the end of December 1964; and 
ii) reviewing the prices for electricity, transportation and other public utilities. 
4) External sector policy: 
i) ceilings on the level of short- and medium-term external credits; 
ii) introducing an additional 5 per cent "statistical" tax on imports; 
iii) introducing a 5 per cent tax on invisible transactions with the exception of 
transfers on government account and funds for the Pilgrimage and for 
students studying abroad; and 
iv) establishing a general export policy, involving a uniform subsidy for all 
exports other than cotton, rice, raw onions and crude petroleum, by 1 
January 1965. 
2 United Arab Republic, 'Stabilisation Program of the United Arab Republic,' 18 Apr. 1964, in 
International Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To 
Member of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, United Arab Republic- Stand-By Arrangement, 
EBS/64/69 Supplement 1, confidential, 25 May 1964, pp. 5-8. 
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5) No new bilateral payments agreements with IMP members would be introduced and 
steps would be taken to eliminate bilateral payments agreements with IMP within 
two years. 
6) No new restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions 
would be introduced or the existing ones would be intensified. 
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Appendix C 
IMF Conditionality unde:r the Ap:ril 1977 SBA3 
1) Exchange reform and external trade policy: 
i) by 1 January 1978, the commercial banks would be required to maintain 
all accounts involving foreign exchange assets and liabilities at the parallel 
market4 exchange rate; and 
ii) a price adjustment fund, which would be established as an account in the 
CBE to offset the impact of the shift of imports of intermediate goods and 
raw materials to the parallel market by providing temporary subsidies for 
items significant in the consumption of the lower-income groups, would be 
credited with no more than LE 200 million during the first half of 1977 
and LE 100 million for the remainder of the stand-by period; and would 
not have a negative balance. 
2) Domestic price liberalisation: 
i) gradually instituting a system of "management by objectives and results", 
and gradually shifting performance criteria from production targets to 
profitability considerations, beginning with the company budgets for 
calendar 1977; 
ii) gtvmg compames the power to determine the levels of production and 
prices of many of their products; 
iii) raising prices of the major industrial products so as to cover costs and in 
particular to compensate for the increased costs of inputs resulting from 
imports being shifted to the parallel market rate, as well as the increase in 
interest rates and wages; and 
3 Arab Republic of Egypt, Annex to Stand-By Arrangement [the Letter of Intent], 4 Mar. 1977, in IMF 
Central Files, C/Egypt/1760, Stand-by Arrangements, 1977-1985, International Monetary Fund, 
Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members of the Executive Board, 
From the Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/77/90 Supplement 1, 
confidential, 21 Apr. 1977, pp. 1-12. 
4 The parallel market was established by the Egyptian government in September 1973 as a way to 
alleviate the shortage of foreign exchange in Egypt by offering an exchange rate at a more depreciated 
level. 
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iv) bringing the agricultural producer pnces more closely into line with 
international prices at levels which provided adequate incentives for 
farmers. 
3) Fiscal policy: 
i) increasing customs and excise duties on luxury goods, and stamp duties; 
and 
ii) revising income tax law. 
4) Monetary and credit policy- quantitative limits on the level of cotton ceilings, and 
on the expansion of overall domestic credits and of bank credit to the Government. 
5) External debt policy and arrears- quantitative limits on external borrowing, public 
debt and arrears. 
6) There would be no introduction of any new multiple currency practices without the 
IMP's approval, no introduction or intensification of restrictions on payments and 
transfers for currency international transactions, no introduction of any new bilateral 
payments agreements with the IMP's members, and no introduction or 
intensification of restrictions on imports for balance of payments reasons. 
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AppendixD 
IMF Conditionality under the July 1978 EFF5 
The first-year programme of the 1978 EFF included: 
1) Exchange reform: 
i) by 1 January 1979, the official and parallel rates would be unified with the 
prevailing parallel rate; and 
ii) the policy of exchange rate flexibility would continue to be adopted and 
consultations with the IMF on exchange rate policy would be included in 
each review of the programme. 
2) Pricing policy- in addition to price increase measures already taken in early 1978, 
further price increases of at least LE 150 million would be implemented by the end 
of September 1979, of which at least LE 75 million would take place by the end of 
June 1979. 
3) Fiscal Policy - the Egyptian government's reliance on bank financing would be 
reduced by at least LE 200 million in 1979 to no more than LE 850 million, and the 
overall deficit would be limited to no more than LE 2,250 million. 
4) Monetary and credit policy: 
i) limits were set on the expansion of the net domestic assets of the banking 
system, and on the increase in net bank credit to public sector; and 
ii) the interest rates would be raised by 1 percentage point from mid-June 
1978, making maximum deposit rates 7 per cent and lending rates 9-10 per 
cent. A further increase of one percentage point would be implemented by 
1 January 1979. 
5 Arab Republic of Egypt, Extended Arrangement- Arab Republic of Egypt, 10 June 1978, pp. 1-14, in 
IMF Central Files, C/Egypt/1791, Extended Fund Facility, 1976-1979, International Monetary Fund, 
Document oflnternational Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members of the Executive Board, 
From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Extended Arrangement, EBS/78/358 Supplement 1, 
confidential, 2 Aug. 1978. 
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5) External debt policy -limits were placed on foreign debt. 
6) There would be no introduction of any new multiple currency practices without the 
IMF's approval, no introduction or intensification of restrictions on payments and 
transfers for current international transactions, no introduction of any new bilateral 
payments agreements with the IMF's members, and no introduction or 
intensification of restrictions on imports for balance of payments reasons. 
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AppendixE 
IMF Conditionality under the May 1987 SBA 6 
The supply-side measures included: 
i) a step-by-step unification of the two exchange rates markets (the 
commercial bank pool and the free market) by June 1988 to simplify the 
existing multiple exchange rate system. This would involve adjustment of 
the commercial bank exchange rate by transferring transactions from the 
commercial bank pool to the free market in three stages. The first 40 per 
cent of transactions would be transferred by 1 May 1987 (prior action), the 
further 40 per cent by the end of December 1987 and the remaining 20 per 
cent by the end of June 1988; 
ii) positive real interest rates; 
iii) an adjustment of the structure of lending interest rates by 1 May 1987 
(prior action). This involved an introduction of a new structure of lending 
interest rates which would be differentiated on the new basis of the length 
of maturity of loans, in addition to the type of sectors as the existing 
differential (agricultural and industry, services, and commerce); 
iv) a gradual increase of the domestic prices of energy products to the world 
levels by 1991/92. As the first step, electricity tariffs would be increased 
by an average 29 per cent by 1 May 1987 and the prices of the petroleum 
products (fuel oil, kerosene, gas oil, diesel oil, and natural gas) would be 
increased by a weighted average 66 per cent by the same date (prior 
actions); and 
v) liberalisation of price controls over several agricultural commodities. 
On the demand management side, the measures included: 
i) a reduction of the overall budget deficit from about 20 per cent of GDP in 
1985/86 to 15 per cent in 1986/87, to 13 per cent in 1987/88, and by at 
6 Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Statement by the Government of Egypt on its Economic and Financial 
Policies,' 25 Feb. 1987, in International Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and 
Not for Public Use, To Members of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt-
Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/87 /93 Supplement 1, confidential, 20 May 1987, pp. 6-24. 
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least an additional 2 percentage points annually in subsequent years with 
an objective of reducing it to 4 per cent by 1991/92; 
ii) a restrictive credit policy expressed in terms of set targets on domestic 
credit (ceilings on net domestic assets of the banking system, on net bank 
claims on the non-financial public sector and on net bank claims on the 
Central Government, local governments, and the General Authority for 
Supply Commodities); and 
iii) external policies expressed in terms of targets set on the levels of external 
debt (ceilings) with an eliminating of all external payments arrears by the 
end of June 1988, on external borrowing (ceilings) and on net international 
reserves of the banking system (floors). 
Provisions with regard to multiple currency practices, payment and trade restrictions, 
and bilateral payments agreements: 
i) there would be neither introduction of new multiple currency practices nor 
intensification of the existing ones, except for the transfer of transactions 
from the commercial banking pool to the free market, and the unification 
of the central bank pool rate with the free market rate; 
ii) there would be neither introduction of new restrictions on payments and 
transfers for current international transactions nor intensification of the 
existing ones; 
iii) there would be neither introduction of new import restrictions for balance 
of payments reasons nor intensification of the existing ones; and 
iv) there would be no conclusion of bilateral payments agreements that were 
inconsistent with Article Vill. 
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A JPJP!eHll«lftx JF 
IIMF C([))HlldlitioHllaRity ll.llHlldlter One May ]_99]_ §JRA 7 
In the economic programme under the May-1991 SBA, policy measures and targets 
included: 
1) Public enterprise reform: 
i) reforming legal and institutional environment, increase the autonomy of 
public sector managers, and create a common regulatory environment for 
both the public and private sectors; and 
ii) privatising public enterprises over the medium term, with the exception of 
strategic enterprises. 
2) Price liberalisation: 
i) price liberalisation and deregulation of public industrial and agricultural 
production and of the transport sector; and 
ii) energy sector: 
a) petroleum products - to raise domestic petroleum product prices 
to the levels that ensure 45 per cent of world prices by 10 May 
1991, representing about a 53 per cent increase (prior action); to 
further increase domestic petroleum prices to bring them to 56 
per cent of world prices by the end of December 1991; and to 
increase an additional 11 per cent of petroleum product prices 
annually by each May of 1992-1995 with an aim to bring their 
prices to world equivalence by June 1995; and 
b) electricity - to increase electricity prices by 50 per cent in order to 
bring electricity prices to 59 per cent of long-run marginal cost 
(LRMC) by 10 May 1991 (prior action); and to increase an 
7 The following conditions are drawn from Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Memorandum on Economic Policy 
of the Egyptian Government' and 'Memorandum of Understanding,' 19 Apr. 1991, in International 
Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members of the 
Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Request for Stand-By Arrangement-
Letter of Intent, EBS/91170, confidential, 22 Apr. 1991, pp. 3-38. 
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additional 10 per cent of LRMC electricity prices annually to 
bring them to 100 per cent of LRMC by June 1995. 
3) Investment policies - decontrolling investment which was to be linked to price and 
import liberalisation. 
4) External policies: 
i) exchange reform - unifying the dual exchange rate markets8 by 26 
February 1992; 
ii) restoration of the customs duty rates to the levels in effect in early 1989, 
prior to their approximately 30 per cent reduction so as to conform with 
the tariff reform limits agreed with the IDRD (see below) (prior action); 
iii) trade liberalisation, including 
a) reducing the production coverage of the import bans to 23 per 
cent of total tradable goods output in agriculture and 
manufacturing by mid-June 1991, and to 10.6 per cent by mid-
1992 (before the release of the second tranche of the IDRD' s 
Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL)); 
b) narrowing the margin between the minimum (0.7 per cent) and 
maximum (120 per cent) tariff rates to the range of 5-100 per cent 
with some exceptions (basic foods and luxury goods) by mid-
June 1991, and further reducing the tariff rate range to 10-80 per 
cent with the above exceptions by mid-1992; 
c) reducing tariff preferences; 
d) abolishing the annual foreign exchange allocation and budget 
system for public sector companies; 
e) reducing the list of products where prior import authorisation by 
the Government was required from 55 to 18 before the release of 
the first tranche of the SAL, and to 14 before the release of the 
second tranche; and 
f) removing controls on the exports of a number of products 
through a reduction of export bans, a reduction of the list of 
8 The previous multiple exchange rate system was ended on 27 February 1991 and replaced temporarily 
by a dual exchange rate system, consisting of a primary market and a secondary (or free) market. 
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products subject to annual export quotas, and a reduction of the 
list of exports subject to prior approvals; 
iv) limits on external borrowing, arrears and international reserves. 
5) Monetary policies: 
i) ceilings on net domestic assets of the banking system, net credit to the total 
non-financial public sector, and net credit to the central government, local 
governments, and the General Authority for Supply Commodities; and 
ii) reform on the monetary system to encourage savings, ensure efficiency in 
financial resource allocation, and make monetary policy more active. 
6) Fiscal policies: 
i) the reduction of the budget deficit from an estimated 21 per cent of GDP 
during the fiscal year 1990/91 to 9.5 per cent of GDP in 1991/92, to 6.5 
per cent of GDP in 1992/93, and to 3.5 per cent of GDP by 1995/96; 
ii) the introduction of a general sales tax by the end of April 1991 (prior 
action); 
iii) providing the Managing Director of the IMP by the end of April 1991 with 
letters from donors specifying that US$ 70 million in grants had been 
provided for the year 1990/91 and that the purpose of the funds was for 
budgetary support (prior action); 
iv) providing the Managing Director of the IMP before 10 May 1991 with 
letters from donors specifying that US$ 300 million in grants would be 
provided to Egypt in 1991192 and that the grants were being provided for 
budgetary support in 1991192 (prior action); and 
v) providing the Managing Director of the IMP before the end of April 1991 
with a letter specifying the nature and purpose of donor-financed extra-
budgetary investment expenditures, and the terms of the donor financing 
provided (prior action). 
7) Provisions regarding payment and trade restrictions, multiple currency practices, 
bilateral payments agreements, and import restrictions: 
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i) there would be neither introduction of new restrictions on payments and 
transfers for current international transactions nor intensification of the 
existing ones; 
ii) there would be neither introduction nor modification of multiple currency 
practices; 
iii) there would be no conclusion of bilateral payments agreements that were 
inconsistent with Article VIII of the IMF' s Articles of Agreement; and 
iv) there would be neither introduction of new import restrictions for balance 
of payments reasons nor intensification of the existing ones. 
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Appendix G 
JIMF ConditionaUty under the September 1993 lEFF9 
IMF conditionality under the 1993 EFF is included in the following table. Most of the 
conditions in the table were structural adjustment reforms. The 'financial programme' 
mentioned in the first row of the table involved targets set in fiscal, monetary and 
external policies for fiscal year 1993/1994. In fiscal policy, the fiscal deficit was to be 
reduced to 2.6 per cent of GDP. In monetary policy, conditions included the 
curtailment of inflation to 9.5 per cent on an average annual basis, from an estimated 
average of over 11 per cent in 1992/93, and credit ceilings. Conditions in external 
policies included limits set on net international reserves, external borrowing, and arrears 
on external debt servicing obligations. 
9 The following conditions are drawn from Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Memorandum on Economic Policy 
of the Egyptian Government' and 'Memorandum of Understanding,' 18 Aug. 1993, in International 
Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members of the 
Executive Board, From the Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Request for Extended 
Arrangement- Letter of Intent, EBS/93/139, confidential, 20 Aug. 1993, pp. 3-43. 
Table A Egypt: Matrix Policy Actions under the 1993 EFF 
BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OBJECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-
INTERVENTION TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 DECEMBER 1993 
I) Macroeconomic Framework Compliance with agreed Compliance with agreed 
A. Fi."1l!ncial Programme financial programme. financial programme. 
Send to Parliament law 
B. Foreign Exchange System rationalising exchange control including requirements for 
repatriation. 
Eliminate limits on dealer 
accounts with difference banks, 
raise working balance limits to 
US$ 225,000 perLE 1 million of 
capital, and permit four branches 
for each LE 1 million of capital. 
By January 1994: 
Agree on and announce action Begin voluntary registration of C. Fiscal Policy: plan to introduce a multi-stage wholesalers and retailers. 
a. Tax Policy 
value-added tax (VAT). Announce the turnover 
exemption threshold level. 
Current general sales tax (GST) 
to include: simplification of rate GST to include additional 
structure, expanded coverage 
services including additional services, 
reduced exemptions. 
End renewals of corporate tax Agree on investment incentive 
structure including reorienting holidays. Request Fund free zones to export processing 
technical assistance for 
zones, and addressing problems 
rationalising investment 
of free city of Port Said a long incentives and free zones. 
with Unified Law. 
Global personal income tax 
(with 1 per cent tax on turnover 
of non-financial companies and Implementation of the new 5 per cent withholding tax on global personal income tax. interest earnings) presented to 
the Parliament as agreed with 
the IMF. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 
Compliance with agreed 
financial programme. 
Review remaining exchange 
measures under Article Vlll, 
keeping in mind the need to 
avoid large potential losses. 
Review with the object of 
further relaxing limits on 
working balances and additional 
capital requirement for branches 
in the light of developments. 
Present agreed draft law to 
Parliament. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-
DECEMBER 1994 
Compliance with agreed 
financial programme. 
After parliament approval, 
implement new investment 
incentive structure and free 
zones programme. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 
Compliance with agreed 
financial programme. 
Multi-stage VAT in place with 
reduced number of tax rates and 
broadened base in place. End 
special industry arrangements. 
I 
I 
' 
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BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OBJECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 
nNTERVENTION DECEMBER 1993 DECEMBER 1994 
Periodic adjustment of specific Review the stamp tax for 
consistency with other reformed 
excises/fees/charges every 12-18 
taxes and implement the 
months for inflation. 
reformed stamp tax. 
Request IMF mission on 
Agree on programme of reform 
on budgeting, expenditure Continue implementing agreed Continue implementing agreed budgeting, expenditure control, Increase resources for operation 
control, and financial reforms on budgetary, reforms on budgetary, b. Expenditure Policy and financial management. and maintenance across sectors 
management. Begin expenditure control, and fiscal expenditure control, and fiscal Mission to study systems and within overall budget targets. implementation in areas not management. management. procedures. 
related to budget cycle. 
Ensure that public sector 
investment under the Five-Year Prioritise public investment 
Plan is consistent with the toward basic education, 
recommendations of the Bank preventive health care, research, 
c. Public Sector Investment and with the macroeconomic infrastructure complementary to Assess implementation of the Assess implementation of the Assess implementation of the framework. Size and sectoral private investment, poverty agreed programme. agreed programme. agreed programme. 
allocation of 1993/94 and alleviation, and prevention of 
1994/95 investment broadly in environmental degradation. 
line with IBRD IBRD to monitor. 
recommendations. 
Agree on terms of reference and Broaden the scope and continue 
d. Civil Service Reform' Freeze non-technical personnel funding for a study financed Civil service reform study Agree on plan for reform, and implementation of civil service hiring by Government. through Institutional completed. begin implementation. 
reforms. Development Fund grant. 
Subsidy reform programme 
initiated limiting commodity 
coverage to popu Jar bread. Complete IBRD labour I Initiate reform of existing cash 
restructuring study; agree on a 
transfers and small loan plan of action for Continue implementation of 
I programmes. Agree on terms of implementation. Agree on a Implement the new targeted labour restructuring and targeted D. Social Safety Net reference for IBRD study for programme to target subsidised programme. electricity and commodity Continue implementation. 
targeting consumer and 
electricity and commodities, to subsidies. 
electricity subsidies and labour be financed within the 
restructuring associated with 
established fiscal targets. 
reform programme, and begin 
study. Appoint counterpart 
team. w 
...... 
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BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OBJECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 INTERVENTION DECEMBER 1993 DECEMBER 1994 
Agreed to i) intensify efforts to 
improve statistical base, Begin regular publishing: including industrial production 
already available industrial 
E. Data Enhancements' index, labour market data, and production index, Continue implementing agreed Continue implementing agreed Continue implementing agreed price indicators; ii) improve 
employment/unemployment programme. programme. programme. balance of payments statistics indicators, and wage statistics. 
with technical assistance from 
the Fund. 
Government to request technical Complete IBRD technical 
I assistance for national income assistance mission; begin Begin regular publishing of 
accounts funded by an IDF implementing recommendations. national income accounts. grant. 
Announce publicly trade Authorities to review policy, 
liberalisation/tariff reduction The maximum tariff rate is with objective of reducing 
programmes, to include, inter reduced from 80 per cent to 70 The maximum tariff rate reduced maximum tariff to below 50 per 
alia, tariff reduction, no per cent. All other tariff from 70 per cent to 60 per cent. cent by end-December I 996. 
introduction of new nontariff brackets between 70 per cent All other tariff brackets between 
II) Real Sector R!:fQrms barriers, and no tariff rate and 30 per cent reduced by I 0 60 per cent and 30 per cent TariffrefQrrn tQ ll!; imJllemented increases except when necessary percentage points; e.g., 70 per reduced by I 0 percentage points, by Dec!:ml!er I 225: A. Trade Policy to remedy distortions in tariff cent reduced to 60 per cent, 60 e.g., tariff rates of 60 per cent The maximum tariff rates 
a. Imports 
structure and without prejudice per cent reduced to 50 per cent, reduced to 50 per cent, 50 per reduced from 60 per cent to 50 
to Egypt's rights and obligations 50 per cent to 40 per cent. and cent to 40 per cent, and 40 per per cent. All other tariff 
under the GATT. Previously 40 per cent to 30 per cent. Rates cent to 30 per cent. Rates of 30 brackets between 50 and 30 per 
banned imported items will be at 30 per cent and below not per cent and below not affected. cent reduced by I 0 percentage 
allocated tariff rates within the affected. points. Rates at or below 30 per 
agreed tariff structure. cent not affected. 
No tariff rates on imports to be No tariff rates on imports to be No tariff rates on imports to be No tariff rates on imports to be No tariff rates on imports to be 
increased, except when increased, except when increased, except when increased, except when increased, except when 
necessary to remedy distortions necessary to remedy distortions necessary to remedy distortions necessary to remedy distortions necessary to remedy distortions 
in tariff structure and without in tariff structure and without in tariff structure and without in tariff structure and without in tariff structure and without 
prejudice to Egypt's rights and prejudice to Egypt's rights and prejudice to Egypt's rights and prejudice to Egypt's rights and prejudice to Egypt's rights and 
obligations under the GATT. obligations under the GATT. obligations under the GATT. obligations under the GATT. obligations under the GATT. 
Previously banned imported Previously banned imported Previously banned imported Previously banned imported Previously banned imported 
items will be allocated tariff items will be allocated tariff items will be allocated tariff items will be allocated tariff items will be allocated tariff 
rates within the agreed tariff rates within the agreed tariff rates with in the agreed tariff rates within the agreed tariff rates within the agreed tariff \.>.) 
-structure. structure. structure. structure. structure. (Jl 
--
BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OBJECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 INTERVENTION DECEMBER 1993 DECEMBER 1994 
-Agree on list of capital goods 
with IBRD during evaluation 
miSSIOn. 
-Reduce tariffs on subset of Implement programme reducing B:x: end-December 1995: 
capital goods to 5 or I 0 per cent. 
tariffs on remaining capital Complete programme reducing 
-Agree on a programme goods. tariffs on remaining capital progressively reducing tariffs on goods. 
the remaining capital goods to 5 
or I 0 per cent, with very few 
exceptions. 
Eliminate exceptions to 
maximum tariff for cigarettes 
Agree on programme to and automobiles, of more than 1600cc and replace with 
eliminate exceptions to domestic excise tax. Implement agreed plan. Implement agreed plan. 
maximum tariff, except for Agree on action plan to reduce 
alcohol. tariffs on automobiles of 1300-
1600cc to maximum tariff 
during first review mission. 
Eliminate tariff preferences, 
except those governed by Eliminate tariff preferences for Eliminate tariff preferences for international treaties, and except tourism, except for alcoholic 
temporarily on health and beverages. health. 
tourism. 
Eliminate all import bans except Bans on poultry to be removed. ' Bans on textiles and garments to 
on textiles, garments and their be reviewed in the context of the by-products and poultry to 4.7 
multilateral fibre agreement and per cent of production 
coverage? after multilateral trade 
negotiations with the GATT. 
Eliminate all import prior 
approvals. 
Agree on a plan of action for 
improving safeguards, anti-
dumping, countervailing duties, Implement agreed upon plans of 
and agree on a programme to 
action for safeguards, anti-harmonise the enhancement of 
quality control standards and dumping, countervailing duties 
and standard quality control fees, applying equally to both 
mechanisms. imported and domestically-
produced goods during 
\,;.) 
-0\ 
evaluation missions. 
BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OBJECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 I!NTERVENTION DECEMBER 1993 DECEMBER 1994 
Agree on draft changes in laws Present draft law allowing 
allowing foreign trading foreign trading companies to 
companies to operate on equal operate on equal footing with 
footing with domestic domestic companies to 
companies. Parliament; seek approval. 
-Abolish checks by the General 
Authority for Investment (GAFI) 
and the General Organisation for 
Industrialisation (GOFI) on 
equipment imports. 
-Liberalise imports restricted by -Present draft law eliminating all 
Ministry of Military Production. remaining restrictions on private 
-Abolish the jurisdiction of the sector cotton imports and 
Industrial Monitoring Authority exports with imports subject to Review customs procedures and 
over imports. sanitary certification by the 
-Eliminate foreign exchange Egyptian government. streamline as appropriate. 
budgeting and end 
discrimination against private -Introduce Harmonised System 
sector (e.g. wheat, cotton), and of Classification. 
remove barriers to importers' 
unrestricted participation in 
Government procurement on an 
equal footing with domestic 
producers. 
Non new non-tariff barriers Non new non-tariffbarriers to be Non new non-tariff barriers to be Non new non-tariff barriers to be Non new non-tariff barriers to be 
(NTBs) to be introduced, or introduced, or expansion of introduced, or expansion of introduced, or expansion of introduced, or expansion of 
expansion of existing NTBs existing NTBs without prejudice existing NTBs without prejudice existing NTBs without prejudice existing NTBs without prejudice 
without prejudice to Egypt's to Egypt's rights under the to Egypt's rights under the to Egypt's rights under the to Egypt's rights under the 
rights under the GATT. GATT. GATT. GATT. GATT. 
Present draft law removing 
b. Exports Eliminate quota on tanned hides. barriers to foreigners in trading Eliminate ban on raw hide Eliminate ban on scrap metal 
companies to Parliament and exports exports. 
seek approval. 
B. Price Liberalisation: Eliminate price controls on the 
a. Industry remaining products under Group v-' <..;.) 
>-
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BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OB.DECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 TAKEN BY END-INTERVENTION DECEMBER 1993 
Petroleum products and gas: 
retain SAL I schedule and Review gas pricing policy based 
b. Energy formula as a floor. Increases of on recommendations of ongoing 
I 0 piasters in prices of kerosene, study. 
diesel oil, and gas-oil. 
Electricity: retain SAL I 
schedule as a floor. 
Eliminate all remaining budget Complete deregulation cotton 
c. Agriculture input subsidies for fertilisers, pricing, production, marketing, 
and pesticides. Confirm 
maintaining crop rotation limits. 
elimination of food subsidies. 
Initiate study on deregulation of 
sugar sector. 
-Present draft law to Parliament 
decontrolling rents on new and 
vacant units and buildings. 
C. Buildings -Initiate study of rent control 
laws, regulations, and all 
housing subsidies, including 
interest subsidies. 
C. Regulatory reform: Market Abolish the domestic content Abolish 'energy initiative 
Entry, Operation and Exit. requirements. industries' from the negative investment list. 
Prepare draft of 'Unified Law' 
(which will eliminate any 
remaining discrimination 
between private and public 
sector companies) for all 
companies including 
bankruptcy, anti-trust, merger, 
and arbitration provisions. 
Require only registration for 
location changes. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 
Petroleum products and gas: 
retain SAL I schedule and 
formula as a floor. 
Electricity: retain SAL I 
schedule as a floor. 
Complete sugar study, agree on 
action plan, and begin 
implementation of agreed 
measures. 
After Parliamentary approval, 
implement law decontrolling 
rents on new and vacant units 
and buildings. 
-Complete a study on rent 
control laws, regulations, and 
housing subsidies; set a 
timetable for implementation. 
Present 'Unified Law' to 
Parliament. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-
DECEMBER 1994 
Allow operation of cotton 
exchanges (by September 1994). 
Present Ia w decontrolling rents 
for buildings including housing 
to Parliament. After 
Parliamentary approval, begin 
decontrol. 
Implement 'Unified Law' after 
Parliament approval. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 
-Petroleum products and gas: 
retain SAL I schedule and 
formula as a floor. 
-Develop a programme to 
incorporate current world market 
prices, distribution margins, and 
taxation (as needed for fiscal 
reasons) by June 1996. 
Complete deregulation of sugar 
sector. 
Continue to deregulate buildings 
including housing under agreed 
timetable as stated in law. 
Review implementation. 
w 
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BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OBJECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 TAKEN BY END-IINTERVENTION DECEMBER 1993 
Abolish Governorate decrees 
establishing investment approval 
procedures, prior establishment, 
and GOFI licensing activities. 
Joint IBRD/Government study 
I on establishment of an 
independent utilities regulatory 
framework to be initiated. 
Agreement on policies and 
procedures that would apply to 
the allocation of funds from the 
budget for public enterprises 
(PEs) that are candidates for 
privatisation or restructuring. 
Privatisation outlays would be 
D. Non-Financial Public Government and holding limited to amounts required for 
Enterprise Reform companies to agree on profit and solving financial and labour 
rate of return on equity targets problems. Restructuring outlays 
a. Public enterprise reform for I 99 3/94. would be only for equity capital 
injection in PEs that are 
economically and financially 
viable and for amounts that 
cannot be raised in capital 
market. Total outlays will be 
within agreed fiscal targets. 
Adopt agreed divided policy. 
Monitor progress on agreed 
1993/94 restructuring/exit 
programmes according to 
criteria to be agreed during 
evaluation mission. 
Agree on 1994/95 
restructuring/exit programmes, 
including targets for action 
based on the latest available 
financial statement. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 TAKEN BY END-DECEMBER 1994 
Replace current complicated 
procedure for company 
establishment with simple 
registration. 
Complete IBRD/ Government 
study on establishment of an 
independent utilities regulatory Establish independent utilities 
framework; and begin regulatory commission. 
implementation. 
Government and holding 
companies to agree on profit and 
rate of return on equity targets 
for 1994/95. 
Monitor implementation of Monitor implementation of 
restructuring/exit programmes restructuring/exit programmes 
according to agreed criteria. according to agreed criteria. 
Agree on 1995/96 
restructuring/exit programme, 
based on latest available 
financial statement. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 
Government and holding 
companies to agree on profit and 
rate of return on equity targets 
for 1995/96. 
Monitor implementation of 
restructuring/exit programmes 
according to agreed criteria. 
---
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BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OBJECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 
rNTERVENTION DECEMBER 1993 
Target: complete sales of the 22 
assets/ companies brought to the 
point of sale through March Targets: bring to point of sale 1993, or of similar assets for an 
equivalent amount. Targets: remaining 75 per cent (LE 6.8 billion) and complete sale of bring to the point of sale 25 per 
additional30 per cent (LE 2.7 Issue mandates or letters of cent (LE 2.3 billion) and billion) of assets/companies of 
b. Privatisation4 invitation to hire consultants and complete sales of I 0 per cent I 993/94 Privatisation financial 'agents' to enhance (LE 0.9 billion) of the book Programme. Progress in implementation capacity. value of the companies included 
meeting the targets must be in the 1993/94 Privatisation 
Programme. Progress in satisfactory to the IBRD, 
according to agreed evaluation 
meeting the targets must be 
criteria5 
satisfactory to the IBRD, 
according to agreed evaluation 
criteria5 
Agree on the 1994/95 
Privatisation Programme which 
should include an additional 15 
per cent (LE 10.95 billion) of the 
book value of all public 
enterprises. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-
DECEMBER 1994 
Target: complete sale of 
additional 30 per cent (LE 2.7 
billion) of the 1993/94 
Privatisation Programme. 
Progress in meeting the target 
must be satisfactory to the 
IBRD, according to agreed 
evaluation criteria5 
Targets: bring to the point of 
sale 50 per cent (LE 5.5 billion) 
of the book value of the 
assets/companies and complete 
sale of20 per cent (LE 2.2 
billion) included in the 1994/95 
Privatisation Programme. 
Progress in meeting the targets 
must be satisfactory to the 
IBRD, according to agreed 
evaluation criteria5 
Agree on 1995/96 Privatisation 
Programme, containing at least 
an additional 20 per cent (LE 
14.6 billion) of the total book 
value of public enterprises. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 
Target: complete sale of the 
remaining 30 per cent (LE 2.7 
billion) of the 1993/94 
Privatisation Programme. 
Progress in meeting the target 
must be satisfactory to the 
IBRD, according to agreed 
evaluation criteria5 
Targets: bring to the point of 
sale the remaining 50 per cent 
(LE 5.5 billion) and complete 
sale of additional 40 per cent 
(LE 4.4 billion) of the 1994/95 
Privatisation Programme. 
Progress in meeting the targets 
must be satisfactory to the 
IBRD, according to agreed 
evaluation criteria.' 
Targets: bring to the point of 
sale 50 per cent (LE 7.3 billion) 
and complete sale of 20 per cent 
(LE 2.9 billion) of the book 
value of companies/assets of the 
1995/96 Privatisation 
Programme. Progress in 
meeting the targets must be 
satisfactory to the IBRD, 
according to agreed evaluation 
criteria.' 
w 
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BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OB.!JECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-
INTERVENTION TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 DECEMBER 1993 
Agree on a plan of action to sell 
Government shares in joint-
III) Financial Sector Reforms venture banks during evaluation 
A. Banking Sector Reform mission. Begin implementation 
agreed plan of action to sell 
shares in joint-venture banks. 
Reduce foreign currency reserve 
requirement from 15 per cent to 
10 per cent. 
Introduce repurchase agreements 
as a means to control short-term 
liquidity. 
-Remove direct controls on bank Introduce a programme to leading to public sector 
reduce the overall exposure to a 
companies. 
single customer to 30 per cent of 
-Publish agreed branching 
the bank's capital as defined by 
criteria ensuring equal market 
the Basle Committee. Agree 
access to solvent private and 
schedules for compliance. public banks. 
-Remove remaining ceiling on 
interest rate for demand Libera lise banks' fees and deposits. 
-Permit all bank customers to charges by setting minimum at 
freely choose bank without zero and maximum at an 
permission of current bank or unconstraining level. 
setting all balances. 
----
-
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY END-TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 DECEMBER 1994 
Targets: bring to point of sale 40 Targets: bring to point of sale 30 
per cent and complete sale of 20 per cent and complete sale of an 
per cent of Government shares additional 40 per cent of 
in joint-venture banks. Progress Government shares in joint-
in meeting the targets must be venture banks. Progress in 
satisfactory to the IBRD, meeting the targets must be 
according to agreed evaluation satisfactory to the IBRD, 
criteria.5 according to agreed evaluation 
criteria5 
Agree on selection of one major 
public sector bank for 
privatisation. 
Review with Fund the feasibility 
of reducing or remunerating the Monitor programme for 
reserve requirement taking into 
reduction of reserve 
account the burden of sterilising 
requirement. 
new balance of payments 
inflows. 
Monitor agreed programme for 
reduction of the overall bank 
exposure to a single customer. 
Present to parliament law 
removing maximum and 
minimum limits on fees and 
charges. 
--
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 
Targets: bring to point of sale 
remaining 30 per cent and 
complete sale of remaining 40 
per cent of Government shares 
in joint-venture banks. Progress 
in meeting the targets must be 
satisfactory to the IBRD, 
according to agreed evaluation 
criteria5 
Target: Bring to the point of sale 
one major public sector bank, 
and complete sale by December 
1995. Progress in meeting the 
target must be satisfactory to the 
IBRD, according to agreed 
evaluation criteria.5 
Monitor reduction of reserve 
requirement. 
Bx end-December 1996: 
All banks to comply with 30 per 
cent exposure limit. 
~ 
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BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OBJECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 TAKEN BY END-UNTERVENTION DECEMBER 1993 
Publish by end-September 1993 
and implement by January 1994 
foreign currency exposure limit 
of I 0 per cent of capital as 
defined by the Basle Committee 
for single currency and 20 per 
cent for total gross exposure by 
end-September 1993. 
Financial data on four large 
public sector banks and Agree on programme to 
certification to be received by 
establish credit risk bureau. IBRD before the evaluation 
miSSIOn. 
-Agree on a programme for 
-Ensure all similar existing and improving the legal environment 
future stock exchanges are aimed at ensuring competition 
subject to uniform securities (i.e. access to security trading 
B. Securities Market Reform: regulatory requirements. and liberalising broker 
commissions), fair trading, and 
IBRD to review the capital transparency in security 
market law and executive transactions. 
regulations. -Adopt procedures and format to 
implement legal requirements. 
Agree on an action plan to 
Eliminate interest rate ceilings strengthen the Capital Market 
on corporate bonds. Authority (CMA) and the stock 
exchanges. 
Submit to Parliament a new 
C. Insurance Sector Reform: Insurance Law based on international prudential 
standards. 
Begin to strengthen the Egyptian 
Insurance Supervisory 
Authority's (EISA) solvency 
monitoring capacity. 
Agree to amend the insurance 
law to allow foreign entry, and 
send proposal for amending the 
Jaw and for decontrolling the 
premiums to the Council of 
Ministers for decision. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 
Encourage private sector 
creation of a central securities 
depository. 
Establish an investor protection 
fund. 
Begin implementation of 
programme to improve the legal 
environment. 
Implement institutional reforms 
in CMA and stock exchanges. 
Study and encourage computer 
assisted securities trading. 
Seek Parliamentary approval for 
new insurance law. Upon 
Parliamentary approval, issue 
executive regulations. 
Draft amendment to the law and 
send it to IBRD for review. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-
DECEMBER 1994 
-Complete implementation of 
programme to improve the legal 
environment. 
-Enhance capacity to enforce 
securities regulation. 
-Establish company information 
disclosure system. 
-Enhance stock exchange self-
regulation. 
Complete strengthening of 
EISA. 
Submit to Parliament law to 
deregulate insurance premiums, 
and allow foreign policy. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 
' 
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BROAD POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE POLICY ACTIONS TO BE OBJECTIVES/AREA OF TAKEN BY END-JULY 1993 TAKEN BY END- TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1994 TAKEN BY END-JrNTERVENTION DECEMBER 1993 DECEMBER 1994 
Targets: complete sale of joint-
venture companies and bring to 
Agree on a plan of action to the point of sale one public 
privatise public companies and company. Progress in meeting 
all joint-venture companies. the targets must be satisfactory 
to the IBRD, according to agreed 
evaluation criteria. 5 
Review regulations of the 
private complementary pension Implement agreed programmes 
D. Social Insurance and system to improve investment for reforming social insurance Continue implementation of Pension Reform rules and to strengthen solvency 
and private pension systems. agreed programmes. 
monitoring along international 
prudential standards. 
Agree with IBRD on a reform of 
the social insurance pension 
system, that would continue to Begin implementation of agreed be based on fully funded programme. principles and would include a 
detailed programme of 
implementation. 
Scarce: Taken from Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Memorandum on Economic Policy of the Egyptian Government,' 18 Aug. 1993, in IMF, op. cit., 20 Aug. 1993, pp. 22-32. 
Notes: 
'These elements of the programme will be supported by IBRD operations outside of the proposed Structural Adjustment Monitoring Programme. 
2 Exceptions are items in areas of national security, environment, health, and national patrimony. 
3 Goods produced under monopoly conditions or benefiting from subsidised inputs. 
4 Values are based on estimated book values at historical cost, as of June 30, 1991. 
POLICY ACTIONS TO BE 
TAKEN BY END-JUNE 1995 
Targets: complete sale of one 
public company by December 
1995, and bring to the point of 
sale a second public company by 
July 1995. Progress in meeting 
the targets must be satisfactory 
to the IBRD, according to agreed 
evaluation criteria.' 
Continue implementation of 
agreed programmes. 
Continue implementation of 
agreed programmes. 
5 All references to the progress in the privatisation programme will be related solely to measures taken by the Government and other public sector entities as agreed to with the !BRO. It is understood that the 
Government does not guarantee actual sales of any public asset; yet it guarantees that it will implement measures as agreed with the Bank aimed at the conclusion of sales. Progress in meeting the targets in 
the privatisation programme will be measured according to evaluation criteria to be agreed between the Government and the Bank during the review of the Bank monitored programme. 
(j.) 
N 
(j.) 
In addition to the conditions in the above table, there are also provisions regarding 
payment and trade restrictions, multiple currency practices, bilateral payments 
agreements, and import restrictions: 
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i) there would be neither introduction of new restrictions on payments and 
transfers for current international transactions nor intensification of the 
existing ones; 
ii) there would be neither introduction nor modification of multiple currency 
practices; 
iii) there would be no conclusion of bilateral payments agreements that were 
inconsistent with Article VIII of the IMF' s Articles of Agreement; and 
iv) there would be neither introduction of new import restrictions for balance 
of payments reasons nor intensification of the existing ones. 
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Appendix H 
JIMF Conditionality under the October 1996 SBA 10 
Macroeconomic targets included: 
i) curtailing the overall budget deficit to 1.1 per cent of GDP (which 
excluded privatisation revenue and any further debt relief) in 1996/97 from 
1.3 per cent in 1995/96; 
ii) reducing liquidity growth to 9 per cent in end-June 1997; 
iii) stabilising inflation at 6.2 per cent on average annual basis in 1996/97; 
iv) introducing an asymmetric intervention policy to safeguard 
competitiveness; and 
v) specified limits on domestic credits, external debt and arrears, and net 
international reserves. 
On the other hand, the policy measures and targets in relation to structural reforms 
included: 
1) Pri vatisation: 
i) divesting a majority interest in 12 public sector companies (prior action); 
ii) offering for sale a majority interest in a further 8 companies by end-August 
1996 (prior action); 
iii) divesting up to about 40 per cent of a further 5 companies (prior action); 
iv) liquidating one public holding company by end-September 1996, reducing 
the total number of holding companies to 16 (prior action); 
v) announcing the details of 1997/98 privatisation programme (prior action); 
vi) identifying two public sector banks, one of which will be selected for 
privatisation during 1997; elaborate a quarterly timetable to achieve this 
objective (prior action); 
10 The following conditions are drawn from Arab Republic of Egypt, 'Memorandum on Economic Policy 
of the Egyptian Government' and 'Technical Memorandum of Understanding,' 12 Sept. 1996, in 
International Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and Not For Public Use, To 
Members of the Executive Board, From The Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Staff Report for 
the 1996 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/96/149, confidential, 17 
Sept. 1996, pp. 56-94. 
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vii) divestiture of the public commercial banks' majority holdings in four joint 
venture banks, and reducing the public bank's minority holdings in the 
other joint venture banks (prior action); 
viii) divestiture of public enterprises to yield 5-6 per cent of GDP m both 
1996/97 and 1997/98; 
ix) divestiture of bulk of public holdings in joint-venture banks by December 
1997; 
x) privatising one of the four public commercial banks during 1997; 
xi) divesting one of the two public insurance companies during 1997; and 
xii) privatising remaining two joint-venture insurance companies by June 
1997. 
2) Trade liberalisation: 
i) reducing tariff rates in a three-step programmes: 
a) reducing tariff rates above 30 per cent by 10-15 per cent, 
including a cut in the maximum tariff rate (except for alcoholic 
beverages, automobiles, and tobacco) to 55 per cent from 70 per 
cent by end-September 1996 (prior action); 
b) cutting the maximum tariff rate to 50 per cent, and rates above 30 
per cent by 5 per cent by July 1997; 
c) reducing the maximum tariff rate to 40 per cent and rates above 
30 per cent to 30 per cent, and limiting the number of tariff bands 
to 7 by July 1998; 
ii) reducing the maximum tariff on automobiles from 160 per cent to 135 per 
cent by end-September 1996 and increase excise taxes accordingly (prior 
action); 
iii) reducing the import surcharge rate in three phases: to 4 per cent from 5 per 
cent by end-September 1996 (prior action), to 3 per cent (from 4 per cent) 
by July 1997, and to a uniform 1 per cent (from 3 and 2 per cent) by July 
1998; 
iv) abolishing restrictions on cotton imports and exports (prior action); 
v) eliminating the export ban on scrap metal by September 1996 (prior 
action); 
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vi) replacing local quality control standards on about 100 spinning and 
weaving products by standards of the country of origin or internationally 
recognised standards (prior action); 
vii) eliminating all remaining non-tariff barriers on exports and imports by July 
1998; 
viii) abolishing restrictive features of import quality control system during 
1997;and 
ix) setting a five-year programme on reducing tariffs on automobiles by 
January 1997. 
3) Structural fiscal reform (revenue and expenditure reforms): 
i) adopting an action plan for extending the general sales tax to the wholesale 
and retail levels in the 1996/97 budget (prior action); 
ii) phasing-in the input credit mechanism to all new capital goods from 
January 1997; 
iii) extending the general sales tax to the wholesales and retail levels on 1 July 
1997; 
iv) implementing administrative reforms to enhance tax collections; 
v) reforming the income tax system, starting with the 1997/98 budget; 
vi) cutting civil service employment by 2 per cent per year, commencing 
1996/97; and 
vii) reducing the ratio of civil service wages to GDP in 1996/97 and maintain it 
constant thereafter. 
4) Energy prices: 
i) adopting a plan to eliminate the implicit subsidy on petroleum products, 
natural gas, and electricity over the two years from July 1997 (prior 
action); 
ii) rmsmg pnces of petroleum products and natural gas by reducing and 
eventually eliminating implicit energy subsidy in three steps: the first one-
third reduction by July 1997; a further one-third reduction by July 1998; 
and the final reduction by July 1999; 
iii) increasing the weighted average price of electticity to its long-run 
marginal cost on the same schedule as above; and 
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iv) introducing an automatic energy price adjustment mechanism. 
5) Financial sector reform: 
i) eliminating a 49 per cent limit on foreign ownership of joint venture banks 
(prior action); 
ii) adopting action plans for improving prudential regulation of the banking 
system, implementation of monetary policy, and functioning of foreign 
exchange market (prior action); 
iii) implementing a schedule for reducing the overall exposure to a single 
customer to 30 per cent of the commercial banks' capital (prior action); 
iv) implementing action plans for improving prudential regulation of the 
banking system, implementation of monetary policy, and functioning of 
foreign exchange market; 
v) reducing the overall exposure to a single customer to 30 per cent of the 
commercial banks' capital; and 
vi) lengthening the maturity structure of public debt. 
6) Deregulation and statistical data: 
i) agreeing with the IMF on the details of a draft unified investment law 
(prior action); 
ii) adopting a plan for improving national income accounts based on IMF 
technical assistance (prior action); 
iii) pursuing the passage of the draft unified investment law by 1 January 
1997; and 
iv) implementing action plans for improving national income accounts. 
7) There are also provisions regarding payment and trade restrictions, multiple 
currency practices, bilateral payments agreements, and import restrictions: 
i) there would be neither introduction of new restrictions on payments and 
transfers for current international transactions nor intensification of the 
existing ones; 
ii) there would be neither introduction nor modification of multiple currency 
practices; 
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iii) there would be no conclusion of bilateral payments agreements that were 
inconsistent with Article VITI of the IMF' s Articles of Agreement; and 
iv) there would be neither introduction of new import restrictions for balance 
of payments reasons nor intensification of the existing ones. 
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Appendix I 
John Gunter~s Unpublished Paper (A Section on :Egypt) 
A sad story from every viewpoint. 
It is time to discuss Egypt. There is a lot to be said. 
Perhaps I should begin by acknowledging my personal 
attachment to Egypt, to Cairo in particular. My feelings 
are an outgrowth of my living in Cairo for the better part 
of two years during the War. This was testing time for me -
my first important assignment when I was pretty much on my 
own. Actually, I did virtually no work on "Egyptian 
problems", which were not of major concern at this time. I 
did not get to know any Egyptian officials very well, but 
did have some discussions with foreign technicians at the 
National Bank of Egypt. 
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I was attached to the American Economic Mission in the 
Middle East, and this mission was established primarily to 
work with the British in controlling shipping and supplies 
for the ME. The most interesting problems that I worked on 
in Cairo were those growing out of the differing interests 
of the US and the UK in the area, particularly looking 
forward to the end of the War. 
I learned much more about other Middle Eastern 
countries on my trips on specific Treasury assignments 
(Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Ethiopia and Iran, in particular). 
But I spend most of my time in cairo, and it was living 
in Cairo that I found so fascinating. Cairo was a much 
smaller city than it is today. There was no feeling of 
"teeming humanity" that one gets in cairo today. There was 
pleasure in wandering around the city. I stayed for a while 
at the old Shepheards near the Opera, and at the Mena House 
near the Giza pyramids. I stayed several months with an 
Italian family who had a large flat in the business area, 
and eventually rented a house in Gezira with a number of 
other American men without families. We took trips to 
Alexandria, Suez, and up the Nile to Luxor and Aswan. 
With this background, I welcomed the opportunity to 
lead Fund missions to Egypt, which I did for more than 20 
years - more than one mission a year frequently. 
The first mission, some details of which I can 
remember, was, of course, largely exploratory. We met for 
the first time Kaissouni who was Minister of Economy and 
would be in that position or Deputy Prime Minister for 
economic affairs for a number of years until at least the 
mid-1960's. He would drop out of the Government for a 
number of years, partly because of poor health, but then 
returned as Deputy Prime Minister. The key to Fund 
negotiations with Egypt was the difference in Kaissouni's 
policy approach from one period to the next, as I will 
explain. 
We also met Galeel El Emory, who was Governor of the 
National Bank of Egypt, a large British commercial bank with 
the principal central banking functions. The central banking 
functions would soon thereafter be transferred to the 
Central Bank. I knew that El Emory had the reputation of 
being a knowledgeable central banker, as well as being 
highly intelligent and a man of absolute integrity. I found 
him to be all of these and also a modest person and a 
careful one. I came to admire him greatly. our discussions 
with him were, however, of limited usefulness because he 
avoided discussing fiscal policy and took a narrow view of 
the role of the National Bank. He did not inform us that he 
would leave his position soon. 
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It is essential to understanding the discuss-ion& w-ita---, 
Egypt to have in mind the changes in tl,e Egyptian situation 
resulting from the overthrow of the Monarchy and the 
establishment of Nasser as President and, in due course, as 
absolute ruler. Prior to Nasser's coming to power, economic 
policy was strongly influenced by the British and the 
financial situation wa·s dominated by the National Bank. The 
economy was, however, experiencing very little growth in the 
absence of significant capital inflow. 
Nasser made great changes in virtually every direction. 
He had ambitions to leadership in the "third" world and 
formed close ties with Yugoslavia and India. At least in his 
early years, he did not seek a stronger role iri the Middle 
East, but rather emphasized Egypt's position in Africa. 
Egypt's neutrality in East-West terms led to the development 
of economic ties with the Soviet Union and other nations 
associated politically with the Soviets, while ties with 
Western Europe and the US weakened. Egypt engaged heavily in 
bilateral trade agreements. Moreover, after negotiations 
with Western countries and the World Bank encountered 
difficulties, the Soviets undertook a major role in the 
construction of the High Dam. 
Domestic economic policy was highlighted by 
nationalization of industry, the banks and the Suez Canal. 
Trade controls were a carry-over from the War period, but 
they became more pervasive, being essential to making 
bilateral agreements effective and to coping with growing 
pressures on the official exchange ra~e. With rising 
inflation, the scope of subsidized consumption was expanded 
well beyond the traditional loaf of bread to include many 
essential consumer items. 
With these policy trends, there was much to discuss in 
the consultations with the Fund. However, there was no sharp 
deterioration in the domestic economic situation during the 
1950's because the pressures in the economy were reflected 
primarily in the payments deficits. In short, Egypt drew on 
its sterling balances accumulated during the war. But, as 
the Fund staff emphasized in the early consultations 
discussions, these balances should be regarded as providing 
time during which policies could be adjusted to restore 
equilibrium in the economy. 
What bothered me most in the early years of our 
discussions with Egypt was that Kaisouni made little effort 
to defend the lack of action to correct the situation. It 
became increasingly clear that Kaisouni and the group around 
him understood the situation quite well, but were unwilling 
or unable to do much about it. I pressed on several 
occasions for discussions at the political level, and this 
understandably was resented by Kaisouni a·s a minister. In 
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any event, I was careful to leave a written statement about 
the dangers in the situation, at the conclusion of each 
consultation mission. (I learned years later when I 
accompanied Mr. Schweitzer to met President Nasser that the 
President had seen my statements regularly). · 
What I came to understand in time was that Kassouni 
believed it was import·ant for him to keep his position in 
the Government because, if he left, he would probably be 
replaced by someone who was incompetent or would have less 
influence than he had with Nasser. He was probably.right. 
Kaisouni's position needs to be contrasted with that of 
several other Egyptian economists who did not accept policy-
related positions. I have already noted that El Emory left 
the National Bank and was not willing to stay on to 
supervise the establishment of the Central Bank. I do not 
doubt that he saw the situation as hopeless for a central 
banker. In my judgment, the most competent of the Egyptian 
economists at this time was Ali Gritley. He made clear that 
he was unwilling to take a Government position. He became 
head of the nationalized Bank of Alexandria, regarding this 
as non-policy oriented. He and I met frequently in Cairo for 
private luncheons, which I found very instructive, even 
though he offered no criticism of Kaisouni, who was a 
friend. Gritley in the 1970's undertook UN assignments, 
including Resident Representative in Jordan. 
Another economist outside of the Government with whom I 
maintained contact was Sherif Lotfy. He was chief economist 
of the National Bank for several years after it no longer 
functionned as central bank. He was approached to become 
Minister of Economy on several occasions, and once in the 
1980's came close to being appointed. He always indicated 
his willingness to become Minister subject to prior 
agreement on the essential elements of a "program", which 
was close to Fund proposals but by no means identical. 
A few words about the problems of statistics: Economic 
data particularly related to banking and balance of 
payments, were incredibly bad. Data published by the 
National Bank did not reflect economic concepts. We pressed 
hard for several years to get the situation improved 
particularly in the case of monetary statistics and made no 
progress. Then, one day we discovered at the Ministry of 
Planning (which lived in sort of a dream world) detailed 
monetary data suitable for publication in IFS. The Planning 
Ministry had asked the Central Bank for these data as we had 
been doing, and the Banking Supervision Department (not the 
Research Department) had required the Banks to report the 
necessary data monthly separately from what they were 
already providing the Research Department~ Thereafter, the 
Centra~ Bank provided these data to us on a .routine basis. 
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However, it was at least two years before the data were 
transmitted officially to the Fund for publication. 
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Incidentally, the Banking Supervision Department had a 
number of very good statisticians and economists, several of 
whom came to work for the Bureau of statistics. 
A story about having discussions with the Egyptians 
sometime in the early 1960's: our meetings were typically 
rather long because the Egyptians had not prepared very 
well, so that at the beginning of each new subject the 
Egyptians had a long discussion in Arabic among themselves 
before picking up the discussion with the mission. I wanted 
to know what they said among themselves. One year I brought 
along Samir Makdisi (Lebanese), and he gave me a summary 
after the meetings. At the end of the visit, Hamid El Sayeh 
presumed on our personal friendship to suggest that I should 
not bring along "that Lebanese fellow" next time. I didn't, 
but I did something which I think in retrospect was a bad 
idea. I brought along an Englishmen who had l]ved for 
several years in Aden and had a working knowledge of Arabic. 
In the 1960's we entered a new phase of negotiations 
because Egypt wanted to draw on the Fund. There was no 
possibility that Egypt would come forward with a major 
reform which would support a large stand-by arrangement. 
Thus, we began discussions about a less demanding program 
which would support a first credit tranche drawing. This was 
a helpful approach because it was necessary to set forth a 
coherent program, even if there were no "triggers". This 
provided a framework for discussion of credit ceilings, 
interest rates, subsidies, bilateralism, exchange rates, 
etc. Over the next several years the first credit tranche 
was rolled over several times, and each-time we made a 
little progress in improving policies. 
On one occasion shortly before an Annual Meeting we 
reached an impasse over a modest step to improve the realism 
of the exchange rate. Kaisouni decided to take the matter to 
the MD (Jacobbsen) while he was in Washington for the Annual 
Meeting. I briefed the MD, telling him it was likely 
Kaisouni would offer tighter credit policy as a substitute, 
and that I doubted Egypt could live with lower credit 
ceilings in practice, given the budgetary situation, unless 
new fiscal measures were undertaken. The MD invited Kaisouni 
to his suite at the Wardman Park, and I was the only other 
person present. Kaisouni did, very skillfully, what I had 
predicted, and the MD bought it (as I also expected). In the 
event, I was right too about the credit ceiling, but Egypt, 
of course, already had its money. 
Soon thereafter, Kaisouni dropped out of the picture 
for a number of years. We dealt with several Ministers of 
Economy, all of whom were bright and seeking to do a good 
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job. One who had no background in economics or finance asked 
me to meet with him privately to explain some of the 
concepts involved. Another was Professor Zaki Shafei of the 
University of Cairo, an able economist and a good friend of 
Shaalan. He understood the issues very well and made a 
substantial effort at reform. However, ultimately the 
"politics" were too much for him to cope with. 
Then, in the mid-1970's we had Kaisouni's second 
coming. This time he was resolved to put in place a genuine 
reform program supported by substantial Fund resources . We 
worked very hard with him and his associates. I remember few 
of the details, but a good program emerged which was "do-
able11 with a reasonable degree of political support. It 
involved significant, but we all agreed, modest reductions 
in consumer subsidies. I think we reached agreement at the 
technical level in November 1976. The mission returned to 
Washington to await developments. 
In December the President made a speech in which he 
;:~~ro~~~~d continuation.of the ~onsumer subsidies, but made no 
~ ment1on~program be1ng subm1tted to the Fund. I am 
uncertain ~hether the "letter of intent" for the stand-by 
arrangement reached the Fund bef£~e or after the speech. We 
were, of course, disma ed that apparentl~political support 
for the program would not be forthcoffi1~ The Fund, 
nevertheless, approved the stand-by on the basis of the 
letter of intent. 
When the details of the program were announced in 
Cairo in January, the riots resulted. No effort had been 
made to gain public support for the program. Few know that 
I arrived in Cairo on a late plane the evening of the day 
the riots occurred. My plane's departure from Athens (I 
think) was delayed because of the riots. I managed to get 
to my hotel in spite of a curfew, in an Egyptair bus, along 
with 20 or so other late arrivals. six months later I no 
longer worked for the IMF. I did, however, arrange a few 
more trips to Cairo and, for a few years, kept close tabs on 
the developments in Egypt. 
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International Monetary Fund, Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for 
Public Use, To Members of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab 
Republic of Egypt- Request for Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/87/93, confidential, 
29 Apr. 1987. 
- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Stand-By 
Arrangement, EBS/87/93 Supplement 1, confidential, 20 May 1987. 
- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Staff 
Report for the 1987 Article IV Consultation, SM/88/98 Supplement 1, 
confidential, 20 May 1988. 
- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Request for 
Stand-By Arrangement- Letter of Intent, EBS/91170, confidential, 22 Apr. 1991. 
-- - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Staff 
Report for the 1991 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By 
Arrangement, EBS/91173, confidential, 26 Apr. 1991. 
- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt-
Staff Report for the 1991 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By 
Arrangement, EBS/91173 Supplement 2, confidential, 16 May 1991. 
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--- , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Stand-By 
Arrangement, EBS/91173 Supplement 4, confidential, 28 May 1991. 
---,Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Review of 
Stand-By Arrangement; Request for Waiver and Modification of Performance 
Criteria Under Stand-By Arrangement; and Approval of Exchange Measures, 
EBS/911213, confidential, 13 Dec. 1991. 
---,Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Second 
Review of Stand-By Arrangement- Letter of Intent, EBS/9317, confidential, 13 
Jan. 1993. 
- -- , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Second 
Review of Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/9317 Supplement 1, confidential, 28 Jan. 
1993. 
- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Stand-By 
Arrangement- Request for Extension, EBS/93/31, confidential, 23 Feb. 1993. 
- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Second 
Review of Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/9317 Supplement 2, confidential, 11 Mar. 
1993. 
-- - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Second 
Review of Stand-By Arrangement, EBS/9317 Supplement 3, confidential, 16 Mar. 
1993. 
---,Arab Republic of Egypt- Stand-By Arrangement: Executive Board Decision, 18 
Mar. 1993. 
---,Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt-
Request for Extended Arrangement- Letter of Intent, EBS/93/139, confidential, 
20 Aug. 1993. 
---,Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Staff 
Report for the 1993 Article IV Consultation and Request for Extended 
Arrangement, EBS/93/139 Supplement 1, confidential, 25 Aug. 1993. 
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- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Staff 
Report for the 1993 Article IV Consultation and Request for Extended 
Arrangement, EBS/93/139 Supplement 2, confidential, 10 Sept. 1993. 
- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Extended 
Arrangement, EBS/93/139, confidential, 22 Sept. 1993. 
- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Acting Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt-
Staff Report for the 1996 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By 
Arrangement, EBS/96/ 149, confidential, 17 Sept. 1996. 
- - - , Document of International Monetary Fund and Not for Public Use, To Members 
of the Executive Board, From the Secretary, Arab Republic of Egypt- Staff 
Report for the 1996 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By 
Arrangement, EBS/96/149 Correction 1, confidential, 8 Oct. 1996. 
UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENT 
Gunter, J., unpublished paper, pp. 33-38. 
INTERVIEWS 
Lutfi, Ali (Prime Minister during 1985-1986), personal interview, Cairo, 3 Feb. 2001. 
Sultan, Fouad (Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation during 1985-1993), personal 
interview, Cairo, 11 Mar. 2001. 
Badr, Mohammed Saad (Sub-Governor for the Foreign Relations Department at the 
CBE), personal interview, Cairo, 11 and 13 Mar. 2001. 
The remainder of the thirty-three interviewees have expressed their wish to remain 
anonymous and are thus coded as Interviewees 1-30. A list of their names will be made 
available to the examiners. 
